

# INTERNATIONAL HUNGER CRISIS

Y 4. AG 8/1:103-19

International Hunger Crisis, Serial...

HEARINGS  
BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN  
AGRICULTURE AND HUNGER  
OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

APRIL 29, JUNE 9, 10, AND JULY 20, 1993

Serial No. 103-19



DEC 17 1993

Printed for the use of the Committee on Agriculture

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# INTERNATIONAL HUNGER CRISIS

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THURSDAY, APRIL 29, 1993

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AGRICULTURE AND HUNGER,  
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 1300, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Timothy J. Penny (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives McKinney, Stenholm, and Allard.

Also present: Representative E (Kika) de la Garza, chairman of the committee.

Staff present: Joseph Muldoon, associate counsel; Glenda L. Temple, clerk; Jane Shey, Anita R. Brown, and Lynn Gallagher.

## OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TIMOTHY J. PENNY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA

Mr. PENNY. Today's hearing will come to order.

I would like to welcome all of those who are participating in this morning's hearing. It will be the first in a series of Foreign Agriculture and Hunger Subcommittee hearings to examine the problems of international hunger. This hearing aims to provide an overview of the international hunger situation and some of the USDA and AID programs which seek to remedy it.

As a former member of the Select Committee on Hunger, I am saddened by its demise, but it is important, in my view, that the issues of domestic and international hunger continue to be addressed. I welcome the interest taken in this issue by our full committee chairman, Mr. de la Garza, and the fact that he held a full committee hearing and received testimony from Secretary of Agriculture Espy yesterday at that hearing.

The subcommittee will be working closely with the Committee on Foreign Affairs and with the new task force on hunger, which is soon to be announced by the Speaker of the House. We will also seek to use not only their expertise, but the expertise of those former staffers of the Select Committee on Hunger.

Progress has been made in the fight to end world hunger. In developing countries, there are now fewer chronically undernourished people than there were 20 years ago, but 20 percent of the population of these countries, which make up the bulk of the world's population, are still, unfortunately, undernourished.

Clearly, there is still much work to be done. Today's hearing marks the beginning of this subcommittee's effort to contribute to the process of eliminating world hunger.

I would ask the chairman of our full committee, Mr. de la Garza, if he might have any opening remarks, and then we will move on to our first panel.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. E (KIKI) de la GARZA, A  
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS**

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don't wish to take too much time from your schedule and your program here. I want to commend you and the members of your subcommittee for delving into this very important area. It has been much in the limelight of late. It is good that we now have a designated subcommittee that will handle hunger, domestic and abroad. I know that you are a very capable and dedicated chairman of that subcommittee.

I wish you well and we will be working with you. We need to document our needs. There are some concerns about other areas since the demise of the Select Committee on Hunger.

I don't know what is going to happen with that or what the end result will be, but the fact is that we, under our responsibility in this committee, have been handling this issue. We have countless bills that we have passed. In all these areas you have been a major participant, Mr. Chairman. I don't know what is going to happen, but I don't want it to be said that we haven't fulfilled our responsibilities and that we haven't been there.

If anyone says that there is an insensitivity in the Congress or in the House of Representatives to the hunger issue, that does not apply to this committee. Now we have a subcommittee totally dedicated to that issue. One thing that should be made known is that we can legislate what you bring to us. We can put that into legislation and pass it from this committee. And that cannot be done by select committees. I am not speaking for or against. That is another issue. But we can legislate and we have legislated and we will continue to legislate.

Mr. Chairman, I said I was going to be very brief, but how soon we forget. Some of the world issues have not been resolved, but it hasn't been because we didn't try. I went to Somalia in the 1970's before people knew that there was a Somalia. I went to Mozambique as the chairman of the subcommittee that Mr. Penny now has. I went to Ethiopia. I went to Sudan. I went to Chad. I went to the Central African Republic. I went across Africa. I went to the Pacific Rim countries. I went to Hong Kong. I went to Vietnam in the midst of the Vietnam war to look at the plight of the refugees from the north. I went to the Gaza Strip. I went to the West Bank.

That has been the history of this committee. But yet it is said we haven't done anything.

We will continue. Our lead person in this effort is going to be our distinguished chairman, Mr. Penny, who I know will do an excellent job in this area.

I am sorry that I get carried away, Mr. Chairman, and take more of your time. But it is a little frustrating that the word is out that no one in Congress is doing anything about hunger in America.



I made a study in 1974 that we documented. We have been addressing the issue. The thing is that all of the millions that we have poured into some of those countries still haven't resolved the issue.

When our friend and brother Mickey Leland was lost in Africa—and to leave a widow and three children—but he wasn't bringing food. He was negotiating between rival factions to let the food go through. The food was there. Your organizations were there. The problem was that because of political, ethnic, or tribal, or religious reasons they weren't allowing the food to go through. We lost one of our Members in a mission of mercy. But he wasn't bringing the food. He was negotiating between rival factions.

It was a shame that that would happen, and it is still happening. We now have the former Yugoslavia. We still have the issues in many of those countries that we cannot resolve.

So working with your organizations and with our Government—Chairman Stenholm handles the domestic part and Chairman Penny will handle the foreign and domestic as far as hunger is concerned—we are able to legislate. When the need comes, we will legislate.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PENNY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your long-standing leadership on these issues. There have been a variety of efforts that in recent years focused on hunger. Your leadership in that regard has been tremendously helpful.

In fact, in the 100th Congress there were seven domestic hunger initiatives that were approved by this committee. In the 101st Congress there were four. In the 102d Congress there were four additional domestic hunger initiatives processed by this committee and signed into law.

So we have a longstanding record on these issues. Mr. Stenholm yesterday began hearings on the Mickey Leland Hunger Act, which would be the hallmark legislation for this session of Congress in terms of domestic hunger.

We are trying to expand our involvement in international hunger issues, but you can check the 1985 and 1990 farm acts and see quite creative work being done by this committee in terms of its authority over Food for Progress, Food for Peace, and the other international hunger relief programs. Again, your leadership in all those areas is greatly appreciated.

My longstanding policy is to allow a ranking minority member to make an opening remark—and I have cleared this with my subcommittee members that no other members are allowed opening remarks, but can put them in the record or use their question and answer time for that purpose.

We will move on to Mr. Allard and then move on to our first panel.

Wayne.

#### OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WAYNE ALLARD, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome this opportunity to hear from the witnesses scheduled today concerning the U.S. foreign food assistant programs. The Secretary of Agriculture testified yesterday before the full committee about the significance of these programs. There is no doubt that developing countries of the world look to the United States for help in times of disaster and to assist in feeding hungry people.

Since 1954, when Public Law 480 was initiated, the United States has provided over \$44 billion in food aid. That represents about half of worldwide food contributions to developing countries each year. According to the Agency for International Development, American food aid is equivalent to 13 billion meals per year, or enough to feed 35 million people annually.

Food assistance from the people of the United States circles the globe, whether it is providing help in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, the drought in southern Africa, in Sudan, in the Republics of the former Soviet Union, and in Bosnia.

The purpose of our hearing today is to review the world hunger situation and to hear from representatives of the Department of Agriculture and the Agency for International Development, as well as other witnesses. The primary program in use to address world food needs is the Food for Peace Program, Public Law 480, that I mentioned earlier.

This program was significantly amended in the 1990 farm bill. It is designed to use the abundant agricultural productivity of the United States to accomplish several goals: Combating world hunger and its causes; promotion of world agricultural development; expansion of world trade; development of export markets for United States agricultural commodities; and encouragement of private enterprise and democratic participation in developing countries.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how the Food for Peace Program is working around the world. I welcome any suggestions that they may have on how this subcommittee may make sure that the goals of the 1990 farm bill concerning the Food for Peace Program are reached.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PENNY. Thank you, Mr. Allard.

With that, we will call forward our first panel, Ms. Lois Richards, Acting Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance, Agency for International Development; and Mr. Christopher E. Goldthwait, Acting General Sales Manager, Foreign Agricultural Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.

We will proceed with Ms. Richards first and then with you, Chris.

**STATEMENT OF LOIS RICHARDS, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR FOOD AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

Ms. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I take particular pleasure in this opportunity to address this subcommittee on behalf of the Agency for International Development. In my role as Acting Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance, I deal daily with the reality of international hunger and food security, which we are addressing here today.

Let me add, Mr. Chairman, that the bureau had an especially close and productive working relationship with the Select Committee on Hunger, and we look forward to having the same kind of relationship with your subcommittee on these very important issues.

In the context of developing the foundations for sustainable economic development with tangible benefits to the poor, nothing is sustainable, nothing is durable, and no foreign aid, however well-intentioned or well-designed, will be well-utilized unless the basic necessities of humanity are satisfied. In much of the developing world, social and economic stability exists in sufficient measure to give reasonable hope that institutional, social, and economic development programs, along with progress toward democratization, will prosper.

Yet our attention is drawn daily to the misery and suffering of populations, mainly in Africa, particularly in Somalia and the Sudan, but also in the Yugoslav States, the Middle East, in Latin America, and in Asia. In these areas, food insecurity, malnutrition, natural catastrophes, or civil disturbances caused by tribal and ethnic hatreds or political disruptions, tear at the very fabric of human society. At the same time, under presumably normal conditions, hundreds of millions of people in Africa, Asia, and Latin America live without enough food to meet their daily needs.

The United States has produced a record of response to the cries of people for help and, along with other donors, has effectively saved tens of millions of lives in recent years through emergency food aid programs. In fact, emergency food aid is the largest component of overall U.S. disaster relief in most years. In addition, 52 million people directly benefit from U.S. food aid provided under the more than 116 regular food aid projects underway throughout the world.

Estimates of the number of people in the world who are undernourished vary, but the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations put the figure, in 1991, at over 780 million adults and children, a drop of 150 million since 1970. While this decline is a testament to human efforts to combat global hunger, the number of underfed still represents 20 percent of the world's population.

Furthermore, FAO reports that the numbers of hungry are still increasing in some world regions, especially Africa. This persistent problem has resulted from population growth in countries with poor or uneven development performance, coupled with the spread of natural disasters and civil conflicts.

The global hunger problem does not stem from global food shortages. In fact, if the world's total food supply were distributed evenly, each person would have a more than ample supply of calories, protein, and other nutrients and hunger problems would not exist.

Yet the abundance of food on a global scale has not resulted in a world free of hunger because the available food is not equally accessible or affordable, either to all countries or all households, even in food abundant countries. Thus, even in countries whose food production is sufficient to meet their domestic requirements, food security problems exist. We have this problem at home.

In the developing world, it is not surprising that the problem is both more common and more difficult to resolve, especially in the



face of the increasing complexity and frequency of situations requiring large amounts of disaster relief in the 1990's.

I would mention that the head of the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Assistance recently pointed out to donors in Geneva that last year there were more instances of civil conflict than international conflict. Regional and ethnic fighting has become more frequent, even though the cold war has ended. The massive displacement of populations by these events and the prolonged period needed for achieving resolution require much larger food relief and dollar resources. Yet, as we all know, deficit reduction efforts and the efficient use of funds means that we have to watch our expenditures very carefully.

Let me just point out that, last year, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance reported more disasters declared than at any time since they started recording these numbers in the 1960's.

Less visible but important nutritional problems also emerge for people who are not affected by disaster situations. Sometimes these people are lost sight of because they don't appear on our television screens. But more than 2 billion people normally subsist on diets lacking the essential nutrients required to prevent premature death and disability and to promote better productivity. Most of these people fall into the most vulnerable groups, especially young children, adolescent girls, and women.

I think we are all aware of the terms of the 1990 Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, which specified that it is the policy of the United States to provide its abundant agricultural resources to promote both U.S. foreign policy objectives and to enhance the food security of the developing world. AID has defined food security to mean when all people at all times have both physical and economic access to sufficient food to meet their dietary needs for a productive and healthy life.

This is an expansion on the definition given in the legislation, but it is an expansion that is fully consistent with the legislative definition, and one that facilitates programming of all of AID's resources, not just food aid but also the various dollar assistance appropriations that we administer.

Let me just take a few minutes to talk a little bit about how AID addresses hunger and food security through its Public Law 480 title II and title III programs. I will also make reference to uses of section 416(b) commodities, provided under the Agricultural Act of 1949, which are administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

We utilize food aid, technical assistance directed toward food production, distribution, and marketing, nutritional programs funded from technical assistance, and promotion of sound agricultural policies all together as ways to get at the various food security problems. We collaborate very closely—especially with the World Food Program, the World Bank, and other donors—in efforts to bring about achievements in food security.

We look at ways to improve food security, not just increasing the amount of food available, but also trying to assure that people have access to the food they require as well as the ability to use food in the most appropriate way. By the latter, I mean especially trying to end cultural traditions that may mean the men eat first and the



women and the children eat last so that the most nutritionally beneficial food is gone from the stew. In fact, the Ghanaians have a proverb that deals with what happens when you are eating out of the bottom of the pot.

Title II regular food aid programs include both grants to private voluntary organizations and to the World Food Program to administer and arrange a variety of food security programs. Also, we have the title III Government-to-Government programs.

Title II activities can include infant, child, and school feeding nutrition activities. An example would be CARE, and the Catholic Relief Services, and WFP cooperating to provide U.S.-donated food to 8.3 million Indians under an integrated child development services program in India.

Another example is the food for work programs in which food is paid as wages to the unemployed for work performed. Thereby, we get a double bang for our buck, if you will. We not only have the nutritional impact of the food, but also the consequences of that work. It might include a rural roadbuilding program—for example, the one in Bangladesh, which CARE and WFP undertake, employs 5 million poor seasonal laborers.

Another example is monetization programs in which food is sold to generate cash to compensate workers active in food security programs, like child feeding activities. These funds pay administrative costs that may be encountered in handling food aid, such as the cost of truckdrivers, guards in warehouses and so forth, or fund a wide variety of development activities not necessarily associated directly with the food itself. That includes a rural potable water activity that Catholic Relief Services operates in Indonesia or efforts to rejuvenate agricultural cooperatives by ACDI in Uganda.

Currently, 21 U.S. private voluntary organizations actively manage title II feeding programs overseas.

The title III programs are a little more complex. Sometimes it may be more difficult to see how they influence food security. Food for development activities carried out under title III benefit those nations willing to commit to policy reforms or to take active steps to enhance broad-based economic growth and address food security deficiencies in a measurable way.

These programs may vary widely in their focus, just as developing nations differ quite widely in the food security problems they face. Commodities have been provided, for example, to countries on the condition that inefficient State enterprises be privatized to support the development of private sector marketing and price stability by auctioning commodities or, for example, to stimulate reforms in national foreign exchange regimes.

These macroeconomic reforms enhance food security by improving the efficiency of the way the food sector operates in helping to establish affordable food prices, thus ensuring better access in the marketplace.

On the emergency side, AID provides part of the title II resources to emergency relief funding or programs. We have also been very fortunate in being able to work collaboratively with USDA in gaining access to section 416(b) surplus commodities, which generally have gone to PVO's and the World Food Program for disaster activities. A prime example is the southern Africa

drought emergency relief program where USDA provided about one million tons of food for the relief effort. AID has provided about 700,000 tons to this point.

Increasingly, though, AID has had to make very difficult choices between providing food under title II to regular development programs with PVO's or to emergency situations in places with which we are all very familiar from our television screens and the newspapers.

These disaster and emergency relief programs are perhaps the most difficult of all that we have to undertake. By their very nature, they are not predictable. Relief is needed urgently, often because lives are at stake and speedy, effective delivery of relief supplies must occur, often despite political disruptions, extremely weak infrastructure, and threats to relief workers themselves, as we have seen in Somalia and in the former Yugoslavia.

Congressman de la Garza made reference to Congressman Mickey Leland's tragic death in Ethiopia dealing with the relief program there. I might add that three AID employees died with him, one of whom had been an employee of mine in Somalia and who went to Ethiopia so that she could work in the Ethiopian relief program.

Mr. Chairman, tragically, I see no change in the increasing trend in emergency relief requirements evident in recent years. The recent opening of the Holocaust Museum reminds us—if we ever needed such a reminder—of the potential for humankind's inhumanity to one another.

We also see global attention drawn to those images of feeding the starving in places like Somalia or the Sudan, where an adequate international response was late in coming. Unfortunately, less often, attention is given to cases where we have very real successes in preventing mass starvation, or to the normal instances of chronic malnutrition that affect large numbers of people in the world.

When we are providing emergency relief, obviously we must coordinate very closely with other agencies of the U.S. Government. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, and the Office of Food for Peace in AID work together, and with the AID field missions. We also work with the State Department, Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

I wish to especially single out the collaboration we have had with the USDA, certainly in the last year and one-half that I have been in this bureau, because I think it does point out the tension that I mentioned earlier between development and relief requirements. Section 416(b), which USDA has been especially helpful in making available, can supplement title II in meeting emergency relief and disaster needs. We have very deliberately worked to bring that about.

But, as the committee knows, section 416(b) availabilities are dependent upon USDA's commodity inventories, budget availabilities and international prices. There are efforts to reduce the amounts of surplus commodities which are on hand. This means that we may not have anything like the availabilities of section 416(b) commodities in coming fiscal years that we have had available in the past. Even when they may be available, it may come very late in a fiscal year.

We continue to work with USDA to try to make the most efficient and full use of all the commodity resources available to us. But, I think it is important that in your examination of the world hunger problems and the United States' ability to react to it, that you be aware of this competition of resources between development and emergency priorities.

Over the years, the United States has maintained a strong commitment to combat world hunger both as a moral obligation and in our national self-interest in a peaceful, prosperous world. I believe that is a direct quote taken from Mr. Espy's testimony recently.

This task is an expression of the very heart and soul of the American people. We believe that along with generosity of spirit, an American public increasingly aware of international events and their impact on the U.S. economy, has the wisdom to see that, ultimately, development and democracy are the more lasting gifts we have for the suffering people of the world.

The 1990's present the U.S. Government—including AID, the Department of Agriculture and other agencies—an unprecedented competition between emergency and regular program needs. These are not the 1980's when food surpluses and food aid funding were readily available to meet the famine that then engulfed the African Sahel.

I have tried to show today, Mr. Chairman, how AID has persisted in efforts to carry out programs to combat world hunger and eradicate food insecurity. We look forward to continuing those efforts, again working closely with you and the other members of your subcommittee.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Richards appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. PENNY. Thank you, Ms. Richards.

Chris, proceed please.

**STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER E. GOLDTHWAIT, ACTING GENERAL SALES MANAGER, FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE**

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I also want to join in commending the full committee and this subcommittee for holding this series of hearings on hunger issues. Several months ago, I had the opportunity to address the Select Committee on Hunger, and I am very pleased to see that this subcommittee is continuing the work of that body.

Secretary Espy, in his appearance yesterday before the full committee, underscored our Department's determination to make progress on a variety of hunger issues. He described in detail the legislative initiative that we have put forward to address many of the shortcomings we currently perceive in the domestic food and nutrition programs.

But at the same time, he reiterated that our concern is not confined just to domestic hunger, but that it carries over to the serious problems that we continue to perceive around the world. I am very pleased to have the opportunity this morning to discuss these in more detail with you as well as our efforts to address these international concerns.



I will confine my remarks only to a few observations that I think are key factors in the situation as we look around. My full statement describes in more detail our various programs and activities as well as our views of the most serious concerns and the most serious problems in different parts of the world.

I would note first of all that in recent years food aid needs around the world have increased. This is due to a number of factors. We have heard already some discussion of the very serious drought situation that occurred in Africa for a number of years. But more recently, we have seen political and economic restructuring in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union create new pressures as countries that formerly relied on their larger components to meet their food needs have now become countries in need of food assistance.

As has been noted in the tragic death of Congressman Leland, it was not an absence of food itself, but the kind of civil strife that arises as we see political change that was preventing people from being fed.

This is an era in which we also have tight budget constraints, but in fiscal year 1992 and fiscal year 1993 in particular we have been able to meet the increasing needs we have perceived by using our various authorities to the fullest extent possible and in new and different ways. It is, however, true that as we look ahead to the new fiscal year the resources that we have under section 416 are likelier to be constrained to fewer commodities. It is uncertain whether there will be grains available at this point. And the increase in program level for the Food for Progress Program is ending with this fiscal year as well.

In the current fiscal year, however, we have done a rather remarkable job of addressing the world need. We will be supplying more than 10 million tons between ourselves and our sister agency AID in food assistance around the world. This is about 2.5 million tons more than last fiscal year and the largest amount of food assistance the United States has provided to the world in many years, perhaps as much as 15 to 20 years.

We will be working through our USDA programs in 60 countries. And that includes nearly all those cited by the chairman of the full committee, Mr. de la Garza, a few minutes ago when he addressed this hearing.

I would note that those numbers do not include the \$700 million special concessional credit program under Food for Progress that the President has announced for Russia. That program is considerably less concessional than our normal food aid programs.

Nonetheless, there are many problems that continue to exist as we look around the world. We see them in Africa; we see them in certain corners of the former Soviet Union; and on the horizon looming ahead we see a very serious situation that has developed in the former Yugoslavia. The problem there, again, is our inability to work in the areas that are most drastically affected.

For our efforts, we have already begun discussions with a couple of private voluntary organizations about using our programs in parts of the former Yugoslavia as soon as the situation stabilizes enough to enable them to operate successfully.

With AID, we have developed a very successful division of labor. It is one that is working very well. AID's programs are targeted chiefly at emergency situations and at the very poorest countries, while our USDA programs are aimed toward countries a little better off, but which nonetheless have considerable and chronic predictable food shortages.

In recent years, however, as Ms. Richards has noted, we have worked very closely together to use our resources—particularly under the section 416 program—to respond to emergencies wherever we can. This is noteworthy in the case of African drought relief where we used considerable resources under the guidance of the World Food Program.

It is also true that with respect to the former Soviet Union we have used our programs to provide the bulk of assistance meeting those needs. And that has been done both on a Government-to-Government and a private voluntary organization basis.

Let me just mention another initiative that we are looking at implementing this summer. As we again look forward to the situation in 1994, we are going to develop and implement an early programming effort for the section 416 program as well as Food for Progress. Because of the unpredictability of resources—especially in the case of section 416, which relies totally on Commodity Credit Corporation inventories—we have not been able to undertake early programming in the past.

But because of the scarcity of resources that we see available in the new fiscal year and because of the needs that we see continuing, we are going to make some assumptions as to what will be available.

We are going to make the assumption that we will use our full programming authority under both programs wherever we can and we are going to go ahead with an early programming effort which I hope will result in our ability to sign agreements immediately after the fiscal year begins and to begin shipments under these programs 2 or 3 months earlier in the new fiscal year.

Let me summarize by simply stating that we share this subcommittee's genuine determination to continue to have an impact on world food hunger. I look forward to a very useful exchange of ideas here this morning and to continuing our work with the subcommittee to use our authorities and resources in the most effective way we can.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Goldthwait appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. PENNY. Thank you, Christopher. I appreciate your testimony.

I want to start with a couple of questions for Ms. Richards and then I will probably come back to you after the other subcommittee members have had a chance to ask some questions.

Both of you mentioned the relative progress that has been made over the last 20 years in reducing the number of malnourished people in the world to where we are now still hovering at around 20 percent of the world's population that is malnourished.

To what degree do we tie AID programs in terms of food relief to population control programs?

Ms. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, when you say food relief, are you referring to emergency relief or to the regular programs?

Mr. PENNY. I am curious about both because it has been my frustration that we treat emergency relief as if it is distinct from our regular programs when in most cases there is a need for a more regularized approach to countries that may have an emergency on their hands.

Ms. RICHARDS. In the case of emergency relief feeding programs, they are not tied to any kind of a population control effort. There is obviously, in the kinds of situations we're facing, the immediate need to save lives. Increasingly, we are faced with disruptions and internal displacement caused by drought as people move in search of food, especially in the Third World and the most underdeveloped parts of it, in places like Somalia and so forth.

The disruption of normal health delivery efforts is such that tying them to population programs would be extremely difficult, if not impossible.

On the development side, it would depend on the kind of food aid program we're carrying out. Obviously in a food-for-work program or a monetization program, it would not be possible to make that linkage. A good amount of the title II feeding programs goes out through maternal/child health programs. Increasingly in the less developed countries—and certainly it has been part of AID's strategy for years—in doing maternal/child health and family planning programs, these are all part of an integrated package.

It is a lot more cost-efficient in the Third World to do all kinds of health services through one system rather than have duplicate systems for population, nutrition, health education and so forth. So in that sense, they do come together.

Sometimes, however, since a lot of our development food aid programs do go through PVO's, there are some PVO's who are much more favorably disposed toward dealing in these kinds of areas than others. For example, the Catholic Relief Services would find it very difficult, I think, to engage in population programs. But there are a number of others that are working very directly with governments or U.N. agencies, or have their own integrated systems where family planning is a part of that.

Mr. PENNY. Could you discuss briefly the main factors that have led to the decline in the malnourished population during the past 20 years? As was stated in your testimony, we have seen world population increase by 40 percent in that same timeframe, and yet those that are categorized as undernourished or malnourished has declined from about 930 million to 780 million. What are the success factors at play here?

Ms. RICHARDS. That has been seen that more in Asia than in Africa. There have been significant increases in food production in parts of the developing world, especially due to the benefits of the green revolution, basically due to the application of research to come up with new and improved seed varieties where the yield is greater.

I think, increasingly in recent years, as governments have recognized that state-controlled economies don't work, and as they have started to reform their economies—particularly in lifting price controls—there has been a very direct impact on the production of



food, because Third World farmers are very sophisticated in their appreciation of what it costs to produce and what kind of income they need to realize from production. If they can't make any money, they just grow something else where they can.

There have been increases in food production as price controls have been removed and farmers have been able to earn more from their crops. Also, to the degree that prices go down because of increased quantities, more people are able to buy food. This is obviously not true for all of the world. Certainly it is a problem in Africa where they are a little further behind.

Obviously, population growth has been an adverse counter-factor, although there are a number of countries in the world that have had some rather startling declines in their population growth rates. We saw some reports in the press in the last week about China's success, but this has also been seen in African countries and some of the other countries in Asia.

I think, besides population growth, we have to recognize that as population grows and the pressure on the land and its productive capacity becomes greater, that without access to fertilizer and the technology to use them, the consequent environmental degradation does affect people's ability to produce.

That is an area that needs some more examination but, certainly, one which we are highly sensitive to.

Mr. PENNY. Thank you for those responses.

Mr. Allard.

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a number of questions to ask within my allotted time. I may submit the remainder for written comments.

Ms. Richards, the United States provides a little over half the world's food aid.

Ms. RICHARDS. That's correct.

Mr. ALLARD. The other programs involved in that are the World Food Programs. My understanding is that they receive about 20 percent of that from the United States.

Ms. RICHARDS. I think it is about one-third.

Mr. ALLARD. So it is closer to 30 percent?

Ms. RICHARDS. Yes.

Mr. ALLARD. The World Food Program provides about 17 percent. The European Community provides 16 percent. The remainder comes from a variety of sources.

Is this the correct mix of donors, or should other countries provide more?

Ms. RICHARDS. I think the European States are an interesting case because you have the European Community, or EC, as a unit, which is the second largest donor after us to the World Food Program. Then the individual members of the EC quite often have their own bilateral programs. In dealing with their numbers, it is hard to figure out exactly who is providing what and how much.

Speaking for myself, we would like to see the Europeans be a little more forthcoming. There is an especially serious concern in terms of assistance to the former Yugoslavia, where they have carried the majority of the load. But right now, they are falling behind in their deliveries and their commitments.

I think the Japanese are now the world's largest foreign assistance donor in terms of volume and percentage. A lot of their assistance goes for commercial procurement by developing countries from Japan. While Japan is not the kind of surplus food producer that the United States is, I think that there are some synergies here to be gained by the Japanese and some of the other donors who may not be surplus food producers but who have sufficient wealth to be major foreign assistance contributors to provide cash that can be utilized in the World Food Program or by recipient beneficiary governments to do local procurements, not just in a country where there may be a shortage. As I mentioned, part of the problem is distribution.

I might point out that we have worked with the Japanese and they have, on several occasions, provided their own funds to buy food from United States sources to deliver to the World Food Program as part of their contribution.

Apart from that, we are now starting to see a few developing countries that are able to produce some surpluses. I do not want in congressional testimony, to appear to be saying anything positive about the Government of the Sudan, which I think has acted along with the Sudanese People's Liberation Army [SPLA] and its various rival factions, in a totally irresponsible and inhuman fashion in terms of the situation in the South, but this year, out of its food surplus, the Government of Sudan has contributed 153,000 tons to the World Food Program to be used in emergency relief in that country. There might be a few more instances where that could occur.

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you.

Mr. Goldthwait, the countries that are eligible for Public Law 480, title I—those developing countries experiencing a shortage of foreign exchange earnings and cannot meet all the food needs through commercial channels. How does the USDA determine which countries are eligible to receive title I and in what amounts?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. The legislation for the Food for Peace Act, as amended in the 1990 farm bill, provides for a distinction between title I and title III programming. The distinction is perhaps easiest to think about in terms of countries that have per capita incomes above or below \$600 per year. The countries above that are targeted principally by title I.

In looking at them, we will look at any country that has a food aid need and consider a program from any country basically that requests a program. I think we have been very successful in the past year or two in using our title I resources effectively. If you look at what we have done, we have shifted the mix of countries very dramatically in favor of those that need additional food aid, and away from countries like Egypt, for example, that because of their increasing access to foreign exchange and improving economic situation no longer need the massive assistance we have provided in the past.

Mr. ALLARD. This is a thought that has crossed my mind.

If we provide food aid to these countries, there is a provision there where it can be converted to cash purposes.

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. Right.



Mr. ALLARD. Suppose we have an arms embargo in a particular country. What assurance do we have that that food doesn't get converted to cash and end up buying weapons?

Ms. RICHARDS. When we have monetization programs, the food that is monetized would be monetized in the recipient country for whatever their local currency is. Most obviously international arms trade is done in foreign currency, including dollars. For many of these countries, their own foreign exchange resources are so short it would be difficult for them to convert it back.

But also, we do have AID mission staff, private voluntary organization staff, and World Food Program staff monitoring these transactions. There are some very stringent requirements set out for the deposit of local currencies generated by such sales and their programming to very specific development kinds of activities.

So I think there is no chance of the use of monetized food local currency generations to do arms procurement—I don't want to say that it is certain because in this world nothing is certain but death and taxes, having just paid mine recently—but I think the chance of that happening is extraordinarily slim.

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. Congressman Allard, in many cases, the programming in these countries is done through private voluntary organizations which actually undertake and oversee the sales and the collection of the local proceeds.

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you both for your comments.

Mr. PENNY. Ms. McKinney.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I guess this is a question for either of you. The question is, Do the people who consume U.S. food assistance know that it comes from the United States?

Ms. RICHARDS. Yes. All of the food that we provide that goes out in bags, 55 gallon drums, or 5-pound tins, in the case of vegetable oil, is marked with a symbol for the United States. I think that in cases where it is delivered in bulk—like to India where much of it is—it has to be put in those same containers.

Just speaking from my own experience, if there is any symbol in the world that is readily recognized by an extraordinarily wide range of people in places where it is inconceivable that they would have access to these containers, they do recognize the clasped hands and the new AID symbol on food aid.

But, sometimes the containers in which we deliver are themselves highly prized. Because of that, their origin becomes known. There is no street water seller in Somalia—and presumably even those who are back in business these days—who isn't largely carrying his water around on a little wagon. The water is contained in a big blue 55-gallon drum that is very prominently marked with the clasped hands and "Product of the United States" on it. Those drums themselves have status. Everybody knows where they come from.

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. I would like to add one anecdote that I think shows not only the recognition that the assistance comes from the United States, but also the profound psychological impact it frequently has.

I recall a letter that we recently received at the Department from a retired Russian pensioner. This was an elderly woman who had

probably received about 1 kilogram of our butter under our donation of section 416 butter to Russia last summer. She had written this letter saying that it was the single most important manifestation she had seen of international concern for the kind of economic hardship she and her family were undergoing as a result of the effort to restructure the economy there.

So I think our food aid is genuinely perceived as coming from the United States as well as being very much appreciated.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Great.

Another question I have is about the food assistance that you give to women and young children and the school feeding program.

Does that operate sort of like our WIC program, or do you have something that operates like our WIC program?

Ms. RICHARDS. The way we do our school feeding and our maternal and child health programs will vary by country and by implementing agent. Most of these programs are carried out by private voluntary organizations like CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Save the Children, World Vision, and the Adventist Development Relief Agency; there are about 21 of them that I mentioned earlier.

They will usually, in the case of a school feeding program, provide one cooked meal a day. Usually it will be something like corn/soya blend or wheat/soya blend given out to the children at school. Sometimes, though, because of the situation at the site, or administrative or operating constraints, they may instead provide food to the child to take home to be cooked there.

In the case of the maternal and child health programs, generally, these are feeding programs that are done at a nutrition education center where they can monitor to make sure that the intended recipient does actually get the food. Quite often those kinds of programs are directed toward very malnourished children in contrast to the condition of the schoolchildren, who may be somewhat malnourished as well.

Of course, if it is a program for the severely malnourished—especially targeted feeding programs in emergency relief activities—the food is cooked and served in measured amounts. Usually it is more than one meal a day and is done under medical supervision where personnel monitor the reaction so that they can see the change in their condition.

It is amazing. You can see what I call stick children—the extremely malnourished skeletal frames that walk—and when you give them 2 weeks of feeding under controlled conditions who will come back relatively quickly. That doesn't mean they are cured because if the food supply is disrupted, they can revert to that original state. They may have already suffered some growth and mental consequences as a result. But, you have to do that kind of feeding under a much more controlled scenario.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you.

Mr. PENNY. Chris, in your testimony, you indicated that the programs primarily under USDA's jurisdiction, title I and section 416(b), were targeted at chronic and predictable circumstances of hunger. You further testified that the allocations for these programs are made on a year-to-year basis.

The two seem to be out of sync. If your primary involvement is with chronic and predictable hunger or nutrition problems, why don't we have a stronger emphasis on multiyear commitments?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. First of all, with respect to the section 416 program, we really do not have the legal determination that commodities are available until the beginning of each fiscal year. So we cannot provide section 416 commodities other than through annual agreements. However, in our discussions with the various recipients, we clearly indicate the prospects for whether or not particular commitments are likely to be repeated over a number of years.

With respect to title I funding, again because title I is a concessional loan program rather than a donation program, we have up until now been unable to undertake multiyear programming because the budget subsidy estimates are calculated for those concessional loans vary and cannot be predicted over a period of years. In fact, the way the appropriation is structured, it cannot be used except in a particular fiscal year.

So there are some problems in the way in which the Credit Reform Act is structured that prevent us from being able to do multiyear funding under title I.

Mr. PENNY. If you could wave a magic wand, would you prefer to have programs that would facilitate multiyear commitments?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. Yes, I think we would indeed. We would not use them in every single case, but I think there are a number of countries where we want to be able to—

Mr. PENNY. Are we going to encounter significant budgetary complications if we attempt to restructure the programs along those lines?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. There are going to be some problems. I don't know that I would say they are significant or insurmountable, but there would be some necessary changes in other legislation aside from just title I legislation. In point of fact, title I legislation may not be what would need changing, but it may be the Credit Reform Act.

Mr. PENNY. Within the Department, have you constructed policy language that would speak to this issue?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. As of now, we have not, no.

Mr. PENNY. Could that be done at my request?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. Certainly.

Mr. PENNY. And any budget implications—I would appreciate being appraised of any offsets that we might be called upon to make if this policy change in fact increases budget outlays.

I want to speak to the situation in the former Soviet Union briefly.

The \$700 million that was announced by the President on April 4—is that a Food for Progress initiative?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. It is.

Mr. PENNY. How does that track with the Freedom Support Act and the limitations that were placed on Food for Progress under that legislation?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. The Food for Progress legislation has in fact two limitations on it in its authorizing legislation. One is a limitation on the amount of commodity that may be provided under Food for Progress. That is normally 500,000 tons per year. The second



limitation is on the amount of money CCC may expend for freight costs, and that is \$30 million per year.

The Freedom Support Act lifted the commodity ceiling for fiscal years 1992 and 1993.

Mr. PENNY. And based on that authority, we can accommodate this extra \$700 million?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. Exactly.

Mr. PENNY. Prior to the Freedom Support Act, there would have been a cap that would have made it impossible to move to this degree in terms of offering Food for Progress donations?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. That is correct.

Mr. PENNY. But in the Freedom Support Act, there is this transportation cost cap. How do we then finance this latest installment of \$700 million? It seems to me that while the cap on the volume has been lifted, if there is a cap on transportation, that transfers to a cap on the volume, doesn't it?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. It does at the moment. We are looking right now, in fact, at a number of ways of addressing that.

Mr. PENNY. You have to dip into some other fund? The transportation cap is only on CCC outlays?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. That is correct.

Mr. PENNY. Can you find money someplace else?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. We have ways, perhaps. Let me put it this way: We are studying ways of transferring funds among accounts for which the Secretary may have authority to move funding. It is possible that one of these will produce an administrative remedy. The alternative, of course, is to request legislative action on that cap.

Mr. PENNY. If you shift funds within the Department, what amount of money are we talking about?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. It is hard to say precisely what portion of the \$700 million will need to go to freight. Our initial thinking was around \$200 million.

Mr. PENNY. And that would come off the volume of grain that would be moved under the program?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. It would come out of the \$700 million.

Mr. PENNY. So we may be looking at \$200 million of the \$700 million needed to finance the shipment?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. Some estimates are even a little more. As I said, the \$200 million was our initial estimate.

Mr. PENNY. If we didn't have the cargo preference requirement on this type of shipment, what would those transportation costs be?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. Between one-third and one-half of the \$200 million.

Mr. PENNY. That's a significant differential.

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. Indeed.

Mr. PENNY. What do we get for the extra money?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. I would ask that the maritime industry answer that question, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]

Mr. PENNY. Is it largely a wage differential?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. It involves wage costs, to some degree construction costs within the United States for vessels, safety requirements, and things like this. I am certainly not—

Mr. PENNY. Are these vessels more appropriate to these types of shipments involved, or could we find adequate vessels from other sources?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. There are certainly adequate vessels from other sources. In many cases the U.S. ships are in fact less appropriate.

Mr. PENNY. Let me move to another issue: The distribution of food assistance in the former Soviet Union.

I am talking primarily here about the section 416 program. I assume that you are on the ground with the section 416 program there. Are we working—since most of this aid seems to be targeted to vulnerable populations—or at least that is the premise—are we working primarily Government-to-Government, or is this aid being distributed by private voluntary organizations?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. I believe the majority of what is actually section 416 is probably going through private voluntary organizations. We will be working in the former Soviet Union—we haven't signed all our agreements yet—probably with 18 or 19 private voluntary organizations.

Mr. PENNY. It just strikes me that if we really want to target the aid that that is a more appropriate avenue for distribution. It is sad but true that the Government bureaucracy there is at best inefficient in its delivery system and at worst untrustworthy in their commitment to providing aid where it is needed most.

Do you find any particular difficulty in working through the non-governmental entities in order to distribute this aid? Is there resistance on the part of the Government sector in these former Soviet States?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. There is occasional resistance to the operations of the private voluntary organizations. That is especially true where the PVO's want to engage in monetization.

Mr. PENNY. Do you believe that monetization is to be encouraged? Do you think that there are monetization initiatives that need to go forward?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. I think two of the best initiatives under our programs that we have in the former Soviet Union—and Russia, specifically—are monetization programs and both involve cases where commodities would be sold and local proceeds would be used for lending activities to the newly emerging private farmers.

Mr. PENNY. That might give me some hint as to why you are experiencing resistance because this really does set up a competitive situation for the State-run agricultural system.

In what way does that opposition or resistance manifest itself?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. Chiefly in an attempt to micromanage the PVO's and in a reluctance to simply allow them to operate with the freedom that we would prefer.

Mr. PENNY. But it is not your sense that we ought to throw in the towel on this? Are there PVO's that are willing to put up with the hassles in terms of trying to make this work?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. Yes. Both last year and this year we have managed to make a number of the PVO projects work. I believe we will succeed in making them all work, but it is a very difficult challenge. I might add that with respect to the Russian delegation that is currently in town, this is an issue we will be discussing.

Mr. PENNY. A former FAS employee who had extensive involvement at that time with the Soviet Union testified before our committee a few weeks ago. He suggested a rather novel idea, which was to establish an international WIC program because his view was that within Russia you have certain vulnerable populations and we ought to more effectively target those populations. His notion was that perhaps we could work with PVO's to distribute selected nutritional commodities at day care centers, elementary schools, and facilities of that nature.

I think you have the authority under existing programs to implement that kind of a project. How do you react to that kind of a proposal?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. I think he is certainly correct that those are indeed the vulnerable groups that we want to help. In point of fact, several of the PVO proposals are targeting those groups with these types of commodities. Indeed, some of the commodities that we are providing to the Russian Government are also being distributed at day care centers and similar institutions.

Mr. PENNY. But you acknowledge that the need extends beyond the current program level?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. Yes.

Mr. PENNY. Thank you.

I do have some questions for you, Ms. Richards, and apologize to the next panel for keeping them waiting. This has been a very instructive exchange. We are going to keep you two at the table for just a bit longer. I want Mr. Allard to have an opportunity to jump in with some additional questions at this point.

Mr. ALLARD. We recognize in a lot of countries that there is a problem with insufficient food. The problem in addition to that is frequently there is fighting, poor infrastructure, and weather problems that hinder the delivery of the food.

What, if anything, can we do to facilitate the delivery problems that we are running into?

Ms. RICHARDS. Let me give you some examples because it varies by country.

In southern Sudan, we have a case where the main rebel group, the SPLA, has split now into three factions which are fighting among and between themselves and, occasionally, with the Government of Sudan.

We have joined with other donors and the U.N. to try to work out agreements between the various contending parties to allow delivery of relief food to the areas in need. Sometimes those agreements hold and sometimes they don't. Sometimes these groups obviously don't have control over all their forces.

Where we can't make deliveries by land in southern Sudan we have used barge traffic, trains, when they are operating and can be protected from attacks, and airlifts. Recently, fighting in the South has disrupted deliveries to a number of places in Sudan, so the U.N. has used airlifts into especially severe locations to provide relief to those places. Sometimes that has even meant that they only go in for the day and then withdraw their people at night.

In Somalia you have another extreme case where we have had to utilize the United States and other countries' forces to actually



protect relief convoys, feeding sites and food warehouses from looting and attacks by various groups of contending forces.

We are still making relief food deliveries in northern Iraq, even though the security umbrella has been withdrawn. But, we are managing to bring food in across from Turkey and even some through the South.

In doing programs like this, we can, on occasion, negotiate what I call corridors of tranquility which are protected delivery routes. I have mentioned airlifts already. We are doing air drops in the former Yugoslavia and we have done air drops in northern Iraq.

We have utilized very extensively—especially Somalia illustrates this—the International Committee of the Red Cross, which has run its largest feeding operation there. They serve both sides in a conflict and are recognized by both sides as being neutral. We rely very heavily on private voluntary organizations which, in cases like this, have shown extraordinary patience, effectiveness, and extreme courage to deliver food. We also rely on UN agencies quite often, especially the World Food Program, UNICEF and the U.N. High Commission for Refugees.

You have to tailor your response to the situation you face. Sometimes we go in, and Somalia was a case in point, where we know we are going to lose a lot of food, but we have to try to get food in and do the best we can. Then, when it becomes clear that we are unable to deal with the massive starvation problem we face, then we escalate to another mode of delivery like the airlift and then, ultimately, to the use of the United States and other forces.

Mr. ALLARD. You mentioned some of the delivery problems in Somalia. When you said that the food never got to where it was supposed to, was it because of spoilage or theft on the dock?

Ms. RICHARDS. There was food that did not get to where it was intended for several reasons. Some of it managed to get unloaded in Mogadishu but, because of the threat of looting once it left the dock area, it stayed in the port.

There were other occasions where food was stolen as convoys were looted—sometimes as soon as they got out of the protected area and sometimes just before they got to their destination—and food was taken by the looters and sold on the market, which had an interestingly depressing effect on prices and may, in effect, have been a little bit of a contribution toward addressing some of the hunger problems, but certainly not for the most severely affected groups.

I think cases like Somalia are not signs of the future. But as I said earlier, I think disasters like Somalia and the former Yugoslavia are more and more frequent in the world and we are likely to face more in coming years. I think we will have to continue to work with the delivery agents to try to find more effective ways of delivering food. In a lot of these circumstances, there are a lot of risks involved.

Mr. ALLARD. Do some of those containers that the food comes in become of such a premium value that they just dump the food and keep the containers?

Ms. RICHARDS. No. The premium value is the food. One exception may be our yellow maize. White maize is valued much more highly than yellow maize in many countries of the world. The United

States doesn't grow much white maize. This is not a frequent occurrence, but sometimes our yellow maize is more highly prized as a chicken feed than people food. But when people are starving, they will eat what is available.

Mr. ALLARD. The 1990 farm bill made significant changes in the Public Law 480 program. Basically, the title I's concessional sales and title II and title III had to do with emergency food and Government-to-Government grants.

In your view, how is this working and is there anything that you would suggest to us to improve those programs?

Ms. RICHARDS. I think the belief in AID is that the changes in the 1990 farm bill made a vast improvement. It much more clearly delineated responsibility among the various U.S. Government agencies for food aid activities. It also eliminated the old development coordination committee, a body that really had become inefficient as a mechanism for making decisions on food aid.

The structure that we have now for administering food aid programs is vastly improved.

We have not yet started to look in great detail at further improvements that might be done in 1995 when the legislation comes up for revision, but just off the top of my head and speaking for myself, I think the mandates, the minimums, and the subminimums specified in the title II legislation, may need review because they do require a certain amount of food to go to regular development programs. Certainly this is a target that the PVO's and we would very much like to see met. But, the world situation we face with increasing emergency requirements means that we have been unable to meet it in the last 2 years just because of the demand and priority given to the emergency program. We need to look at how we deal with those mandates.

I think there are some operational parts of the legislation that need review, particularly in terms of 45-day requirements for AID to review PVO submissions. Given the process that needs to be followed between AID and the PVO's, clearances required from field missions, the field PVO office, and the PVO headquarters, and in Washington, 45 days is not an adequate time. You can sort of fiddle with that requirement by deciding when the clock stops and when it starts again, but that is an issue.

You were asking, Mr. Goldthwait, about multiyear programs. The title III program does allow for multiyear programming. We have utilized that in dealing with a number of programs that are eligible for title III. But, what we are seeing now is that when you have multiyear agreements already entered into, budget exigencies that result in reductions in the title III appropriation mean either you have to cut back on some of the commitments you have agreed to in existing and previously approved multiyear programs, or you reduce or even eliminate the opportunity to do new programs as a consequence of the budget pressure, if you will.

I am not making this as a case for increasing the title III appropriation because I recognize the budget pressures, but it is a practical consequence of trying to do multiyear programs with which we have to try to come to grips. And we are looking at that very carefully right now.



I think the system that was set up in the new legislation to enable what we call swaps between the different titles has been a very effective programming device. USDA may not have the same attitude, but we did swaps last year and we are considering swaps this year into title II to help meet the emergency demand.

That is a mechanism that has proved effective as a way to utilize the resources. But, again, when you have lots of demand for your resources, it is a program requirement that may cause some disruption at the end of the fiscal year when you have to use it.

Mr. ALLARD. Can you go into more detail on how your swap arrangements work?

Ms. RICHARDS. The legislation allows for 10 percent, generally, of the amount appropriated in each title to be transferred into another title. For example, last year we transferred some title I funding into title II, and we transferred title III funds into title II as well to help us meet the requirements of the southern Africa drought emergency.

We are looking at a similar kind of swap to deal with—

Mr. ALLARD. Is that provided in the farm bill, or is that provided in the budget bill?

Ms. RICHARDS. It is provided in the farm bill, to my understanding.

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. Congressman Allard, I think we also agree that the new structure that was legislated in 1990 is an improvement. I think we are much more efficient in how the two agencies each implement our own respective programs.

With respect to ideas for further changes and alterations in the legislation, we do not at this point have any specific suggestions, although I am sure that by the time we come around to discussing the new farm bill in 1995 we will have some thoughts to share with this group.

As far as the swaps go, I don't think we have any particular problem with this authority. I think it is probably a necessary authority. It is something that we have found to have worked well. We simply need to be convinced from our standpoint that the need for making the swap is clearly evidenced by the emergency condition.

Mr. ALLARD. I would assume that the chairman agrees with me on this, but we really do need to start thinking now about the 1995 farm bill.

Thank you.

Mr. PENNY. Thank you, Mr. Allard.

Mr. Goldthwait, Chairman de la Garza has asked the USDA to provide written comment on the status of PVO proposals in the former Soviet Union. Are you familiar with his request for that information?

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. I have not yet seen the request, but I know of the chairman's interest.

Mr. PENNY. I am speaking on his behalf when I request that the USDA provide a response to that request as soon as possible.

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. Certainly.

Mr. PENNY. Ms. Richards, Mr. Allard pursued the question of the complication that is caused for relief efforts when you have civil strife. Inherent in that is the displacement of the affected popu-

lation. We are seeing that in the Balkans. We saw that in Iraq. We saw that within Ethiopia.

It seems to me that finding these populations is not the problem. They either go across the border or they go to some safe haven within their own country. Getting them emergency assistance is not a particular problem, although it can be if there are rebel troops blockading the major roadways.

What do we do long term? Is there a strategy when we go in with food assistance as to how we end this situation of dependency and get them relocated or returned to their original homeland?

Ms. RICHARDS. There are two ways to address that problem. Normally, in cases of famine, people leave home not when they have exhausted all their food resources, but when all their sources of income to buy food have been used. It is not that food is unavailable, it is that they can't afford to buy it. So they tend to go where they hear food is available and they might have a chance of getting some they can afford.

Ideally, then, what you want is sufficient advance notice of famine so that you can prevent people from moving and keep them home where they are productive and you don't have this mass movement, which creates other kinds of problems. There is no place where people are more likely to die than refugee camps. More often than not, they die of disease gained in the camp, as opposed to starvation.

In the southern Africa drought, because we had sufficient advance notice, the USDA and AID working with other donors and the World Food Program, were able to get sufficient food into the region, distributed a lot of it using market mechanisms to keep the prices low to keep people at home and avoid massive displacement internally or across borders. Using markets, frankly, was a more efficient mechanism for distributing food than Government or PVO networks because the PVO network really wasn't that extensive in southern Africa.

That is one part of the strategy and I think the southern Africa drought is probably the first place where we have ever been able to do that. But, it was possible because we had at least 9 months' advance warning that there was going to be a famine without some outside intervention.

Where you have situations where refugees or internally displaced are already created, ideally, assuming security can be restored, you want to do several things. We are doing this now in Somalia. Starting a year ago, we financed, through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, grants to PVO's and to the International Committee of the Red Cross to provide seeds and farming implements to enable farmers to start farming either where they were or back home.

In fact, those farmers who managed to stay fairly close to their traditional lands, where there was good rain this last rainy season in Somalia, have managed to produce quite a good harvest. That approach is part of the much expanded rehabilitation effort that is underway in Somalia right now. There are people in camps and in the major urban centers where feeding took place in Somalia who are starting to go back home.

We—when I say we, I mean the donor community because the U.N. is most involved in this—are starting now a pilot project to

start returning some Somali farmers from camps in northern Kenya to the Juba Valley.

The normal practice for the U.N. High Commission for Refugees [UNHCR] is to give refugees who are repatriating seeds and tools, the kinds of things they may need to get themselves started when they get home, usually a sufficient supply of food to last them about 6 months until they can get a crop in the ground and become self-sufficient again, coupled with assistance at the site when they arrive. This may take the form of plastic sheeting for a temporary shelter while they rebuild a house or even assistance in terms of building supplies to help them rebuild a home so that they can go back home.

This pilot program for 2,500 Somalis in northern Kenya has been delayed a week because of rainfall. That is normally the procedure that is followed. Not always do you have to give refugees much assistance to go back. There wasn't a lot of assistance given, for example, to Iraqi refugees who went home because they weren't all that far away from home. Most of those on the Turkish border came from two towns, one that was 8 miles away from the border and the other much closer, so they just turned around and went back home.

Mr. PENNY. I have several quick questions and if you can accommodate me with relatively quick answers, then I can move on to the next panel.

What is your general assessment of the military mission in Somalia and its relationship to the food aid effort?

Ms. RICHARDS. I think, in terms of providing security for food deliveries, it has been amazingly successful. Deaths from starvation are way down. We have food being delivered and reaching the places it should.

Mr. PENNY. Would you say that it might serve as a model for the way we could handle military participation in those instances where there is civil unrest or warfare complicating our food assistance efforts?

Ms. RICHARDS. It is one model. I think the situation in northern Iraq was another. There may be other models that evolve as we face different situations.

Mr. PENNY. You spoke about the title III program, which was Government-to-Government. Do you think by and large it is an effective tool? Or is it a less useful tool than the other programs under your authority?

Ms. RICHARDS. I think it is a necessary complement to the other programs we have. There are lots of ways to get to Rome. They can all be equally valuable. There are very specific cases where the policy reform you want to achieve or whatever other objective you are trying to achieve is much better done with much bigger programs than title III allows than smaller very targeted title II programs.

Mr. PENNY. You mentioned as well that in the last couple of years we haven't been able to meet the subminimums on the regular program. How could we guarantee that the subminimums are met without—what do we need to do perhaps in legislative authority or transfer authority for the Department to make sure that we don't put the emergency needs up against the regular program activities?



Ms. RICHARDS. At this point I don't really have a ready answer, but I think we need to look at the way we appropriate food for development programs and emergency programs when we do the revision of the farm bill.

The other minimums—I think we met the one on bagged processed commodities. We have never had any trouble with the one on monetization. It is mainly those related to emergency levels that are a problem.

Mr. PENNY. You also mentioned that you have had problems sometimes with section 416, which is essentially the surplus commodities that are held in stock. Is there something that we can do to guarantee a ready reserve of those commodities so that we don't have to rely on domestic production levels giving us the surplus we need to take care of section 416 needs?

Ms. RICHARDS. From where I sit, the ideal solution would be to have, early on, a known quantity of section 416(b) that is available, so we can work with USDA to reach an agreement on how much we might use for emergency situations that we know at the time exists. That may have some consequences, positive and negative.

Mr. Goldthwait is probably better able to address the question than I am.

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. Fundamentally, from the standpoint of the food assistance, that would be very valuable. It would, however, be a major departure from the basic premise of the section 416 legislation.

Mr. PENNY. It would require us to go out and buy certain commodities every year even if they are not in surplus.

Mr. GOLDTHWAIT. That is correct. I think it is something that the Department would certainly take under study, but I can't offer a particular solution right now.

Mr. PENNY. I was intrigued by your notion of prepositioning food. We have also talked in this whole debate over restructuring our armed forces about the possibility of prepositioning certain types of military equipment, if not unilaterally as a United States activity.

Could you elaborate a little bit to give me some sense as to how that might work?

Ms. RICHARDS. Well, there is food that is prepositioned for emergencies now, particularly where you know that an emergency is a continuing one. We have prepositioned food for distribution to Ethiopia in the following fiscal year. We did attempt some prepositioning at the early stage of the southern Africa drought emergency.

I think the problem with prepositioning, particularly when you are dealing with emergencies, is going to revolve around predictability. The World Food Program does have what it calls an international emergency food reserve to which donors pledge. But my understanding is that donors don't actually provide the food until it is required. So prepositioning is really not the same thing. It has been our policy not to pledge ahead of time to the international emergency food reserve but, instead, to respond to individual appeals for specific emergencies as they arise. Quite often, we are faster in getting food there than the IEFRR is.

There may be some cases where you could find some places off-shore for prepositioning that does have storage costs and so forth

and you do have to worry about the shelf life of food. There are a lot of pros and cons to it that would need more careful examination.

Mr. PENNY. Thank you for your presentations this morning and for your answers to our questions. It has been very helpful.

I now call forward our next panel of witnesses. Professor Robert Kates, director-emeritus, World Hunger Program, Brown University; Jeffrey Clark, consultant and senior advisor for the U.S. Committee for Refugees; Charles Sykes, vice president of CARE; and John Swenson, acting executive director, Catholic Relief Services.

I would ask you all to come forward to the witness table and would request that you offer your testimony in the order in which you appear on the agenda. We will begin with Mr. Kates.

**STATEMENT OF ROBERT W. KATES, PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR-EMERITUS, ALAN SHAWN FEINSTEIN WORLD HUNGER PROGRAM, BROWN UNIVERSITY, PROVIDENCE, RI**

Mr. KATES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Before beginning my testimony, I would like to make a small personal observation.

Most of us in a lifetime encounter few heroes. I suspect that Congress is no different from the rest of the world. But I have been fortunate enough in my work with the World Hunger Program to encounter two who were Congressmen. The first was Mickey Leland, to whom we have proudly given the Alan Shawn Feinstein World Hunger Award for Public Service, and the second is Tony Hall. I am delighted that you have taken the lead in helping to pick up their torch. I wish you well in the endeavor.

I have been asked to do three things: To try to give a broader overview on problems of international hunger; to tell you a little bit about the emergent hunger agenda for the 1990's; and then I would like to conclude with outlining some opportunities for you to take leadership in behalf of the hungry people of the world.

International hunger has many faces. The common face we see and the common face we have discussed this morning has been the face of famine. But famine is actually the small tip of an enormous iceberg. As you described, Mr. Chairman, there are some 786 million people who live in households too poor to obtain the food that they need.

In actual numbers, relatively small numbers of people are affected by famine each year 15 million to 35 million. Actually, the number keeps going down, even at this moment in Somalia. In the attached paper on Somalia, I have a chart that shows overtime, the numbers of people resident in countries affected by famine. It still continues to go down. So we are at a very crucial point in time where we can envision now, for the first time in all of human history, the elimination of deaths from famine.

If we take the broader view of hunger, we have 786 million hungry people by the one recent measure, and we have 400 million underweight women, 184 million wasted and stunted children, and we have hundreds of millions or more who suffer from micronutrient deficiencies—the hidden hunger of vitamin A, iodine, and iron deficiencies.

The trends show good news and bad news. If you want to be a skilled advocate, you can find adequate support either way. The proportions of hungry have consistently been going down, as well as what you have noticed, Mr. Chairman, that the actual numbers of hungry in households have decreased. But similarly if you turn to my table 1 in my prepared statement from the latest United Nations statistics, you will see that the number of children under 5 who are wasted and stunted has actually increased while at the same time the proportion has gone down.

They have increased because it is children who are the fastest-growing population group. Population increase takes the form of children. That is why the trend is somewhat discouraging. Regionally, hunger has increased in Africa, decreased slowly in South Asia and Latin America, and has decreased rapidly in East and Southeast Asia.

The point was made before that there is enough food in the world if it were distributed evenly. This is a slight exaggeration. We think that if you took all the food in the world and put it into a common pot and you put some holes in it to allow the food that gets wasted in the process to leak out, then there surely is enough. Actually there would be 120 percent of what we need, enough to feed 6 billion people if it was distributed evenly and if everyone was satisfied with a vegetarian diet.

But if we look at the actual diets that people consume, if we take as a standard the relatively modest animal product diet of Latin America, then there is only enough food for 75 percent of the world's population. If you take the healthy diet suggested by the National Academy of Sciences, then there is only enough for 50 percent of the world's population.

Of course, we could grow much more food if people had the incomes required to pay for it, but it is not necessarily what is happening in the world.

Turning to the hunger agenda for the 1990's, there has been a series of international meetings, beginning with an effort which you are familiar with Mr. Chairman, because you were present when I testified on it in 1990. There are four major achievable goals that have emerged for the 1990's. It is possible to envision the virtual elimination of famine deaths and it is possible to eradicate completely two of the three forms of hidden hunger—vitamin A deficiency and iodine deficiency.

It is also possible to cut hunger in half in the very poorest households. It is also possible to cut malnutrition in half for mothers and small children. This was indeed the goal that was committed to at the World Summit for Children and these are the goals that were reinforced in the course of the International Conference on Nutrition that was held in Rome with 162 countries present in December of 1992.

For each of these particular goals there has been major progress. We discussed earlier the particular opportunity we now have as we struggle to find ways of providing humanitarian assistance in zones of armed conflict. But on poverty, the World Bank has made a renewed commitment on children and women. Major efforts are underway to implement the World Summit for Children. Finally,



there is a very broad and very effective effort to deal with hidden hunger.

As to the U.S. role, we provide major leadership on vitamin A, in particular. The United States support for child survival activities has been steadfast. We provide a major share of the emergency food supplies that are going to prevent famine. We have played less of a role, unfortunately, for the reduction of poverty.

Let me just say a note about cost. I have included in my statement as a way of focusing on costs, an invoice that might go out to all the residents of the rich countries in the world. It would say that for \$7.24 per person of the world's rich folks, it would be possible to make real the hunger agenda of the 1990's to literally cut hunger in half. Something like under \$9 billion per year, is required to do that, of which about \$5 billion is already being spent.

So the kinds of costs are relatively modest, although in times of shrinking resources no costs are really modest. I understand that.

Finally, let me conclude by reading very quickly the testimony that I presented in 1990 to the House Select Committee, which I think still stands in terms of your opportunity to provide leadership.

"For the first time in human history, the end of famine is achievable. Endemic goiter and vitamin A blindness can be eliminated. The wasting and stunting of small children and the starvation of their mothers can be halted. Most nations, even poor ones, could meet their minimal overall nutritional needs, even if distributing food adequately proves more difficult.

The United States can contribute in a major way to such an effort if we build on our skills and experience. A U.S. initiative could include the following:

On deaths from famine, maintain the moral high ground in addressing hunger as a weapon of war by leading in the provision of humanitarian aid and seeking safe passage in zones of armed conflict;

To cut hunger in half in the poorest households and make sure that our generosity in providing food aid is matched by the neediness of its recipients. Use our experience in targeting food aid at home and abroad to make such aid more effective. Find ways to make our assistance of microenterprises work for truly poor people. Make sure that our external assistance and that of other donors does not undermine hungry farmers' production incentives and access to resources. Use short-term support for hungry people in Africa to help build a rural infrastructure for internal markets.

For mothers and small children, build upon the current efforts on child survival with activities and support rising to double the current level. Assist mothers with support for child spacing.

For iodine and vitamin A deficiencies, build upon the experience in both research and practice in addressing vitamin A with a clear U.S. commitment to seek eradication within the decade.

And overall, we should provide a global challenge to the rest of the world to match us 3 to 1, a U.S. commitment of \$1 billion per annum in new resources to be matched by \$3 billion elsewhere."

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kates appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. PENNY. Thank you, sir.  
Jeff.

**STATEMENT OF JEFFREY CLARK, CONSULTANT AND SENIOR  
ADVISOR, U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES**

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Chairman, it is really a pleasure to be with you today as you begin this series of hearings. I have just a few words to say at the moment, based on my 16 years of experience in both the operational and policy determination aspects of providing as effective humanitarian assistance to the world's hungry and displaced as possible, whether they be victims of drought, natural disasters, civil strife, ethnic religious clashes, or simply acute poverty. That experience and my analysis of what is transpiring around the world today leads me to the conclusion that your subcommittee faces both unique challenges and opportunities.

There are compelling reasons to be optimistic about reducing hunger in the world parallel to a series of harsh realities that serve to dampen that hope.

My testimony outlines several reasons to be both optimistic and pessimistic. I will simply list them very quickly and then leave you with a few thoughts as areas where I think the subcommittee may focus.

I think there are reasons to be optimistic, starting with the fact that the ability to grow food for the population we have and are likely to have in the foreseeable future has now been demonstrated. In many measurements by many different sources, the human condition is improving in many ways.

The awareness and concern about reducing hunger is increasing, which equals political pressure that is going to be applied to this Congress and to Parliaments around the world. The universal right to freedom from hunger accord, which Congressman Hall has talked about, is coming in my view in some fashion. Indeed, I think the whole definition of national sovereignty is going to be under review in the future as we challenge governments that are imposing hunger on their own citizens.

There are encouraging case studies that one could look at. I have had a particular involvement in Ethiopia over the years. Ethiopia is everybody's image of a nightmare country with famine wracking its people. Ethiopia is green today and things are better and possibly going to remain better for quite some time. Ethiopia is not alone.

Also, I think there is an improved capacity to link relief to development. We now have better ways of having market interventions to head off the onset of famine or severe food emergency. Monetization is working, structural adjustment is working in Ghana and other countries.

Development is simply taking off in a number of countries. With that comes increased food security and an expanded pool from which development and relief assistance can come. India and China are two very significant examples of that.

At the same time, there is reason to be quite pessimistic, of course. I think the United Nations and its entire humanitarian assistance regime is in something very close to shambles. I think it is ill-prepared for the new role being thrust upon it. I think the



U.N. has proven itself to be unacceptably inept in the current Somali situation.

There are quite unfortunately more Somalis around the corner. The Sudan and Angola are current examples of tragedies affecting millions of people. Zaire is probably coming up very soon. I don't see anybody taking the necessary preparations to head off calamity in Zaire.

I fear a possible retreat on the part of the United States. I fear a chipping away of our development assistance funds, diversions to the Soviet bloc, pressure because of the budget, and so on. What then happens to those children in Haiti and elsewhere that we have been talking about today if the United States backs away?

I think the U.S. Government's own humanitarian assistance regime needs redesigned and expanded, accountability and oversight mechanisms. I think we need to be on guard against our humanitarian programs becoming overly politicized. We had an example of that last year on the former Soviet Union where we spent lots of money and did virtually nothing to help anybody who was truly in need.

There is a new role clearly coming for the Department of Defense. We have seen that in Somalia. I certainly applaud what we saw in Somalia but I think we need to think through the process before it just evolves without any real consultation. The whole process needs to be open to scrutiny.

And the last reason to be particularly pessimistic is the growing ethnic and religious clashes that we're seeing all around the world, particularly in countries that already endure food insecurity.

The areas I would encourage this subcommittee to concentrate on in a very broad sense would include: Joining the growing course of people and agencies demanding drastic, dramatic, serious, and immediate overhaul of United Nations humanitarian assistance mechanisms. Some of the children in Somalia died as a result of U.N. bungling and weakness. We have to get a better handle on that system and that process.

The entire foreign assistance program of the United States needs to be strengthened and overhauled, not an easy task politically or even programmatically. But that is an essential one for a number of reasons. The decline in the effectiveness of the Agency for International Development over the past several years is highly regrettable and the irrelevance of our foreign aid legislation is a major obstacle to the needed bureaucratic restructuring.

More directly, I would urge this subcommittee to consider calling for the establishment of a blue ribbon commission comprised of members of the administration, the Congress, the humanitarian and religious communities, and the press to conduct a review of the U.S. Government's humanitarian assistance programs and policies.

Last, this subcommittee would have obvious interest and expertise in improving the mechanisms of delivering food aid components of humanitarian aid. We had discussions earlier about monetization and title II, both of which I think are proving to be quite effective and can be expanded as we approach the next farm bill.

I can expand on any of these, but my time is up and I wanted to leave these with you.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Clark appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. PENNY. Thank you, Mr. Clark.

Mr. Swenson.

**STATEMENT OF JOHN SWENSON, ACTING EXECUTIVE  
DIRECTOR, CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES—USCC**

Mr. SWENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief.

On behalf of Catholic Relief Services, I would like to thank you, the subcommittee, and the chairman of the full committee for undertaking these hearings. Though we greatly regretted the demise of the Select Committee on Hunger, we are encouraged that hunger as an issue will now have institutional attention through this subcommittee.

Most of what I wanted to say is contained in my written testimony. It echoes somewhat what Ms. Richards was saying, that hunger is increasingly accompanied by violence in the world today. Armed conflict is both causing and exacerbating hunger. Worse, it is impeding access by humanitarian assistance agencies to those in greatest need.

This underlines, Mr. Chairman, that the institutions developed to govern international life following World War II are inadequate to today's new world order. During the cold war when differences were clearly defined, they served more or less well, but in the face of the nationalistic, ethnic, and religious strife that is seen now, the necessity for international, political, and diplomatic structures of mediation, restraint, and intervention have yet to be developed.

The U.N. was created to deal with the world of nation States, not to negotiate the shoal of national dissolution which threatens some of its members. The international goals of the United Nations charter offer little guidance in coming to terms with the resilient forces of nationalism, factionalism, and ethnic controversy, which have asserted themselves in so many places around the world.

We urgently need a complete reform of the U.N. system. I see no other way to bring that about other than for the United States to take the lead in turning the energies of the organization toward efforts at peacemaking, at ensuring humanitarian access to victims of war and strife, and in making it more responsive to a world where lower level conflicts, as opposed to the superpower competition in the past, are going to be increasingly seen.

This need for restructuring approaches and visions of the world I think needs to be mirrored in the United States' foreign assistance program. It is always said that foreign assistance has no constituency, it is very unpopular with the American people, and the only thing that kept it afloat was the Soviet/American rivalry. I don't think that is true. I think the American people do want to provide humanitarian assistance around the world, but they want to make sure that it is reaching the people in the greatest need.

I think the AID program needs to be restructured to reflect that support by the American people. I think it should provide for humanitarian emergency assistance, for long-term development programs that have impact at the community level, that it supports programs that are friendly to the environment, and that the entire program be restructured in such a way that removes all the accre-

tion of often conflicting goals and objectives that the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 has come over the years to contain.

We need a development program that really aims at development rather than that which seeks to counter Soviet influence around the world.

Those are the points I wish to make, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you again.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Swenson appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. PENNY. Thank you, Mr. Swenson.

Mr. Sykes.

#### **STATEMENT OF CHARLES SYKES, VICE PRESIDENT, CARE**

Mr. SYKES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On behalf of CARE, I add the same sentiments as the other panelists with regard to the importance of this hearing. The work that you and your colleagues did on the House Select Committee on Hunger is an outstanding record and an outstanding repository of information from which this subcommittee can draw in terms of direction for the future on the issues of hunger and poverty.

I have spent some 32 years with CARE, 20 years in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean in the administration of programs, both development and relief programs. We start from the basic belief that development and relief are on the same continuum, on a linear basis, and that food aid constitutes one of many components which help us to respond to and get at this issue of hunger and poverty.

The extremes of poverty in the so-called Third World are a moral outrage. When we see and visit and go around the world and in our own country and see poverty, it should appall us all. Almost a century ago, the great Bengali poet, Tagore, said that for many people in the world, God can only appear in the form of bread. That is still unfortunately true today. This tragic and unacceptable condition exists in far too many countries and for far too many people.

As we embark on this last decade of the 20th century, the most basic human right, the universal right to food, still remains an illusive goal to mankind. In addition to famines and natural disaster, we know that carnage, hatred, greed, and bigotry poison our global efforts to end hunger and poverty, often fed by myths which label the poor as unproductive and which leave them outside and looking into the process.

As to the subject of the hearing today, hunger and poverty and possible solutions, I recommend that the subcommittee be guided by the work of the House Select Committee on Hunger. I think it is important to quantify the issue of—and I think it has been addressed in terms of numbers and how many people we're talking about in the world today—but I think another question we have to ask ourselves is: Where are the hungry? Where are the poor?

In a recent International Fund for Agricultural Development report, they estimate that of the 1 billion people living below the poverty line, approximately 900 million are in rural areas; approximately 600 million in Asia, more than 200 million in Africa, and the balance in the Caribbean and Latin America area.

So we know where they are. Who are they? The rural poor are generally small holders with 7 acres or less, tenant farmers, and



landless laborers. Unfortunately, a good number are made up of women, especially women heads of households. In other areas, pastoralists and other groups, particularly tribal groups and indigenous peoples, are more often counted amongst the poor and hungry.

So we know where they are and we know who they are. Has there been any progress in reducing poverty and hunger? Evidence suggests that the scale of poverty and hunger has been reduced, but yet population has increased. Africa, from the period 1990 to 1992, was marked by severe famine, particularly southern Africa. Drought and war, as my colleagues have mentioned, caused severe famine in a number of countries, often making it extremely difficult to provide the external assistance which is made available from the United States and from the private voluntary organizations.

A gloomy scenario is that we will have 1.5 billion people rather than 1 billion hungry and impoverished people by the year 2000. I think part of the work of this subcommittee and part of the work of the organizations represented here today is to insure that that scenario is not fulfilled. Can we reverse the trend? I think at the microlevel our experience as NGO's is that it can be overcome.

But it takes more than food. Food is just one component. We see that a number of questions came up about a WIC program as a model. We have seen that there are poor countries that have WIC-like programs. Food can constitute an important component, but it also requires immunization, oral rehydration, education, and services for pregnant and lactating women, and the availability of family planning services. These aggregated services can have a tremendous impact on poverty. But taken by itself, except in emergency situations, food aid needs a very well-defined program in which to fit. It needs other components.

So one of the recommendations which we would make to the subcommittee is the importance of interface with your colleagues on the Foreign Affairs Committee—Ms. McKinney, we know that you are sitting on the Foreign Affairs Committee—and in the Banking Committee, which deals with the multilateral contributions because the largest external funding for the poorest countries comes from the World Bank. It is important that those policies are related as far as what you do in terms of making available food aid and in terms of making available multilateral and bilateral assistance to the poorest countries.

There are great opportunities for this subcommittee to work across committee lines. Whether that is on a formal or informal basis, that is for your determine.

We would also like to say that there is already a road map for dealing with food security and food insecurity. At the International Conference on Nutrition in December in Rome, as Dr. Kates mentioned, the United States was a signatory to the agreement which calls for national plans by all the countries of the world. We can be an important part of that plan.

Other policy recommendations are contained in the paper which I had presented at the February retreat of the committee, e.g., the recommendation for establishing an international cereal reserve to deal with the extraordinary emergencies and famine.

I thank you for this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, and the members of the subcommittee, and the chairman for the chance to present our views.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sykes appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. PENNY. Thank you for your testimony.

I specifically want to respond to a couple of remarks you made, Mr. Sykes, one relating to the resources available from the many years of work by the Select Committee on Hunger. I have personally had numerous conversations with Chairman Hall about coordinating our efforts and my staff has worked closely with the staff of his committee to arrange for access to the volumes of material they have compiled over the years on these very issues. We certainly intend to follow up on their work and to access the product of their efforts over the years.

We also know that there may be a task force established to continue some type of hunger focus that would be multijurisdictional. As you have mentioned, many of these issues reach beyond our subcommittee and must be addressed by the Foreign Affairs Committee. For that reason, I would applaud the Speaker's decision if he would in fact establish some type of task force. We would clearly work closely with that group. I would hope that Mr. Hall would be given a leadership role in such a task force.

You also mentioned the World Declaration on Nutrition and urged us to do some oversight on that document. We intend to pursue that within this subcommittee. I appreciate the suggestion in that regard.

There has been a repeated reference this morning to the emerging hunger crisis situations and that it seems increasingly to be tied to civil unrest or warfare in one form or another. Could I get a quick reaction to the role of the military in Somalia and whether you are comfortable with the model that has been established in terms of a military role in cases where civil unrest or other bloodshed is compounding our relief efforts?

Mr. KATES. I am comfortable with our role in Somalia. I think the model that I have always advocated is tying very close military intervention to the goal of humanitarian assistance. That was exactly, as I see it, what was followed in Somalia. I think that in Bosnia, we have a similar opportunity if we tie our intervention to the creation and the maintenance of safe havens.

Mr. CLARK. I would just say, Mr. Chairman, that after the military forces arrived in Somalia in December, they made the absolute difference between survival or death for some unknown hundreds of thousands of people. We owe them a great debt.

The problem with the model is that they went too late and that their mandate was not broad enough to encompass disarming the gangs and thugs that had and still have guns in store. So if the UNISOM II Force, which takes over in a couple of days, is able to do that, then hopefully we will see a successful conclusion of the exercise.

I would just caution, as I did in my written testimony, that we not move too quickly to relying on military interventions as kind of an easy-out on these things. One of the reasons that the military had to go into Somalia is that other people did not do what they

could have done and should have done early enough. We need to make sure that when we have military interventions it is because we have truly exhausted the other possibilities, which was not necessarily true in Somalia.

Mr. SWENSON. To answer your first question, I think the intervention in Somalia was extraordinarily effective. I hope that it will not be a model for the future. There are great difficulties in making the application of national military forces, as opposed to international forces, a means of intervening in humanitarian crises.

We recently participated in a conference at Ditchely which brought together both military, civilian, and governmental practitioners from Europe and the United States. The almost unanimous conclusion of everyone concerned, particularly the military officers, was to be very careful. Military forces and humanitarian agencies have distinct missions, by definition. If you start to mix them you could get into a great deal of difficulty.

In terms of the mission of the United States forces, an intervention of the kind that happened in Somalia would have been inconceivable during the time of the cold war because of the configuration of the missions of our forces at that time.

So I think we must be very careful in applying military force to humanitarian objectives.

Mr. SYKES. I was in Somalia in September and visited the various cities and it was very clear that the situation for our own staff, principally Somalis—150 or so—and expatriates, was untenable with regard to their protection. Worse was the anarchy that existed for the Somali citizens themselves. The Somalis were in a life-threatening situation over which they had no control.

If we had a choice, we would prefer not to have military intervention. If we have to have military intervention, then I think the United States should play a major role in supporting the United Nations, improving its apparatus and mechanism for peacekeeping, peacemaking, and it should be thoroughly integrated. We have to take the leadership at the moment.

The U.N. system is in disarray at the moment. But we have to support the United Nations. We were with the Swedish Ambassador yesterday who is responsible for crafting their humanitarian program at the U.N. They are the ones who sponsored the resolution that allowed for the creation of the DHA, the department in the U.N. for humanitarian affairs.

But as we know, you have to work on that system. It is an important system which we are part of. We believe that the peacekeeping and peacemaking and military part of it should be through the United Nations.

Mr. PENNY. Thank you for your responses.

I have some additional questions, but I want to defer to my colleague, Ms. McKinney, for any questions she might have.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I only have one question. If you could recommend some improvements or changes in the way we spend our money in program priorities or funding priorities so that the money would be well spent—and I think I am referring specifically to Mr. Clark's testimony—could you tell me what you would recommend that the U.S. assistance look like?



Mr. CLARK. Well, that is not an easy one and it would take more time than we have. But in a very general sense, there has been a lot of work done by the Overseas Development Council and people at this table and elsewhere on a design of a sustainable development program that would more or less replace what we have at the moment. It would concentrate and focus U.S. development aid in three or four major categories: Environmental protection, health care, food security, and so on.

It would move us away from the rather fragmented approach that we have at the moment. It would further redirect money within the overall foreign aid budget.

Let me make an important intervention here. We do not need more money for foreign aid, we just need money within that budget spent in different ways and to move, as I see it, very quickly away from an allocation that is skewed toward base rights countries and other legacies of the cold war and putting money into countries where we have some real hope of reversing acute poverty and food insecurity and so on. And that can be done.

It is not easy, cheap, immediate, and there is no guarantee of total success across the board, but we have seen and are seeing with the reduction of diseases and the reduction in population growth rates that these programs can be effective. We simply need to spend more money on that and less on aid to countries like Greece and Turkey, which have quite sufficient incomes to get along without our siphoning of our foreign aid in that direction.

It is much more complicated than that, but it is doable and I think it is pretty well sketched out by a number of people who would be able to provide you some pretty good guidance in writing. It would just take some political determination to do so.

Ms. MCKINNEY. So you could help my office if we contacted you to get some more information on it?

Mr. CLARK. I would be pleased to do that.

Ms. MCKINNEY. That is wonderful.

I would also like to know what organizations or which of your organizations are specifically involved in the child school feeding programs or the mother/infant programs.

Mr. SYKES. We both are. The Catholic Relief Services has been involved for many years.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PENNY. Thank you.

I would like to share with this panel the outline of legislation that I have introduced in this session of Congress. This bill would be to call for a U.N. reform commission. We are celebrating the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the U.N. It seems to me it is an appropriate time for us to ask ourselves whether the U.N. is constructed to meet the needs of the next century.

I suggest in my legislation that the reforms ought to establish a security council with five additional members, naming members that would represent continents that are now neglected with a member from South America, another from Africa, and an additional member from the Asian theater. In addition, my proposal would suggest the establishment of a U.N. peacekeeping force num-

bering perhaps 75,000 personnel with troops dedicated from a number of member nations.

I am just curious in terms of making the U.N. more reflective of the current world, hopefully then making it more responsive to crises which too often occur in the Third World and giving the U.N. early intervention capabilities with peacekeeping troops—are these reforms that make sense?

I don't expect from you an absolute endorsement this morning, but just some general observations.

Mr. CLARK. I will respond by saying that it has immediate appeal to me. I don't think there is any question that we can long delay an expansion of the Security Council. I don't think there is much hesitation on my part to talk about some kind of standing U.N. peacekeeping force that I presume would be kept under national command until drawn down upon for particular situations wherever it might be.

And to go back to your original question, I think I have already indicated in my testimony and what I have said quite publicly elsewhere over the past several months that the reform required of the U.N. to restructure it for the new era in which we live and for the foreseeable future is not only advisable but absolutely required.

I do not in any way differ from what my colleague, Mr. Sykes, was saying in insisting that we ought to strengthen the U.N. This is not just U.N. bashing for the sake of U.N. bashing that I am engaged in. I am just trying to be candid on the fact that it is not now adequate to do what it needs to do.

If the United States does not take the lead in making that come about, then it probably will not happen.

Mr. KATES. I would like to comment on the U.N.

I think it is very important to use the historical perspective that you suggested with the 50th anniversary, but also to take a much longer historical perspective and to see that we are at this enormously critical juncture in time, trying to, in effect, really refashion a new and different world order. While Jeff at times does stray into U.N. bashing, I think that the tension is between the fact that while all of us call for reform in the U.N. system, we belong to nations that are very reluctant to appear to cede even a modicum of their sovereignty or control.

Mr. Chairman, just look at the way we have offered military forces to the United Nations system. I think it would be a major step forward if we could create that kind of 75,000-person force that you described. Here in this historical perspective, humanitarian assistance is probably the lead opportunity to struggle and to fashion that new kind of world order. We have the most consensus around the issues of humanitarian assistance. The application of force, the breaching of sovereignty, cross-border operations, creating safe havens—all those issues carry us forward in the difficult struggle to try to refashion a new and better world.

Mr. SYKES. As I have stated in my written testimony, I certainly agree that the United Nations system is in need of profound reform both in terms of policy and what the world expects of the organization and getting general agreement on that. But also I would not underestimate the need for sheer administrative reform.

A great problem of the United Nations system, in my experience, has been that nobody is in charge. All the disparate agencies and appendages of the U.N. are off on their own doing whatever it is they are supposed to be doing and nobody is giving clear policy administrative direction and pulling together the resources available to the United Nations to respond to these new kinds of crises. So I think real reform is needed.

Mr. PENNY. Let me request of each of you some observations on those other aspects of U.N. reform such as UNICEF, the World Health Organization, Foreign Agriculture Organization.

It seems to me that the bureaucracy of the U.N. is such that co-ordination is inherently difficult, yet in most nations where development needs are immense, where malnutrition is evident, where famine might exist, the vast majority of these agencies are involved at some level.

How would you bring some cohesion to the system, if you could be king for a day?

Mr. CLARK. I think there are two very fundamental problems. The lack of accountability—as Mr. Swenson said, nobody quite knows who is in charge. Frequently, that means that nobody is in charge.

Also, the personnel system needs to be completely revamped. People are put into positions for which they have no technical capacity whatsoever, and therefore couldn't be expected to deliver a particularly good job.

I am just back from a trip to Ethiopia. Depending on whose count you get—and everybody had a different count—there are either 150 or 350 expatriate professional U.N. employees permanently based in Ethiopia for the various humanitarian assistance agencies. They are all there that you mentioned and others.

But it has been necessary to create an ad hoc group, called the Ethiopian planning and preparedness group, to actually carry out a number of humanitarian programs on behalf of the U.N.—this was done by special donations by the United States and other donors—and to hire new and additional people without in any way offsetting the contributions going to those agencies already present or without in any way taking their people to putting them at work in this new office.

So you have, in addition to all the UNDP and the UNHCR and the UNICEF and all the other people this new group that is there that is actually doing a pretty good job. But it makes the question as to why we need to create a new bureaucracy. If the U.N. history is any guide, we can assume that quite a number of years from now into the future, even if the emergency in Ethiopia has passed, that this special ad hoc group will still be there and somebody will still be paying salaries.

The UNHCR that you mentioned is not only to be included in that list, Mr. Chairman, but probably at the top. Their failures are truly egregious by any measurement. If you could take a quick trip to Ethiopia, I could show you some things that you wouldn't believe and wouldn't want to believe.

Mr. SYKES. I think the immutable principles found in the charter of the United Nations are there. They don't need to be recreated. I think they can be a guidepost to saying that if we had to start



organizing, or we had to put in place an organization today that fulfilled those principles, how would we go about it? How would we organize ourselves?

I think that is the key. I think things would look a lot different today and we would probably come up with more answers and some of the ideas you have included in some of your resolutions. Times have changed, even though the principles are immutable. But it is more important to go through that revisioning of how we achieve those principles first before we touch any boxes or we focus on reform of any particular agency. That process, I think, is a prerequisite toward streamlining and improving the performance of the United Nations.

We have a leadership role to play in that we are a part of it.

Mr. KATES. I think for the immediate future this subcommittee could play a very useful role in pressing the U.N. system on how the good rhetoric and good words of Rome become implemented. A major missing item in the plan of action and in the declaration was really any effective follow up. There was talk of using the Subcommittee on Nutrition, the ACC/SCN, which is supposedly an integrating group across the various agencies. Actually it is a very small and useful technical group but without much integrating capacity.

Using the lever of your oversight, it would seem to me that to press for an effective coordinating mechanism for implementing the results of Rome might be a good start on your short-term contribution.

Mr. PENNY. I think that is as good a place as any to wrap up this morning's hearing. We do appreciate you for your participation and for your presentations.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene, subject to the call of the Chair.]

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]

## STATEMENT

BY

LOIS RICHARDS  
 ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR  
 FOR FOOD AND  
 HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE  
 AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee:

I take particular pleasure in this opportunity to address this Subcommittee on behalf of the Agency for International Development. In my role as Acting Assistance Administrator of the Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance, I deal daily with the reality of international hunger and food security which we are addressing here today.

### Introduction

In the context of developing the foundations for sustainable, economic development with tangible benefits to the poor, nothing is sustainable, nothing is durable, and no foreign aid, however well-intentioned, will be well-utilized, unless the basic necessities of humanity are satisfied. In much of the developing world, social and economic stability exist in sufficient measure to give reasonable hope that institutional, social and economic development programs, along with progress toward democratization, will prosper. Yet our attention is drawn daily to the misery and suffering of populations, mainly in Africa, particularly in Somalia and Sudan, but also in the Yugoslav States, the Middle East, in Latin America and in Asia. In these areas food insecurity, malnutrition, natural catastrophes, or civil disturbances caused by tribal and ethnic hatreds or political disruptions, tear at the very fabric of human society. At the same time under presumably normal conditions hundreds of millions of people in Africa, Asia and Latin America live without enough food to meet their daily needs.

The United States has a proud record of response to the cries of people for help, and along with other donors, has effectively saved tens of millions of lives in recent years through emergency food aid programs. In fact emergency food aid is the largest component of overall U.S. disaster relief in most years. In addition, 52 million people directly benefit from U.S. food aid provided under the more than 116 "regular" food aid projects underway throughout the world.

### The World Hunger Problem

Estimates of the number of people in the world who are undernourished vary, but the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations put the figure in 1991 at over 780 million adults and children, a drop of 150 million since 1970. While this decline is a testament to human efforts to combat global hunger, the number of underfed still represents 20 percent of the world's population. Furthermore, FAO reports that the numbers of hungry are still increasing in some world regions,

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especially Africa. This persistent problem has resulted from population growth in countries with poor or uneven development performance coupled with the endemic spread of both natural disasters and civil conflicts throughout the world.

The global hunger problem clearly does not stem from global food shortages. In fact, if the world's total food supply were distributed evenly, each person would have a more than ample supply of calories, protein and other nutrients, and hunger problems would not exist. Yet the abundance of food on a global scale has not resulted in a world free from hunger because the available food is not equally accessible or affordable, either to all countries or to all households, even in food-abundant countries. Thus, even in countries whose food production is sufficient to meet domestic requirements, food security problems exist. We have this problem at home; in the developing world it is not surprising that the problem is more common and more difficult to solve.

This is especially true in the face of the increasing complexity and frequency of situations requiring large amounts of disaster and emergency relief in the 1990's. The head of the U.N.'s Department of Humanitarian Affairs recently pointed out to donors that last year saw more instances of civil conflict than of international conflict. Regional and ethnic fighting has become more frequent even though the Cold War has ended. The massive displacement of populations by these events and the prolonged period for achieving resolution require much larger relief food and dollar resources. A.I.D.'s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance reports that the number of new disasters, natural and man-made, increased from 53 in 1990 with 52 million people affected, to 65 affecting 393 million in 1991. In FY 1992 U.S. Ambassadors declared the highest number of disaster declarations recorded in one fiscal year - 66. So far in fy 1993, there have been 43 disaster declarations compared to last year at this time when there had been 37 disaster declarations.

Less visible, but important nutritional problems also loom large for people who are not affected by disaster situations. More than two billion people "normally" subsist on diets lacking the essential nutrients required to prevent premature death and disability and to promote better cognition and productivity. Most are in the most vulnerable groups, especially young children, adolescent girls and women.



### Food Security Mandate

In recognition of the problem of global hunger Congress passed in 1990, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1990 (also referred to as the Mickey Leland Food for Peace Act) which states, "It is the policy of the United States to use its abundant agricultural productivity to promote the foreign policy of the United States by enhancing the food security of the developing world ...". To implement this mandate, A.I.D. has issued a food security policy determination (PD-19) which guides all Agency programming, including food aid. In keeping with the law, the Agency has defined food security to mean "when all people at all times have both physical and economic access to sufficient food to meet their dietary needs for a productive and healthy life." This definition incorporates, in the broader context of all of A.I.D.'s programs, the legislation's definition of food security which applies specifically to Titles II and III, namely, "Access by all people at all time to sufficient food and nutrition for a healthy and active life." In addition, A.I.D. has defined three elements of food security: (1) national and community food availability, (2) access to food by households, and (3) proper utilization of food.

Based on aggregate national data, the 1992 World Food Day report to Congress in discussing global food security and its relation to world hunger and malnutrition revealed 55 countries to be relatively food insecure and another 16 countries to be "borderline" food insecure.

### A.I.D. ACTIONS

I wish to use the remainder of my time to discuss how A.I.D. addresses hunger and food security through its food aid programs under Titles II and III of the Farm Bill, or P.L. 480, as we commonly refer to it. I will also make reference to Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949, under which the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has provided significant quantities of food aid to support A.I.D.'s efforts to address emergencies in recent years.

Food aid and A.I.D.'s nutrition programs funded under the Foreign Assistance Act, focus on the same priority countries and populations. Both concentrate on vulnerable populations and emphasize the drought and disaster-prone regions.

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Among the ways A.I.D. deals with food security problems are: food aid; technical assistance for food production, distribution and marketing systems; and for natural-child nutrition, and promotion of sound agricultural policies. In combination these are the means that the world's foreign aid donors -- bilateral or multilateral -- seek to improve food security. While limiting myself here to food aid, I in no way wish to imply that in isolation food aid can resolve the often difficult food security problems of income distribution, domestic food production and prices, import competition, and so on.

In using food aid, A.I.D., other food donating nations, and the U.N.'s World Food Program (WFP), manage two kinds of programs: development (or regular) and emergency.

#### Development Food Aid

Development or "regular" food aid programs include both Title II grants to PVOs and WFP and Title III government-to-government programs. Title II programs include:

- infant, child, and school feeding nutrition programs. An example: both U.S. PVOs and WFP cooperate to provide food to 8.3 million Indians under an integrated child development services program.
- a wide variety of food for work programs in which "food" is paid as wages to the unemployed for work performed. An example: the rural road building program in Bangladesh, a joint U.S. PVO and WFP effort, employs some 5 million poor seasonal laborers outside the non-agricultural season.
- monetization programs, where food is sold to generate cash to compensate workers, to pay administrative costs of handling food aid commodities (truck drivers, guards, warehouse construction), or to fund a wide variety of development activities not necessarily associated with the food itself. An example: rural potable water installation on the island of Java in Indonesia, or rejuvenating the agricultural cooperative movement through agricultural credit in Uganda are examples of this last kind of monetization.

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Currently 21 U.S. Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) actively manage Title II programs overseas. Without the PVO's outreach, dedication, integrity, creativity and experience, the food delivery chain would not, in the end, reach the intended beneficiaries.

The Title II regular programs are subject to several legislative mandates. Within the annual Title II program minimum tonnage levels (which increase annually from 1991 to 1995) set forth in Title II, Section 204, there are annually increasing subminimum tonnage amounts which must be distributed through the regular programs of PVOs and WFP. We have not been able to meet the regular program sub-minimum in recent years because of the priority given to meeting emergency requirements. In FY 1991 we missed the subminimum target by 94,000 metric tons and in FY 1992 by just over 112,000 metric tons.

There is another mandate -- not less than 75 percent of the total tonnage shipped under all (emergency and regular) Title II programs must be processed, fortified or bagged commodities. Meeting this target, which we have met only once since 1990 depends upon the types of commodities requested by the PVOs and WFP for regular programs, and on the types of commodities needed to meet emergency relief requirements. WFP requests are not under our control although A.I.D.'s Office of Food for Peace does encourage WFP to consider requesting processed and bagged foods throughout each year.

With regard to Title III, which the Farm Bill calls "Food for Development", A.I.D. provides food resources to those nations willing to commit to policy reforms or take active steps designed to enhance growth and address food security deficiencies in a measurable manner. These multi-year programs vary widely in their focus, just as the developing nations vary widely in the food security problems they face. Thus, commodities have been provided: (1) to countries on the condition that inefficient state enterprises be privatized, (2) to support the development of private sector marketing and price stability by auctioning the commodities, and (3) to stimulate reforms in the national foreign exchange regime. Local currencies, generated from sale of Title III food aid among other purposes, have been used to increase resources for country development programs.



Emergency relief food aid programming

A.I.D. provides P.L. 480 Title II resources and Section 416(b) commodities to U.S. PVOs, WFP and directly to Governments for disaster and emergency relief activities. A.I.D.'s role in recent years has increasingly been directed to complex emergency relief and disaster situations. Emergencies in places, now tragically familiar to all of us, such as the Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Angola, the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Liberia, Mozambique, and the other nations affected by the 1992-93 Southern African drought emergency. In addition, increased refugee and internally displaced populations have required prolonged emergency assistance, most recently in Pakistan, in the nations surrounding Liberia, and in Mozambique and Angola, to name a few.

These disaster and emergency relief programs are perhaps the most difficult operations to undertake. By their nature they are unpredictable; relief is needed urgently - often lives are at stake, and speedy, effective delivery of relief supplies must often occur despite political disruptions, dangerously weak infrastructure, and threats to relief workers themselves, as we have seen in Somalia and in the former Yugoslavia.

Mr. Chairman, tragically, I see no change in the increasing trend in emergency relief requirements evident in recent fiscal years. The opening of the Holocaust Museum reminds us, if we ever needed such reminder, of the potential for humankind's inhumanity to one another.

This trend is magnified because global attention is often drawn to the images of feeding the starving in places like Somalia and the Sudan where an adequate international response was late in coming. Less attention is given to cases, such as the southern Africa drought, where provision of timely international food aid led by the USG averted tragedy in ten nations in Southern Africa.

Programmatically, emergency relief relies upon well-developed, close and continuous coordination within the USG, principally among OFDA, FFP and A.I.D. field Missions, the concerned regional bureaus of A.I.D. and the State Department, as well as USDA, DoD (when appropriate), and multilateral donors.

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Especially noteworthy has been the collaboration experienced with USDA in putting together relief food aid programs that I have seen over the last year and a half. Section 416(b) resources made available by USDA can be used to supplement Title II in meeting emergency and disaster needs. In FY 1991 over 678,000 metric tons of Section 416(b) commodities were made available by USDA for food programs, of which over 5,200,000 metric tons went to emergencies. In 1992 slightly more than 1.0 million metric tons were made available, virtually all of which was for emergencies. But as the committee knows, Section 416(b) availabilities are dependent on USDA commodity inventories, which, in turn, depend on international prices as well as domestic production and ultimately U.S. budget resources. Section 416(b) availabilities fluctuate and may only exist late in a fiscal year, if at all. Close collaboration between A.I.D. and USDA made possible both appropriate USG responses to major emergencies and full use of appropriated resources.

While P.L. 480 Title II and Section 416(b) in combination have enabled us to respond to the total requests for emergency assistance so far in the 1990's, we are still faced with the fact that we have only been able to meet the emergency needs by reducing commodities available for regular Title II and Title III programming.

### Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, the 1990s presents the USG with an unprecedented competition between emergency and regular program needs. These are not the 1980's when food surpluses and food aid funding readily met the famine that engulfed the African Sahel while regular programs could be maintained. This is more complex decade and a world with widespread hunger and malnutrition, (as President Clinton recently stated, a world where more than a billion people live on less than a dollar a day).

Mr. Chairman, I have tried today to show how A.I.D. has persisted in efforts to carry out efforts to combat world hunger and eradicate food insecurity. As Secretary of Agriculture Espy testified yesterday before the Committee on Agriculture, "the United States has maintained a strong commitment to combat world hunger, both as a moral obligation and as national self interest in a peaceful, prosperous world." This task is an expression of the very heart and soul of the American people. It is work motivated by their strong and undiminished humanitarian impulses. And we believe that, along with generosity of spirit, an American public increasingly aware of international events and their impact on the U.S. economy has the wisdom to see that ultimately development and democracy are the more lasting gifts we have for the suffering peoples of the world.

Statement by Christopher Goldthwait  
 Acting General Sales Manager  
 Foreign Agricultural Service  
 U.S. Department of Agriculture  
 Before the House Agriculture Subcommittee on  
 Foreign Agriculture and Hunger  
 April 29, 1993

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you this morning as Acting General Sales Manager of the U.S. Department of Agriculture to discuss food aid and the serious hunger problems that exist around the world.

Last year, an FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) study estimated the number of chronically undernourished people in developing countries at about 790 million. FAO also noted that this number, covering 1988-1990, has dropped by about 150 million since the early 1970's -- a period, I might add, during which total world population grew by some 40 percent.

So, perhaps, there is reason to be hopeful . . . to believe that the world has made some headway in combating hunger through developmental efforts, technology, trade, economic reform, and all those things that help produce growth, reduce poverty, and improve the supply and distribution of food.

We should also recognize that the United States remains the world's largest food aid donor, providing 55-60 percent of annual cereal grain donations by all countries. In addition, private aid in various forms by Americans through religious, voluntary, and business groups is even greater than official U.S. government aid.

Yet these efforts must be acknowledged with more humility than pride, because the magnitude of the problem remains enormous. With more than three-quarters of a billion people going hungry every day, with lives being lost to hunger and malnutrition, we are still a long, long way from the world we all seek. And every year, in addition to chronic problems related to poverty, the world faces new hunger emergencies. Whatever other issues we are dealing with, these realities must never be far from our minds.

Last year, I had the pleasure of testifying before the House Select Committee on Hunger on which you served. As you know Mr. Chairman, during its nine year existence, the Select Committee on Hunger provided a forum for the consideration of the diverse international issues related to hunger. Without the Select Committee to provide this forum, many including myself were concerned that hunger issues would lose the stature to which they had risen.

So, on behalf of Secretary Mike Espy and the Department, I want to commend and thank this Subcommittee for continuing to give these issues the attention they deserve. As you know, Secretary Espy has a personal commitment



-- a commitment that extends beyond the domestic pockets of hunger that continue to exist in this great country -- to combating hunger worldwide.

#### USDA Food Aid Programs

Mr. Chairman, this morning I would like to discuss the foreign food aid programs of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and their role in U.S. efforts to help alleviate world hunger and deal with current hunger emergencies.

USDA provides humanitarian food aid through three programs: the P.L. 480 title I Food for Peace Program; programs established under Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949; and the Food for Progress program established pursuant to the 1985 Act. Given the focus of this hearing, I will confine my discussion to these aid programs. However, I should mention briefly that USDA's commercial export programs are also playing an important role, coincident to their primary objectives, in helping developing countries and emerging democracies to meet their food import needs. At the same time, technical assistance, the Farmer-to-Farmer program, research, and other USDA efforts are contributing to longer term agricultural development and the transition to market economies -- efforts that, we expect, will contribute to a better fed, more prosperous world in the future.

P.L. 480 focuses on the needs of developing countries and emerging market economies. Its goals are to help meet humanitarian needs, provide needed calories and nutrients, and establish a U.S. market presence. The Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 assigns specific responsibility for title I activities to USDA. The Agency for International Development (AID) administers title II, covering emergency and private assistance donations and title III which provides food aid grants to support economic growth in lesser-developed countries. USDA does, however, assist AID in the operation of title II and III through the procurement of commodities. Also all three titles of P.L. 480 are budgeted and financed through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC).

Title I provides government-to-government financing for sales of U.S. agricultural commodities at below-market interest rates, with repayment terms up to 30 years. USDA expects to provide around 2.6 million metric tons of commodities under title I this fiscal year to about 30 countries, compared with 2.7 million tons to 24 countries last year.

Under the Section 416(b) authority, USDA provides donations of uncommitted CCC stocks to needy people overseas. During fiscal year 1993, corn, butter, and butter oil are being supplied from CCC inventories, together with more than 800,000 tons of feed wheat made available from stock rotation. Because of the limited availability of CCC-surplus corn, a substantial portion of this aid is being distributed through the multilateral World Food Program. In total, we expect to provide nearly 2 million metric tons of food to more than 40 countries this year under Section 416(b).

The Food for Progress program is implemented using either funds appropriated to carry out title I of P.L. 480, or the authorities of Section 416(b). Under this program, USDA provides commodities on grant or concessional credit terms to needy countries and emerging democracies to reward efforts toward agricultural reform and free enterprise. A significant portion of the aid is provided through U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVO's).

As you know, in implementing food for progress, the use of CCC funds for freight and other non-commodity costs is limited by law to \$30 million per year. For FY 93 only the annual 500,000-ton limit on the quantity of CCC-acquired commodities that may be provided under Food for Progress will not apply to the countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), making this program the principal U.S. response to food aid needs in the FSU. USDA expects to provide more than 2 million tons of commodities under Food for Progress this year, with all but about 450,000 tons going to the FSU. Additional tonnages are yet to be determined under the new \$700-million initiative announced in Vancouver by President Clinton earlier this month. We begin discussions with the Russians on the details of this initiative this very afternoon.

I want to point out here that USDA's aid programs are designed primarily to meet chronic, predictable food deficits rather than emergency situations, and they are targeted at countries that rank above the poorest in per capita income. As such, these programs complement the AID-administered titles of P.L. 480 that are targeted to food aid emergencies and to providing food for very poor countries. Nevertheless, USDA and AID work closely together in planning food assistance, and USDA tries to allocate resources to help meet emergency situations. USDA has generally avoided multi-year commitments to maintain maximum flexibility in its programs so as to be able to respond to changing global realities and provide the appropriate program mix to meet critical needs within available resources.

In this context, it is important to note that we have faced increased worldwide food aid needs in the last few years, coming at a time of tight resources and a serious economic slowdown in the United States and in other food donor nations. These growing needs have resulted not only from natural disasters, but to a greater extent from civil strife, ethnic conflicts, and major geopolitical changes. This has resulted, for example, in a significant commitment of resources over the last few years to respond to the needs of the emerging democracies in the FSU and Eastern Europe, as well as to urgent situations in other parts of the world, such as last year's severe drought in southern Africa.

#### Problem Countries

As we look around the world today, there are a number of problem countries that USDA and AID have identified for special attention. I will highlight just a few of these where USDA has focused some of its resource.

In central and southern Africa generally, substantially improved harvest prospects are expected to bring imports and aid levels back to more normal levels. However, there are serious problems in several areas.

In Somalia, FAO reports a substantial improvement in the late-season crop reflecting good rains and an increased availability of inputs. Nonetheless, production remains well below pre-war levels, and there are pockets of severe shortages in central and southern areas. Most of the population remains dependent on food aid.

Mozambique was one of the countries most severely affected by last year's drought, as its corn production fell more than 50 percent. The 1992-1993 crop should be well above last year's level, but this country, too, continues to require heavy transfers of food aid given the large regional disparities in cereal production, distribution problems, and an increased influx of returning refugees.

There are a number of other African countries -- from Mauritania in the north to Malawi in the south -- with emergency needs this year as a result of civil strife, poor weather, a lack of foreign exchange for imports, or other problems.

Another troubled area requiring special attention is the Transcaucasus -- particularly the former Soviet states of Armenia and Georgia. Although Armenia's grain harvest is up from last year's, the food and fuel blockade by Azerbaijan has seriously affected food availability. FAO has called the food situation "alarming". Like Armenia, Georgia is traditionally a grain-deficit state with particularly severe current problems, including reduced grain output, inadequate stocks to meet minimal needs, and a lack of foreign exchange to make up the difference through imports.

There are critical problems, as well, in the central Asian states of the FSU. In Tajikistan, for example, food distribution has been disrupted by civil strife and the breakdown of the political and economic system.

Although food aid emergencies often arise from situations that cannot be anticipated, we can identify some areas where an increased need for food assistance can be expected. For example, in the former Yugoslavian state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and in southern Sudan, continuing conflict is seriously impeding the ability to provide the food needed by desperate, and in some cases, starving populations. If and when peace comes, the need for food assistance to refugees and currently besieged areas is likely to increase dramatically. Given the other needs around the world, this will place a further demand on available food assistance resources.

#### USDA Food Aid Programming to Vulnerable Areas

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to discuss how USDA is using its food aid programs to help meet the critical needs in some of the most vulnerable areas. USDA efforts, of course, are being supplemented by food assistance provided by



AID through the P.L. 480 titles II and III programs, by programs of other nations and multilateral organizations, and by commercial shipments from the United States and other exporters.

USDA is primarily using section 416(b) donations through the World Food Program (WFP) to meet the more critical needs in several African countries. Of the planned 745,000 tons of U.S. commodity donations through the WFP, more than 560,000 tons -- or about three-fourths of the total -- are targeted to Africa. Most of this is corn.

We are, for example, providing 85,000 tons of corn to Somalia, 145,000 tons of corn to Mozambique, and 164,000 tons of corn to Malawi. Some of the other African countries receiving U.S. corn and, in some cases, butter oil through the World Food Program this year include Kenya, Rwanda, Swaziland, Zambia, Tanzania, Sudan, and Morocco.

USDA is also providing direct food assistance to a few African countries, including about 140,000 tons of corn allocated to Zimbabwe through P.L. 480 (title I) and section 416(b). AID is also supplying food to many African countries.

Another part of the world where we are focusing USDA attention, of course, is the FSU. Last month I testified before this Subcommittee, covering the full range of our commercial, concessional, and technical assistance programs for the Russian Federation and other FSU states.

As you know, U.S. government food assistance is being met primarily under the USDA-administered programs through government-to-government agreements and through U.S. PVO's. Because today's focus is on the more critical hunger problems, I will highlight our food assistance programs in the Transcaucasian and central Asian republics. The assistance is for both human consumption and for much-needed feed for livestock and is being provided under section 416(b) and the Food for Progress program.

In the Transcaucasus, we are providing assistance to two of the three republics. We plan to provide Armenia with around 260,000 metric tons of U.S. commodities, including 156,000 tons of feed wheat under 416(b), 50,000 tons of food wheat under Food for Progress, and smaller quantities of rice, dry milk, butter, butter oil, soybeans, infant formula, and flour. Georgia will also receive around 260,000 metric tons of food assistance, primarily feed and food wheat, as well as other commodities.

We are providing assistance to all five central Asian republics, but the greatest needs are in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. We plan to provide Kyrgyzstan with around 220,000 tons of aid, mainly wheat for feed and food and some butter. Food aid donations planned for Tajikistan amounts to about 4,500 metric tons, primarily flour but also some dry milk and butter oil.

I should note that these totals represent only a portion of expected USDA food assistance to the FSU states. We have additional flexibility in providing food assistance this year because the Freedom Support Act waived, with

respect to the FSU states, the 500,000-ton limit on commodities that may be made available each fiscal year under the Food for Progress program. The waiver has allowed us to respond to needs in the FSU states without restricting our efforts in other parts of the world. The waiver, however, expires at the end of the current fiscal year.

Let me mention, briefly, just a few other countries of the nearly 60 countries receiving USDA food assistance this year, again with the focus on those with the more urgent needs. In Mongolia, where three successive harvest shortfalls have created serious shortages, USDA is using section 416(b) to provide 25,000 tons of feed wheat and 7,000 tons of butter and butter oil from CCC stocks. In our own hemisphere, U.S. 416(b) commodities are being provided through the World Food Program to help respond to regional crop shortages in Peru and serious hunger problems among vulnerable populations in Central America.

#### Increased Needs

Mr. Chairman, the United States has maintained a strong commitment to combat world hunger, both as a moral obligation and as part of our national self-interest in a peaceful, prosperous world. Today, USDA and AID together are providing food assistance to help meet emergency situations and chronic food deficits in 80 countries around the world.

Allocation decisions are likely to become increasingly difficult in a world where, as President Clinton recently stated, more than a billion people live on less than a dollar a day. We anticipate increased needs related to continuing geopolitical change, a growing tide of nationalism in many regions, and the increased potential for civil strife.

We are using all the programs at our disposal to assist in meeting urgent and chronic food needs and in working through these programs and others to promote development and encourage policies that will improve food production, distribution, and trade.

One new initiative I want to mention is our intention this year to undertake, for the first time, early programming of both section 416(b) and Food for Progress assistance for next year. We have not done this in the past because we could not predict in advance the resources available to us under the two programs. This summer, we intend to make some assumptions about commodity availabilities so that we can proceed with early programming for FY 1994. Through advanced planning of this nature, we will be able to sign donation agreements and move commodities several months earlier in the fiscal year.

This is one effort we are making to be more responsive to the increased world food aid needs that have emerged over the last few years in response to the major changes in Africa, the FSU, and Eastern Europe, as well as to other events around the world.

Mr. Chairman, we recognize the increasing magnitude of the problems we face -- and their human dimensions -- and we will continue to work with AID, other U.S. agencies, and the world community in a concerted effort to make the most effective use of available resources to alleviate hunger and suffering around the world.

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**Statement by Robert W. Kates to the U.S. House of Representatives,  
Committee on Agriculture, Subcommittee on Foreign Agriculture & Hunger  
April 29, 1993**

*My name is Robert W. Kates. I am University Professor and Director-emeritus of the Alan Shawn Feinstein World Hunger Program at Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island. The World Hunger Program is the unique research center that combines basic research on the causes and prevention of hunger with efforts to bring together and to communicate what is known about world hunger and the policies required to end it. Currently I serve as Co-chair of an international nongovernmental advisory group of scientists, advocates, and practitioners under the title of Overcoming Hunger in the 1990s. I am a geographer by training and a member of the National Academy of Sciences. In 1991, I received from President Bush the National Medal of Science, for among other research, "studies on the prevalence and the prevention of world hunger"*

Before beginning my testimony I would make a personal observation. In our lifetimes, most of us encounter few heroes, and it is probably the same in Congress as elsewhere. Yet I have been fortunate in the last five years to meet two such heroes, both of them Congressmen. One is with us today in spirit, Mickey Leland, the other is Tony Hall. Brown University is proud to have honored the House Select Committee on Hunger with the Alan Shawn Feinstein World Hunger Award for Public Service in 1988. The Select Committee's torch has been passed to you. Grasp it proudly!

I have been asked to give you an overview on international hunger and what might be done to overcome it. Thus I will try to do three things: to bring you up to date on trends in the prevalence of world hunger, to describe the international consensus that has produced a common hunger agenda for the 1990s, and to outline the opportunities for U. S. leadership in implementing that agenda.

#### **Trends in the Prevalence of World Hunger**

International hunger has many faces. For most people hunger is synonymous with famine. Famine is the only form of hunger that you are likely to see on television. Famine is frequently associated with large and persistent food shortages, although we now know that people can suffer famine because of their inability to have access to food even when food is available. Indeed, all current famines stem primarily from the use of hunger as a weapon in war.

Despite our sense that famine is rampant, the numbers affected by famine as compared to other, less acute forms of hunger, are relatively small—15-35 million at risk at anytime in recent years—and are declining. The trend in famines since the end of World War II is clearly downward, reflecting a lessening of famine and a major shift in famine incidence from populous Asia to less-populated Africa. Indeed, even as we focus on the horrors of famine in Somalia, the numbers at risk to famine continue to decline. Indeed, Somalia can mark a turning point in the age-old struggle against famine (I have appended my recent analysis of the famine situation from the April 8th issue of the *New England Journal of Medicine*).

If we define as hungry individuals whose dietary intake is inadequate for growth, activity, and good health, then the faces of the hungry are many. According to the latest estimates by the United Nations Subcommittee on Nutrition as of 1990, more than a billion people worldwide suffered one or more nutritional deficiencies. Such deficiencies included the 786 million who lived in households too poor to obtain the food they need for health and modest levels of activity, the 400 million underweight women, and the 184 million wasted and stunted children under the age of five. Hundreds of millions more suffer anemia, goiter, or impaired sight; or die from diets with too little iron, iodine, or Vitamin A (see Table 1).

The trends show good news and bad news. Over the last 25 years the proportion of malnourished individuals in developing countries has decreased from 33% to 20% and of children from 42% to 34%, yet the number of hungry children has actually increased from 168 million to 184 million because of rapid population growth. Regionally, hunger has increased in Africa, decreased slowly in South Asia and Latin America, and rapidly in East and Southeast Asia.



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ACC/SCN Second Report on the World Nutrition Situation 1992  
Chapter 1 Overview

Table 1. Malnutrition in Developing Countries, 1975-1990

	Percent affected		Number (millions)	
	1974-76	1988-90	1974-76	1988-90
<b>GENERAL MALNUTRITION</b>				
1. Population (all ages) with energy intake (kcal/caput/day) on average below 1.54 BMR over one year	33%	20%	976	786
	1975	1990	1975	1990
2. Children (under five years) with weight below -2 S.D. of reference	42%	34%	168	184
	1980s	1980s		
3. Women (15-49 years old) with weight below 45 kg.	45%		400	
<b>MICRONUTRIENT MALNUTRITION</b>				
4. Anaemia: women (15-49 years old) haemoglobin < 12 g/dl (non pregnant) or < 11 g/dl (pregnant)	42%		370	
5. Iodine deficiency disorders (IDD) Goiter (all ages)	5.6%		211	
6. Vitamin A deficiency: children (under five years) with xerophthalmia	2.8%		13.8	

Notes:

1. Data on population with low energy intake (underfed) were calculated by FAO. The estimates are averages for 1974 to 1976 and 1988 to 1990.
2. Underweight children results are estimated by ACC/SCN, for children aged 0 through 60 months, using a cut-off of -2 S.D. of the median NCHS reference.
3. The estimate of underweight adult women is calculated from ACC/SCN's database on women's nutrition. The 45 kg cut-off is used as a basis for comparison, as that commonly reported. The prevalence estimates exclude pregnant and lactating women but these are included in the calculation of numbers.
4. Anaemia estimates are based on ACC/SCN's database on women's nutrition. The cut-off points for anaemia use the WHO reference for pregnant and non-pregnant women. See
5. IDD estimates are based on WHO and ICCIUD data.
6. Vitamin A deficiency estimates are based on WHO data.

Finally, as this is a committee concerned with agriculture, a word on global food sufficiency. Considering the world as a single region, global food sufficiency depends on the standard of food sufficiency adopted and the assumed purchasing power of the population. For example, it is widely believed that there is actually plenty of food in the world and that hunger results mainly from its maldistribution. This is certainly true for a world universally content with a basic vegetarian diet. Distributed equally according to need, the vegetarian food supply plus the naturally grazed animals, could feed about 120% of the world's current population. But for a world whose diet contains a modest amount of animals fed with cereal grains, there is only enough food produced at present for three-quarters of the world's population. And to feed people with a healthy but animal-rich industrialized nation diet, there would only be enough food for 50% of the world's population. These figures do not necessarily imply that people cause hunger by eating cereal-fed animals or that there is or will be a global food shortage.

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Economists rightly point out that if poor countries and peoples had greater purchasing power there could easily be greater production of food, as the world has much unused capacity for raising food.

#### The Hunger Agenda for the 1990s

In November 1989, a major nongovernmental initiative, the *Bellagio Declaration: Overcoming Hunger in the 1990s* proposed four achievable goals for the 1990s: (1) to eliminate deaths from famine; (2) to end hunger in half of the poorest households; (3) to cut malnutrition in half for mothers and small children; and (4) to eradicate iodine and Vitamin A deficiencies. Together, these comprised a comprehensive yet practical program to end half of world hunger in the 1990s by building on the better and best of programs and policies for overcoming hunger. The most promising programs, the Declaration found, were those that empower people to assess their own condition and to act in their own behalf, that provided short-term hunger relief while addressing deeply rooted causes, and that could be sustained over the long term.

In the 42 months since its production, the Declaration has been widely disseminated—even emulated—the individual goals have been adopted in many fora, and major efforts at implementation are under way. At the same time, renewed conflict, slowed economies, and population growth increase the numbers at risk of hunger and make the halving of hunger more difficult to achieve.

The Declaration itself has been endorsed, to date, by over 360 technical experts, advocates, practitioners, and opinion leaders in 65 countries. The goals of the Declaration have been adopted in various fora and in somewhat differing formats. Even preceding Bellagio, the World Food Council had adopted in its Cairo Declaration a statement supporting goals of "...the elimination of starvation and death caused by famine; a substantial reduction of malnutrition and mortality among young children; a tangible reduction in chronic hunger; and the elimination of major nutritional diseases." Through this more general formulation, the goals have been included in the UN Development Decade Strategy for the 1990s. The Bellagio goals relating to children and to micronutrient deficiencies were adopted by the extraordinary gathering of heads of state in the World Summit for Children held in New York in 1990. Finally, the intergovernmental International Conference on Nutrition, attended by 162 nations in December of 1992, affirmed the human rights to food and nutrition and adopted the goals of the World Summit for Children (including cutting child undernutrition in half) and declared, as well, that an end to famine deaths and elimination of Vitamin A and iodine deficiencies are achievable goals by the end of the decade. In short, these goals in various formats have emerged as the international hunger agenda for the 1990s.

Major efforts are under way to implement each of the four goals:

- Ending famine deaths crucially depends on being able to provide humanitarian assistance in zones of armed conflict. U.S. leadership in Somalia (and one hopes as well in Bosnia) has provided new precedents for delivering such assistance through the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other nongovernmental agencies. In turn, the United Nations has sought to improve upon the delivery of humanitarian assistance in zones of armed conflict by creating a special fund and coordinating the diffuse responsibilities within agencies under a new deputy secretary-general. The ready availability of U.S. food aid is a basic requirement for such emergency food aid.
- The World Bank, following on the "personal commitment" of its new President, has renewed its efforts to address poverty, exemplified by efforts to increase funding for nutrition, to provide food security in Africa, to introduce poverty considerations in all Bank activities, and to include "poverty conditionality" in bank lending.
- Under the leadership of the World Health Organization and UNICEF, national plans to halve hunger among mothers and children and to implement the World Summit for Children's goals are being prepared in 72 countries. Integrated efforts to encourage breastfeeding, to monitor growth and supplement feeding, and to break the nexus between illness and undernutrition by

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immunization and oral rehydration are having measurable effects in reducing childhood wasting and stunting. U.S. support for such child survival activities has been steadfast.

- Following a series of major international gatherings, international and national agencies, the technical community, and international voluntary groups are vigorously attacking the "hidden hunger" of micronutrient deficiencies. Efforts are under way to supplement iron, iodine, and Vitamin A intake, to fortify commonly available foods with appropriate micronutrients, and to encourage the use of foods naturally rich in these nutrients. Creative new approaches are being sought for implementing such interventions and linking efforts addressed to individual nutrients. U.S. leadership on Vitamin A in particular has been outstanding.

These encouraging actions, are however, primarily "top-down" initiatives that address only individual goals of the Declaration. What is still missing is a focal point for pursuing a comprehensive program for overcoming hunger rather than particular goals; a reliable process for assessing progress; an independent forum for resolving tensions; and most important, a bringing together of the grassroots and the summit at scales sufficient to make halving hunger a reality. This last point is most important. When we met at Bellagio 42 months ago, we were encouraged by the enormous and spontaneous growth of local, indigenous grassroots organizations throughout the developing countries. We thought then, and still believe, that if their energy, local initiative, and insight could be effectively linked to the international hunger agenda, then there is real opportunity to take a giant step forward in cutting hunger in half.

Finally, a word about costs. Based on yearly per capita costs of large scale programs already in existence, \$25 can stave off famine, \$20-25 can eliminate hunger in poorest households, \$15 can address malnourishment among small children, and a bargain 50¢ can provide Vitamin A or 7¢ can provide iodine to those in need.

A bill to each of the 1.2 billion citizens of the developed countries for halving hunger would appear thus

### INVOICE

To: Developed Country Citizen  
From: Overcoming Hunger in the 1990s  
For: Annual services to be rendered to the hungry of the world

To eliminate deaths from famine	\$0.55 billion
To reduce hunger among poorest households	\$6.41 billion
To cut malnutrition among women and children	\$1.61 billion
To eradicate Iodine and Vitamin A deficiencies	\$0.17 billion
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$8.74 billion</b>

**Your share: 1/1,206,600,000                      \$7.24**

*Payable Annually 1991-2000*

- ☐ Government   ☐ Private Voluntary Org.   ☐ Both  
☐ Taxes   ☐ Credit Card   ☐ Check   ☐ Cash

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Thus a realistic program to combat hunger in the 1990s would cost less than \$10 billion a year and might require only \$4-5 billion more in new resources because an amount equal to that is already being spent, albeit not necessarily well. Thus more important than money, halving hunger in the 1990s requires renewed social energy and political will, the creative employment of local institutions and underutilized resources, and increases in the level of public support.

#### U.S. Leadership

In 1990, I testified before the House Select Committee on Hunger as follows:

"Yet for the first time in human history, the end of famine is achievable. Endemic goiter and Vitamin A blindness can be eliminated. The wasting and stunting of small children and the starvation of their mothers can be halted. Most nations, even very poor ones, could meet their minimal overall nutritional needs, even if distributing food adequately proves more difficult. The worst forms of urban food poverty and rural food insecurity can be halved.

The United States can contribute in a major way to such an effort if we build on our skills and experience. A U.S. initiative could include the following:

- *To eliminate deaths from famine:* Maintain the moral high ground in addressing hunger as a weapon of war by leading in the provision of humanitarian aid and seeking safe passage in zones of armed conflict.

- *To end hunger in half the poorest households:* Make sure that our generosity in providing food aid is matched by the neediness of its recipients. Use our experience in targeting food aid, at home and abroad, to make such aid more effective. Find ways to make our assistance of microenterprises work for truly poor people. Make sure that our external assistance and that of other donors does not undermine hungry farmers' production incentives and access to resources. Use short-term support for hungry people in Africa to help build a rural infrastructure for internal markets.

- *To cut malnutrition in half for mothers and small children:* Build upon the current efforts on child survival with activities and support rising to double the current level. Assist mothers with support for child spacing.

- *To eradicate iodine and Vitamin A deficiencies:* Build upon the experience in both research and practice in addressing Vitamin A, with a clear U.S. commitment to seek eradication within the decade.

- *Overall:* Provide a global challenge to match 1:3, a U.S. commitment of a billion dollars per annum in new resources."

Three years later, this list of possible U.S. initiatives is still relevant. Overcoming hunger remains a unique, low-cost opportunity to make a better post-cold war world. Although not all of us can hope to be heroes, this Subcommittee can carry forward the inspiration of Mickey Leland and Tony Hall and be heroes on behalf of hungry people everywhere.

(Attachment follows:)



## WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE

The following will be held in Detroit, unless otherwise indicated: "Medical Investigations of Death" (April 22 and 23); "Science and Politics of Women's Health in America" (May 12-15); "All Michigan OB-GYN Review" (Ypsilanti, Mich., May 17-22); and "6th Annual Summer Conference on Aging" (Novi, Mich., June 7-10).

Contact WSUSM, Div. of CME, Univ. Health Ctr., 4201 St. Antoine, 4-H, Detroit, MI 48201; or call (313) 577-1180.

## MECHANISMS OF CARCINOGENESIS

The "Baptist Memorial Health Care Foundation Forum on Cancer Research" will be held in Memphis, Tenn., on April 23.

Contact Dr. James E. Hamner, Univ. of Tennessee, Memphis, 62 S. Dunlap, Rm. 511, Memphis, TN 38163; or call (901) 528-6354.

## UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

The following courses will be offered in Buffalo: "Recombinant DNA Technology: Methods and Applications" (April 19-23); "Methods of Immunologic Research and Diagnosis" (May 10-20); and "Latex Particle Immunossays" (May 21 and 22).

Contact Dr. Roger K. Cunningham, UB, Ernest Witbeck Cr. for Immunology, 266 Sherman Hall, 3435 Main St., Buffalo, NY 14214; or call (716) 829-2901.

## TULANE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER

The following courses will be offered in New Orleans: "Update Your Pediatrics" (April 22-24) and "Dermatology Update and All That Jazz" (April 28-30). Contact TUMC, Office of CME, 1440 Canal St., Box 55, Suite 1611, New Orleans, LA 70112-2699; or call (504) 588-5466.

## SPECIAL REPORTS

## ENDING DEATHS FROM FAMINE

## The Opportunity in Somalia

AS we witnessed the starvation, disease, and dying in Somalia, it was surely difficult to remember that Somalia was the site of the greatest triumph of 20th-century international public health. There, in October 1977, Ali Maow Maalin, a 23-year-old cook in the town of Merca, was identified as having "the world's last endemic case of smallpox."<sup>1</sup> Now, more than 15 years later, Somalia may again prove to be a turning point in the much longer and larger human struggle to end deaths from famine. To understand that opportunity amid all the pain and suffering requires a sense of that long struggle, an assessment of the trends in cause, prevalence, and prevention of modern famines, and the specific challenges of undertaking humanitarian action in the midst of armed conflict.

Food shortage and subsequent starvation are what is popularly conceived of as famine: an absolute shortage of food within a bounded area, usually caused by the failure or destruction of crops or by wartime sieges or blockades. But studies of major modern famines—in the Soviet Union in 1932 through 1934, Bengal, India, in 1943, China in 1958 through 1961, and Ethiopia in 1972 through 1973 and 1984 through 1986—indicate that widespread hunger and starvation can occur even when food is available if large numbers of people lose their capacity to produce, purchase, exchange, or receive food.<sup>2</sup> Thus, a sudden increase in food prices, a drop in laborers' incomes, or a change in government policy can create hunger for millions even in the absence of the more familiar causes of food shortage: droughts, floods, pests, or armed conflict.

Famine is as old as humanity. Its occurrence is inferred from paleoforensic data in the Harris lines

of long bones and in the Wilson bands of teeth.<sup>3</sup> It is recorded in the 4000-year-old lamentation for the Mesopotamian city of Ur after one of the earliest Iranian-Iraqi wars: "In all its streets, where they were wont to promenade, dead bodies were lying about; Ur — its weak and strong perished by hunger."<sup>4</sup> It is displayed on the stelae all around the Roman empire that laud the generosity of the wealthy politician who supplied grain in the region's great moment of need.<sup>5</sup> And it is carefully documented in the "last great subsistence crisis in the Western world,"<sup>6</sup> which hit Europe and North America in 1816.

The 1816 crisis was also a turning point in the struggle to end deaths due to famine. The year was known in New England as "the year without summer," when wet, cold weather throughout North America and Western Europe was triggered by the dust veil that followed the eruption of Mount Tambora in Indonesia. Crop and harvest failures combined with the unsettled economic conditions in post-Napoleonic Europe led to widespread food crises. But in this case, unlike the frequent famines of the previous century, European states and cities organized to prevent famine deaths by raising funds and importing food from Russia and the Baltic states. The new commitment not to accept deaths due to famine as inevitable was seen everywhere in Europe except two areas, Ireland and Transylvania, each still beyond the pale of the dominant empires of Great Britain and Austro-Hungary. This commitment would again fail the Irish in 1847 and particular populations in the two world wars of this century, but overall it would hold in Europe and then be gradually extended to other parts of the world. To this day, the 19th-century famine codes serve as a basic framework for the highly successful programs of famine prevention and relief in India.<sup>7</sup>

Famine, while frequent in history, is never ordinary. Food is the most basic of human needs, and mechanisms to cope with periodic food shortage are features of the earliest social systems. For the mechanisms of famine prevention to fail, multiple stresses, such

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as the "year without summer" coinciding with an economic depression, are almost always required. Over time, the natural causes of famine — drought, flood, pests, and disease that lead to crop failure and animal death — have become relatively less important. Social causes of famine have become correspondingly more important as the nature of food procurement has changed from simple access to natural resources and the help of kinfolk to a complex set of productive resources, exchanges, and gifts. And throughout time, famine created in the course of war has persisted, even as the scale and technology of warfare have changed.

Food sources now include the entire globe instead of the area bounded by the earlier limits of a day's walk, a hunting trip, or a seasonal migration. This enlargement of scale, however, so important to the reduction of scarcity, renders some areas marginal and courts catastrophe when errors in food-system management occur. Big food systems can make big mistakes. Thus, the worst famine of the 20th century, the Chinese famine of 1959 through 1961, in which between 15 million and 30 million people died, was rooted primarily in state policies connected with the ill-fated "great leap forward" that devastated the Chinese food-producing system while ignoring the warning signs of increasing stress.<sup>8</sup>

Famine is the only form of hunger that one is likely to see on television. The power and immediacy of the medium creates a sense of widespread and increasing vulnerability. Yet the numbers affected by famine — now 15 million to 35 million at risk — are relatively small. Other less acute forms of hunger, however, are much more common. The recent International Conference on Nutrition estimated that 780 million people in developing countries lack access to enough food to meet their basic daily needs for health, growth, and light activity (an average daily caloric requirement of 1.54 times the basal metabolic rate).<sup>9</sup> In addition, one child in six in the world is born underweight, and almost two in five children are underweight by the age of five.<sup>10</sup> Some 2 billion people, mostly women and children, are deficient in one or more of the three major micronutrients: iron, iodine, and vitamin A.<sup>11</sup>

The total population residing in countries where episodes of famine have been reported in *The New York Times* can serve to indicate the population at risk. Figure 1 shows such a measure from 1950 through 1991.<sup>12</sup> By this measure, the trend in famines since the end of World War II is clearly downward, reflecting a lessening of the prevalence of famine and a major shift in the incidence of famine from populous Asia to less-populated Africa. The total population in countries with reported famine peaked in the period from 1957 through 1963 at a yearly average of almost 788 million, then declined to a yearly average of 264 million in 1978 through 1984. This decline continued over the next seven years (from 1985 through 1991), when the combined population of famine-plagued countries averaged 141 million. And it declined further in 1992,




Figure 1. The Average Total Population of the Countries Where Famine Was Reported in *The New York Times* from 1950 through 1991.

Yearly averages for each seven-year period are shown.

when famine was reported only in Somalia and Sudan, which have a combined population of 35 million.

Four years ago, an ad hoc international group meeting in Bellagio, Italy, found that it was theoretically possible to halve hunger in this decade by building on the successful efforts that were currently under way.<sup>13</sup> Four specific goals were adopted: to eliminate deaths from famine; to end hunger in half the poorest households; to cut malnutrition in half among mothers and children; and to eradicate iodine and vitamin A deficiencies.<sup>14</sup> The optimism that underlay these commitments, even in the midst of disaster, was based on the long-term downward trend in the size of the populations affected by famine and the knowledge that most of the elements required to prevent famine were already in place.

The effort to cope with drought, flood, war, and famine in the 1980s led to major improvements in the global emergency-food-aid system. Early-warning systems, dispersed emergency stocks, continuing commitment on the part of donors, and improved logistical and distributional capability either now exist or can readily be brought into being.<sup>15</sup> An important international early-warning system coordinated by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization was established in 1975, and several regional systems are in operation as well. Some 2 to 4 million metric tons of emergency food aid have been distributed annually in recent years. With the continuing commitment of donors, it should be possible to place emergency stocks near where they may be most useful and to deliver them when and where needed.

In all of the countries that have reported famine so far in the 1990s — Angola, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia, and Sudan — armed conflict has been a major cause. Indeed, "food wars" — conflicts in which a principal feature has been the destruction or interdiction of civilian food supplies or of resources to produce food — became a consistent feature of the Cold War years.<sup>16</sup> For example, in 1989, there were 19 such food wars.<sup>16</sup> In the 1990s, armed conflict became the dominant cause of famine worldwide.

Thus, the key obstacle to eliminating deaths due to famine remains the destruction or interdiction of civilian food supplies in zones of armed conflict. The rudi-

ments of the international protection of civilians' right to food exist in the form of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and most specifically, the 1977 protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 that prohibit starvation of civilians as a means of combat. Ad hoc humanitarian efforts to deliver food to civilian populations in conflict-torn Mozambique and southern Sudan had some success in staving off mass starvation. But the efforts broke down with the eruption into armed conflict after the Cold War of political, ethnic, religious, and even clan-based rivalries. Old and new conflicts threaten civilian food supplies in Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Kurdish regions of Turkey, Iran and Iraq, Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia, and Sudan.

The current efforts in Somalia follow in the path of the "corridors of tranquillity" established in southern Sudan (routes successfully negotiated with the help of strong international pressure to provide cross-border relief within that zone of conflict<sup>15</sup>) and the opening of the port of Massawa in the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict. Another precedent was the direct use of force by the Allied Coalition to ensure a protected Kurdish enclave in Iraq.<sup>16</sup> These efforts paved the way for the military force led by the United States that has provided the necessary space for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.

If the operations in Somalia are to be a turning point in the long struggle against famine, they must lead to the development of rules of humanitarian intervention. The reluctance of some to intervene in Somalia and of many to undertake similar operations in Bosnia arises partly from the sense that the United States and the world are now on a slippery slope. Many Americans are concerned that intervention will bring, at worst, other Lebanons and Vietnams or, at best, continued tasks and moral fatigue for the United States in its role as the would-be world policeman. For the world, intervention conjures up fears that the now lone superpower will interfere in the affairs of other nations wherever its imperial designs or concerns raised by CNN's television coverage take it. Thus, while there is a pressing need to move along the process of humanitarian intervention if we are to realize the promise of ending deaths from famine, there is also a need to take the process beyond the media-mediated moral claims that require both public exposure and enormous death tolls to bring forth action. (A beginning can be found in the Providence Principles on Humanitarian Action in Armed Conflict, which identify the primacy of life-threatening suffering wherever it may occur and assert that assistance should be appropriate to local needs and given in a nonpartisan and open manner.<sup>17</sup>) Most important, and most controversially, when humanitarianism and sovereignty clash, a new understanding of sovereign rights must be developed that defers to urgent humanitarian needs. Stated simply, no nation has the right to starve its own or other people.

Beyond such emerging principles, there is a need for a new system of humanitarian assistance, a graduated response that uses armed intervention only as a last resort. Such a system would require the various United Nations agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the regional intergovernmental groups, and the international and national nongovernmental organizations to be prepared for a range of appropriate responses to the humanitarian needs of civilian populations in conflict, including protection by armed forces and preventive enforcement of the peace.

Our intervention in Somalia takes us into the truly unknown territory of world order and disorder, of conflicts of principles and claims of compassion, and the reach and overreach of power. If we are not to be overwhelmed by the difficulty of traveling into the unknown, it is useful to recall the true length and nature of the journey.

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STATEMENT OF  
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THE BEST OF TIMES, THE WORST OF TIMES:  
CONFRONTING WORLD HUNGER

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

It is a genuine privilege to be with you today as the committee launches its initial oversight hearing on international hunger issues. As a former professional staff member of the House Select Committee on Hunger, I find it particularly encouraging that the new Congress and the Agriculture Committee elect to send an early, clear signal that the commitment to addressing chronic hunger and subsequent human suffering has not lapsed with the demise of the Hunger Committee itself.

My few words today stem from sixteen years experience in both the operational and the policy determination aspects of providing as effective humanitarian assistance as is possible to the world's hungry and displaced -- whether victims of drought, natural disaster, civil strife, ethnic or religious clashes, or, of course, simply acute poverty. That experience and my analysis of what is transpiring around the world today leads me to the conclusion that this committee faces both unique challenges and opportunities. There are compelling reasons to be optimistic about reducing hunger in the world parallel to a series of harsh realities which serve to dampen that hope.

Why would anyone be optimistic about reducing if not eradicating hunger in a world in which 35,000 humans perish every day from starvation and the diseases associated with chronic malnutrition? There are several reasons.

- First, despite the rather terrifying numbers still associated with population growth rates in too many of the world's poorest nations, the ability of the world to produce enough food for the current population and that predicted for at least the near term is not in question. There is, and will be, enough food to ensure survival for all -- assuming positive resolutions of other issues, of course. Once-popular theories of ever expanding starvation in a world engulfed by misery and deprivation are faulty. The human condition is improving, not worsening.



- Awareness and concern over hunger and malnutrition in the world has expanded and deepened. More people are aware of the problem -- and the true nature of the problem -- and are demanding an addressing of it by elected and appointed leaders, such as the members of this committee. It will be, I believe, increasingly difficult for governments and international development agencies to ignore hunger alleviation as a central obligation. A Universal Right to Freedom from Hunger accord, as promoted by Congressman Hall, is not as remote an occurrence as some may think. Even the definition of national sovereignty may alter as pressures expand to prevent brutality and the use of food as a political weapon by authoritarian governments.
- There are encouraging locations on the world map today where hunger, once the dominant human story, is in retreat. Illustratively, my work has centered on Ethiopia more than any other country. The image of Ethiopia is that of a famine-stricken land of horror and almost unspeakable human depravation -- and indeed those that worked in Ethiopia during the 1984/85 famine will never lose the searing images of tens of thousands of starving people gathered in bleak "relief camps" with little or no food or water to offer. But today, famine has been broken in Ethiopia. The long civil war is over, the tyranny of Mengistu's dictatorship has ended, the rains have returned -- and Ethiopia is green! I have just returned from my twelfth visit to the country and have never been more encouraged about the possibilities of addressing, at long last, the underlying development needs of the country. The most recent harvest was a dramatic increase over those of all recent years.

And Ethiopia is not alone. There are other countries offering renewed hope for progress in addressing hunger -- neighboring Eritrea is one. (It is not overly insightful to observe that there is a direct correlation between the establishment of democratic government and an open economy and the reduction of hunger, as both Ethiopia and Eritrea somewhat illustrate.)

- There is simply an improved capacity on the part of non-governmental organizations, indigenous and international, as well as donor governments and international development agencies to link immediate hunger alleviation programs with the underlying constraints to development which create food insecurity. There is, for example, a growing understanding that early market interventions can do more to ensure an adequate supply of food than a later (and far more expensive) delivery of relief commodities. There is a growing understanding that the value of food aid quite often lies in a monetization approach -- converting food to cash -- rather than direct feeding. At completely another level, the economic restructuring programs supported by the World Bank are bearing fruit and countries like Ghana are moving from dependency to self-sufficiency. In short, we collectively know how to do some things better.
- Also, there are a number of countries around the world where development is taking off, a phenomenon frequently associated with either economic liberalization or expanded political rights. This offers the best guarantee for expanded in-country food security and, of course, expands the international pool from which assistance in various forms can originate. In contrast to an earlier era, India today is the provider of food aid, as it was during the Ethiopian famine of 1984/85. China, now with the world's fastest expanding economy, is long free from famine.

There are other reasons to be encouraged. But it is important to balance the picture, for there are many reasons to be troubled as one contemplates hunger in our world of plenty.

- First, as the United Nations comes into a new era of assumed responsibility and authority, we must honestly confront the fact that the UN's humanitarian assistance regime is in dire need of radical overhaul and restructuring. It simply is not adequate for the demands on the system. Basically unknown to the public, but easy to document, is the recent example of the UN's inept and unprofessional performance in the midst of the Somali disaster. The UN's initial response to

Somalia was, in fact, a parallel disaster to the one imposed on the Somali people by Siad Barre and the clan warlords.

- There are too many other Somalias waiting for us around the corner and there is a frightening lack of preparation for these easily foreseeable tragedies. Who, for example, is working on the contingency plans for humanitarian assistance to Zaire when everything explodes in that troubled land? How are we going to respond to the hungry victims of genocide in southern Sudan? What efforts are underway to quickly aid the victims of renewed civil war in Angola? There is scant effort visible to either bring about the effective restructuring of the UN's humanitarian assistance system to deal with the multitude of such emergencies that will be faced in the aftermath of the Cold War or specific preparation for these mentioned already in focus.
- As a consequence of both the end of the Cold War and budget paralysis here in Washington, there is an alarming possibility of retreat on the part of the United States from long-standing international development obligations and leadership in fighting poverty, disease, high population growth rates, environmental degradation and the other contributors to human hunger. Hunger can be reduced, then eliminated, but not without a long-term commitment to the underlying causes -- all of which ultimately relate to either the denial of human rights or acute poverty (normally in concert, of course). If the Congress allows a chipping away of development assistance funds due to political or budgetary pressures, then there will be a diminished American impact on hunger alleviation. If the Congress allows a transfer of those already limited funds to legitimate but separate needs in the former Soviet bloc countries, the same result will be manifest for the hungry children of Sub-Saharan Africa, Haiti and other areas suffering from food insecurity.

To be clear, this does not suggest that in order to have impact in seriously addressing hunger alleviation we must look at a vast expansion of the foreign aid budget; we do not. We must, however, look at reallocations within that budget

and maintain a firm commitment to providing the best possible development aid at generous levels... or our impact will diminish.

While the United States has a humanitarian assistance system -- emergency food and non-food relief assistance through the Agency for International Development primarily -- often far more effective and practical than that offered by the UN or by other donor governments, it is a system in need of redesign -- and expanded accountability and oversight. The politicizing of humanitarian assistance over the past several years is alarming and threatens to undermine long-standing American traditions of non-political humanitarianism. One year ago, I was witness to a basically fraudulent U.S. Government "emergency relief program" in the former Soviet Union that had little if anything to do with either the humanitarian -- or political -- needs in Russia or elsewhere for which we paid hundreds of millions of dollars to deliver essentially useless surplus. Very few people ate better or lived better as a result of our alleged humanitarian intervention.

Now we seem to be moving very quickly toward an expanded role for the military in our humanitarian programs, but without much debate on the policy guidelines which should accompany such a move. This is not a criticism of the military intervention in Somalia -- without which we would have seen a death toll of truly staggering proportions and the total collapse of relief efforts -- but simply to register a cautious note about possibly moving too quickly to a new system without adequate consideration of complex questions. The military option is not too frequently going to be the only or even best option and never the least expensive.

The U.S. Government's humanitarian assistance system simply needs greater policy input from the non-governmental humanitarian community and greater monitoring by the Congress. A system now too closed needs to be opened to greater scrutiny.



- The specter of expanded ethnic and religious clashes around the world, but especially in lands where food security is marginal in any case, is very real and very troubling. That, of course, is the story in Bosnia and Somalia and the Sudan today and threatens the unraveling of too many other societies. All of the positive reflections on Ethiopia offered in this testimony, for example, could become invalid if the ethnic tensions in that country overwhelm the drive toward democracy and development. This factor relates to virtually all the others relevant to a discussion on alleviating hunger and shortens the time frame in which we can move to correct systemic problems and/or move to exploit opportunities.

There are a number of critical issues on which this committee could appropriately focus its attention for maximum impact. I will humbly offer my short priority list based on a belief that if this body can work in a synergetic fashion with others in the Congress, the Clinton Administration and the humanitarian community, significant impact can be realized, and in the near term.

- First, I urge this committee to join the growing chorus demanding drastic, dramatic, serious and immediate overhaul of the United Nations' humanitarian assistance mechanisms. Some of the children in Somalia died as a result of UN bungling and weakness. There are many historic reasons for the sad state of affairs at the UN, including long neglect by the United States, but for whatever reasons it is a body in need of repair and redesign concurrent with if not in advance of an expanded role in responding to internal conflict, the flow of refugees, the politically and ethnically displaced, the hungry, and peacekeeping. And the problems are too overwhelming to be wished away. This will take a concerted effort over time by a number of players and this committee can help activate that process.
- Two, the entire foreign assistance program of the United States needs to be strengthened and radically overhauled -- not an easy task politically, but an essential one for a host of reasons. The decline in the effectiveness of the Agency

for International Development over the past several years is a disgrace and the irrelevance of our foreign assistance legislation is a major obstacle to the needed bureaucratic restructuring; it is of course impossible to design any structure to respond to as many competing and mutually exclusive objectives as AID is asked to do. The transition from a Cold War approach to foreign aid -- one that allowed this country to provide more dollars to Mobutu in Zaire than to virtually the rest of Africa combined for many years, a reality with a stark legacy staring us in face -- to a sustainable development one more likely to help alleviate hunger will not be easy or automatic. And political courage is required to support such a transition and to educate the public on the tangible possibilities we have to make inroads against acute poverty and hunger.

There is documented evidence that the American public overwhelmingly supports tax dollars going for humanitarian purposes abroad if they are certain of positive impact. This committee can help strengthen that support by freeing foreign aid of special interests and a Cold War framework. Money to reduce hunger need not be seen as money going down the "rat hole."

Three, more directly, I suggest the committee consider calling for the establishment of a "blue ribbon commission" comprised of members of the Administration, the Congress, the humanitarian and religious communities, and the press to conduct a review of the humanitarian assistance policy and programs of the United States Government. The specific purposes of the commission would be multiple, including: identifying appropriate monitoring mechanisms to ensure a more consistent and non-political response to human emergency; suggesting criteria for the use of U.S. military units in the provision of humanitarian aid; establishing accountability criteria for various agencies and officials for early reporting of/response to emerging disasters; and, exploring bureaucratic structuring of and coordination requirements within the official humanitarian assistance arms of the U.S. Government. The commission should further consider options for standing liaison mechanisms between these arms and the humanitarian community and the press.

- Four, this committee would have obvious interests and expertise in improving the mechanisms for delivering the food aid components of humanitarian assistance. Monetization in my view should be considerably expanded. Title III of PL-480 should be expanded. There are additional approaches and reforms which together can help ensure that sending surplus American grain to the hungry is not an end in itself, but more appropriately an effective addressing of the underlying causes of the hunger.

The conclusion I have reached over the years is that making serious strides in reducing hunger and malnutrition and even acute poverty is indeed possible. We have seen the measurable impact of concerted efforts in Ethiopia a few years ago and Somalia currently where emergency relief programs of the United States, as well as those of other donors and the United Nations, have saved the lives of literally millions of people. We have seen the success of even more difficult long-term development efforts in a host of countries and on a number of fronts where the various factors which produce hunger have been addressed -- Guinea worm and other infectious diseases are being eradicated, immunization rates are up dramatically, crop production is up, population growth rates are down, more girls and women are gaining access to education, micro-enterprise businesses are providing food security to millions.

It is possible to continue make these strides, but it is not easy. I would urge this committee to take a long and a broad view of the problem and then to move forward on as many of the basic factors as it can. This testimony has outlined a few of those; there are additional issues of equal importance. I would further urge this committee to take bold and courageous steps in an honest addressing of the challenge... as the choices are to take these steps or to be witness to an agonizing series of Somalia-like scenarios playing themselves out before us. That would be bad enough, but it would especially painful knowing that we have not done what we could to prevent such tragedy.

I thank the committee for the opportunity to present these views.

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**Testimony  
of  
John Swenson  
Acting Executive Director  
  
on behalf of  
Catholic Relief Services - USCC**

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to testify on behalf of Catholic Relief Services on issues of mutual concern to your committee and our agency --- international hunger.

Catholic Relief Services, one of the largest international relief and development agencies in this country, is celebrating its 50th anniversary this year. It is a celebration we view with mixed feelings. For fifty years our agency has worked to alleviate the suffering of people throughout the world, suffering caused by both natural and man-made disasters; and, at the same time, we have worked to promote development among those most in need so that they might exercise greater control over their own lives.

In many areas of the world we have seen success, in other areas the scandal of poverty and hunger has persisted with little amelioration. Throughout the past 50 years we have worked in situations involving conflict; however, in today's changing world --- in the new world order --- civil conflict has increased and, as a result, created a new set of problems, both for the citizens in these countries and for relief organizations seeking to feed the hungry.

The most visible problems are Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, but slowly we are seeing attention turn to the Sudan; as well as the on-going problems in Liberia, Angola, Rwanda, Haiti, Cambodia, the list goes on. All with the same common theme --- civil conflict. Agencies such as CRS are, unfortunately, now being forced to provide aid under conditions of extreme danger.

It is becoming increasingly evident that as these situations of civil conflict and humanitarian assistance continue to overlap, increased emphasis by both NGOs and government agencies must be placed on improved coordination.

It is in this context that I would like to focus my testimony today. Specifically, the role



that civil conflict is playing in increasing the levels of hunger in countries throughout the world and, secondly, the inability of the international community to coordinate a comprehensive response to this increased need.

In 1980 it was recommended by a Presidential Commission on World Hunger that the United States make the elimination of hunger the primary focus of its relationships with developing countries. Four years later the greatest famine in history took place in Ethiopia; in 1991, people in Somalia began to starve to death as a result of civil conflict and drought; and today we are witnessing atrocities in the former Yugoslavia which are being referred to as another holocaust.

In addition to these events, which have made their way into the headlines of our leading newspapers and also on the network news, our agency is also working in places like the Sudan where a ten year civil war is creating a famine on a large scale; in Cambodia where the intractable political and armed conflict threaten to disrupt elections and the prospects of peace in that country; in Liberia and Rwanda where civil wars have forced people from their homes in the hundreds of thousands; the list goes on and on. There is, however, the continuing thread of civil conflict in all of these countries, exacerbating the plight of the poor and the hungry who are always war's victims.

All of the examples cited have all been in some sense the unfortunate results of the cold war, either due to its existence or its demise. Beginning in Ethiopia where the world ignored the disintegration of that country because of its alliance to the former Soviet Union; to Somalia where the guns now being used by the so-called "technicals" were supplied as part of the superpower rivalry in propping up the government of Siad Barre. During the cold war, political and security considerations tended to dominate this country's foreign aid program; with the collapse of the Soviet empire, we are now facing repercussions of that conflict and the challenge of making our foreign assistance programs more responsive to humanitarian and development needs.

While it is evident that the end of the cold war and the bipolar rivalry between the United States and the former Soviet Union were welcome events; the end of the cold war has yet to result in a new order capable of solving the problems directly affecting peace, productivity and prosperity for people throughout the world. It is a bitter irony of the end of the cold war, that despite the dangers inherent in a superpower rivalry --- which we saw in Ethiopia, Korea, Nicaragua and a host of other instances --- it served to hold in check other kinds of conflicts simmering on a smaller scale. As we are witnessing in the Balkans, without the once clearly defined adversary, the nations of the west are increasingly unwilling to accept the political risks of intervention in local conflicts.

Before I elaborate on situations CRS now confronts in its battle against hunger, it is important for me to note that our agency, Catholic Relief Services, views its work in the context with Catholic social teaching. As a result, CRS believes that although the common good is the first responsibility of government, it is likewise a social responsibility falling on all persons and groups. When political authorities, either domestic or international, fail to protect the common good (understood as the safeguarding and protection of civil, political, economic and social human rights), it falls to others, including social institutions like CRS, to act on behalf of the rights of deprived populations, when those populations are unable to protect themselves.

For CRS, this guiding principle, elaborated in Pope John XXIII's encyclical on peace, *Pacem in terris* (Peace on Earth), elevates the needs of people at risk above considerations of national sovereignty. The concept of "humanitarian intervention," however, must be carefully defined. What we mean by the term is the provision of humanitarian assistance to a country without the request or consent of the government, but also without the forcible introduction of external armed force. Examples of this are cross-border programs carried out in rebel-controlled territory or relief programs established in countries where no functioning government can be said to exist.

Historically, the United Nations has not been willing to support cross-border programs without the consent of the government, even when that government has lost complete control over part of its territory. While at times the U.N. has been successful in securing the agreement of the government in question, at other times it has not, which has resulted in the loss of thousands of lives. This is a clear example of the need for more cooperation and a changing role for the U.N.

Another example of the U.N. being hampered by its own policies was the evacuation of U.N. personnel from both Liberia and Somalia based on the U.N.'s security regulations. In this changing world order, with the collapse of the cold war, if the U.N. is going to play a role in situations where manifest human need is present in the midst of great danger, it must have people on the ground. The U.N. must be willing to take the risks that CRS and other NGOs are assuming to insure that the needed aid is provided. The U.N. must not only be providing peace-keeping troops, it must be equally involved in peace-making.

The most recent example of the need for a new kind of role for the U.N. was in Somalia. The situation we all witnessed in Somalia was the one of the greatest human tragedies of this century. The problems went well beyond the conditions one usually associates with famines -- such as drought and violence --- in Somalia we saw a country where practically every vestige of civilized order and conduct disappeared. The animosities were even more primitive than ethnic strife; they regressed into a savage and brutish clan and sub-clan warfare which was indiscriminate in its choice of victims. In such conditions there is no politics but force, and little ground for negotiation and compromise.

The situation we and other NGOs face is, in many ways a, legacy of the cold war, but its hatred and anarchy are home grown. The nation was fragmented into warring factions who cared little for international opinion and less for the arts of conciliation. As the innocent died at a rate of 2,000 a day, the traditional tools of diplomacy proved to be largely ineffectual in providing for channels of humanitarian assistance.

While the U.N. was criticized for failing to act sooner in Somalia, and while some of that criticism was well founded; in fairness, it is difficult to see what the U.N., as presently constituted, could have done. Without a strong and clear mandate from the Security Council and resources to back up that mandate, the U.N. has shown itself ill-equipped to deal with conflicts we have witnessed in Somalia and which are currently occurring in the Balkans and in the Sudan.

All of this leads to the inevitable conclusion that the institutions developed to govern international life following World War II are inadequate in today's new world order. During the cold war, when differences were clearly defined, they served more or less well, but in the face of the nationalistic, ethnic and religious strife that is being seen now, the necessary international political and diplomatic structures of mediation, restraint and intervention have yet to be developed. The U.N. was created to deal with a world of nation-states, not to negotiate the shoals of national dissolution which threaten some of its members today. The international goals of the U.N. charter offer little guidance in coming to terms with the resilient forces of nationalism, factionalism and ethnic controversy which have asserted themselves in so many places around the world.

The search for solutions, however, should begin with the U.N. Talks should be initiated with a view to expanding the organization's powers to effectively intervene in conflicts --- thereby insuring that food and other humanitarian assistance reaches those who need it. The expansion of powers will include formulations that modify the U.N.'s current inability to act in ways that contravene the sovereignty of any of its members. Conditions will have to be defined when the world community agrees to subordinate the claims of sovereignty in the pursuit of peace.

The U.N. must also be given both the political mandate and the resources it needs if it is to be expected to carry out a major political, coordinating and operational role in emergencies. It must be able to impose sanctions, disburse funds, deploy troops, even engage in combat to



keep warring parties apart and to protect innocent lives. By beginning with the U.N., a test of the credibility of the new world order will unfold as we witness the willingness --- or unwillingness --- of the nations of the world to accept new powers which may imply a sacrifice of some measure of the principle of sovereignty in the name of peace.

Naturally, however, we do not expect the U.N. to be all things to all people. Bilateral aid agencies have more flexibility than the U.N. and often provide quiet support to cross-border programs despite host government opposition; there are problems, however, in terms of coordination between NGOs and AID's Food for Peace Office and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). While both agencies have been responsive, the timeliness of grant approval and the confused lines of authority and inconsistency of policies between AID missions overseas and AID offices in Washington has been problematic. With a new mood in Washington and plans to reform foreign assistance we are optimistic that humanitarian and development assistance in both food and funds will be identified as a major goal of US aid programming.

The U.N. estimates that 40,000 children die every day from hunger and disease. While food aid from the United States is a critical element, it is only part of the answer to the vast and complex problems associated with hunger. Nevertheless, the world looks to us for leadership in this area and since 1954 with the enactment of the P.L. 480 Program we have met this challenge.

The continued commitment of the U.S. government to respond to food deficit situations around the world is witness to our humanitarian concerns. We are, therefore, pleased to see that the President's FY '94 budget proposes an increase for P.L. 480 Title II. We applaud and support this commitment; however, it is important to note that the ongoing refugee and famine crisis' in Somalia, Sudan and the former Yugoslavia may render this allocation insufficient.

The civil strife in recent years have exacerbated the effects of droughts and other natural disasters and emergencies have become protracted in places like Bosnia, Somalia and

Cambodia. We must come to grips with this change taking place and focus even more closely on the links of opportunity from disaster relief to rehabilitation and long term development.

The role of the United States is obviously central to any of these proposed changes. We continue to hear again and again that the cold war is over and that we are the world's only superpower. The question still remains, however, what is this country going to do with its preeminent influence now? This is an historic moment for the United States to vigorously pursue issues that have traditionally been expressed: the pursuit of lasting peace, the mediation of Conflict, the advancement of human rights, and the promotion of democracy. We now have as opportunity to act with almost unchallenged influence to give specificity to our long held vision of world free of war and oppression.

There is a real danger that this moment will be missed. At time it seems that our victory in the cold war has left us dispirited and disturbed, lacking in confidence at the precise moment when we should be looking ahead with renewed hope. What we need to affirm to ourselves and to the world is that the United States stands prepared to lead, that this country recognizes the unique role which it plays in international life.

Without American initiative and leadership, drift and indecision will result people dying from hunger in places like the former Yugoslavia and the Sudan. Our goal should be to work through this period with the kind of determination that built our country; to demonstrate to the rest of the world the values that we have always stood for in our relations with other nations; and in so doing give concrete expression in terms of a foreign assistance program that is designed to have impact on the lives and well-being of those most in need.



Washington Liaison Office

HUNGER ISSUES AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS:  
A NEW U.S. PROGRAM FOR INTERNATIONAL  
DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION

before the  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AGRICULTURE AND HUNGER  
of the  
HOUSE AGRICULTURE COMMITTEE

APRIL 29, 1993

BY

CHARLES SYKES, VICE-PRESIDENT OF CARE

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MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, THANK YOU FOR CALLING THIS TIMELY HEARING AND THANK YOU FOR INVITING NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS LIKE CARE TO SHARE THEIR EXPERIENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS WITH THOSE OF YOU WHO BEAR RESPONSIBILITY, WITH THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, FOR CRAFTING EFFECTIVE U.S. POLICY ON OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.

TWENTY OF MY THIRTY-TWO YEARS WITH CARE INCLUDED OVERSEAS SERVICE, ADMINISTERING BOTH DEVELOPMENT AND RELIEF PROGRAMS IN THE FIELD, INCLUDING FOOD AID PROGRAMS, IN INDIA, PAKISTAN, EGYPT, POLAND AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

HISTORICALLY, THE UNITED STATES HAS PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN MEETING THE FOOD NEEDS OF VULNERABLE GROUPS IN POOR FOOD INSECURE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THAT WERE NOT ABLE TO GROW OR COMMERCIALY PURCHASE OR IMPORT ADEQUATE FOOD TO MEET THE BASIC FOOD NEEDS OF THEIR PEOPLE TO LIVE HEALTHY AND PRODUCTIVE LIVES.

FOOD AID FROM DONOR COUNTRIES LIKE THE U.S. WAS REGARDED AS A SHORT TERM PALLIATIVE AND NOT A LONG TERM RESPONSE TO THE CHALLENGE OF HOW WE ENGAGE THE POOR IN THE PROCESS OF SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. TO THE EXTENT THAT FOOD AID CAN BECOME A POWERFUL INSTRUMENT AND FORCE FOR IMPROVING THE HEALTH AND PRODUCTIVE CAPACITIES OF POOR PEOPLE, IT HAS A VALUABLE ROLE TO PLAY IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, PARTICULARLY GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE POTENTIAL FOR EXPANDING U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS WILL LARGELY DEPEND ON INCREASED DEMAND FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WHICH IN TURN DEPENDS NOT ON INCREASED DEMAND OF ELITES, BUT STEADY IMPROVEMENT OF THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE POOR.

THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF THIS PROGRAM ARE INDEED QUITE SIGNIFICANT TO THE UNITED STATES. 75% OF U.S. FOOD AID MUST BE DELIVERED ON U.S. FLAG VESSELS. OTHER SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY GENERATED BY THIS PROGRAM IN THE UNITED STATES ACCRUE TO U.S. FOOD PROCESSORS, RAIL AND BARGE TRANSPORTERS, BAG MANUFACTURERS AND STEVEDORE UNIONS.

THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS [NGOS], LIKE CARE, CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES, THE NATIONAL COOPERATIVE BUSINESS ASSOCIATION AND THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAM OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBTAIN FOOD COMMODITIES TO CARRY OUT PROGRAMS UNDER TITLE II-THE EMERGENCY AND PRIVATE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. IT IS THE EXPERIENCE OF THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS OR NGOS WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU TODAY.

WHAT DO WE KNOW AND WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED ABOUT THE ROLE OF FOOD AID IN PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, WHAT ARE ITS SHORTCOMINGS AND FINALLY WHAT ARE THE CRITICAL POLICY CONCERNS WHICH SHOULD BE ADDRESSED BY THIS COMMITTEE IN THE DECADE OF THE 1990S?



WHAT DO WE KNOW AND WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED ABOUT FOOD AID SINCE ITS INCEPTION?:

IN THE LATE 1970S SOME POLEMICISTS RAISED SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT THE USEFULNESS OF FOOD AID AS AN EFFECTIVE RESOURCE EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF EMERGENCIES AND LIFE THREATENING SITUATIONS. THE PAUCITY OF WELL DOCUMENTED FIELD EVALUATIONS ON FOOD AID SUPPORTED PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS RAISED DOUBTS IN THE MINDS OF THE PUBLIC AND POLICY MAKERS ALIKE. WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED ABOUT FOOD AID OVER THE LAST DECADE WITH RESPECT TO ITS UTILITY AS A DEVELOPMENT RESOURCE?

\*WE'VE LEARNED THAT A VERY MODEST DAILY RATION PER STUDENT OF 100 GRAMS OF FOOD SERVED AT POOR RURAL AND URBAN PRIMARY SCHOOLS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES HAS A SIGNIFICANT POSITIVE IMPACT ON ENROLLMENT, ATTENDANCE AND RETENTION, PARTICULARLY AMONGST GIRLS AND THAT FEMALE LITERACY HAS A DIRECT LONG TERM POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH IMPROVED FAMILY NUTRITION AND HEALTH, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND FERTILITY.

WE'VE LEARNED THAT A MODEST 90 GRAM DAILY SUPPLEMENT OF FOOD FOR PRE-SCHOOL CHILDREN IN INDIA, WHEN COMBINED WITH IMMUNIZATION AND ANTENATAL CARE, CAN HAVE A DRAMATIC EFFECT IN REDUCING CHILD MORTALITY. IN SUCH PROGRAMS, THERE IS EVIDENCE OF SIGNIFICANT DECLINE IN SEVERE AND MODERATE MALNUTRITION. FOR EXAMPLE, IN INDIA SEVERE MALNUTRITION DROPPED FROM 20.5 PER CENT TO 6.6 PER CENT FROM 1976 TO 1990 IN INDIA'S INTEGRATED CHILD DEVELOPMENT SERVICES PROGRAM. \*WE'VE LEARNED THAT WELL DESIGNED FOOD-FOR-WORK PROJECTS HAVE A DIRECT POSITIVE IMPACT ON RURAL EMPLOYMENT, INCOME AND FOOD CONSUMPTION LEVELS WHILE THE PROJECTS THEMSELVES, SUCH AS THE CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE OF VILLAGE-TO-MARKET ROADS, IRRIGATION CANALS AND GRAIN STORAGE FACILITIES CREATE NEW AND LASTING JOBS WHICH STRENGTHEN RURAL AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIES.

\*WE'VE LEARNED THAT SLUM IMPROVEMENT FOOD-FOR-WORK PROJECTS HAVE NOT ONLY HELPED PROTECT LOW INCOME URBAN DWELLERS FROM BASIC COMMODITY PRICE INCREASES DURING PERIODS OF RAPID INFLATION AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT. MORE IMPORTANTLY, SUCH PROJECTS HAVE IMPROVED THE LIVING AND HEALTH CONDITIONS IN THESE BLIGHTED COMMUNITIES AND STIMULATED COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACTIONS WHICH WENT FAR BEYOND THE ORIGINAL OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECTS.

\*WE'VE LEARNED THAT WOMEN PLAY A CRITICAL ROLE IN THE SUCCESS OF FOOD AID SUPPORTED PROJECTS--SUCH ROLES AS ORGANIZERS, FOOD PREPARERS, TEACHERS, HEALTH PROMOTERS AND WORKERS AND AS FOOD PRODUCERS.

\*WE'VE LEARNED THAT FOOD AID CAN HELP PROMOTE BOTH FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY AND THAT FOR MOST OF THE WORLD'S POPULATION, FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY [INCLUDING SAFE DRINKING WATER] ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT AND FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS OF NATIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY.

\*WE'VE LEARNED IN INDIA THAT FOOD AID CAN CONTRIBUTE POSITIVELY TO MACRO-FOOD SECURITY AND BASIC COMMODITY PRICE STABILITY WITHOUT HAVING ANY DISINCENTIVE EFFECTS ON LOCAL PRODUCTION.

\*WE'VE LEARNED THAT THE MORE CAREFULLY DESIGNED, WELL MANAGED AND PURPOSEFUL PROJECTS OF NGOS AND THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAM ARE MUCH MORE LIKELY TO REACH VULNERABLE GROUPS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THAN ANY OTHER TYPES OF FOOD AID PROGRAMS.

\*WE'VE LEARNED THAT NON-EMERGENCY FOOD AID IS FAR MORE EFFECTIVE WHEN FULLY INTEGRATED INTO PROJECTS WHICH HAVE SIGNIFICANT CAPITAL BUDGETS AND WELL DEFINED OBJECTIVES--NOT IN ISOLATION FROM OTHER INPUTS.

\*WITH RESPECT TO EMERGENCY PROGRAMS, THE NGOS HAVE LEARNED THAT FOOD AID IS OFTEN THE ONLY RESOURCE WHICH CAN EFFECTIVELY RESPOND TO HUMAN NEEDS IN CASES OF DROUGHT AND FAMINE. IN SUCH PROGRAMS, THE FOOD AID RATIONS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY LARGER BECAUSE IT IS FREQUENTLY THE ONLY FOOD AVAILABLE TO PEOPLE. FOR EXAMPLE IN SOMALIA, THE DAILY RATION PER ADULT IS 400 GRAMS OF GRAIN WHILE CHILDREN RECEIVE SPECIAL HIGH PROTEIN, CEREAL-BASED PROCESSED OF FOODS.

THE NEWEST FOOD AID MODALITY, AUTHORIZED BY THIS COMMITTEE IN 1990, FOR USE BY NGOS IS MONETIZATION [SALE FOR LOCAL CURRENCY], WITH THE LOCAL CURRENCY BEING USED TO MEET THE FOOD SECURITY OBJECTIVES OF PUBLIC LAW 480. THE CURRENCY GENERATED BY MONETIZATION IS USED FOR TWO PURPOSES, [1] TO COVER INTERNAL TRANSPORT, STORAGE AND TRANSPORT COSTS OTHERWISE NOT COVERED BY RECIPIENT COUNTRIES AND [2] TO IMPLEMENT INCOME GENERATING, NUTRITION AND HEALTH, COMMUNITY AND COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND OTHER DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND ACTIVITIES WITHIN RECIPIENT COUNTRIES.

THE SHORTCOMINGS AND DANGERS OF FOOD AID:

\*FOOD AID SUPPORTED PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS ARE MANAGEMENT INTENSIVE; THE SHIPPING, TIMING, PORT CLEARANCE AND IN-COUNTRY ACCOUNTING RESPONSIBILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS ARE MUCH MORE DEMANDING THAN OTHER FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE.

\*FOOD AID CAN BE A DANGEROUS RESOURCE TO MANAGE IN THAT IT IS FUNGIBLE AND HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR SPOILAGE AND DAMAGE.

\*FOOD AID IS REGARDED BY MANY DEVELOPMENT PROFESSIONALS AS A RESOURCE OF SECOND CHOICE AND MANY ARE FRIGHTENED AWAY FROM USING IT BECAUSE OF THE STRINGENT AUDIT REQUIREMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH FOOD AID AND THE DANGERS ALLUDED TO ABOVE.

\*THE GENERALLY NEGATIVE ATTITUDE AND VIEW OF FOOD AID EFFECTS DECISION MAKING IN THE AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT.

\*FOOD AID CAN HAVE A DISINCENTIVE EFFECT ON LOCAL AGRICULTURE BY DEPRESSING THE PRICES OF LOCALLY PRODUCED FOODS, PARTICULARLY THE ARRIVAL AND DISTRIBUTION OF LARGE FOOD AID SHIPMENTS AT THE TIME OF CEREAL HARVEST IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND DURING THE TRANSITION FROM EMERGENCY TO RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION PROGRAMS.

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FROM OUR EXPERIENCE WITH FOOD AID, WE CAN CLASSIFY FOOD AID PROGRAMS INTO SEVERAL CATEGORIES:

EDUCATION AND COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: IMPROVING THE VALUE AND POTENTIAL OF HUMAN CAPITAL, I.E., PROGRAMS WHICH HAVE LITERACY, WITH ITS HIGH BUT DEFERRED RATE OF RETURN, AS THEIR MAJOR OBJECTIVE.

INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENT: THE UPGRADING AND MAINTENANCE OF RURAL FEEDER ROADS, THE CONSTRUCTION OF MINOR IRRIGATION WORKS, THE REFORESTING AND CARE OF FRAGILE SOILS, LAND RECLAMATION AND DRAINAGE AND WASTE DISPOSAL IN URBAN SLUMS ARE BUT A FEW EXAMPLES OF PROGRAMS IN WHICH FOOD AID CAN SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE CAPITAL COSTS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS.

CHILD SURVIVAL AND POPULATION: FOOD AID, WHEN FULLY INTEGRATED WITH LOW-COST HEALTH COMPONENTS, E.G., IMMUNIZATION, ORAL REHYDRATION, BREAST FEEDING AND GROWTH MONITORING, CAN BE HIGHLY EFFECTIVE IN ENABLING CHILDREN TO NOT ONLY SURVIVE BUT ALSO REALIZE THEIR FULL GENETIC POTENTIAL. WHEN COMBINED WITH FAMILY PLANNING EDUCATION AND SERVICES, THESE PROGRAMS CAN HAVE DRAMATIC IMPACT IN REDUCING BIRTH RATES.

EMERGENCIES: DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS, EMERGENCIES HAVE OCCURRED WITH GREATER FREQUENCY AND INTENSITY. IN MOST CASES, BUT ESPECIALLY IN FAMINE SITUATIONS, FOOD AID IS AN INDISPENSABLE RESOURCE TO COMBAT ACUTE HUNGER AND STARVATION. IN RECENT YEARS, EMERGENCIES HAVE ALSO BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY SO CALLED "LOW INTENSITY" WARS AND THE COLLAPSE OF CIVIL AUTHORITY, MAKING THE WORK OF NGOS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS A GREAT DEAL MORE RISKY.

INCOME GENERATING, COMMUNITY AND COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS SUPPORTED BY MONETIZATION: IN ADDITION TO ADDING TO THE NET AVAILABILITY OF SCARCE ESSENTIAL FOOD COMMODITIES IN FOOD INSECURE COUNTRIES, MONETIZATION ALLOWS NGOS TO GENERATE THE CAPITAL NECESSARY TO ADDRESS THE ROOT CAUSES OF FOOD INSECURITY BY INCREASING THE PRODUCTION AND INCOMES OF POOR AND VULNERABLE GROUPS AND ENCOURAGING THE FORMATION OF COMMUNITY AND COOPERATIVE GROUPS.

\*OUR OBSERVATIONS OF THE CONCESSIONAL SALES PROGRAMS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND OTHER OECD COUNTRIES, ARE THAT THERE IS CONSIDERABLE SCOPE FOR IMPROVING THE TARGETING OF ECONOMICALLY AND NUTRITIONALLY VULNERABLE GROUPS.

KEY POLICY CONCERNS DESERVING THE ATTENTION OF THE HOUSE AGRICULTURE COMMITTEE DURING THE 103RD CONGRESS AND IN PREPARATION FOR THE PUBLIC LAW 480/FARM BILL REAUTHORIZATION IN THE 104TH CONGRESS:

1. THE INTEGRATION OF FOOD AID WITH THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT. AS THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT IS REVISED, THE 103RD CONGRESS SHOULD CONSIDER INTEGRATION OF FOOD AID AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE POLICIES, AND THE COORDINATION OF THESE PROGRAMS WHERE APPROPRIATE, TO ACHIEVE THE GOALS OF FOOD SECURITY, POVERTY REDUCTION AND ENHANCED OPPORTUNITIES FOR ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED PEOPLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS.



THE HOUSE AGRICULTURE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEES SHARE JURISDICTION OVER PUBLIC LAW 480. APPROXIMATELY 10% OF OUR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE IS IN THE FORM OF FOOD AID. THERE IS NO MENTION OR CROSS REFERENCE IN EITHER THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE OR P.L. 480 AUTHORIZATION LEGISLATION WHICH SEEKS TO INTEGRATE THE DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN RESOURCES MADE AVAILABLE IN THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT AND THE FOOD AID RESOURCES MADE AVAILABLE UNDER PUBLIC LAW 480. A JOINT POLICY WORKING GROUP, WITH MEMBERSHIP FROM BOTH COMMITTEES, SHOULD BE FORMED TO DEVELOP A COMMON POLICY STATEMENT FOR INCLUSION IN FUTURE INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE AND PUBLIC LAW 480 AUTHORIZATION BILLS. THE NGOS ARE PREPARED WORK WITH THE COMMITTEE IN THIS EFFORT.

2. CREATION OF A INTERNATIONAL CEREALS RESERVE TO PROTECT AGAINST GLOBAL FAMINE AND DROUGHT, WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE PRINCIPAL GRAIN PRODUCING COUNTRIES.

THIS IS NOT A NEW IDEA. IN 1979-80, THE SENIOR MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE WILL REMEMBER THEY SET UP A U.S. WHEAT RESERVE OF 4 MILLION METRIC TONS OF WHICH 300,000 METRIC TONS COULD BE PROGRAMMED IN ANY FISCAL YEAR, THROUGH NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, TO MEET EMERGENCY NEEDS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. THE INTERNATIONAL CEREALS RESERVE WOULD BE ADMINISTERED BY THE DONOR COUNTRIES TO THE RESERVE, INCLUDING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. WE HOPE THAT THE COMMITTEE WILL RENEW ITS EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL CEREALS RESERVE IN THIS SESSION OF CONGRESS.

3. REMEDIES FOR CHRONIC AND ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY. THE 103RD CONGRESS SHOULD CONSIDER POLICY AND PROCEDURAL OPTIONS FOR RESPONDING TO ACUTE SHORTAGES AND EMERGENCIES , WITHOUT DISRUPTING OTHER PROGRAMS OF ASSISTANCE THAT TARGET AREAS OF CHRONIC FOOD INSECURITY.

TITLE II OF PUBLIC LAW 480 IS ENTITLED "EMERGENCY AND PRIVATE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS" FOR GOOD REASON. ESSENTIALLY THIS TITLE DEMONSTRATES CONGRESS' AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH'S HISTORIC RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAM IN RESPONDING TO GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY, HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN THE POOREST COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD. GLOBAL FOOD AID NEEDS ARE EXPECTED TO DOUBLE DURING THIS DECADE.

THE MAGNITUDE AND FREQUENCY OF ACUTE EMERGENCIES ARE MUCH GREATER THAN ANY OF US WOULD HAVE ANTICIPATED-WITNESS THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DROUGHT, SOMALIA, SUDAN, MOZAMBIQUE, ANGOLA, BOSNIA, BANGLADESH, HAITI EMERGENCIES. ON THE OTHER HAND THERE ARE MANY NON-EMERGENCY PROGRAMS WHERE CHRONIC MALNUTRITION STILL CLAIM THE LIVES OF SOME 40,000 CHILDREN DAILY.

DURING THIS FISCAL YEAR, TITLE II CALLS FOR THE PROGRAMMING A MINIMUM OF 1.5 MILLION METRIC TONS FOR NON-EMERGENCY PROGRAMS, WITH 475,000 METRIC TONS SET ASIDE FOR EMERGENCIES. DURING PREVIOUS YEARS, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DRAW ON OTHER AUTHORITIES AND POOLS OF RESOURCES SUCH SECTION 416 COMMODITIES, HELD BY THE COMMODITY CREDIT COOPERATION [CCC] AND MADE AVAILABLE BY THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, TO MEET EMERGENCY AND DOMESTIC AND OVERSEAS NEEDS. HOWEVER, THE POOL OF COMMODITIES AVAILABLE FROM USDA UNDER SECTION 416 [B] HAS DIMINISHED AND VARIES IN COMPOSITION FROM YEAR TO YEAR. IN ADDITION TO SECTION 416 [B], THERE ARE OTHER OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO POLICY MAKERS SUCH AS TITLE III OR FOR EXTREME EMERGENCIES, EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS.. MOREOVER, COORDINATION WITH OTHER DONOR COUNTRIES IS ESSENTIAL FOR TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO DISASTERS.

4. IN DECEMBER OF 1992, THE UNITED STATES WAS ONE OF 159 NATIONS TO SIGN THE WORLD DECLARATION ON NUTRITION AND THE PLAN OF ACTION AT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON NUTRITION IN ROME; BOTH DOCUMENTS HAVE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES. WE RECOMMEND THAT THE COMMITTEE SCHEDULE HEARINGS ON IMPLEMENTATING BOTH THE DECLARATION AND THE NATIONAL/INTERNATIONAL PLANS OF ACTION EARLY IN THIS SESSION.

THESE ARE THE POLICY ISSUES WE WOULD LIKE TO TABLE FOR THE COMMITTEE'S CONSIDERATION DURING THE 103RD CONGRESS. WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE COMMITTEE AND THE ADMINISTRATION IN HELPING TO CRAFT AND IMPLEMENT THESE POLICY OPTIONS.

THE NGOS ARE AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE NEW MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE TO DISCUSS FURTHER THE FIELD OPERATIONS OF THE PROGRAM AND THE POLICY ISSUES WHICH EFFECT FOOD AID PROGRAMS MANAGED BY NGOS IN THE FIELD.

# HUNGER: EARLY INTERVENTION—THEORIES AND PRACTICE

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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 9, 1993

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AGRICULTURE AND HUNGER,  
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m., in room 1302, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Timothy J. Penny (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Baesler and Allard.

Staff present: Glenda L. Temple, clerk; Jane Shey, James A. Davis, and Lynn Gallagher.

## OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TIMOTHY J. PENNY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA

Mr. PENNY. The subcommittee will come to order.

I would like to welcome everyone to this hearing, the second in a series by the Foreign Agriculture and Hunger Subcommittee to examine issues relating to international hunger. Today, we will be looking at the concept of early intervention, which can be loosely defined as the prompt, and where possible, proactive response of the international community to the humanitarian needs of any country beset by civil conflict, war, or natural disaster. Tomorrow we will be focusing on the specific problems faced by several countries, in addition to providing a general overview of some regions that we need to be paying close attention to in the coming months.

As a former member of the Select Committee on Hunger, I am very pleased to welcome my colleagues, Tony Hall and Bill Emerson, to today's hearing. Many of the issues that we are going to cover over the next 2 days have already been the subject of discussion and the presence of its senior members will provide some sense of institutional memory for this subcommittee.

There can be no doubt that the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations are adept at gathering timely information about potential threats to food security in particular countries.

However, it concerns me greatly that there appear to be no corresponding mechanisms in place to ensure that the information is acted upon. As a consequence, there is no consistent policy regarding the speed and scale of response to these disasters.

The subcommittee does not wish to apportion blame for events in the past. Rather, we seek to facilitate agreement as to the kinds

of policies that would best strengthen bilateral and multilateral humanitarian efforts to avert disasters.

It is important that we work together to build effective response mechanisms within our national and international agencies, so that in the future we might avert the tragedies of all the Somalias yet to come.

With that, I would indicate that it is my desire that we wrap this hearing up before noon today.

I yield to my colleague, Mr. Allard, for any remarks he might have today and then we will hear from the witnesses.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WAYNE ALLARD, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO**

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am glad we are starting on time. I think that is a compliment to the chairman, because we do appreciate working with a chairman who is going to be prompt in calling the meeting to order and staying on schedule.

Mr. Chairman, I am looking forward to hearing the testimony of the impressive array of witnesses we have scheduled over the next couple of days. These hearings are important for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that the Agriculture Committee, and this subcommittee need to show that the hunger issue is important and that we have a commitment and a willingness to continue the work that the Hunger Committee has carried on commendably for many years.

The issue of early intervention and regions in need of early intervention assistance is an appropriate place to begin hearings on hunger. A system of early intervention, that anticipates where problems are likely to evolve, would save time, money, and most importantly lives.

The development of an early intervention system certainly makes more sense then waiting until there is wide scale suffering, and then having to deal with a crisis.

The parts of what would make up an early intervention system may already be in place. Among the existing international aid organizations, such as the International Red Cross and various agencies in the United Nations there should be a structure in place that could serve this purpose.

I certainly would like to look at those organizations closely to fill this need before contemplating the creation of an entirely new bureaucracy.

I think it is also important that the United States work with other nations should we move forward on this. An early intervention system should be done cooperatively, not independently by the United States.

Tomorrow, I look forward to hearing about those regions of the world that are at risk of a large scale famine. If we can identify these regions early perhaps we can avert a crisis.

Once again, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the next 2 days of testimony.

Mr. PENNY. Thank you.



With that, we will move to our first panel, Representative Tony Hall.

Tony served as the chairman of the Select Committee on Hunger. I was honored to have the opportunity to work with him on that committee over the last several years.

I also have deep admiration for Mr. Hall's personal commitment to the hunger issue. It is not simply a legislative involvement but something that he practices in his own life.

I know in his home community he has been extensively involved in food shelves and other programs for the needy. He has traveled extensively throughout the world to see basic hunger firsthand and to share with us here in Congress the very real needs that exist in remote regions of the world, and to challenge us to really prick our conscience, as it were, to do what we as a wealthy Nation ought to do to provide for those in need here and abroad.

We welcome you.

#### **STATEMENT OF HON. TONY P. HALL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO**

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Allard. I do appreciate the chance to be here and thank you for holding these hearings. I am very grateful for your work and the time that you spent on the Select Committee on Hunger. I look forward to working with you in the next few years on this issue.

I have a very long statement. I would ask that it be part of the record.

I have shortened it substantially and I will read from parts of it.

Mr. PENNY. Certainly.

Mr. HALL. I believe humanitarian intervention needs to be viewed in the context of the right to food. One of the key international provisions of the Freedom From Want Act which was a piece of legislation I introduced through the Select Committee on Hunger that was quite a large piece of legislation that I felt would help end hunger in the country and overseas.

One of the key provisions was a section which asked the United States to propose in the U.N. General Assembly that a declaration and a Convention on the Right to Food be adopted and submitted to the countries of the world for ratification. Such a convention would spell out the obligations of the world community to ensure the right to food by people of all countries, including the provision of both emergency and nonemergency assistance; the obligations of individual Governments, and of armed opposition groups, to ensure the right of access to food during times of conflict.

In 1991, while leading a congressional delegation to Ethiopia, I urged their President, Meles Zenawi, to lead a humanitarian summit in the Horn of Africa. This summit produced a document outlining humanitarian guidelines to be used in the region.

This summit, plus the International Conference on Nutrition helped to raise the right to food as a global concern. But a Convention on the Right to Food would state clearly the principles of humanitarian intervention.

The humanitarian interventions with which I am most familiar, were to help the Iraqi Kurds and the people of Somalia. Yet in the

Kurdish situation it seems there were problems in the U.N. in determining which U.N. entity was in charge.

In Somalia the crisis worsened month by month, and many of us criticized the United Nations for not intervening sooner and more effectively. The United Nations and the world community seemed to make up rules for each situation as they went along. We should not have to reinvent the wheel for each humanitarian response.

While it is true that each crisis will have its own special challenges, our general approach should be clarified. The first step, which I have mentioned, is to have in place international authority for a Convention on the Right to Food for humanitarian intervention. That way, we would not lose time debating new United Nations' interventions for action while lives are on the line.

The next step would be to increase the authorities of the United Nations Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs. This position was called for by the Select Committee on Hunger in the Freedom From Want Act, and in subsequent Select Committee on Hunger initiatives.

While this office is ably led by Jan Eliasson, I would like to say it should have more power to organize leadership in humanitarian crisis. This office could play a lifesaving role in achieving the earliest possible mobilization of world response to a humanitarian disaster.

Given the serious logistical and military obstacles that often arise in a humanitarian crisis, a United Nations-coordinated, ready-to-respond strike force should be created. We have seen the critical role played by the United States air and sea power in the Kurdish and Somalian situations.

As the world's remaining superpower, we should be ready to lend our logistical capabilities. Other Nations should step forward to offer military and humanitarian service to the world communities.

Relief itself should continue to be provided by private voluntary organizations. They are also in the best position to help those they serve move from the process of relief to rehabilitation.

However, as we have learned in Iraq, Somalia, Liberia, Angola and Sudan, these organizations cannot do their job under attack, when their hands are tied by those who are in control or when their safety is untenable. Most of these crises are man-made, arising out of civil or ethnic conflict or war between neighboring countries.

In our diplomatic efforts, we need to place a special emphasis on negotiating skills to address combatants whose actions deny food to innocent civilians. I firmly believe it will help greatly if we start thinking of the suffering they cause as violations of human rights.

The world community needs to agree that using food as a weapon or blocking food is a human rights crime and those who engage in such conduct are criminals.

I recommend that we elevate the right to food and expand our concept of human rights in this post-cold war era.

Thank you for holding this hearing. I look forward to working with you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. PENNY. Thank you.

With that, we will move to Mr. Emerson's testimony as well and then proceed with questions for both panelists.

Bill was the ranking Republican on the Select Committee on Hunger. In that capacity I watched him perform ably, particularly in terms of his advocacy of coordination and improvement of our domestic hunger programs.

We are delighted to have you with us this morning.

# STATEMENT OF HON. BILL EMERSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI

Mr. EMERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a statement I would like to submit for the record and I would also like to make a brief statement.

International intervention in the hunger crisis is a very important principle. The crises I have been most directly involved in have been those over the course of the last 10 years involving Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia. I must say that in no instance was famine and the widespread starvation and death caused by a lack of food in the world that could have met the needs of the people.

Weather is very often obviously a critical factor but it is always compounded by either civil war—and that is the case in Sudan, a terrible civil war. In Ethiopia there were major climatic changes occurring in that region there. There was a lack of infrastructure in that country and at the point of the worse circumstances, there was a very uncooperative Government.

The case in Somalia, of course, has been one of total anarchy. I think we went there and did our job and got things straightened out, but I am distressed to hear in the newspaper this morning as to what is happening there. Apparently we are airlifting some heavy equipment, tanks in there to once again restore order.

I think it is important for whatever committee of the Congress may have jurisdiction over this subject matter, to keep in mind the fact that a lack of food in the world is not the fundamental problem. There is an adequate supply of food in the world and the people can be fed, but the other impediments such as civil war, lack of infrastructure, and uncooperative governments are very often the critical, exacerbating circumstances that lead to widespread hunger, starvation, and death.

I think the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance has done a very admirable job, at least in the areas in which I have had any contact with them in alleviating the most destructive situations in the world. Very often there are complex political reasons for things being as they are, but I have never seen on the part of the USOFDA anything but the most serious effort to cut through all the chaff and to get at the root of the problem.

Of course, in that regard, I think they have worked most admirably with the PVO's. Now the PVO's are the most critical element in guarding against and alleviating hunger and starvation in the world.

PVO's don't ever get much credit. They don't seek much credit, and nobody gives them much credit, but they are always there doing their job. They have their tentacles out and they know where problems are developing because they have people all over the world.



I am not going to name any of them because you always get in trouble doing that. There are many good ones that are excellent sources of information and concern that they are willing to share.

Of course, when tragedy strikes, they are the ones who are there doing the work in a overwhelming majority of instances. So I would encourage very strongly that as we look to the future revisions in any warning system that the PVO community be made a vital element of whatever system may be devised.

I don't mean to sound harsh, but I think the U.N. needs to get its act together better than it has. I don't want to unload on the U.N. here, but I have noted some situations in the world where tragedies have evolved as they have because of ineffective U.N. leadership and coordination.

I didn't think their efforts in Sudan were very adequate in 1989, and I certainly didn't think the United Nations' efforts in the crisis in Somalia were adequate. We had to intervene, quite frankly, in Somalia because the U.N. could not get its act together.

I think that now with the situation appearing to be coming unglued in Somalia again, that this is a good juncture to send a message to the U.N. You know we went in there and established the peace.

The object now is for the U.N. to succeed our military in maintaining the peace there, so that Somalia can sooner, hopefully, rather than later, get on with the business of nation rebuilding.

But what I am hearing on the news this morning causes me to worry that we may be reverting to the situation that existed in Somalia prior to Operation Restore Hope. There is just too much bureaucracy at the U.N.

They get too mired down in, I don't know, petty squabbles, or whatever. I think they need to focus better. I think one of the great roles for the U.N., as we look to the world of the future, is very sensitive attention to the problem that your subcommittee is addressing here today.

Finally, I would recommend, and I think Mr. Hall would agree with me on this, there are voluminous files that constitute the remains of the Select Committee on Hunger. I would encourage this subcommittee to avail themselves of those files. In the process of shutting down the select committees, the Clerk of the House came in and did a archival job, so I would not think that those files should be difficult to call up.

We have held many hearings over the years about the subject at hand here today. I would encourage you to retrieve those files and have the staff of your subcommittee review them, because I think there is probably a lot of valuable information there.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Allard, for this opportunity to appear here today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Emerson appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. PENNY. Thank you.

Our staff was in contact with the staff of the Select Committee on Hunger to inquire about records and other information, so I do appreciate your suggestion. We have followed up on that.

Mr. Hall, Bill mentioned the bureaucracy at the U.N. and the overlap, the turf battles perhaps that oftentimes impede our effec-



tive response to hunger when it raises its head. I know you have given some thought to how better to structure the U.N. for its efforts in this area. Maybe you could talk a bit about how to streamline the U.N.'s work in this area.

Mr. HALL. In the Select Committee on Hunger, we recommended a couple of years ago, as I said in my testimony, that there be a special office within the United Nations, an Under Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs. That in fact became a reality.

The reason why we felt that should come about was because in places like Angola, et cetera, the U.N. would answer these crises and these situations with different people. It would take months upon months to send somebody down there to investigate and report back to the U.N.

They just didn't have any ability to deal, in my opinion, with major humanitarian situations in the world, Angola and Liberia were great examples.

We recommended they set up this office. They have not been in existence very long. They don't have a lot of teeth.

They don't have a lot of staff. Maybe it should be kept that way. But that is designed to be able to react to a situation like Somalia.

They have not been in a position long enough to have the prestige or probably even the respect yet. But they have a very good Director, a very talented Under Secretary.

I expect great things from them. I think that that entity is the proper one. It is hard for the United States to go it alone. We are the superpower, we need to lead, push, and direct.

It is hard for any Western nation to be all things to all people. The United Nations is the proper vehicle. They have not been responsible in recent years mainly because of, I think of the bureaucracy.

They just have not been able to deal with the situation very well. They represent all the nations of the world, and there are some very good people in their structure.

We can help push them to be able to react to situations as a multinational force, as we asked with the Kurds and in Somalia. Somalia is an out-of-the-ordinary precedent that we are setting now because we are not observing the borders, the sovereignty, of the country. Those are two extraordinary examples.

Mr. PENNY. Very frequently we see the U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees involved because, at least of late, it seems like hunger sends people scurrying across borders. We also have the Food and Agriculture Organization working to, I suppose as much as anything thing, working to predict and recommend preventive policies so we can get ahead of the crisis.

The World Food Programme is the primary U.N. agency in terms of actually distributing food assistance. Again, it strikes me that the lines of authority here are not defined.

Does this Under Secretary post—is it constructed in such a way that it can provide a coordinating function or is it still evolving? What do we know about the authority that has been granted?

Mr. HALL. You have some people who will follow us today who will be able to shed some light on the real specifics and parameters. The parameters are fairly broad. The office is evolving. It is fairly young.

They are really evolving in the whole process. But you get at a situation which is a disaster in itself, one of the shames, I think, of the world relative to humanitarian programs, whether they be U.N. or private voluntary organizations, there is oftentimes a lack of coordination.

Take a situation like Haiti. They tell me they have somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000 groups down there dealing with the issue of food, hunger, and humanitarian assistance. I have been down there a couple of times. I have even gotten those people together in some cases.

In most cases, they don't work together. There is not the coordination to bring them together. If you have 5,000 groups in Haiti, they ought to be able to work together and really do a job down there.

But, obviously, if you look at the country and the chaos, it is that they are not delivering the humanitarian aid in a way that can be beneficial to the majority of people down there.

I think that is a problem that you can look at and follow all across the world. In our own country, in the U.N. and Somalia, it takes somebody to coordinate it and lead.

Mr. PENNY. You mentioned the need for some sort of a—I don't know if you used the term "strike force." How would you structure such a force?

What size would we need and how do you deal with the question of sovereignty in terms of Nations essentially turning over to U.N. control?

I assume you are talking about military personnel here because this would be a security force that would step in to facilitate the administration of humanitarian relief.

Mr. HALL. I don't have the ability logistically to tell you how large the force should be. I don't have that kind of background.

I think that is for people who have that kind of expertise. But if you just look at the situation around the world there are 45 or 46 wars going on now, and you look at Angola, you look at Liberia, and you look at the Sudan now, Somalia, the Kurds; prior to the Kurds, the world has always come down on the side of respecting the sovereignty of the borders.

As a result of that, we have allowed criminals that use food as a weapon, people like President Bashir of Sudan. We have allowed them to get away with this.

The world looks on helplessly. We can't do anything about it. The Red Cross can't do anything about it. One division of the Catholic Relief Services, or CARE, they do their best to work in an impossible situation. But you need to have some kind of a force, multi-national, I think under the leadership of the United Nations. I don't know how large it should be, but it should be able to look at each situation as it comes up, to be able to move very quickly, probably under this Office of the Under Secretary of Humanitarian Affairs, to move quickly into Sudan, not to fight a battle, not to be on the offense, but in fact to be in a situation similar to what we did in Iraq and Turkey, and what we are doing, and still doing in Somalia.

It leads into a situation like Bosnia. If you ask me about Bosnia, I don't know what to do about it. I have not been there. I have not seen it.

I am trying to understand it. I don't understand it. That is a sticky situation.

But I speak with a little bit of authority in understanding about Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. We did the right thing. We went against precedent.

That is the debate in all these international organizations. The debate is always sovereignty versus humanitarian assistance. We have always come down, except for the last couple of years, on the side of obeying the sovereignty of the countries.

We need to change that and we are changing it. As that evolves, we need to do a better job of streamlining that. I am sorry to take so long.

Mr. PENNY. That is fine.

Mr. EMERSON. Mr. Chairman, if I could comment.

Mr. PENNY. Certainly.

Mr. EMERSON. I think it is important to keep our objectives clearly defined and the necessary level of our intervention with military force well understood. I agree with Tony that, a U.N. force to intervene when necessary, to ensure that people are not starving to death is a useful tool. But I think we have to be very careful about developing that.

When you talk about the use of military force in relieving humanitarian situations, it gets to be a very sticky wicket. Now the PVO's, and I come back always to the PVO's, they usually don't want the military involved. They can do a better job without the military.

The only instance that I am personally aware of where they asked for the military was in Somalia. I think there were other cases where they thought it might be desirable in relieving circumstances if we could have some military assistance. But they said in Somalia, they just could not do their work with these bandits, these thugs pointing a gun at their head every day and night when they were trying to go about their work.

I think you have to listen very carefully to the PVO's. I think PVO's might be better qualified than governments, in many circumstances, in recommending how to achieve the delivery of the most fundamental humanitarian assistance.

Ordinarily, when armies are involved, there are all sorts of different implications that are perceived than the basic fundamental delivery of humanitarian assistance. It is not to say sometimes in order for that assistance to succeed, you might need a little military help. But I caution great sensitivity to this subject.

I don't think that just having a standing military force to go in and knock heads in Sudan, Ethiopia, or any other place, is per se necessarily the right answer.

Once again because of the professionalism of most of the PVO's and their level of sensitivity and their commitment to basic fundamental humanitarian assistance, I think you are almost going to have to assess every situation as it arises on its individual merits.

I guess my point here is that I would always pay close attention to what the PVO's are telling you about the situation.



Mr. HALL. If I might just add, I really second what Bill said. I don't want to give you the impression that I am asking for a military force to go into each particular situation.

I mentioned isolated situations. You had a situation in Iraq after the war, where you had several hundred thousand people living on top of a mountain. There is no way that private voluntary organizations could deliver that food.

It took the logistics of the U.S. military and some of our Western allies to do it. That was special. But it was interesting and very unique and wonderful to see our military used in that way.

Somalia is different, completely different. But to protect the humanitarian workers when they ask for it, I think in our special situations, we need to be more organized for situations like this in the future.

Mr. PENNY. I would agree with the gentlemen.

Mr. Allard.

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank both of you for being here this morning. I have enjoyed your comments. I think they reflect your experience in this area. I think that we can benefit immensely from your being here.

I would like to bring up the issue of an early warning system. How do we set up an early warning system to alert donor countries of perhaps an impending need for food assistance?

Do we rely on the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other organization for that information or is this something that we need to do in-house here in this country, or do we try and push the United Nations to go that way, or a combination?

I wonder if both of you could respond to that?

Mr. HALL. I think we need a Convention on the Right to Food in the United Nations to elevate it like we do on torture, like we do on disappearances. I think we need a convention on it, but the right to food is one of the most basic rights in the world, and elevate it to the point where a violation of this right is a major human rights violation. We should brand people who violate this right as criminals. They are guilty on both sides in Sudan, both the leaders of the Government and the rebels; they are guilty.

The reason I say that is because we have an early warning system through the United Nations and we have it through our own groups, and we warned and said it to many different groups and nobody was listening. The media did not pick up on this very much in the early months of 1984 and 1985. We told the world as much as we could, there was not a lot of press on it, that there was going to be a major famine in Ethiopia.

The leader at the time there, Mengistu, he pretty much thumbed his nose at the world and said the heck with it. He would not let anybody in. He said it was not a problem, he would take care of it. So for 6 or 7 months he did nothing. So we had our early warning system. We knew about it.

Somalia was the same way. Our committee was in that country 18 months before it happened. The Red Cross was there before the committee was there and many other people were there and warned the world about Somalia.



We had the early warning systems and we knew about it. It took a year and a half at least to respond to Somalia. We could have saved many lives there if we had gone in much earlier. So we have an early warning system and it works fairly well.

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. Emerson.

Mr. EMERSON. I agree with what Tony said. There is a system and it does work rather well. The problem probably is not detecting the need for basic humanitarian assistance.

The problem is how to deliver it once that need is detected. This leads to being able to store food in advance in certain regions so it may be tapped when the situation becomes very critical. But there is a system in place.

Once again I say we need to rely on our own Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance which has its tentacles out virtually everywhere through the U.S. Embassies; the PVO's in virtually every country in the world are in touch with our Embassy personnel and with the U.N., and what have you.

It is not for the lack of an apparatus. The problem is these issues get so complex so fast the question is, how do you deal with them once they occur? I think a little refinement in the early intervention system is what is needed.

The question is, how do you deal with them because they develop so quickly? The complexities, we could sit here and talk all day about the complexities of Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Sudan, in particular, but what we would be talking about is civil war, lack of infrastructure, uncooperative governments, climatic changes in the Sahara region of the world.

These are all factors and impact upon our ability to be of maximum assistance when a disaster does hit. But I don't think—has there been a situation that we didn't know about long before it occurred?

Mr. HALL. No.

Mr. ALLARD. I was trying to think of a situation. I could not think of one where there was not some early warning.

Mr. EMERSON. We know about it but the question is, how much attention does it get? Ethiopia in 1984 had been brewing for a long time. Finally, some British television camera people got in there and took some film of starving children, old people and all other sorts of people literally falling down dying from starvation. Then when the world sees the image of this, when they see what is really happening, then everybody gets excited.

Mr. ALLARD. Can you think of a situation where maybe we thought there was an impending disaster that never occurred? Can you think of any situation?

Mr. EMERSON. I cannot off the top of my head. I am sure there have been some. It is the success stories you never hear about.

Mr. HALL. We get the reports, not only the photographs which are highly technical and specific as to where the droughts will be, we have people who go to countries and get reports from farmers. They say it is going to be a terrible year. PVO's give us reports. Our own AID, they are good at that; everybody, the world organizations in Rome.

There have been times I remember when Andrew Natsios, as head of OFDA, came before us to warn of impending disaster. We sometimes were able to react very quickly to it and avert it.

Mr. ALLARD. Once we have identified these early warning systems, did your committee look into the most feasible way of providing assistance and getting in there? We are talking about underdeveloped countries, so how do you get your food in?

Did you look at that? What kind of suggestions came out, if you did?

Mr. HALL. There is really not a problem in delivering food or medicines to any place in the world. Logistically the PVOs, our own Government and other Western nations are very good at it, even to the heart of the Sahara, the middle of Mali and to torturous Terrain, and over long distances, even to the middle of Sudan. It is not a problem.

In my experience, the problem has always been using food as a weapon in places like Sudan's civil war and the absolute disregard of rebel leaders and Government officials, those who really don't care about their own people.

Mr. EMERSON. I would agree with what Tony said there. I think it is important to remember the problem in delivering food. It is not hard to get it to the country that is affected. It may be exceedingly difficult to get it from the port, or wherever, to the people who are in need.

That was certainly a problem in Sudan, it was certainly a problem in Ethiopia. There was a point in time in Ethiopia that there was not going to be enough food in the pipeline, not enough coming to port, much less getting it out to the people. But steps were taken and that matter was corrected by getting some ships that were at sea in the Indian Ocean carrying grain to India, they were diverted and turned up toward Ethiopia and a further tragedy was diverted.

Tony is right, the problem is not getting the food to the country. The problem is getting the food to the people who really need it.

I wanted to say in answer to your question, Ms. Richards is going to be the next witness here this morning and she has had a lot of experience in this. I think she can probably answer your question better than Tony or I about success stories because she is a Government official who deals with this all the time.

I just turned and asked her what was a recent success story. Of course, instantly there was one. It is the situation in southern Africa, of course. We remembered it but we don't dwell on it because it was a success. We only remember the horrors.

You ought to grill Ms. Richards extensively because she has a lot of answers.

Mr. ALLARD. How well do you perceive the Department of Agriculture is carrying on with this issue with the Public Law 480 program, and under their title I, they have the concessional sales and the Agency for International Development under title II and III, and they have the Government-to-Government program and preenterprise.

How do you view these programs as working? Are they working or not, or can we do something to make them better?

Mr. HALL. I think it has to do with the people running it. It is country by country. If we have a good person working in that coun-

try through the Department of Agriculture, or even AID, that runs a special project and places it through the PVO's, it works very well.

I like the programs where we have to get special concessions out of the Government. We will give you certain commodities, but you will do this or you will do that. We expect with this food that you will build some bridges and dig some wells, et cetera, et cetera.

I like the fact that we can monetize some of our commodities and use them for transportation purposes and other things. I think it is country by country.

There have been great successes and there have been amazing failures. Maybe Bill can shed some light on that.

Mr. EMERSON. You summed it up very well. I agree with what you said.

Mr. ALLARD. You mentioned monetizing. Let me make sure I understand that. That is where you have American goods and you convert them over to cash in that country. When that converts over to cash, do you have a problem with the cash getting in the wrong hands, so to speak, in the country?

Mr. HALL. We try to, in many countries, go through our private voluntary organizations. We contract with them. We trust them. We have been dealing with them over the years.

They have really strict accounting procedures, that our Government looks over their shoulder. They look at these contracts and I think they can monitor them.

Mr. ALLARD. You feel comfortable that once they are monetized, they don't go and buy guns or something like that?

Mr. HALL. I am sure there are some situations where that has happened, but I don't think we have ever heard of a major horror story on that.

Mr. ALLARD. That is all I have.

Thank you, Mr. Hall and Mr. Emerson.

Mr. PENNY. When you mention the Convention on the Right to Food, have conventions of this type been done under U.N. auspices to establish policy to guide U.N. action in the future on those issues?

Do we need to change the U.N. Charter to implement any of these suggestions you have made this morning? I am getting at the question of involving ourselves in internal situations as a general rule when humanitarian needs are concerned. The notion of some type of security force, do these kind of changes require an adjustment in the U.N. Charter?

Mr. HALL. I think all they require from us is a proposal. For example, on the Under Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs, that was a suggestion that came from the Select Committee on Hunger.

We can suggest and we can promote probably through resolution in the Congress that they have a right on the convention to food, which I would like to do with you either through legislation or otherwise. But I think all we can do is suggest and prompt, push, yell, jump up and down. Oftentimes it works.

Mr. PENNY. I would intend to work with you in terms of programs on a resolution speaking to the question of a Convention on Humanitarian Needs. We can pursue that in the relatively near future.



With that, unless there are some additional remarks you gentlemen want to make, we appreciate your participation this morning and your ongoing leadership on these issues.

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PENNY. We will call forward our next panel which includes Ms. Lois Richards, Acting Assistant Administrator, the Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance at the Agency for International Development. And Ms. Mary Chambliss, Acting Associate Administrator, Office of International Cooperation and Development, the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

Ms. Richards, we will hear from you first and then Ms. Chambliss.

Your entire testimony will appear in the record.

It has been my long-standing policy as a subcommittee chair to keep remarks within the 5-minute timeframe and to strongly suggest to our witnesses that they summarize their remarks as best they can. It gives us more time for Q and A, and frankly, most of what you might say in your written testimony is likely to come forward in the question and answer period anyhow. So it does save us all some time.

We appreciate your presence this morning and ask you to proceed.

#### **STATEMENT OF LOIS RICHARDS, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR FOOD AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

Ms. RICHARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I take particular pleasure for this opportunity to address the subcommittee on behalf of the Agency for International Development concerning early intervention in crisis situations. In my role as Acting Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance, I coordinate the responses of the offices of Food for Peace—FFP, and U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance—OFDA, to emergency situations worldwide.

I deeply appreciate the remarks of Congressman Emerson and I hope I can live up to his claims of great expertise that he has extended in my and OFDA's behalf.

I thought I would talk this morning briefly about the mechanisms that both the U.N. and the United States use in dealing with immediate responses to crisis. And in light of the testimony and some of the questioning that has gone before, I think some of these remarks I planned to make are particularly pertinent.

First, obviously early warning systems are in place for natural disasters. We can measure rainfall, prospective droughts, estimated crop production, and also likely timing of seismic events like earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and natural weather disasters like cyclones and floods.

The majority of the disasters to which we respond are the natural disaster-type. Something like over 40 of the 66 disasters to which we responded in fiscal year 1992 fall in this category. Early warning of manmade disasters, particularly those like in Somalia and Ethiopia that were being discussed, are a lot more difficult to predict. Sometimes though, these, as was mentioned before, are



underlain with a natural disaster as well, for example, the drought that hit Somalia and Sudan last year.

When you have adequate early warning, you can respond successfully to an emergency. I would cite the southern Africa drought and the Mount Pinatubo volcanic eruption, several of those eruptions that have occurred as examples where you can move to provide resources, give early warning, try to get people to move, in the case of volcanic eruption, to save places and thereby stabilize and mitigate the impact of a disaster.

In the case of drought and famine, there is always a cushion after the rains fail during which the people eat the food reserves they have on hand. They may eat their seeds. They sell off their personal belongings to get money to buy food as the prices go up and it becomes more scarce. So you do have a cushion.

We need to use that cushion along with commercial purchases made by the affected governments in southern Africa to rush quite significant quantities of food into the area and to prevent famine from occurring.

We knew the hunger season would be August and September. We knew in January or early February that we had a very serious drought on our hands.

Once we have an imminent disaster facing us or an actual disaster, in fact, of both ourselves and the World Food Programme, we will divert food that is being shipped to some other location to the disaster site. That is usually the quickest response that you can give with food aid. You can also preposition food when you see something coming down the pike.

I remember we prepositioned some food in anticipation of the Iraqi refugee crisis, although it was not quite the actual crisis in the form that actually occurred. And the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance prepositions various kinds of emergency supplies in various parts of the world to call on when there is a disaster, be it a natural disaster or even one of these man-made situations.

When a disaster is declared in a host country for the U.S. Government, this is done by the U.S. Ambassador, this will trigger an immediate response by OFDA sending \$25,000 that can be used for local purchases of whatever relief supplies are deemed critical, while we also move to provide more significant responses, if such a response is required.

Since I see my time is running out, let me just say that there are expedited procedures for preparing food and shipping it. There are, I think, some affected country situations, as was mentioned in previous testimony, that will bear on previous circumstances, and I am sure we can get into that in the questioning.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Richards appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. PENNY. Ms. Chambliss.

**STATEMENT OF MARY CHAMBLISS, ACTING ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE**

Ms. CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, will try to be brief so that we can move to the Q and A, which I think will have more substance to them perhaps than the testimony, much of which will repeat what you have heard.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate your invitation to speak this morning on how the United States can improve its response to food emergencies and lessen the suffering we have all seen recently.

It is particularly appropriate that this subcommittee assume the role played by the Select Committee on Hunger and combine it with the role of the Committee on Agriculture. It is, in many ways, the success of U.S. agriculture that has, over the years, allowed the United States to take a lead in responding to emergency foods needs.

At the outset, I think it is important, as others have said, to be realistic about the causes of the most serious food crisis that we have seen in recent years.

More and more of the devastating crisis we see are, at root, man-made political ones. These are the ones that are most difficult to respond to. There are both limits to our ability to anticipate political conflict and to intervene without internationally sanctioned military measures.

Fortunately, there is growing recognition of the right of the international community to intervene. At the International Conference on Nutrition, held just last December, the issue of when and how the international community should intervene was hotly debated.

It was just as the conference began that the first U.S. troops landed in Somalia. While there was a sense of relief and joy in many quarters, there was also suspicion in other quarters.

After much debate, this conference, which represented well over 100 countries, did finally reach a consensus that the international community could intervene in conflict situations to prevent massive suffering among civilian populations. However, finding a way to do this is going to be even more difficult.

Although less publicized, other political problems also contribute to the problem. This was a situation referred to by Congressman Hall in Ethiopia, the tendency of governments to deny that a food crisis exists, when many of us, including AID, including the World Food Programme, including the Department of Agriculture, are well aware of what is happening.

These political impediments are, I think, more difficult to deal with bilaterally. I think that is what leads us to look to the U.N. system which can respond better politically and sometimes culturally to provide food aid.

I would also agree that PVO's, both the ones we are familiar with in America, and also, I think often indigenous PVO's, are sources of expertise and knowledge to deliver the food to groups we would like to work more with. Given the limitations we face in acting early to prevent some of these food crises, what can we do to improve our performance?

First, we can look to responses that have been successful. I would agree with Ms. Richards that southern Africa is a classic example of where the system did, in fact, work. The early warning systems worked. FAO, AID, USDA, we all knew in November, De-

cember, and January that the weather had changed and the drought was coming.

The World Food Programme did an excellent job in obtaining rapid logistical response. AID provided resources for WFP to keep the logistics on track. Perhaps most important, these African nations worked together to deal with their common problems. They sat down and figured out the transportations and the logistics, and they did it.

Finally, perhaps probably the reason it really worked and was the success we have all forgotten, was that there were no major conflicts in the regions. We did not have to deal with that type of problem.

Among mechanisms that are established and being improved as sure, quick, and effective responses are the World Food Programme's rapid-response team and the U.N. Emergency Coordinator, which was also spoken about earlier. AID, once again, is supporting the formation of this rapid-response team, which builds on WFP's extensive, 30-year history of moving food.

We are also hopeful that the new U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs will soon be more effective in coordinating the U.N. efforts that are diverse and scattered.

Another step we can take is early programing of food aid, which means timely decisionmaking and excellent coordination. I think that needs to be done both within the U.S. Government, particularly between USDA and AID, as well as internationally. This is one of the things that took place in the southern Africa drought, both agencies provided food aid early in the process.

In this connection, USDA will, with two of its food aid programs, its Food For Progress Authority and its section 416 food aid program, will begin for 1994 to make early programing decisions and to make tentative country allocations to help expedite the delivery of food under those two food aid authorities. This is in addition to the additional Public Law 480 authority that our agencies deal with.

Finally, I would like to briefly mention that AID and USDA have established a famine mitigation activity.

Again, OFDA is funding an activity which is being implemented by USDA's Office of International Cooperation and Development, to try to seek steps earlier in the process where we can do things to help lessen the devastating effect of famines, before they become massive, before people have moved and before it becomes much more difficult to address the need.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Chambliss appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. PENNY. Thank you.

In your testimony, Ms. Richards, you gave statistics on the number of disasters for 1990, 1991, 1992. The increasing number of instances, is that related to simply weather patterns or are there other factors that are leading to that increase?

Are we doing a better job of identifying situations? Are we seeing an increase in civil strife that compounds a problem that otherwise might not have been in a crisis level?

What are some of the factors at play here?



Ms. RICHARDS. One of the principal causes for the increase in the number of disasters we see every year, is the increase in the number of complex international disasters. It used to be that we averaged maybe about five a year in the 1980's, but now for the last 2 years, we are seeing 16 going on at one time.

I think there are consequences of environmental degradation, urbanization, population growth, those kind of factors at work that probably are making underdeveloped countries certainly more vulnerable to natural disasters.

It is hard for me to say, to quantify an increase in natural disasters, but I think your observation about maybe being able to identify them better—certainly, I am sure, there are places in the world where because of communications developments and just our ability to do weather forecasting and early warning, et cetera, we are aware of more disasters going on in places we might not have heard about before.

Mr. PENNY. You mentioned that the AID response is triggered by the declaration by the U.S. Embassy in that country. Does our declaration track with U.N. recognition of the problem or do we run into a buzz saw here, where we are trying to do something where the U.N. is not focused?

Ms. RICHARDS. I can't think of any instance where we and the U.N. agencies have not agreed that the disaster is existing. I think we are much quicker, not only in declaring a disaster but in organizing a disaster response.

Mr. PENNY. Is the prepositioning of supplies sufficient? You mentioned in your testimony that we have in Panama, Italy, Thailand, and Guam, material in storage. Are we able to maintain those at adequate levels and do we need to consider additional stockpiles of diets around the world?

Ms. RICHARDS. We have managed every year out of the OFDA funding that is included in the Foreign Assistance Act, to replenish the stockpiles. I don't think there is any sense that they have become inadequate to requirements.

They are a useful first response, but in the case of major disasters, obviously, they are not intended to meet all the requirements. They facilitate an immediate response. They don't constitute the totality of our response for a major disaster.

Mr. PENNY. Your example of southern Africa as a success story, could you elaborate about how that evolved and who got involved at what stage?

Ms. RICHARDS. At the end of January, as I recall, the FAO early warning system put out the first alert to a drought, and it followed fairly quickly thereafter, from reports we were getting from AID field missions and embassies in the region. There was not, at that time, an AID early warning system in southern Africa but it was being developed in the aftermath of the drought.

In any case, by late February, early March, we had a fairly good picture, certainly here in Washington, as to the extent of the crisis and the prospect of famine. I think we started having our first meetings with the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the State Department in March to start identifying food resources.



We sent an OFDA-AID assessment team to southern Africa in March, visited all of the 10 countries to try to identify how serious the problems were and the various kinds of assistance needed.

We started having meetings with private voluntary organizations here in the United States, to alert them to the severity of the situation in February. I remember addressing a group of food aid PVO's in early March, to call their attention to the problem. We did not have in southern Africa, because of competing demands elsewhere, as extensive a network of foreign PVO's experienced in relief assistance, as was the case in Ethiopia and Somalia.

We did organize a trip by Andrew Natsios, the then Assistant Administrator, accompanied by Mrs. Quayle, who was the chair of the International Disaster Advisory Committee to southern Africa, along with Ms. Chambliss and other AID personnel to try to call the world's attention to the severity of the problem there.

We utilized meetings with donors to discuss emergency operations. In February, the CFA Committee on Food Aid meeting on the World Food Program, in April, as well, to reinforce to them the urgency of the requirement and try to get other donors to focus on the needs.

We shipped quite significant amounts of food between January and June. We delivered virtually all of the 1,700,000 metric tons we approved for southern Africa in fiscal 1992 from USDA and AID resources. By December of 1992, we were trying very hard to beat it—if you had wanted the August-September timeframe when we knew severe hunger would start to become apparent.

We encouraged the World Food Program to coordinate logistics arrangements. The majority of countries with which we were dealing were highly dependent on southern African ports and the road and rail system that reach inward from South Africa and Mozambique, and even from Tanzania, to deliver the food, especially to countries like Zambia and Malawi that were landlocked.

We had efforts in each of these countries led by the AID missions and the U.S. Embassies, to try to organize donors there and to work with the PVO's to try to set up distribution systems. AID even contracted with an audit firm to review all food distribution systems which we were going to be relying on to try to make sure that they were adequate to protect against losses. And we encouraged the U.N. to host a donor meeting, which I believe they did in early April, to solicit international appeals for donor assistance.

We have also had diplomatic demarches made by U.S. Embassies in various donor capitals to encourage their contributions to the southern Africa drought and tried to impress on them the urgency for moving massive amounts of food and other resources quickly, but also tried to coordinate the logistics, because one of our great fears would be that all of this massive amounts of food that we were talking about, something like, 11 million metric tons, having to be delivered during, roughly, September to April.

We had visions of all of this hitting the ports all at the same time and being caught in a massive logistics logjam, which fortunately never developed. I like to think that is because the U.S. food got in there so fast and so early that we beat the other donors. I don't think I am far wrong in taking that credit unto ourselves.

While there are still requirements for food assistance in southern Africa, this year they had fairly good rains, there was no massive famine in the region. There were severe hunger problems in Mozambique during the time of this drought.

They were trying to reach an agreement on the cease-fire at the time. There were a few pockets of hunger where people started to move but by and large, we averted famine, massive displacement of people, the logistics logjams, and I think that is something the United States should be rightly proud of.

Mr. PENNY. Thank you.

Ms. Chambliss, you mentioned the possible formation of a rapid-response team by the World Food Programme. How do you envision that response team?

What kind of role would it play in coordinating and expediting our relief efforts?

Ms. CHAMBLISS. Let me briefly share the information that Ms. Richards and I heard last week. We were in Rome at the governing committee of the World Food Programme. I believe their Executive Director will be here tomorrow to give you additional information.

The World Food Programme proposed to its governing committee and basically we consented to their proposal, that they identify 10 staff members who had experience in dealing with emergencies, particularly, I suspect, in the logistical transportation problems that have to be addressed. They would keep this staff in a central unit, I assume located in Rome, and they could then quickly be moved to a country where problems occurred.

WFP staff, as is true of many staffs, are rather short-handed in countries. If you are in a developing country and you are carrying on development feeding programs, which are intensive and difficult, and all of a sudden you are hit with either a natural or complex situation and now you have 100,000 or more people that you have to address, the staff I think feels overwhelmed. The Executive Director is looking for a mechanism where she can move people with specialized knowledge and training. They talked about trying to develop some special training and techniques and then quickly move them into a country for a period of time to get things on track. That is my impression of what they are looking for in the rapid-response mechanism.

Mr. PENNY. I have no further questions at this time.

Mr. Allard.

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you.

Ms. Richards, the United States provides about half of the United States food aid and the World Food Programme receives about 20 percent of the commodities from the United States and provides about 17 percent of that. The European Community provides 16 percent. The remainder comes from a variety of sources.

Is this the correct mix of donors or should other countries provide more?

Ms. RICHARDS. I think the mix of donors may not be as serious a problem as some donors who promise but never deliver or deliver late. EC is famous for delivering late. I think they value us because they know when we make a pledge, we deliver and we deliver quite quickly. There are occasions where other donors, like the Japanese, provide dollar resources to the World Food Programme to be used

to procure food, quite often within the United States. I think they just announced another pledge to do so last week in Rome at the Committee on Food Aid meeting in Rome that Ms. Chambliss and I attended.

As Mary already said in her testimony, U.S. agriculture is so efficient and productive that this enables us to be a major source of food aid. Few other countries really match our productivity.

Mr. ALLARD. Ms. Chambliss, I don't know which one would be best qualified to answer this, but if you don't feel qualified and want to pass the buck, that is OK.

Ms. CHAMBLISS. I have no qualms about doing that.

Mr. ALLARD. The countries eligible for Public Law 480, those that become eligible for that are apparently developing countries experiencing a shortage of foreign exchange earnings and they did not get all the food needs through commercial channels. Those are the two standards I understand. How does the USDA determine in which countries they are meeting this standard?

Ms. CHAMBLISS. The two criteria you identified were the provisions of the 1990 farm bill that basically recast all of our food aid authorities.

In terms of what is a developing country, the standard that is generally accepted and that was used in previous legislation is the criteria established by the World Bank, called the IDA criteria. IDA, I believe, is International Development Association.

That sets a certain per capita income that identifies countries that are considered developing and therefore in need of various forms of assistance. That is the general guideline, USDA needs to look at countries on that list. Congress also identified categories for food aid programs administered by the Agency for International Development, particularly title III, of Public Law 480, that identifies the poorer countries and sets a lower income.

So when the USDA looks at countries, they basically look at countries above the lower capital income line, which AID tries to meet needs with grant assistance, but the World Bank says these countries need assistance. USDA can then assess the individual countries financial situation; they can draw on Treasury information, on Embassy reports, and other sources.

In terms of looking at commercial purchases of agricultural commodities, the Foreign Agricultural Service maintains its own expertise and intelligence to assess what is a country's projected ability to buy commercially. You look at a combination of those. You look at the resources they have.

The USDA then tries to look at countries where they see some long-term market development potential to benefit U.S. agriculture in the long run for this resource, and that is how they identify the countries.

There are two other affiliated authorities created in the farm bill which USDA runs, and those I referred to in my testimony. Those are grant resources. They are used for all countries that have a need for food. They have more flexible criteria based on the authorities that Congress passed.

Mr. ALLARD. On title I, how do you determine how much aid to give?



Ms. CHAMBLISS. It is an appropriated account. In the U.S. budget process, we make recommendations and Congress disposes of them.

Mr. ALLARD. But the individual situations, you make decisions on the amount of money?

Ms. CHAMBLISS. We make an analysis of what quantity of food seems to meet the criteria and the needs of that country, because the countries vary a lot. What commodities we have and the cost of those commodities also vary and then a judgment is made as to what is an appropriate level and then you negotiate it with the country.

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you.

To get to something more current here, are there sufficient food donations in Bosnia?

Ms. RICHARDS. Let me address that.

I think there is great concern about the adequacy of the food available for Bosnia. The U.N. has told us that only roughly one-third of the amount requested by WFP has been pledged. The appeal period runs from April through December.

I understand from my staff who discussed it with WFP personnel and people at the EEC within the last 2 weeks, that there is sufficient food coming available from the contributions we have made, the EEC, Japanese, Scandinavians, to carry them through June. They think with promises they have, that they should be all right into December, but they will qualify this, again because they don't have that food in hand, and because there is another factor here that the longer the Yugoslavia situation goes on, the more people become in need of food assistance.

We have seen quite a significant increase in the number of beneficiaries for which the U.N. is appealing since last spring.

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank both of you for being with us today.

Mr. PENNY. Ms. Chambliss, you mentioned the need to better link our aid programs with ongoing development efforts. What are the most appropriate ways to accomplish that?

Ms. CHAMBLISS. I think this is hard to say specifically, because I have not worked overseas in the countries. Last night as I was thinking about this committee meeting, I was thinking what are some of the things that we might do that would allow better use of the tools we have to make the transition from emergency situations to more traditional development activities?

I think most of our legal authorities, at least in the food aid area, have segregated those two types of activities. We have created authorities that were traditional food aid development feeding mechanisms and then we created some special authorities for unique emergencies. If you look at the legislation, you will see there are some differences.

As people are having longer-term emergencies, we have people becoming displaced over a period of years due to civil conflicts or they may never return home. We need to have ways to use more flexible authorities so people in the field can use those authorities better to meet whatever their needs are.

Maybe we should do development projects in a certain emergency situation because that gives you a head start in some of the things.



I would ask Ms. Richards if she has other recommendations from her experience in the field.

Ms. RICHARDS. Yes, there are two ways to look at that. Some countries are more disaster prone than others, like the Sahel. The AID development programs in the Sahelian countries in part is an outgrowth of the Sahel droughts, have focused significantly over time on early warnings of droughts, doing the agricultural programs that have stressed drought-resistant cereals, ways to conserve water, and ways to harness whatever water is available and getting it to flow into increasing agricultural production, and to building up systems for distributing food, and including food stock reserves, to try to mitigate against the effects of these situations.

The problem, as Ms. Chambliss points out, it is much more difficult after an emergency has hit, because we have a sequence that we go through that moves from relief, to rehabilitation, to recovery, and on to longer-term development. Rehabilitation really is intended to try to get basic facilities up and operating that may have been destroyed by war, for example. Without rebuilding a water works, you cannot provide a generator to get water pumps going.

We also try to get seeds and tools for the farmers so they can go back and start planting again.

I think the U.N. system and our own system as well, need to look better at the way you get from the rehabilitation stage out to recovery and development. I think the refugee area is one where particular attention needs to be given, because you have with refugees, people who the world system, if you will, sees the short-term residence in a country not their own, who are intending to go home.

The host country has international obligations about taking care of them while they are there, but it really doesn't want to divert their development resources to, if you will, foreigners, when there are competing demands from its own citizens, and quite often where refugees come and stay for quite an extraordinary long time, as we are seeing more often, you have competition for resources between host country nationals and the refugees.

Also, when you have situations where refugees are starting to go back, especially in these countries where there has been massive devastation due to war, and Somalia is another case in point, quite often you have to be sure there is security in the places they are going home to, otherwise they won't go. Quite often, they don't want to go home when there is nothing, even if they are given food and basic tools and something to live on for 6 months or so until they get a crop in the ground.

They may have to rebuild their homes. Quite often, the infrastructure repair and renovation is much more significant than any of these developing countries can bear.

The donors, because we are dealing in a situation that is still relatively new, need to give much more attention to this than they have done in the past. I think the situation in Somalia, where we have just gotten the World Bank's agreement to lead donors in the massive infrastructure reconstruction effort, and where we are working with other donors in the U.N. to try to work through this rehabilitation recovery process over the next 2 years, could well set a pattern that could apply in other years.

We really have not had much experience with doing this before. So we are sort of learning as we go.

Mr. PENNY. Ms. Chambliss or Ms. Richards, either one, we are going to hold a hearing, I believe next week, on cargo preference. Do you care to share any thoughts about the expense of cargo preference and the degree it mitigates our relief efforts?

Ms. CHAMBLISS. I guess the obvious is that it is expensive and resources are limited. I am aware that there has been a great deal of back and forth—I believe there was a hearing yesterday before another committee on that subject, and USDA will be pleased to appear at your hearing.

I have been somewhat removed from the operations of the specific food aid programs to which cargo preference applies, so I don't think I am knowledgeable to make additional comments at this point.

Ms. RICHARDS. I would just underscore that cargo preference does make delivery of food more expensive and, therefore, cuts into the amount of funds available for buying food.

One of the most innovative things done during the southern Africa drought by our AID Mission Director in Zambia, was he worked out a deal, I don't know how, where the donors paid for the transport of the United States food and that enabled us to triple the amount of title III food that we were sending to Zambia, in large part in response to the drought.

I think, obviously, there are lots of arguments on all sides on the cargo preference and why it exists, many of which go beyond the foreign assistance aspects of it. I would have to defer to those other parties to argue their cases.

Mr. PENNY. I appreciate your testimony this morning. It has been tremendously helpful.

With that, I don't see any other subcommittee members present. So we will move on to the next panelist.

At this point, I call a recess of the subcommittee, so the next witness would not be formally testifying before the subcommittee but would instead be favoring the subcommittee members with some observations off the record.

[Recess taken.]

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—Pursuant to U.N. rules, the witness representing the United Nations was unable to appear before a Government entity and thus briefed the subcommittee and responded to questions off the record. The prepared statement of Mr. Ed Tsui, Chief, Office of the Under Secretary General, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations, New York, NY, is held in the committee files.]

Mr. PENNY. We will now resume our subcommittee hearing and call forth our last panelist, Mr. Per Pinstруп-Andersen, director general, International Food Policy Research Institute.

Welcome to the subcommittee this morning. We look forward to your testimony.

#### STATEMENT OF PER PINSTRUP-ANDERSEN, DIRECTOR GENERAL, INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Mr. PINSTRUP-ANDERSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, widespread hunger and malnutrition such as that found in sub-Sahara Africa is a disgrace. We have a moral obligation to deal with it. Certainly we can be more effective if we have early warning systems and if we are better prepared to move in quickly in cases of crisis.

However, that is not what I am going to talk about this morning, although it is a subject I have included in my written statement, which I would submit for the record.

Mr. PENNY. Without objection.

Mr. PINSTRUP-ANDERSEN. We believe we need to focus more of our efforts in preventing famines from occurring in the first place. We may not be able to prevent drought and civil unrest, but there is no reason why drought and civil unrest must necessarily result in famine.

Famine is man-made, as we have heard this morning. It is not visited upon us by some unforeseen force. We can break the link between drought and civil unrest on the one hand, and famine on the other. That causal relationship doesn't have to exist.

The root causes of famine are well understood: Poverty, lack of infrastructure, inappropriate market conditions and policies, inadequate agricultural technologies, problems that should be addressed not through emergency relief measures, but through long-range development initiatives.

Mr. Chairman, famine relief is expensive. It can cost as much as long-range development initiatives, and more importantly, it diverts funds that could be applied toward fixing the fundamental problem.

The United States Government has spent nearly \$800 million in southern Africa to prevent the recent drought from being a catastrophic famine. That is as much as the entire 1992 fund for the Continent of Africa within the Agency of International Development.

In Somalia alone, the United States has spent somewhere between \$800 million and \$1 billion on relief efforts during the last couple of years. More importantly, the expenditures and relief contribute little toward eliminating future famine.

Southern Africa is probably not much better equipped today to deal with future droughts than it was before the emergency relief was undertaken. This is not to take anything away from a very successful relief effort, but the advantage of preventative measures is that they are sustainable. In contrast, relief is something we have to keep going back to again and again, because it fails to address the root causes.

Hunger is related to agriculture. In fact, hunger is the principal reason for agriculture. Today the gap between domestic food production and demand in the sub-Saharan Africa is 12 million to 14 million tons. By the year 2000, the International Food Policy Research Institute calculates that shortfall will be closer to 50 million tons.

If current conditions persist, there is no possibility of meeting such a shortfall through imports or through food aid. So what is likely to happen is this, Mr. Chairman, we are going to see much more famine than we have seen in the past.



So what can be done? First, we must help countries grow more food, and in the process raise incomes among the rural poor. So we must reverse the recent downward trends in investment in agricultural development in low-income developing countries. Support for developing countries' agriculture by the Agency for International Development dropped by about 50 percent during the last 5 years. It is currently about half of what it was in 1988.

Second, we have to increase supports for agricultural research. Given the projected shortfalls I just mentioned, unless we increase crop yields we are doomed; we will see famines the likes of which we have never seen before.

Increased crop yields can come about through better technology and more research. I recommend increased support for agricultural research within developing countries and increased support for international agricultural research, in particular for the activities of the Consultative Group of International Agriculture Research, which has a proven track record in developing new technologies which lead to increasing productivity and the alleviation of hunger and poverty.

Third, we need to expand our investment in the rural agricultural markets and assist those countries who wish to pursue an orderly transformation of the role of Government in development.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we certainly need to improve the mechanisms for crisis intervention. Again, my written testimony addresses this issue. I wanted to point out here that one of the issues we need to deal with is the better coordination of the efforts of relief and development agencies to begin making headway in the fundamental causes of famine.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pinstrup-Andersen appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. PENNY. Thank you.

Speaking of coordination, what observations might you make about the U.S. involvement in that regard in interagency coordination and also the U.N.?

Mr. PINSTRUP-ANDERSEN. Mr. Chairman, I think there is a tendency both within the U.S. Government and in the United Nations to separate relief efforts from development efforts. Let me give you a concrete example about where that may lead us. In Somalia, we have shipped large quantities of food and that is the way it should be.

The problem is that we are not following up with development efforts to permit Somalian farmers to make money in production of food. When you ship that much food into a country, you basically destroy the market for agricultural commodities and you basically take the market away from farmers.

We have to coordinate such shipments with agricultural policies to assure a fair price to producers in the country you are trying to help. This is just an example.

I think much needs to be done to coordinate the relief efforts with the subsequent development efforts, both in the U.S. Government and U.N.

Mr. PENNY. What about the notion of a dollar-for-dollar commitment or for every dollar of humanitarian aid or emergency relief,



we guarantee we will devote a dollar to the development effort as kind of a follow on to the crisis and a way of averting the next crisis?

Mr. PINSTRUP-ANDERSEN. I am not sure that such a rule would be appropriate in all cases. I think the more dollars we can provide for development efforts, the less dollars we will need down the road for emergency efforts.

It is an investment to avoid emergencies in the future. I am not sure we can necessarily have a one-to-one rule that would be appropriate in all cases.

Mr. PENNY. I am thinking of it in terms of kind of highlighting the issue, because increasing support for the ongoing development efforts may make an awful lot of sense, but it is a more difficult sell. People don't see the immediate benefits. Yet we just heard from earlier witnesses that we have, I think, 63 disaster declarations in calendar year 1992; 46 so far this year.

There is not a shortage of problems out there. It seems like only when the crisis hits do we pay attention.

The only reason I suggest this kind of dollar-for-dollar commitment is it is a way of using or taking advantage of the attention that has been brought to a crisis, to obligate us to a more aggressive development program for that region. For example, you mentioned in, I think, southern Africa, the \$800 million the United States contributed as its share of the relief effort there. Can you speculate how much we could accomplish with 800 million dollars' worth of development assistance in that same region and the kinds of purposes it can be put toward?

Mr. PINSTRUP-ANDERSEN. Yes, sir. I completely agree with the principle. I think in terms of obtaining support for long-term development assistance, linking the two together would be a good principle. We can do a lot in southern Africa with \$800 million allocated for development assistance.

We can help small farmers get access to more inputs, to produce more output. There are a number of things we can do. We can assist southern Africa in building roads, feeder roads into farms so they don't have to carry their products on their backs. There are a number of things that we can do to avoid that we will have a famine next time there is a drought in sub-Saharan Africa. Of course, they will have droughts, but will they also have famines?

Mr. PENNY. I assume you have the resources to apply to this question, I would request that you run a model of some sort to indicate what \$800 million in development assistance could achieve, and maybe we can use southern Africa as the example here. Then project what that might mean in terms of protecting against a similar crisis developing in the future.

If \$800 million were applied to these types of development programs and a couple of years from now the same kinds of weather conditions applied, how much protection might we have against a more serious crisis?

I know that these all, there are so many variances that it is tough to be precise, but I think we can put some quantification to that question. I think it might be very instructive to this question if we can look at \$800 million in aid and what that might save us down the road if those development efforts succeed in building up

a reserve or improving production techniques so that they were less weather dependent, et cetera.

So if you could agree to provide us some information in that regard, it would be tremendously useful.

Mr. PINSTRUP-ANDERSEN. I will be glad to submit the information. I think this is the kind of thing that we can do.

[The information follows:]

**INTERNATIONAL  
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October 8, 1993

The Honorable Timothy J. Penny  
Congressman from Minnesota  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Penny:

This letter is in response to your request during the hearing on June 9 for information about how additional development assistance for Southern Africa might improve living standards of the poor and reduce the need for future drought relief.

Since time is obviously of the essence, particularly for those millions of Africans who suffer from hunger and malnutrition, my colleagues and I have made some rough calculations of the costs and benefits associated with what we consider to be the most promising opportunities for enhanced food security and reduced risk of famine associated with any future droughts. We have also embarked on more solid analyses to refine the evidence needed to guide future assistance to Southern Africa. We will share the results from these analyses with you as they become available.

The 1991/92 drought in Southern Africa was especially severe. Most places received the lowest levels of rainfall in 100 years, and crop production was down by 50 to 90 percent. In Zimbabwe alone, over 4.5 million people were requesting relief food by mid-1992. An estimated 6 million tons of food imports was required to feed 30 million people in the region. Southern Africa lacks the capacity to import food on this scale, and, food aid requirements were estimated at 4 million tons. In contrast, less than 1 million tons of food aid had been required the previous year. Widespread famine was averted, but at substantial costs to both national governments and donors, and, of course, to the many millions of people whose lives were devastated by the drought.

While droughts as severe as the one in 1991/92 are rare, droughts occur periodically right across Africa. To enable Africa to prevent future droughts from turning into famine, sustained agricultural growth and economic development is needed to ensure that food can be produced to the extent possible during drought and that people

continue to earn incomes needed to buy food even if they cannot grow it. As further elaborated in my testimony, drought triggers famine not only through reductions in food production, but also through reductions in income that prevent people from buying food on the market. Agricultural growth addresses hunger directly through its potential to increase production and indirectly through its potential to generate rural employment and therefore income.

However, there are constraints to agricultural growth and development in Africa. Farmers lack the resources to grow more food - resources such as improved crop varieties, fertilizer, pesticides, animal traction (oxen), mechanical traction (tractors), tools, sacks, carts, and many other things that American farmers take for granted. African farmers lack access to credit at reasonable terms to purchase these resources, even if available. Transport and market infrastructure to allow farmers to participate in the market are in an embryonic stage in most of these countries. Small-scale irrigation, which would help during drought, is still relatively undeveloped in the region.

It is a surprise that African farmers continue to produce as much as they do even under such adverse circumstances. But, external assistance can help them develop the full potentials of their agricultural sector and strengthen their capacity to withstand future droughts in a number of ways. The most important of these include:

- \* Provision of improved technology, including more drought-resistant and drought-tolerant crop varieties;
- \* Construction and maintenance of essential infrastructure such as rural feeder roads, small dams, irrigation systems, and marketing and storage structures;
- \* Facilitating access to inputs such as fertilizer, pesticides, tools, oxen, tractors, and the credit often needed to purchase these;
- \* Enabling access to knowledge via good extension services;
- \* Improving the capacity and capability of national governments to collect and analyze information for policymaking, in order to foster "good governance" and effective marketing, pricing, and other policies conducive to agricultural growth.



There are at least three areas of gain to be realized from early investment in agriculture versus late investment in emergency food relief:

- (i) a net increase in aggregate food supply;
- (ii) a net saving in the volume of relief activities required; and
- (iii) a net saving in relief costs because of improved efficiency of delivery.

Quantifying these potential savings is a difficult task. To my knowledge no solid empirical study has been done on this. However, there are estimates on the potential savings from improved crop varieties; there is considerable indirect evidence on the payoffs, in terms of increased incomes, production, and employment, of investment in the types of activities noted above; and there are some real successes of components of a strategy to mitigate or prevent famine. I briefly pursue some of the available evidence below.

#### Improved Crop Varieties

Maize is the main staple crop of Southern Africa, but use of unimproved germplasm, lack of fertilizer, and inadequate weed control, among other shortcomings, have resulted in yields of just 1 ton per hectare on average for the region. In comparison, maize yields in the United States average about 7 tons per hectare. Cultivation of improved maize varieties has considerable potential to increase yields and, thereby, production.

The recent drought is considered to have reduced maize production in Southern Africa by 60 percent region-wide, or almost 5 million tons of maize -- worth about \$600 million at port in southern Africa. If improved drought-tolerant cultivars had been used, an additional 1.4 to 2.8 million tons of grain could be produced each year, worth \$170 to 340 million at the farm gate.<sup>1</sup> Even in a normal year, using drought-tolerant germplasm might add an extra 300,000 tons of maize, worth about \$30 million.

The research investments to generate these improved cultivars would have cost about \$16 million in 1993 dollars during 1980-90 for the region. Hence, if germplasm products with added drought tolerance

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<sup>1</sup> Background data and estimating methods are available from IFPRI.

had been in place in 1992, the benefits (\$170 to 340 million plus local transportation costs) would have far outweighed the accumulated research costs (\$16 million). Generating the benefits of using drought-tolerant germplasm in non-drought years (\$30 million per year) would cost another \$1.5 million in annual research expenditures.

Other crops such as improved sorghum and millet also hold considerable potential in the region. On-station field trials at the ICRISAT Sahelian Center in Niger indicate that yields for improved varieties were 78 percent higher than for local varieties under drought conditions in 1984. If in 1991 improved varieties had been planted on half of the acreage under millet and sorghum in Southern Africa, and if farmers could have attained a 50 percent increase in yields using drought-resistant varieties, an extra 57,000 tons of millet and 84,500 tons of sorghum might have been produced, giving a total of 141,500 tons of additional coarse grain production in the region, valued at \$22.3 million. If improved varieties had been seeded on all the acreage under millet and sorghum, additional coarse grain production could have come to 283,000 tons, valued at roughly \$45 million.

It takes about 10 to 12 years to establish a good and productive breeding program, and can cost about \$10 to \$12 million over that period. Thus, an annual investment of about a million dollars in a breeding program might contribute as much as \$170 million of added production on condition that farmers have access to the improved varieties and supporting inputs and services.

### Improved Technologies

While increasing the adoption of improved and drought resistant varieties in rain-fed regions could start immediately, investment in developing small-scale irrigation and irrigation management systems should be pursued to sustain production levels, mitigate the impact of recurrent drought and increase the income and standard of living in the medium to long term. Large areas of rain-fed land could be converted to small-scale irrigation over the next few years with gravity flow, pumping, and open furrow technology. Research from Zimbabwe suggests that during drought years, maize yields on smallholder irrigation schemes average 3 tons per hectare versus 1.2 tons per hectare on rain-fed land. In normal years, the yield differential on such schemes is much higher. Thus, smallholder irrigation has considerable benefits to offer in both drought and non-drought years.

At a development cost of roughly \$10,000 per hectare irrigating 100,000 hectares, food production could be increased by roughly 4 million tons per year. Irrigation technology development is also essential in the long run to stabilize yields of food crops, expand area planted by allowing more than one crop to be cultivated, enhance incomes, expand food production, and provide foreign exchange. All of this will assist in reducing rural-urban migration.

Yet, increases in food production through irrigation or by other means cannot be sustained without attention to environmental concerns, such as salinity and soil erosion which threaten to reverse productivity gains. Much can be achieved in this realm at a low cost by using low-input technologies such as biological pest control and nitrogen-fixation through appropriate crop rotations. For example, \$1 spent in the biological control of cassava pests can increase farmer incomes by an estimated \$150. Increasing and maintaining soil fertility through alley farming and soil and water management can also assist in sustaining production in the long-run.

### Improved Input Use

It is not enough to generate improved crop varieties; farmers must have access to them as well as to supporting inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, animal and mechanical traction, extension services, and credit. I expand on just two of these below; fertilizer and extension.

Use of chemical fertilizer in Southern Africa is very low, ranging from 2 kilograms of nutrients per hectare in Mozambique to 15 in Zambia, with Zimbabwe being an exception at 57. This is in contrast with China which applies an average of 174 kilograms per hectare. Not surprising, then, that crop yields in Southern Africa are low and that improved crop varieties do not achieve their full potential. Tests in Malawi show that applying fertilizer to local maize resulted in yield increases of 750 kilograms per hectare, while applying fertilizer to hybrid maize resulted in yield increases of 2.4 tons per hectare over local maize. Such yield increases suggest that fertilizer use can have substantial pay-offs, especially when applied to improved crop varieties.

Farmer demand for fertilizer is constrained by high prices and unreliable supplies. The price African farmers pay for fertilizer, relative to the price they receive for their output, is much higher than in Asia. Fertilizer prices are high in Africa because the price of importing fertilizer tends to be at least twice as high in Africa

than in Asia, and because transportation costs are high due to poor infrastructure, small volumes, and inefficient distribution systems.

Without substantial fertilizer subsidies, it is simply not economically rational for many African farmers to use fertilizer in the appropriate amounts on their crops. In the Malawian case alluded to above, without a 25 percent subsidy, returns to fertilizer use, even on hybrid maize, would not exceed the 100 percent assumed necessary for widespread adoption by farmers. Similar situations are observed across Africa. Until fertilizer prices can be brought down to reasonable levels, it may be appropriate to consider limited targeted fertilizer subsidies to farmers, in order to elicit large production increases and increase food supplies.

Estimates suggest that the landed cost of fertilizer can often be reduced by 20 to 40 percent (\$60 to 160 per ton of fertilizer) through relatively simple improvements in management and operation of the procurement system. Further potential savings can also be realized through bulk importing and local bagging of fertilizer (about \$17 to 30 per ton), and through local processing of imported materials (\$30 to 60 per ton). Many of these savings can then be passed directly to farmers, improving their incentives to use fertilizer. Additional major cost reductions can be obtained by investments in better roads and other rural infrastructure. This is further discussed below.

Extension services are an important link between researchers and farmers. The few instances when improved crop varieties have been successfully adopted on a large scale in African countries -- for example, hybrid maize in Kenya and Zimbabwe -- have been characterized by strong extension efforts. Strong national extension services based on the T & V system (training and visit system) have been successful in parts of Africa. In Kenya, for example, some farmers increased maize yields by up to 50 percent; in Cote d'Ivoire, yields improved by about 15 percent for rain-fed rice and maize, 25 percent for irrigated rice, and up to 100 percent for coffee; and in Burkina Faso, farmers who belonged to groups in contact with extension achieved crop yields that were 28 percent higher than those of farmers not involved.

Well-organized extension services can pay off. Rates of return to increased investment in extension were found to exceed 100 percent in Kenya, and to be even higher in Burkina Faso. Effective national extension services might conceivably cost about \$65 million annually for the Southern Africa region. If even a 20 percent increase in yields on one crop, maize, was encouraged by the extension services, it would lead to additional maize production of 1.4 million tons,



valued at \$140 million at the farm gate, more than off-setting the annual cost of \$65 million. The benefits of extension services to other crops are not even considered here, but it is obvious that the production benefits might be far in excess of the operating costs of such services.

### Infrastructure

Of course, the potential benefits of both new crop and irrigation technology depend on adequate market and transport infrastructure such as rural roads and storage facilities. Infrastructure development is also the key for fostering and quickening the process of appropriate market and economic reforms in the next 10 years. Inadequate infrastructure hinders easy exchange of food supplies between deficit and surplus regions or countries.

Studies of 58 countries during 1969-78 show that a 10 percent increase in road density leads to a 2.4 percent increase in fertilizer demand. Furthermore, 7 percent of the growth of agricultural output and 7 percent of the growth in fertilizer use over 1971-81 was directly attributable to investments in roads. In Tanzania, an investment of \$1.00 in transport is estimated to yield as much as \$1.50 in increased income.

Yet, existing road networks are poor. Road densities are very low, about 50 meters per square kilometer in Mozambique and 200 in Zimbabwe. Road densities in Asian countries are five to ten times higher. Less than 20 percent of the African roads are paved. Thus, most African farmers are isolated from markets and cannot engage in market activities, or receive inputs in a timely manner. Expanding and maintaining rural infrastructure is essential if the agriculture sector in these countries is to grow. Inadequate infrastructure also hinders easy exchange of food supplies between deficit and surplus regions or countries, and increases the monetary and time costs of relief.

Conservative estimates by the World Bank indicate a needed investment of 1 percent of GNP for rehabilitating and expanding rural road networks. For Southern Africa, this would translate to \$110 to \$130 million (in 1990 Dollars). Some necessary investments are already being made in sub-Saharan Africa with bilateral and multilateral funds. Speeding up these investments and (continued support for them) are essential in the long run to harness short run gains from the efforts mentioned above.

Labor-intensive public works projects have potential in this respect to generate employment and income (thereby meeting immediate food security needs), as well as to build or rehabilitate rural infrastructure and set some of the conditions for achieving long-term food security. Market and transport infrastructure also reduces the cost of yield increasing inputs and increases their accessibility. Botswana and Zimbabwe have been particularly successful in applying public works to combat food insecurity and prevent starvation deaths and mass migration during times of drought. Botswana, which faced severe droughts for six consecutive years between 1982 and 1987, instituted early on a labor-intensive relief program that absorbed about 41,600 workers per year during that period in implementing a variety of projects. The government spent \$22.6 million in non-recurrent programs costs. Access to cash income through this program was instrumental in preventing the drought from escalating into famine.

### Conclusions

There is ample evidence from within the region that countries such as Zimbabwe, that have invested more in agriculture over time, and countries such as Botswana, that have developed better infrastructure and food security policies, are better able to cope with drought and emergency relief than countries with poor infrastructure, poorly developed agriculture and inappropriate policies. Similarly, there is ample evidence from across Africa that external assistance can successfully promote smallholder agricultural development: examples include coffee and tea in Kenya, cotton in Cameroon and Senegal, and dairying in Kenya. However, past successes have mainly been in cash crops, a legacy of colonialism; food crops have been somewhat neglected by donors.

National and international agricultural research offer a tremendous opportunity for expanded food production and reduced poverty in Africa. Unfortunately, external assistance to developing country agriculture (including agricultural research) has declined in recent years. The share of agriculture in total development assistance to developing countries decreased from 22 percent in 1980 to 14 percent in 1990. USAID, in particular, has sharply cut its financial assistance to agriculture during the 1980s. By 1990, its real commitments to agriculture were less than one-third of those in 1980 and one-half of those in 1988. Moreover, an increasing proportion of its agricultural funding is coming from short-term budget support facilities such as the Special Activities Initiative, rather than from the more long-term-oriented Development Assistance


Fund for agriculture. Declining USAID investment in agriculture today may lead to the need for more (and more costly) relief shipments tomorrow.

Thus, it is essential that assistance to agricultural development and growth in Southern Africa be sharply increased. Emphasis should be placed on expanded support of agricultural research and technology development in the countries of the regions and that undertaken by the international agricultural research centers. However, the specifics of development assistance allocation in each recipient country cannot be decided in Washington; that is a recipe for non-effective and wasteful aid programs. Aid decisions must be driven by country and local conditions, based on past experience, and tailored to specific agroecological and institutional settings. Close collaboration with in-country decisionmakers is essential.

National decisionmakers need to improve their capacity to collect and analyze information for policymaking and develop appropriate pricing, marketing, and other policies for managing their food economies. Assistance of various different types could be provided: short- and long-term training and assistance in developing national food and nutrition policies for permanent preparedness. The cost of these long-term investments in human skills are difficult to estimate. Tangible benefits are likely to be very large.

I hope that this information can be of use to you. We can discuss any comments that you or your staff may have on the issues raised here. If you require any clarifications, or the detailed calculations and assumptions underlying these arguments, or if we can be of further assistance please do not hesitate to contact me at IFPRI.

Sincerely,



Per Pinstrup-Andersen  
Director General

Mr. PENNY. Thank you.

Mr. Allard.

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Does your organization collect data on resources in a country, their agricultural production, climatic conditions, and health information, those types of information that would help us in formulating some strategy for need because they are at risk?

Mr. PINSTRUP-ANDERSEN. We work very closely with FAO and the World Bank and other international organizations that collect such data. We collect data in specific cases. We do not keep a nationwide monitoring system. The data is available to us and we can do further analysis of them.

Mr. ALLARD. You don't look at the data until there has been an identified risk in the country and then you focus on the country?

Mr. PINSTRUP-ANDERSEN. No. Most of our work is done before that. Most of our work is done on specific policy issues the Government wants to address, price policy, technology policy, et cetera. Much of that would be useful in developing strategies for the country.

Mr. ALLARD. Ordinarily, are you getting that information far enough in advance that you can begin to look at agriculture and make some adjustments in agricultural programs in that country so that you can avoid it?

Mr. PINSTRUP-ANDERSEN. We have had a great deal of information that shows what is likely to happen over the next 5 to 10 years in specific countries, yes, that is correct. It is precisely that kind of information that makes me very concerned.

What we are seeing is major increases in food deficiencies in sub-Saharan Africa over the next 20 years. We don't see how that deficiency is going to be dealt with other than more starvation.

Mr. ALLARD. Is that population growth?

Mr. PINSTRUP-ANDERSEN. That is partly population growth and it is partly lack of increase in production. Population grows 3 percent a year and food grows 2 percent. There is no indication that either of the two trends will change over the next 5 or 10 years.

Mr. ALLARD. What can we do to improve agricultural production in Africa?

Mr. PINSTRUP-ANDERSEN. A large number of things. I think the most important thing that we can do is to support African countries in their efforts to increase yields per unit of land, in such a way that we don't downgrade or degrade the environment, in other words sustainable yield increases among small farmers is a solution to the problem.

The most critical component is new technology. That means new crop varieties, access to fertilizer, access to credit, rural infrastructure that is sufficiently good so that farmers don't have to carry the fertilizer on their backs and carry the maize out on their backs. We have to have access to remote areas.

Those kind of things require financial assistance, financial and technical and they require research. All of those things would be tremendously helped with additional support from the U.S. Government, which, as I mentioned before, rather than increasing is decreasing at a very rapid rate.

Mr. ALLARD. Are many of these areas semiarid areas?



Mr. PINSTRUP-ANDERSEN. That is right.

Mr. ALLARD. You know, in the United States we have done a lot to improve the agricultural production in semiarid areas by the way we manage our water supply, which means dam construction and irrigation projects. I am surprised you did not mention those in your comments.

Mr. PINSTRUP-ANDERSEN. In my written statement, I make reference to small-scale irrigation projects, which I think is very important. We have not had a great deal of success with large-scale irrigation in sub-Saharan Africa.

Mr. ALLARD. Why is that?

Mr. PINSTRUP-ANDERSEN. It is partly because of the large expense involved in developing these large-scale irrigation schemes. It is also because they were not maintained properly. There are a number of more technical reasons.

Mr. ALLARD. So maybe we need some training in that area in those countries in order to support their agriculture?

Mr. PINSTRUP-ANDERSEN. I think that is correct, but I think we should stay away from the very large-scale irrigation projects for most of Africa, there are exceptions to that rule as well, but I think we should be pursuing small-scale irrigation in that area as well.

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you for your comments.

Mr. PENNY. I thank you for your presentation this morning. It has been particularly helpful.

We will follow-up with you to secure whatever you can provide in terms of an analysis of an aid effort comparable to the size of the relief effort and how they might minimize the need for future assistance in southern Africa.

With that, we will call this meeting to a conclusion and we will reconvene tomorrow morning at 9:30 a.m.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene at 9:30 a.m., Thursday, June 10, 1993.]

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]

## STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE TONY P. HALL

## Subcommittee on Foreign Agriculture and Hunger

June 9, 1993

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I want to thank you for holding this hearing and for inviting me to participate. As former Chairman of the House Select Committee on Hunger, I appreciate the work of this Subcommittee and your interest in the issue of humanitarian intervention. Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for all of your efforts as a member of the Select Committee on Hunger, and I look forward to continuing to work with you and this Subcommittee.

The issue of humanitarian intervention was one of the top international concerns of the Select Committee on Hunger. It is an issue of ongoing interest to me, and I am pleased to be able to share my perspective on it with you.

I believe humanitarian intervention needs to be viewed in the context of the right to food. One of the key international provisions of the "Freedom From Want Act," which I introduced in 1991, was a section which called for a Convention on the Right to Food. This section, which later was accepted as an amendment to the Foreign Aid Authorization bill, proposed an international Convention on the Right to Food as a tool to increase global respect for the right to food, especially among governments and armed opposition groups.

This legislation asked the United States to propose to the United Nations General Assembly that a Declaration and a Convention on the Right to Food be adopted and submitted to the countries of the world for ratification. Such a Convention would contain

the following elements: 1) the obligations of each country's government to ensure the realization of the right to food by the people of that country; 2) the obligations of the international community to ensure the realization of the right to food by the people of all countries, including the provision of both emergency and nonemergency assistance; 3) the obligations of individual governments, and of armed opposition groups, to ensure the realization of the right to food during times of war or other forms of armed conflict; and 4) sanctions against governments or armed groups that fail to take adequate steps to ensure the realization of the right to food by the people of the country.

In 1991, while leading a Congressional delegation to Ethiopia, I urged President Meles Zenawi to convene a Humanitarian Summit for the Horn of Africa. This Summit, which took place in May of 1992, was attended by five heads of State from the region, United Nations observers, and representatives of non-governmental organizations. The Summit produced a document outlining humanitarian guidelines to be used in the region.

This Summit, plus the World Declaration and Plan of Action for Nutrition arising from last year's International Conference on Nutrition, helped to raise the right to food as a matter of global concern. But a Convention on the Right to Food would provide the required clear set of principles to support future acts of humanitarian intervention.

The humanitarian interventions with which I am most directly familiar -- to help the Iraqi Kurds and the people of Somalia -- seemed to be handled on a piecemeal basis. Individual United Nations resolutions provided the authority for the interventions, and the operations were fashioned as events unfolded. I believe we need to have universally acknowledged guidelines in place. A Convention on the Right to Food would set the overall

framework, but specific operating procedures also would enable future humanitarian interventions to run more smoothly.

In the Kurdish situation, it seemed there were problems within the United Nations system in determining which U.N. entity was in charge. In Somalia, the crisis worsened month by month, and many of us criticized the United Nations for not intervening sooner and more effectively. When I visited Somalia in January this year, everyone I talked to -- from the relief workers to the military leaders -- had complaints about the performance of the United Nations.

The United Nations and the world community seemed to have to make up the rules for each situation as they went along. As we face future humanitarian crises that will require international action, we shouldn't have to reinvent the wheel for each response.

While it is true that each crisis will have its own special challenges, our general approach should be clarified. The first step, which I have mentioned, is to have in place international authority through a Convention on the Right to Food for humanitarian intervention. That way, we wouldn't lose time debating new U.N. resolutions to approve action while lives are on the line.

The next step would be to increase the authority of the U.N. Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs. This position was called for by the Select Committee on Hunger in the "Freedom From Want Act" and in subsequent Select Committee initiatives. While this office is ably led by Jan Eliasson, I would like to see it have more power to coordinate and supervise U.N. leadership in humanitarian crises. This office can play a life-saving role in achieving the earliest possible mobilization of world response to a



humanitarian disaster.

Given the serious logistical and military obstacles that often arise in a humanitarian crisis, a U.N.-coordinated, ready-to-respond "humanitarian strike force" should be created. We have seen the critical role played by United States air and sea power in the Kurdish and Somali situations. As the world's remaining superpower, we are in a position to offer certain logistical and deployment capabilities that other nations cannot. We should stand ready to contribute these elements to an international response force. The recent tragic loss of multinational soldiers in Somalia must not be allowed to discourage other nations from stepping forward to offer their military in humanitarian service to the world community.

This international humanitarian force would provide the logistical and security assistance necessary to allow relief to be distributed. Relief itself should continue to be provided by private voluntary organizations. They also are in the best position to help those they serve move from the process of relief to rehabilitation. However, as we have learned in Iraq, Somalia, Liberia, Angola, and Sudan, these organizations cannot do their job when they are under attack, when their hands are tied by those in control, or when their own safety is untenable. That's why it is important to resolve the security concerns.

I am deeply frustrated by the delays we have seen in aiding the Kurds, Somalia, and Sudan. Relief groups on the ground in these places have sought to provide early warning, but the response was slow -- with many lives lost as a result.

Much of the reason for this is political. Humanitarian disasters tend to get put on the back burner because of competing issues and "famine fatigue." We in Congress need to fight to make such human suffering a priority and press for the earliest diplomatic

intervention to address it.

Most of these crises are manmade. They arise because of civil or ethnic conflict or because of war between neighboring countries. In our diplomatic efforts, we need to place a special emphasis on negotiating skills to address combatants whose actions deny food to innocent civilians. I also firmly believe that it will help greatly if we start thinking of the suffering they cause as violations of human rights. The world community needs to agree that using food as a weapon or blocking food is a human rights crime, and that those who engage in such conduct are criminals. I recommend that we elevate the right to food and expand our concept of human rights in the post-Cold War era.

Thank you for holding this hearing, and I look forward to working with you on the issue of humanitarian intervention.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BILL EMERSON**  
**FOREIGN AGRICULTURE AND HUNGER SUBCOMMITTEE**  
**REVIEW OF HUNGER: EARLY INTERVENTION IN HUNGER CRISES**

**JUNE 9, 1993**

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be here with my friend and the former Chairman of the Select Committee on Hunger. I view international food aid as a two part process: first, to improve the living conditions of poor people in developing countries and second, to provide disaster assistance. If we are successful in the first part of the program, we can take steps to lessen the need to provide disaster assistance.

Beginning in 1983 Mickey Leland, Tony Hall, and I worked together on issues related to international hunger. One of our primary goals has been to focus attention on international hunger issues and to promote the concept of early attention to potential problem areas and intervention to stem the terrible effects of famines.

Sometimes this is not possible. Civil wars, non-existent infrastructure and mass migration of peoples make the delivery of early food aid difficult, if not impossible. In my view, these situations make it more imperative that international organizations have a system in place to intervene early in known problem areas---since there are so many other areas in which early intervention is not possible.

The number of disasters around the world have increased significantly and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations estimates that 20% of the world's population is underfed. There are more occurrences of internal wars, with

regional and ethnic conflicts becoming more frequent. Therefore it is essential that up-to-date information is maintained so that, whenever possible, disasters can be predicted. Such information should include the agriculture situation, weather patterns, health of the population, food costs and other similar data. If international organizations can forecast impending famine problems and intervene earlier rather than later, the effects of famines can be ameliorated significantly.

Coupled with disaster assistance is the provision of long term assistance to developing countries. The goal is to reduce the causes of hunger and malnutrition which can be accomplished through help in building roads, improvement in farming techniques, and water supplies. Improvement in the living conditions of peoples around the world is an integral part of preventing future disasters. Other programs include maternal and child health, school feeding and nutrition education, and food for work programs.

Through the Select Committee on Hunger my colleagues and I have travelled around the world and reviewed programs aimed at improving the living conditions in poor countries and programs addressing disasters and famines. We have seen terrible conditions and the awful effects of famine. I intend to continue to work to find ways to improve the programs that provide help in improving the living conditions in poor countries and that can prevent or ease the disasters that too frequently come.

I look forward to working with this Subcommittee and will provide whatever assistance that may be requested. Thank you Mr. Chairman.



## STATEMENT

BY

LOIS RICHARDS  
 ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR  
 BUREAU FOR FOOD AND  
 HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE  
 AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I take particular pleasure in this opportunity to address the Committee on behalf of the Agency for International Development concerning early intervention in crisis situations. In my role as Acting Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance, I coordinate the responses of the offices of Food for Peace (FFP) and U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) to emergency situations worldwide.

Introduction

One of the more disturbing trends over the past decade has been the precipitous increase in the number of emergency interventions, caused by both civil strife and natural calamities.

Most recently the number of new disasters to which A.I.D.'s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) responded increased from 53 in 1990 with 52 million people affected, to 65 affecting 393 million in 1991. FY 1992 saw the highest number of disasters declared in one fiscal year - 66. So far in FY 1993, there have been 46 disaster declarations.

In 1992, United Nations (U.N.) consolidated emergency food aid appeals, launched for the Horn of Africa, southern Africa, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Liberia and the former Yugoslavia, solicited more than six million metric tons of food. Since 1988, 14 new U.N. peacekeeping operations have been established, more than in the previous 40 years of its history. Breaking new ground, the United Nations established in March 1992, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs in order to ensure better coordination and efficiency in disaster interventions.

Moreover, the number of ethnic conflicts, which underlay "complex emergencies," are escalating. As Secretary of State Christopher remarked earlier this year before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "If we don't find some way that the different ethnic groups can live together in a country, how many countries will we have? We'll have 5,000 countries rather than the hundred plus we have now."

In the face of this tragic expansion of human problems, A.I.D. has been in the forefront -- in cooperation with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the United Nations, the military, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other donors -- in developing mechanisms for early alert and effective response to humanitarian crises. Most recently A.I.D. has also begun programs to better prepare for, mitigate, and prevent disasters in order to avert or lessen their often devastating effects on people and economies.

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Emergency Response Mechanisms

I would like to discuss some of the many ways in which A.I.D. deals with disaster situations, including the following:

1. The Agency maintains continuous contact with a variety of early warning systems that supplement the local knowledge of its field missions and embassy staffs on potential disaster situations.
2. Armed with this information, A.I.D.'s response is triggered by a disaster declaration by the chief of a U.S. diplomatic mission in an affected country, who determines that a disaster exists which warrants a U.S. response. In special cases, where no U.S. mission is present, an assistant secretary of the State Department may also declare a disaster in order to begin relief efforts, as occurred in Somalia. Once this disaster declaration is issued, A.I.D. immediately releases up to \$25,000 to aid communities most adversely affected.
3. Assistance furnished usually consists of goods (for example, plastic sheeting for shelter, medicines, food aid, monetary donations, and other relief supplies) and other services (transportation, or technical assistance such as logistical or advisory support). In addition to storage facilities in the United States, OFDA maintains a number of emergency stockpiles around the world - in Panama, Italy, Thailand, and Guam. Materiel stored includes such items as tents, tools, blankets, and survival gear. A.I.D. has at times pre-positioned food aid stocks in contiguous countries or in the region in anticipation of quick movement particularly into strife-torn areas.
4. A.I.D. often draws on the resources and technical expertise of other U.S. agencies. A.I.D. has standing arrangements with the following organizations for needed assistance in disaster operations: the Centers for Disease Control, the U.S. Public Health Service, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Forest Service, the U.S. Geological Survey, and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration. It also provides partial funding to, and works in cooperation with, private and voluntary (PVOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs); United Nations agencies, inter alia, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, World Food Program (WFP), United Nations Children's Fund; and international organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and other donor governments.

### Early Warning Systems

Over the past 15 years, A.I.D. and other donors have developed a global network of early warning mechanisms to provide the greatest lead time and to mitigate the effects of potential and incipient natural disasters. We maintain a continuing dialogue with relevant global, regional and national warning systems which monitor geologic, hydrologic and atmospheric activity worldwide. As one example, A.I.D.'s Famine Early Warning System (FEWS), which presently has field representatives in ten African countries, collects data on meteorological conditions, crop production and local food prices from a number of sources, including satellite imagery and ground-based data from dozens of host country groups continent-wide. Recently, FEWS, the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization and U.S. Geological Survey jointly funded the development of computer software designed to assist in the interpretation of satellite imagery (Image Display and Analysis Program). In the Caribbean, South America, South and Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, we have worked with national counterparts and regional organizations to upgrade natural hazard forecasting skills.

In recent years, as examples, A.I.D. resources have enabled the Philippines and Fiji to collect and analyze El Nino climatic data. In Bangladesh, from 1978 onward, A.I.D. has provided, in collaboration with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, some \$6 million to that government's Space Research and Remote Sensing Organization. This system, along with the Bangladesh Red Crescent's Cyclone Preparedness Program, was credited with saving many lives by issuing warnings and evacuating 350,000 people to storm shelters on the eve of the onset of the "killer cyclone" that swept the southeastern coast of that nation on April 30, 1991. In the Philippines in 1991, A.I.D. supported, through its relationship with the U.S. Geological Survey, the development of a successful volcano monitoring program that saved thousands of lives during the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo.

Early warning mechanisms gave the United States an important head-start in responding to last year's devastating drought in southern Africa, where timely intervention by the United States and other donors helped avert a potential regional famine which threatened some 18 million persons in 10 countries.

Unfortunately, similar systems are not as advanced in preparedness and early warning for man-made political disasters. We indeed watch evolving political situations closely, but the diplomatic and political "next steps" are not always defined or even successful when applied. Efforts to anticipate and prevent emergencies arising from civil strife is a daunting, but critical task which demands much more attention. Secretary Christopher's message at his confirmation hearing was very precise on this

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point: "We can't afford to careen from crisis to crisis... We must have a new diplomacy that can anticipate and prevent crises, like those in Iraq and Bosnia and Somalia, rather than simply manage them."

#### Responding to Disasters

Once emergencies happen and a disaster declaration has been made, humanitarian assistance addresses a wide range of emergency needs. This includes requirements in the fields of agriculture and rural infrastructure, food aid, water and sanitation, health, shelter, education, logistics and increasingly in demining, demobilization and refugee repatriation programs. At his confirmation hearing, A.I.D. Administrator Brian Atwood stressed that far greater attention should be paid to rapidly repairing societies that have been disrupted by conflict or disaster.

In addition to its close cooperation with the Departments of State, Defense and Agriculture, A.I.D., in its disaster response, often: (1) mobilizes its own disaster assistance response teams; (2) supports the rapid involvement of appropriate non-governmental or civilian agencies; and (3) collaborates with the United Nations and other bilateral donor countries, beyond providing food and other forms of relief.

#### Disaster Assistance Response Teams

A.I.D.'s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance is responsible for providing assistance for the relief and rehabilitation of people and countries affected by disaster. An important tool which has evolved over the years has been the deployment of Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART). These teams are staffed by experts from OFDA, and often staff from A.I.D.'s Food for Peace Office and other U.S. agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control and the U.S. Geological Survey. As an alternative to A.I.D. sending assessment teams, we may supply members to U.N.-organized missions.

Very often DARTs do the initial assessments of relief requirements and provide other services as well. As part of A.I.D.'s participation in Operations Provide Relief and Restore Hope for Somalia, DARTs were initially positioned in Mombasa, Kenya, and from December 9, 1992 onward, in Mogadishu. These teams accomplished the following activities:

- worked with NGOs, the International Committee for the Red Cross, U.N. agencies, the U.S. military, and the Government of Kenya on matters related to the U.S.-led airlift of humanitarian relief supplies into Somalia;



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- reviewed proposals and approved grants for specific emergency activities to NGOs, U.N. agencies and the ICRC to speed up response to the Somalia emergency;
- facilitated information sharing among the NGOs, the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF), U.S. Government and other donors on security issues, relief needs, donor programs and UNITAF operations to ensure that pressing issues were identified and immediately addressed;
- coordinated with the U.S. military in Somalia responses to NGO security concerns; scheduled relief convoys and airlifts; and identified military relief and rehabilitation activities, such as needed road repairs and elimination of logistical bottlenecks; and
- as part of the staff of the U.S. Liaison Office in Mogadishu, assisted, inter alia, in the vital tasks of re-creation of the Somali police force and formation of local relief and security committees, in advance of arrival of UNITAF troops in outlying regional centers.

#### Civilian and Military Collaboration

Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh, Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, Operation Provide Relief and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia are some recent examples of joint civilian and military involvement in international humanitarian interventions. The Kurdish operation (in particular Security Council Resolution 688 of April 5, 1991) established the precedent that, under certain circumstances, the international community endorses the use of force in support of humanitarian assistance operations.

The armed forces have a comparative advantage in moving large numbers of people and materiel by virtue of their logistical capabilities. Military forces, in civil-strife situations, may be needed to provide vital security for NGO humanitarian operations and even for affected populations. However, some donors are still uneasy about working with the military when maintaining their neutrality may be important or where there may inadvertently be increased security risks to their personnel. Peace-keeping operations may be regarded with particular sensitivity. We need to strive for a better working "climate" where military and interested NGOs can more closely work together in disaster situations. In this context, A.I.D. sponsored on May 26 and 27, a symposium entitled "Civilian/Military Involvement in International Humanitarian Interventions," involving NGOs, the Department of Defense, and a number of U.S. agencies to identify lessons learned from the northern Iraq and Somalia operations and to make recommendations for improved collaboration.

Collaboration With U.N. and Other Donors

U.N. Resolution 46/182 (December 1991) created a Central Emergency Revolving Fund of \$50 million to make possible a faster U.N. emergency response. The resolution also fostered the creation of the U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) to facilitate and coordinate the U.N. system's response to emergencies. Since its creation, the UNDHA has provided a mechanism within the U.N. system for consolidating and making more realistic U.N. emergency appeals. A.I.D. is currently working with the State Department and the UNDHA to enhance the U.N.'s management capacity with respect to disasters.

As former Deputy Secretary of State Whitehead recently wrote, "We seem to be on the threshold of really testing the U.N. system. It has the unique opportunity to become the world's major instrument to relieve human suffering, resolve disputes, keep the peace and possibly even make the peace. The United States, in turn, has an opportunity to lead in this effort by fully supporting the U.N. and its specialized agencies." The United States will be active in the upcoming U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) discussions on improving the U.N.'s coordination of humanitarian assistance.

As for other donors, the European Community (EC) established in 1992 an EC Humanitarian Office (ECHO). ECHO has many similarities to A.I.D.'s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). A.I.D. has provided opportunities to ECHO staff to observe OFDA's operations. At least one of the major bilateral donors, the British Government, has moved to establish its own disaster unit. Additionally, A.I.D. initiated and participates with the EC and other donors in periodic meetings in Brussels to discuss operational aspects of ongoing emergency interventions.

International Committee of the Red Cross

A.I.D. and the State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs provide food and/or other resources to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for its relief programs. The ICRC has the ability to respond quickly to disasters, as witnessed by its moving food into previously inaccessible, Renamo-controlled areas in Mozambique in the summer of 1992 immediately following the signing of the humanitarian accord in July. A.I.D. urged the ICRC to set up in Somalia its largest ever feeding operation, involving the establishment of over 900 kitchens feeding prepared meals to some 1.5 million people daily at the height of the worst starvation. A.I.D. provided 44,500 metric tons of P.L. 480 Title II food for this operation. These kitchens were in addition to the ICRC's provision of its usual medical services. The ICRC filled a vital gap while the U.N. and other agencies were becoming more operational.

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### U.S. Private and Voluntary Organizations

Private and voluntary organizations (PVOs) play a significant role in providing both humanitarian and development assistance. Indeed, U.S. PVO humanitarian activities originated more than a century ago in response to natural disasters. To cite a few current examples, the President of CARE coordinated U.N. relief efforts in Somalia; World Vision has greatly stepped up this year its feeding, medical and agricultural rehabilitation activities in Zambezia and Tete provinces in Mozambique; and Catholic Relief Service has made similar interventions in Liberia, Angola and Sudan. A.I.D. grants food and financial resources to PVOs to deliver food aid and other relief supplies and services in emergency operations. A.I.D. actively encourages PVO participation, coordination and information sharing through regular meetings convened to discuss individual emergencies.

### Disaster Mitigation

It is evident that development and disasters are closely linked. That is, the occurrence of a disaster has both direct and indirect costs which affect a country's economic performance for months, years, even decades after the onset of the disaster. By the same token, underdeveloped countries may be more vulnerable to emergencies.

A.I.D. is utilizing the authority conveyed under Title III of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (P.L. 480, as amended) to promote commitments to policies which promote food security in approximately 12 of the least developed countries. In Mozambique, A.I.D.'s country strategy includes food security as a strategic objective; in Niger, we are funding a famine mitigation project to address both short- and long-term food security issues. Since 1987, A.I.D. has conducted disaster management training programs which involve improved awareness, performance, and coordination for disaster planning and response, enhancing thereby both host country and regional self-reliance. Training has been provided to over 2,000 disaster professionals from virtually all of Latin America, and in 1992, the program was expanded into the English-speaking Caribbean. Plans are now under way for initiating a regional training program in southern Africa, e.g., Zimbabwe, Namibia and Botswana. A.I.D. has also worked with local housing authorities in earthquake-prone countries in Latin America on reforms to building codes.

### Rwanda and Sudan

Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a moment to review U.S. and U.N. operations in Rwanda and Sudan, two countries which you have chosen as case studies for these hearings. Both of these countries aptly illustrate the real-world complexity of early warning and response, given the large numbers of displaced

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persons affected by widespread civil conflict, the extreme risk to which these populations have been exposed, and the uncertain prospects for political resolutions.

Rwanda. In February and March, the U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the World Food Program alerted the donor community of the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Rwanda involving the displacement of up to 900,000 Rwandans. The U.S. Government, even before receipt of the U.N. donor appeal in April, moved to divert 20,000 metric tons of food aid resources, which had been committed but were less urgently needed elsewhere, to ensure a quick response in one of the most densely populated countries in Africa. The United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Rwanda depicts the situation as one "...exacerbated by Rwanda's already precarious economic condition, high-population density and rapidly declining agricultural production. Most of the displaced are living in and around 30 camps where conditions are miserable: serious malnutrition and disease have become distressing facts of life. Although the international community has been providing relief in the form of food, medicines, water and essential non-food items, the sheer weight of the new needs is now overwhelming."

To date in FY 1993, the U.S. Government has provided 28,830 metric tons of P.L. 480 Title II and Section 416(b) commodities through the World Food Program for Rwanda. Most recently, A.I.D. approved an FY 1993 emergency program for Catholic Relief Services for 12,599 metric tons of Title II commodities for distribution to 83,000 displaced persons in three camps in Rwanda, i.e., Muhura Parish, Busogo Parish and Gishaka Parish. In addition to the food aid valued at \$24.1 million, OFDA has approved, from March 1993 onward, a total of \$2.2 million for relief supplies such as plastic sheeting for shelter, wool blankets, and water containers.

Sudan. The U.S. Government's strategy in Sudan is to target critical needs for the war and drought-affected victims, displaced persons, refugees, and returnees. The United States has been providing relief assistance for 10 years. In January - March 1993, the U.N., A.I.D. and the Centers for Disease Control, given the Government of Sudan's decision to allow greater access to certain areas, identified very serious famine conditions in a number of regions. In response, the U.S. Government is spending \$56 million for food and emergency relief this year. However, the U.N. appeal, which requests \$190 million from all donors, remains under-funded.

A.I.D. has worked hard to focus the attention of the donor community on Sudan; as recently as mid-May, we sponsored an informal meeting with key donors to revitalize international humanitarian assistance. In mid-March, A.I.D. established a Sudan field office in Nairobi to give more priority and increased



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emphasis to food and relief efforts in the south. To enhance the airlift capacity out of Kenya, A.I.D. is contributing to the refurbishment of the logistics base at Lokichokio. OFDA moved to extend the current airlift of a Hercules C-130 for sixty days and added a second C-130 (the only C-130s flying) to the relief effort for one month. We have supported the efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross to resume operations in southern Sudan, where since April it has been undertaking humanitarian needs assessments. The World Food Program has been provided funds for 30 days to airlift and distribute Sudanese government-donated sorghum. In short, A.I.D. has provided this year a total of \$15.4 million through the U.N. and NGOs in non-food aid support for the relief effort and will consider additional funding as appropriate.

Assistant Secretary of State for Africa George Moose, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May, highlighted the importance for both parties to press for a peace agreement at the Abuja peace talks, granting NGO access to southern Sudan and the transition zone, and maintaining pressure on the Khartoum government and the factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The U.N. has appointed a special coordinator to focus on the crisis in Sudan. The United States will also appoint an ambassadorial-level official to exercise the U.S. good offices in coordination with the U.N. special coordinator.

#### CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, I have described today the wide-ranging efforts that A.I.D. is undertaking in early detection, early response, and mitigation of disasters. I have illustrated how our capacity to respond in individual situations is clearly enhanced by our long-standing partnership with PVOs and international organizations, and our emerging partnership with the military.

As I have said to this Committee in previous testimony, the 1990s are turning out to be a complex and challenging time for those involved in the field of humanitarian relief. We are confronted with unprecedented competition for resources between the growing demands for disaster relief and the demands for sustainable development. Furthermore, many are concerned with the cost of disaster responses, including military-style interventions. The most important task in this decade for relief agencies is to foster more efficient and effective collaboration between those government, military, and civilian agencies who share a common concern for containing the number of complex international disasters.

Some might say that this is a Sisyphean task. We say -- from the depth of our experience -- that it is achievable and is, without a doubt, a task worthy of the best aspirations of the American people.

Statement by Mary Chambliss  
 Acting Associate Administrator  
 Office of International Cooperation and Development  
 U.S. Department of Agriculture  
 Before the House Agriculture Subcommittee on  
 Foreign Agriculture and Hunger  
 June 9, 1993

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate your invitation to speak this morning on how the United States can improve its responses to food emergencies and lessen the suffering we have seen from hunger in Africa, south Asia and other parts of the developing world.

#### The Limits of Intervention

At the outset, I think it is important for us to be realistic about the root causes of the most serious food crises in recent years. With the exception of natural disasters like the recurring floods in Bangladesh and droughts in sub-Saharan Africa, more and more of the most devastating crises we see are, at root, man-made and political -- southern Sudan, Somalia, Mozambique and Bosnia-Herzegovina are good examples. In these instances, hunger and starvation are politically created and perpetuated. The ultimate solutions are, therefore, political and, in some instances, military. No matter how well prepared we are to deliver food quickly and effectively, there are limits to our ability to anticipate political conflict and to intervene without internationally sanctioned military measures.

Fortunately, there is growing recognition of the right of the international community to act to end these politically induced famines as we have done recently in Somalia. But there remains deep suspicion among developing countries of measures that infringe on national sovereignty. At the International Conference on Nutrition last December, this issue of when and how the international community may intervene was very hotly debated. It was just as the Conference began that the first U.S. troops landed in Somalia and, while there was a sense of relief in many quarters, there was also considerable mistrust and suspicion by some governments.

Another, less publicized political problem that worsens food emergencies is the tendency of some developing country governments to deny a food crisis is imminent despite clear warnings. The sub-Saharan drought of 1984-85 provides an illustration. Despite repeated and urgent warnings from both the Food and Agriculture Organization and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the former Ethiopian Government was very slow to act

for political reasons because its leaders were unwilling to admit to the full extent of the food crisis. There is little the United States can do in these circumstances. We cannot, of course, force governments to accept our food aid. As a drought's impact becomes all too clear, governments do reverse themselves -- but not until there has been significant loss of livestock in rural areas and suffering among the poor. Even after accepting food aid, some governments actually impede deliveries to the needy by charging exorbitant port fees. At one point in 1985, the former Ethiopian Government's largest source of foreign exchange was the port fees it charged to donors trying to deliver food aid for the Ethiopian people starving in the countryside.

To a certain extent, these political impediments are more effectively dealt with by the United Nations (UN) system than by the United States bilaterally. It is easier both politically and culturally for many nations to accept food aid from the UN World Food Program (WFP) than it is for them to accept it from the United States or the former colonial powers of Western Europe. Food aid is sometimes viewed with suspicion in developing countries and, even today, it is not uncommon to find press accounts claiming that U.S. and European food fortification programs are actually contaminating food. Western-based nongovernment organizations are also viewed with suspicion on occasion, despite the superb work they do. Channeling food aid and technical assistance through the World Food Program, other UN agencies, and nongovernment organizations working under their umbrella is sometimes the only viable solution given the largely favorable view of the United Nations in the developing world.

#### Non-political Intervention

Given the political limitations we face in acting early to prevent food crises, what can we do to improve our performance in delivering food and mitigating emergencies?

Our early warning systems are functioning and effective. Our success last year in coping with the massive drought in southern Africa that threatened 18 million people with starvation is a model for how we should intervene to forestall food crises. Much of the credit should go to the UN World Food Program for its rapid logistical response and to the Food and Agriculture Organization for its effective work in assessing the dimensions of the problem early on. USAID helped keep the logistics on track with its support to WFP in quickly developing an effective telecommunications network among donors and recipients that allowed for better tracking and coordination of food deliveries. Finally, both the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and USAID provided food aid to meet the enormous need and provided it on a timely basis and the African nations affected by the drought worked very hard to deal with transportation problems.

Another initiative in the food aid area the United States is supporting is the formation of a Rapid Response Team by the World Food Program. We are also hoping that the new UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs will soon be more effective in coordinating UN relief efforts through its Office of the Emergency Coordinator. The jury is still out on whether this new coordinating mechanism will prove a success.

There are other ways we can improve our response to emergencies both bilaterally and multilaterally. USDA will, for the first time, begin early programming of assistance for next year under our Food for Progress Program and Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949. We avoided doing so in the past because it is so difficult to anticipate the level of food resources that would be available. However, the Department has decided we can legitimately make some assumptions about commodity availabilities that will allow planning earlier for fiscal 1994.

Given our inability to prevent many food crises, USAID and USDA have established the Famine Mitigation Activity. Begun in 1990 by the USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the program is carried out by the USDA Office of International Cooperation and Development (OICD). The Activity was initiated based on an analysis of the relatively high human and monetary costs of famine relief compared with those of preemptive interventions aimed at mitigating famine's impacts.

The Famine Mitigation Activity focuses on drought-prone areas of Africa, where rural, agricultural families are generally the most vulnerable in famine situations. From 1964 through 1992, OFDA responded to over 400 declared disasters in Africa. The two largest disaster categories were drought-induced food shortages and civil strife. The U.S. Government expended more than \$3 billion in responding to these disasters.

These two emergency categories, drought/food shortage and civil strife, are closely related. Civil conflict often prevents farmers from planting or harvesting and creates famine emergencies. In other cases, civil conflict perpetuates famine conditions after the weather has improved. Experts expect to see an increasing number of drought and civil conflict disasters in Africa throughout the 1990's and, therefore, a growing need for significant food and non-food emergency resources.

In all of the current famine emergencies in Africa, civil conflict is a prominent factor complicating emergency responses. For example, access to populations is often limited or even cut off by the march of the conflict. The farmer's ability to plant crops, even if the rains return, is limited by the fighting. Even if farmers succeed in planting their fields, they may be forced to flee before the harvest. In many cases, food is used as a weapon



by both sides, making food even less readily available to the famine victims. Livestock losses caused by disease, marauding government soldiers, and insurgents have harmed the nutritional status and socio-economic base of pastoral societies. Civil conflict isolates farmers from agricultural inputs and services, forcing people to move into garrison towns where there is not enough land to grow crops or graze livestock. As a result, traditional cultural patterns are disrupted and centuries old coping strategies no longer work.

Most donor nations have not integrated mitigation interventions well into their famine emergency strategies. In most responses, the initial focus is on providing food and basic health care and only secondarily on mitigation activities. Because of this, famine conditions at the community and household levels may be unnecessarily harsh and the famine itself prolonged. Unfortunately, many emergency experts have viewed mitigation activities -- providing seeds, cattle inoculation, water conservation, as rehabilitation programs designed to return victims to where they were before the famine began and to be undertaken after the emergency phase is over. This is especially true in famine/civil conflict emergencies where such interventions frequently lag even further behind in the response sequence.

The Famine Mitigation Activity seeks to expand the range of options that can be taken once an emergency begins to develop and prior to the mounting of massive emergency relief operations. In particular situations, where there is evidence that famine conditions may be developing, we believe there are specific interventions which may be employed immediately at the community and household levels which can begin to mitigate the effects of the famine without waiting for stability to return.

The Famine Mitigation Activity has provided technical assistance to the UN World Food Program and International Fund for Agricultural Development in designing their own famine mitigation programs. An Activity Project Officer was detailed to the OFDA Somalia Disaster Response Team to coordinate the review and selection of programs to assist in the recovery from civil strife and mitigate recurrent famine impacts. These programs included ensuring that enough seeds and tools were available for the planting season, providing for livestock restocking, and developing water resources. The Activity is responsible for five OFDA funded grants in Ethiopia. These pilot projects include small-scale irrigation, vegetable gardening, seed banks, and livestock veterinarian training. The Activity also funded a grant to the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture as a response to the Southern African drought in 1992 to support cassava and sweet potato production as drought foods in Malawi. Technical assistance has also been provided to the USAID Missions in Cape Verde, Haiti, Ethiopia, Niger and South Africa.

### Long-Term Strategies

Clearly there are steps that USAID and USDA can take to lessen the harm caused by food crises and improve the emergency responses of the United States. Food emergencies affect tens of millions of people yearly and cause intense and dramatic suffering, especially among women and children. But we would be remiss in focusing primarily on emergency responsiveness and forgetting that nearly 800 million people suffer chronic hunger and malnutrition. Those numbers will only continue to grow inexorably unless we have long-term strategies to deal with the root causes of hunger.

Let me suggest a few areas that demand more attention by this Subcommittee if we are to be truly serious in addressing hunger issues.

1. First, with world population expected to climb to 8 billion by the year 2020, it is imperative that we have more effective measures to address population growth. For example, the International Food Policy Research Institute estimates that, with current population trends, Africa will have a shortfall of 50 million tons of food annually by the year 2000 -- one-third of projected consumption. At current prices for major cereals, the import bill would be \$7.5 billion more a year for a continent already burdened with more than \$250 billion in debt.

2. Second, we must also stimulate food production in the developing world. There has been considerable progress since the Green Revolution, but some regions profited more than others, with Asia and Latin America benefiting far more than Africa. We need intensified agricultural research, especially in relation to tropical products and traditional African food crops such as sorghum and millet. We must bear in mind that the payoff from this type of research can be a full decade in coming. We have to move now.

3. Third, as the United States and the other nations belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) review their aid to the developing world, they should consider devoting more of their official development assistance to agriculture. The percentage of aid from OECD countries to the developing world devoted to agriculture dropped sharply during the 1980's by more than one-third, from 22 percent of the total to only 14 percent.

4. Fourth, we must reduce the pressure on the environment and natural resources caused by non-sustainable farming and grazing of marginal and fragile lands. One way to do this is to give more attention to reducing post-harvest losses which add to the pressure to put new land in production and to non-sustainable agricultural

practices. In some parts of the developing world, postharvest losses of staple crops exceed 50 percent of production.

Another way to lessen the growing pressure on the environment in the developing world is to provide intensified technical assistance to deal with soil erosion, deforestation and overgrazing. The technology is available to address these environmental and resource problems. Proper stewardship of the earth's resources through terracing, crop rotation and other soil conservation measures has been known centuries. There is a need, however, to transfer knowledge and enhance the motivation of the growing number of small and subsistence farmers in developing nations.

5. Fifth, we must look for better ways to use emergency and refugee food aid to help promote long-term development. Food aid devoted to traditional development activities, such as food-for-work, has been shrinking as the avalanche of requests for emergency food aid has continued unabated over the last few years.

6. Finally, we must press for more liberalized trade in agriculture. On the whole, we expect that a successful outcome to the Uruguay Round would have a positive effect on agricultural production in developing countries. That view is shared by analysts at the Food and Agriculture Organization and the OECD. Both food exports and farm income in the developing world would rise and this would encourage desperately needed investments in agriculture.

Mr. Chairman, dealing effectively with food crises and with hunger in general is no simple matter. The barriers to reaching those who truly need our help remain formidable, but I am confident that with creativity and persistence we can make more progress. I would be happy to answer any questions.

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**GETTING EARLY INTERVENTION EFFORTS RIGHT — THE KEY ROLE OF  
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THIRD WORLD FOOD SECURITY**

**BY PER PINSTRUP-ANDERSEN\***

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE  
ON AGRICULTURE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AGRICULTURE AND HUNGER,  
JUNE 9, 1993

Hunger is closely related to agriculture. Indeed, hunger is the principal reason for agriculture. But hunger, particularly extreme hunger, is not just about food supply. It is also about the inability of poor people to buy food. Starvation can occur when food is available in the market—times of plenty do not rule out famine. Famine, one of the principal emergencies to which western governments respond, is a "man-made" phenomenon.

The breakdown of a society, which is an underlying characteristic of all famines, is the result of a lack of appropriate interventions. Countless environmental, economic, historical, and militaristic factors can be mustered to explain why a famine takes place. But local community leaders, national governments, and international donor agencies must not evade responsibility for preventing famines through appropriate, early intervention.

There are two kinds of early intervention: intervention early enough and massive enough to prevent a famine (or other emergency) and intervention during the early stages of a famine aimed at minimizing the damage. My argument here is that both types of intervention are needed, and that they are so dependent on each other for success that they should be dealt with as a whole.

Famine and hunger are not just humanitarian concerns, they are development issues. The conceptual wall between relief and development

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must be breached. Famine interventions often cost as much as long-term development initiatives and divert resources that could be better used for these long-term efforts. For example, the United States government spent over US\$730 million in southern Africa to prevent the recent drought from becoming a catastrophic famine. This effort was successful in avoiding catastrophic famine, but it did little to help southern Africa avoid future famines. Southern Africa will be no better equipped to deal with future droughts unless economic growth and development are successfully pursued. The 1992 Development Fund for Africa budget within the U.S. Agency for International Development was only about US\$800 million for the whole of the continent. In Somalia, the United States spent between US\$800 million and US\$1 billion.

#### DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES FOR FOOD SECURITY

In the long run, eradication of hunger and the threat of famine will result from successful development, as opposed to relief, activities. This requires programs that raise incomes and alleviate poverty for the most vulnerable, or famine-prone, groups. It is the failure of national governments and donors to allocate resources toward sustainable poverty alleviation in Africa that is the reason for the continued resurgence of famine.

African countries are not the only ones threatened by famine. Countries undergoing drastic economic and political transition on the shaky foundation of a fragile economy will always be vulnerable to climate- or war-induced food and income shortfalls. Poorly developed markets and institutions are often unable to cope with such shortfalls. Parts of Central and South Asia and Latin America, for example, could in the foreseeable future witness localized famines that require international intervention. However, the countries of Africa will be the most fertile ground for famine well into the twenty-first century.

Eradicating famine in Africa requires providing food security for millions of vulnerable households across the continent. This must be the central pillar of development efforts. There is no easy or inexpensive way to do it. It will take much time and money and solutions designed for local problems and conditions. Famines are manifestations of collective failures that have complex origins and require complex solutions.

#### GOVERNANCE, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND PREPAREDNESS

But we can build on what we know already, what we do relatively well, and what we feel could be done for the future. Recent research at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and elsewhere has shown that there are three major prerequisites to famine prevention and reduction of hunger in Africa.

The first is good governance. This does not imply a particular political dogma or procedure. Rather it means (1) using resources in an efficient and accountable manner; (2) allocating resources in a way

that is transparent and nondiscriminatory in regional and ethnic terms (this would address many concerns that lead to civil conflict); and (3) planning the use and control of resources in a participatory and decentralized manner at the local level.

The second is sound economic growth policies. In most developing countries, there is little question that policies for enhancing economic growth, particularly in agricultural productivity, must provide the bedrock for future development. Agricultural growth addresses hunger not only through its potential to increase production, but also by generating rural employment and therefore income. There is ample evidence that low-income developing countries with stagnant agricultural sectors have stagnant economies. Yet, with population growth rates in excess of 3 percent per year in much of Africa, and production growth in agriculture at about 2 percent for the 1980s, the challenge to agriculture is daunting.

IFPRI calculates that the difference between domestic food production and demand in Sub-Saharan Africa will be 50 million tons by the year 2000. Currently, the gap is merely 12-14 million tons. It is extremely unlikely that the region will have the necessary foreign exchange to import such large amounts of food. It is equally unlikely that donors will be able to provide such amounts of food aid. Domestic farmers must therefore rise to the challenge.

In the past, bringing new land under cultivation has allowed food production increases, but continued attempts to expand agricultural land will entail ever larger financial investments, accelerated deforestation and land degradation, and, ultimately, declining yields. Increases in the productivity of land must be sustainable. We need to meet growing food demands without compromising the ability of natural resources to meet even larger demands in the future.

There are a number of possible early interventions focused specifically on agriculture that should be explored by governments and donors in collaboration with local communities. The development of improved agricultural technology through agricultural research and appropriate policies is one of the keys to long-term famine prevention and protection of the environment, both through its potential to enhance agricultural productivity and through its related capacity to increase rural employment and alleviate poverty among both urban and rural poor. Investment in small-scale irrigation has the potential to increase agricultural output as long as local priorities and technical feasibility are kept in mind.

The scope for raising crop and animal yields is good in higher rainfall areas, but this requires strong donor investment in agricultural programs and agricultural research. This calls for a reversal of declining trends in donor investment to developing country agriculture, particularly in low-income developing countries. In the early 1990s, assistance by the United States to agriculture in developing countries was less than one half (in real terms) of the amount given in 1988. A similar, though less dramatic decline (25

percent over the same period) in assistance to agriculture was posted by the World Bank. This is extremely unfortunate given that adequate investments in agricultural research, extension, and community-based soil- and water-management activities have a high payoff and together with appropriate policies are essential to avoid future hunger and food insecurity of a much larger scale than seen so far.

In less-favored environments, improvements may come less from new technologies of the "green revolution" type (improved seed, fertilizer use, and water control) than from management innovations related to weed control, tillage practices, mulching, and moisture control, all adapted to local circumstances to avoid degradation of fragile environments.

Improved technology and practices should not be restricted to staple food production, even where improved calorie consumption is desired. Growth in the staple food sector and growth in the cash crop sector are not mutually exclusive. Both depend on refocusing investment on the smallholder farmers as well as on appropriate market- and price-liberalization policies, infrastructure development, access to inputs and credit for the poor, and improved tenure rights.

Market dysfunction plays an important role in famine because poorly developed infrastructure coupled with unfavorable market conditions contributes greatly to the collapse of purchasing power. Consequently, while market liberalization is crucial in many countries, investment is required in building rural infrastructure before markets can play their expected role.

The third prerequisite is good preparedness against emergencies. Although investment in growth is essential, there is no simple market-based solution for the tens of millions of most vulnerable households. The numerous political, climatic, and military upheavals affecting Africa during the 1980s have contributed to a widespread depletion of household assets and savings, declining labor productivity linked to the erosion of natural and human resources, and a continued reluctance among farmers to invest in land-productivity enhancement. As a result, vulnerable households are unable to respond to improved market incentives in the short term.

There are two reasons for this. First, African farmers do not have the resources (or credit) to grow more food even if they wanted to sell a surplus on the market tomorrow. Oxen, seeds, hired labor, tools, sacks, and carts all require capital, which remains in short supply in rural areas. Second, the transport and marketing infrastructure required for the smooth flow of food, capital, and labor around the country are still scarce. The costs of rapidly increasing food production are rising almost as fast as the heralded benefits. Consequently, even if good overall economic growth is achieved, the chronically poor remain vulnerable to climatic or economic shocks for many years.

Reforming the public sector in Africa or Central Asia in favor of mass privatization should not mean absolving the public sector, or its international allies, of present and future responsibility for emergency relief and prevention. There is a genuine need for appropriate policies for stimulating growth. But these policies need to be combined with sound programs for maximizing the food security of vulnerable households. This is where early intervention has a shorter time horizon.

Good preparedness for early intervention has three principal components. First, the ability to record and diagnose distress signals and to alert appropriate institutions of the danger. Second, preparation of explicit strategies to target population groups most at risk. Third, local institutional capacity to organize an effective response to crisis alerts, supported where necessary by external resources.

Ideally, all three components need to be developed in parallel with national and donor institutions so that all agents are referring to the same signals and speaking the same language. On the national government side, the three functions may be best formalized through legislation that clearly defines specific areas of central and local government responsibility. Such legislation needs to support a strong political, financial, and technical empowerment of local government structures.

#### EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS AND EARLY RESPONSE

On the international donor side, improved capabilities for action need to come in two key areas. First is the need for improved early warning systems. Several United Nations and donor agencies, including USAID, have invested heavily in systems for the collection and analysis of data that can assist in recognizing danger signals. Until recently, most systems focused on indicators of food production failure obtained through satellite imagery (remote sensing) and through analysis of national data on rainfall and crop estimates.

However, indicators of food supply may miss the problem altogether. Famine-prone households are forced to seek employment off the farm and to exhaust natural resources when conditions deteriorate. These actions carry high long-term economic and social costs. There needs to be a refinement of the methodology for selecting and weighing indicators of household and regional distress, including less emphasis on such things as rainfall and crop production (supply-side variables) and more emphasis on market prices, household income, and purchasing power (demand-side variables). It also calls for more investment in the collection and analysis of information at the local level. The circulation of timely and accurate information about problems prevents reluctant governments from ignoring such problems. Analysis of food policies and their impact on the poor is a key part of such activities.

Second, there is a need for a linking of early warning to early response. Improvements in early warning methods have limited value if



they are not tied to timely responses that are based on previously prepared technical and economic appraisals of potential interventions. The stabilization of food entitlements for poor households in crisis-prone areas remains a high intervention priority. We should be planning right now for the next famine in Ethiopia or Somalia. Thus, key constraints to effective action identified during past crises, such as a lack of coordination among intervention agencies, ineffective targeting according to need, and issues of cost-efficiency, need to be confronted more openly by donors and private voluntary agencies that they fund, as well as by national governments.

#### PARTICIPATORY PLANNING AT LOCAL LEVELS

Much has been learned during the 1980s and early 1990s about the needs of famine-affected households and how to reach them more quickly. However, evidence suggests that food resources alone have a limited impact, even for famine mitigation. Improved public crisis-response aimed at minimizing the human cost and capital asset loss needs to be based on (1) a combination of food and nonfood resources that reduces income and productivity constraints while tackling the primary need of hunger alleviation; (2) participatory planning of project interventions aimed at improved targeting and communication between managers and relief beneficiaries; and (3) more decentralized supervision of intervention activities. The potential for expanding past grass-roots relief activities of local nongovernmental organizations should be explored with a view to improved participatory planning and targeting.

Many resources currently used in Africa (be they food, technology, or human skills) can be interchanged for a variety of purposes. For example, food aid can be sold in urban markets and the cash can be used for programs where food interventions would disturb rural markets. In other words, food aid or the skills of voluntary nurses should not wait to be mobilized only when feeding camps and aid distribution centers are set up to counter a disaster. The feeding camp is a symbol of failure; it signals that policymakers failed to invest their resources more appropriately in the recent past. Investments for early intervention must be mobilized as early as possible.

Policymakers and planners around the world, awakening late to the realization that not preparing against crises can be more expensive in the long run than responding to individual crises, are beginning to ask the right questions about more appropriate resource allocations. But without information on the impact and costs of alternative policies and projects, few sound decisions can be made on investment alternatives. The longer policymakers make decisions on an uninformed, ad hoc basis, the longer the threat of famine will persist. The longer famine persists, the greater the problem will become.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

To ensure that famine does not persist in the world in the future, the United States government should

- Reverse the recent downward trend in investment in agricultural development in low-income developing countries in order to increase production in a sustainable manner and raise incomes among the poor.
- Expand financial and technical support of agricultural research, which will increase agricultural productivity, avoid environmental degradation, and alleviate poverty in low-income developing countries. This would include providing greater support to these countries' own research institutions as well as to international agricultural research, in particular the activities of the Consultative group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), which has a proven track record in the development of agricultural technologies to expand productivity and alleviate hunger and poverty.
- Expand investment in improved rural infrastructure and agricultural markets and continue financial and technical assistance to countries wishing to pursue an orderly transformation of the role of the government in development.
- Assist national governments in low-income developing countries in improving their capability for the collection and analysis of information that can be fed directly into improved policymaking aimed at higher economic growth and enhanced food security.
- Provide more support for national and international research and other activities that enhance the understanding of the impact of policy on improved food security, alleviation of poverty, sustainable expansion of food production, and enhanced efficiency of agricultural input and output markets.
- Improve the preparedness of both the United States and national agencies for crisis intervention. Washington-based agencies dealing separately with relief and development need to more closely coordinate their efforts to integrate preventive measures including efforts to address the roots of long-term hunger with early interventions, relief operations, and follow-up action.

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# Congressional Research Service

## Drought in Southern Africa: Impact and Lessons for the Future

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## **DROUGHT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: IMPACT AND LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE**

### **SUMMARY**

Southern Africa's worst drought of this century began with a significant decline in rainfall during the 1991-92 rainy season. The U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) estimated that at the height of the drought, 18 million people were at risk of dehydration, starvation, and disease. In the region, the drought blanketed the nations of Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and hit parts of Angola and Tanzania as well.

According to the FAO and the U.S. Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), cereal crop losses were 50-60% of average production. Livestock herds either died or were sold by farmers, because of the lack of water and grazing land.

Because much of industry in Southern Africa is involved in the processing of agricultural products, the drought adversely affected urban as well as rural employment. Economic reform across the region was disrupted by the drought, as food imports absorbed foreign exchange reserves, and inflation escalated due to rising food prices and budget deficits.

International relief workers credit the drought with being a major factor in ending the fighting in Mozambique. Drought relief in Angola, however, was dealt a setback with the renewal of hostilities that followed the country's first democratic election in September 1992.

The rains came late in the 1992-93 growing season, although rainfall in January and February was heavy in many growing areas. The drought has ended in most of the region, with pockets of dry areas remaining in Botswana, Lesotho, and Namibia. Crop production is expected to exceed last year's poor levels, but will nonetheless be below average.

The U.S. and international response was both timely and well-coordinated. The United States was at the forefront of donor response to the drought. As of December 31, 1992, U.S. government assistance to the Southern African drought totalled over \$736 million.

Congress held hearings to call attention to the Southern African drought and to oversee the U.S. response to the emergency. In October 1992, Congress passed two bills--the Foreign Operations Appropriations and Agriculture Appropriations--containing all foreign aid spending for FY93. Included in the legislation was \$100 million for an African disaster fund to deal with famine relief.

The Southern Africa drought demonstrated that famine need not be the inevitable conclusion of drought. Loss of life can be prevented with effective early warning, fast action, and successful donor coordination. The existence of pluralistic political systems, solid infrastructure, and developed economies were shown to play a crucial role as well.

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## **DROUGHT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: IMPACT AND LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE**

### **SCOPE AND IMPACT**

Southern Africa's worst drought of this century began with a significant decline in rainfall during the 1991-92 rainy season.<sup>1</sup> Typically, the rainy season in Southern Africa is from October to March, but the 1991-92 season saw rain only through December. This devastating drought followed a dryer-than-normal decade. An estimated 30 million people, or one-third of the region's total population, were affected by the drought although widespread famine was averted. The U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) estimated that at the height of the drought, 18 million people were at risk of dehydration, starvation and disease. In the region, the drought blanketed the nations of Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and hit parts of Angola and Tanzania as well.

South Africa was also affected by the drought. Corn losses were estimated at 66 percent of normal yield. Poor populations in rural areas of Transvaal and Orange Free State reportedly suffered from malnutrition as a result of the drought. South Africa played a crucial role during the drought crisis as an active participant in a series of regional coordination structures including the coordination of transport corridors, a logistics center, and a computerized communications system. The issue of regional cooperation will be discussed later in the report.<sup>2</sup>

Meteorologists attributed the below-normal precipitation in Southern Africa to the "El Nino" phenomenon, a periodic, rapid warming over a large portion of the tropical Pacific Ocean. Scientists saw this drought as part of a long pattern of 10-year cycles of increasing and decreasing rainfall. This drought was unrelated to the one in the Horn of Africa. A better understanding of El Nino will lead, meteorologists hope, to accurate forecasts in the future of drought in Southern Africa, and other parts of the world.

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<sup>1</sup> This report contains information drawn from CRS Issue Brief 92098, Southern Africa Drought, October 5, 1992 (Archived), by Kimberly Mahling and Charles Hanrahan.

<sup>2</sup> For additional information on the drought's affect on South Africa see Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development (AID). Southern Africa Drought Assessment, March 24-April 29, 1992, pp.130-137.



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**Crop Failure**

According to the FAO, and the Agency for International Development (AID), cereal crop losses were 50-60 percent of average production. When the harvest was completed, production of major cereals in 1992 was 46 percent below 1991 levels on average.

Corn, the staple food of the region, was particularly hard hit by the drought, falling 60 percent across the entire region. According to assessment teams who visited the region, the crops never reached the crucial tasseling stage. The World Food Program (WFP) estimated that corn losses in each of the affected countries (by percentage of normal yield) was as follows: Malawi, 40 percent; Zambia, 66 percent; Lesotho, 70 percent; Namibia, 80-90 percent; Swaziland, 80-90 percent, and Zimbabwe, 90 percent. The drought damaged other crops, such as beans and peanuts, affecting overall food availability. The output and availability of the region's cash crops--sugar, cotton and tobacco--were substantially reduced as well.

**Livestock Depletion**

Herds either died or were sold by farmers, because of the lack of water and grazing land. Cattle serve as a source of income and food for farmers, and are frequently used as draft animals in farming. While herds can be rebuilt, this is a time-consuming process and results in substantially diminished income until completed.

Namibia, Swaziland, Botswana and Zimbabwe suffered especially high livestock losses due to drought. In the southeastern Lowveld area of Zimbabwe it is estimated that 80 percent of the cattle died. This is significant due to the role that cattle farming plays in overall economic activity in the region.

In certain areas of the region, lack of draft oxen for farming was a major impediment during the 1992-93 planting season. The improvements to pasture lands and drinking water that resulted from the November rains, came too late to allow livestock to recover in time for land preparation.

**Economic Crisis**

Much of the industry in the region is involved in the processing of agricultural products. Thus, the drought, which limited the supply of raw materials, adversely affected urban as well as rural employment. The Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers Union estimated a sugar production of 30 percent less than normal, severely affecting the sugar industry, which employs 30,000 people. The growing cycle of the cane is four years, so that the loss of plants in 1992 could have a prolonged impact on the industry.

The drought was devastating to agriculture-based industries in Mutare, on Zimbabwe's eastern border, where factories were threatened with closure due to the lack of adequate water supplies. A.I.D. estimated that water shortages

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affected 18 percent of Zimbabwe companies, with six percent facing factory closures.

Small-scale farmers faced economic constraints based upon access to seeds and ability to finance their purchases. Although the seed distribution and subsidy programs setup prior to the start of the 1992-93 planning season were deemed successful by experts, shortages of seeds and access by small farmers, especially those in remote areas, were problematic. The total area planted in 1993 was vital to the recovery of small-scale farmers; if farmers have access to fewer seeds, they will plant less and earn less income, even without another drought or similar disaster.

Experts acknowledged that the drought could not have come at a worse time for the economic reforms just beginning to take hold in several countries of the region. Zambia and Zimbabwe, for instance, were pursuing structural adjustment programs designed to strengthen the private sector and promote other reforms, including the removal of food subsidies. Economic reform across the region was disrupted by the drought, as food imports absorbed foreign exchange reserves, and inflation escalated due to rising food prices and budget deficits. The drought ravaged the regional economy overall, and drained millions of dollars that had been earmarked for much needed development work. Derailment of the structural adjustment programs will inhibit governments' ability to recover from the drought.

The economic crisis was most severe in Zimbabwe, where inflation rose to 30 percent during the first half of 1992, and drought-reduced imports increased the current account deficit to \$958 million, equivalent to nearly 20 percent of Zimbabwe's gross domestic product (GDP). Real GDP was said to decline nine percent in Zimbabwe in 1992.

Governments purchased food to forestall or dampen dramatic price increases. A.I.D. encouraged governments to pass on the full cost of the commercial imports to customers in order to preclude price disparities across borders, thus preventing smuggling, and to keep macroeconomic policies generally in line with ongoing economic reform programs. At the same time, A.I.D. and other donors urged governments to target food subsidies to people most seriously at risk of malnutrition and hunger.

### Political Factors

The absence of civil conflict in the drought affected countries (with the exception of Mozambique), and the creation in recent years of more democratic systems of government were crucial in averting famine in Southern Africa. Press accounts, especially a special report in *Christian Science Monitor* confirm that countries with more democratic forms of government--Namibia, Botswana, and Zambia--had the greatest success in terms of providing drought relief.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Battersby, John. "Southern Africa Fights Drought of the Century." *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 16, 1992, p.16.

## CRS-4

This appears attributable to the distinguishing qualities of democratic systems such as responsiveness to public needs, willingness to work with outside bodies, the openness necessary to publicize internal crisis, and public accountability.

Mozambique offered an example of the benefits that accompany conflict resolution, while Angola demonstrated the perils of returning to violence. International relief workers credit the drought with being a major factor in ending the fighting in Mozambique, torn by civil war since independence from Portugal in 1975. The devastating drought resulted in many farmers fleeing areas of the country controlled by the Mozambique National Resistance, or Renamo, thereby depriving the insurgents of their food source. This combined with efforts by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to get food to starving villagers in Renamo-held territory afforded U.N. officials the chance to establish transportation and communication links with the rebel-held territory.

Few experts were confident that the cease-fire signed in October 1992 between the South African backed Renamo and the government would hold.<sup>4</sup> To the surprise of many, there has been no fighting for months. Following the signing of the treaty, Renamo de-mined transportation corridors, allowed the U.N. World Food Program (WFP) and the ICRC to deliver more than 1,100 tons of supplies, and for the first time, permitted residents of Renamo-controlled areas to walk to government-controlled feeding centers.

With the expected arrival of significant numbers of U.N. peacekeeping troops, elections tentatively planned for June or July 1994, a functioning government, large numbers of returning refugees, and adequate rainfall this year, there is hope that Mozambique can continue its transition to democracy.

In contrast to Mozambique, Angola has been in the grip of nationwide violence since the rebel Unita (Union for the Total Independence of Angola) movement was defeated in the country's first attempt at democratic elections in September 1992. Despite abundant rainfall in February 1993, plantings were less than 1991-92 levels as a result of the renewal of armed conflict and the resulting disruption to the agricultural labor force and seed distribution programs. Aid experts term the food situation "extremely fragile" as a result of the fighting which has seen devastating air and artillery attacks on cities. The FAO and WFP expect food aid requirements to be substantially increased.

Zimbabwe suffered an especially severe water shortage during the drought, with corn output falling 90 percent. The Mugabe government displayed a lack of openness and public accountability during the drought, experts say. Members of the minority Ndebele tribe charge that the government administered drought relief as a political tool to shore up support in advance of the 1995 election. Drought relief in the country remained under tight party control, with only 15 percent of food supplies coming in the form of donated aid. One of southern

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<sup>4</sup> The South African government denies providing support to Renamo, although allegations to the contrary persist.

Africa's wealthier nations, Zimbabwe imported over 2.4 million tons of commercial grain in 1992-93. Usually a net exporter of corn, Zimbabwe saw a depletion in the country's grain supplies in April 1992, due to a determination to meet export contracts despite grain losses of about 75 percent. The government instituted a grain quota system to provide relief to its drought starved citizens. The system was rife with inefficiency however, with recipients forced to meet a host of rules and requirements imposed by the government to ensure that no one was cheating the system. Recipients stood in line for hours to qualify, and then often did not receive a ration of corn for months. Experts believe that this inefficiency of food distribution, combined with charges of political discrimination in the distribution of food and water, will increase pressure for democratic reforms in Zimbabwe.

In contrast to Zimbabwe, drought relief in Zambia was administered by a committee of aid and development workers along with government officials under the umbrella of the Programme for the Prevention of Malnutrition. The World Food Program played a large role in drought relief in Zambia as well. The basis for relief assistance in Zambia was the food-for-work program in which individuals participated in construction projects (typically road repairs, building latrines and wells, and irrigation canals) in return for food. The Zambian government, a multiparty democracy, provided food handouts to those families who could not take part in the food-for-work projects, as well as malnourished children, the sick, and the elderly. Zambia offered an example of a responsive government that demonstrated the capacity and willingness to take the necessary steps to avert famine.

Authoritarian, landlocked Malawi, is acknowledged by aid experts to have benefitted the least from drought relief efforts. This is attributed to logistical problems with transporting food through Mozambique, but also in part to the fact that the government was slow to respond to the needs of its citizens, and consequently delayed appeals for aid and placement of orders for commercial grain.

## FOOD SITUATION IN 1992-93

The drought has ended in most of Southern Africa, with pockets of dry areas remaining in some affected countries (primarily Botswana, Lesotho, and Namibia). The rains came late in the 1992-93 growing season, although, rainfall in January and February was heavy in many areas. Although it is too early in the growing season to make quantitative estimates of harvest yield for the 1992-93 season, recent estimates by the FAO suggest that crop production in Southern Africa will exceed last year's poor levels, but will nonetheless be below average. This confirms expectations that even with good rains, recovery in the region will be slow.

A major constraint to planting has been the reduced number of available livestock. Seed distribution and subsidy programs setup prior to the planting season, have proven successful although there have been shortages of sorghum



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seed. The region is expected to continue to be a net importer of food in 1993. The two potential exporters of grain, South Africa and Zimbabwe, are not expected to produce surpluses.

Food aid will be required by Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, and Swaziland. Angola has had abundant rainfall in most areas, but the renewal of hostilities between the government and Unita rebels disrupted the planting season. Much prime land is expected to be left idle, and FAO estimates that Angola will require a sharp increase in food aid.

Botswana has seen below average rainfall in the 1992-93 season. A lack of draft oxen has hampered planting efforts. Yields are not expected to be above the low 1991-92 level. It is anticipated that Botswana will purchase, on commercial terms, in excess of 200,000 tons of food in the 1993-94 marketing year (April-March).

Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi, and Zimbabwe have seen adequate rainfall this year. Although cereal crops are in fair to good condition in most of Mozambique, a severe shortage of seeds, hand tools, draft oxen, and the fact that the rains came late will result in reduced harvests. The peace treaty to end the 16-year old war, signed in October 1992 by the government and Renamo rebels, came too late to allow for the return of sufficient numbers of refugees who usually work in agriculture labor. The country is expected to show a continued reliance on food aid to assist returning refugees from the fighting, demobilized soldiers and displaced persons. Mozambique has received over 550,000 tons of food since the drought began. The government estimates that it still needs 100,100 tons of corn, 13,200 tons of beans, and 6,050 tons of vegetable oil to feed 4 million people dependent on aid. With regular rainfall, Mozambique's President Chissano estimates that the country could once again be self-sufficient in food within three years.<sup>6</sup>

With abundant rainfall, Zambia and Malawi should have an average to above average output of staple foods. Despite adequate rainfall and the fact that it is usually the region's breadbasket, Zimbabwe is not expected to produce an exportable cereal surplus for the 1993-94 marketing season. Plans are underway in Zimbabwe for commercial cereal imports.

Both Namibia and Lesotho have suffered from below average precipitation for the 1992-93 rainy season. Food production levels in these two countries are unlikely to reach pre-drought levels. Food import requirements are expected to remain high in 1993.

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<sup>6</sup> Keller, Bill. "Mozambique's Outlook Brightens As Truce Holds and Drought Ends." *The New York Times*, February 22, 1993, p.A6.

## INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

The response of the international community to the drought was timely, sufficient, and well coordinated. The FAO, WFP, national governments, and private and voluntary organizations (PVOs) provided warnings of impending drought early in 1992. In January and February 1992, the FAO, WFP, and A.I.D. played a critical role in determining the extent of the failure of the rains throughout the region. National early warning systems in Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana confirmed the extent of the drought, as well. As a result, governments in the region had time to plan for the expected food shortages.

The FAO and WFP conducted field assessments of the drought and its impact in late March and early April, 1992. They, along with other U.N. agencies identified projects to improve health and nutrition levels, assist livestock owners, and provide emergency water supplies. The WFP established a Logistics Advisory Center in Harare, Zimbabwe, to coordinate the transport of food within the region.

The U.N. and the 10-nation Southern African Development Community (SADC) cosponsored a Donor Pledging Conference in Geneva, June 1-2, 1992. They jointly prepared a report on the drought and an appeal for assistance totalling \$854 million, including emergency food aid of 1.6 million metric tons (MT).<sup>6</sup> This did not represent the total cost of the drought; rather it reflected what the U.N. and SADC considered to be the minimal response to meet emergency requirements in 1992-93. Governments from around the world pledged almost \$600 million in emergency food and non-food assistance, including 840,845 MT of emergency food aid, plus an additional 929,889 MT of non-emergency food aid.

At the Geneva conference, the U.S. pledged 714,389 MT in non-emergency food assistance and \$205 million in emergency food and non-food assistance. The second largest contributor was the European Community (EC), which increased its original pledge of 317,000 MT to 550,000 MT (mostly in the form of wheat flour and skim milk powder). The third largest single contributor was Japan.

The World Bank provided \$310 million in quick-dispersing loans for balance of payments support to Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The loans were essentially a line of credit on which the recipient governments were able to draw immediately. The loans allowed the recipient governments to pay for drought related expenditures, excluding food purchases and rehabilitation projects.

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<sup>6</sup> United Nations World Food Program and the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference. Drought Emergency in Southern Africa (DESA): Consolidated U.N.-SADCC Appeal, May 1992.

## U.S. ROLE

The United States was at the forefront of donor response to the Southern African drought. U.S. agencies took a leading role in the crisis since the rains first failed in January 1992. By early March of that year, the U.S. Government, in responding to the drought, had already prepared a preliminary estimate of crop losses, and had begun to mobilize food aid.<sup>7</sup> By early April, the agencies had allocated food and were beginning to arrange for shipment to the region. And by the end of December 1992, all FY92 U.S. food aid had arrived in the region.<sup>8</sup>

A.I.D. took action on a number of fronts. First, A.I.D. missions reported the failure of the rain early on, and developed estimates of food and water shortages in their countries. Second, A.I.D. expanded the operation of its Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) from the Sahel and East Africa to include Southern Africa in order to monitor rainfall on an ongoing basis. FEWS issued its first report on February 27, 1992. As a result, many of the A.I.D. missions declared drought emergencies in April and May of that year, and began working with the governments as well. Third, A.I.D. established a Southern Africa Drought Task Force to monitor the drought and coordinate the U.S. response. The task force served as the focal point of coordination among the Departments of State, Agriculture, the Peace Corps, and others. In early June 1992, the task force issued an extensive report on the magnitude and impact of the drought, and made recommendations for dealing with the situation based on their March-April assessments. By August 1992, over 600,000 MT of U.S. food aid had arrived in the region, ensuring that sufficient quantities of food would be on hand during an especially crucial period.

A.I.D. reported that as of December 31, 1992, U.S. government assistance to the Southern African drought totalled \$736,239,687. Of this amount, 2,328,183 MT of food aid valued at \$649,844,400 had been provided, as well as \$86,389,297 for non-food aid.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), Southern Africa Drought Assessment, March 24-April 29, 1992.

<sup>8</sup> See Appendices 4 and 5 for country breakdown of U.S. food aid.

<sup>9</sup> See Appendix 1 for summary of U.S. government sources of assistance (food and non-food).

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**U.S. Government Food Aid to Southern Africa**

<b>FISCAL YEAR</b>	<b>METRIC TONS</b>	<b>U.S. DOLLARS</b>
<b>FY92</b>	1,781,023 MT	\$495,979,200
<b>FY93</b>	547,168 MT	\$153,865,200
<b>TOTAL FOOD AID</b>	2,328,183 MT	\$649,844,400

**Non-Food Aid**

<b>FISCAL YEAR</b>	<b>U.S. DOLLAR VALUE</b>
<b>FY92</b>	\$84,419,707
<b>FY93</b>	\$ 1,969,590
<b>TOTAL NON-FOOD AID</b>	\$86,389,297

A total of 239,255 MT of Title II food aid was provided by the U.S. in FY92 and FY93. Title II of P.L. 480 authorizes the provision of commodity donations for emergency relief or for ongoing feeding programs in eligible developing countries.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) allocated 1,126,899 MT of food assistance in FY92, and 255,600 MT in FY93 through Title I of P.L. 480 and Section 416(b). Title I authorizes the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), a U.S. Government-owned and operated corporation, to provide long-term, low interest rate financing of agriculture commodities to eligible countries. Section 416(b) authorizes the CCC to donate surplus commodities it owns to eligible developing countries. In 1993, USDA announced that it planned to make available to Zimbabwe approximately 129,000 MT of additional Section 416(b) corn.

Aid was also provided under Title III of P.L. 480 (Food for Peace) - 446,811 MT in FY92 and 206,350 MT in FY93. The U.S. used Title III, a relatively new bilateral grant program, as an additional source of funding during the drought. Intended for development projects involving policy and institutional reforms, Title III was utilized to stabilize food prices, finance transportation costs, and dissuade food hoarding in the region during the crisis. An A.I.D. official cited Zambia as an example, when pointing to the "creative approaches" U.S. field missions used in employing Title III funding.<sup>10</sup> According to A.I.D., the U.S.

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<sup>10</sup> Statement by John Hicks, Agency for International Development, before the House Subcommittee on Africa, June 9, 1992, p. 8.



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committed \$18 million toward the purchase and delivery of U.S. corn to the government of Zambia. A Trust Fund account was established by the Zambian government with U.S. government funding and other donor contributions. Money from the account was used to pay the transportation costs of the food allowing more food to be procured with the U.S. funds. Instead of the 45,000 MT originally planned, A.I.D. was able to deliver 155,000 MT of corn to Zambia.

## Food Aid Sources

SOURCE	FY92	FY93	TOTAL
FOOD FOR PEACE-TITLE II <sup>11</sup>	154,045 MT	120,161 MT	274,206 MT
FOOD FOR PEACE-TITLE III <sup>12</sup>	446,811 MT	206,350 MT	653,161 MT
USDA-TITLE I <sup>13</sup>	330,339 MT	102,400 MT	432,739 MT
USDA SECTION 416(b) <sup>14</sup>	796,500 MT	307,500 MT	1,104,000 MT

Within A.I.D., the Africa Bureau budgeted \$12.6 million in FY93 for the Southern Africa Regional Programs (SARP) Drought Relief Project. SARP has been used to deal with regional transportation issues, such as upgrading rail and port infrastructure, upgrading old rail cars and engines, and improving inter-state communication systems.

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<sup>11</sup> Title II of the Food for Peace Program (P.L. 480) provides grant food aid for emergency and private assistance.

<sup>12</sup> Title III of Food for Peace (P.L. 480) is a bilateral grant program intended for development projects involving policy and institutional reforms. Title III was used during the Southern African drought to stabilize food prices and dissuade food hoarding.

<sup>13</sup> Title I of P.L. 480 is administered by USDA and is a concessional sales and market development program.

<sup>14</sup> The Section 416(b) program under USDA authorized Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) donations of surplus commodities for Southern Africa.

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By the end of 1992, the U.S. had contributed a total of \$91.7 million for refugee assistance in the Southern Africa region. A total of 198,213 MT of U.S. food aid, valued at \$83.8 million was provided to the WFP for refugee assistance. In FY92 the State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs provided \$4.6 million to PVOs, U.N. agencies, and the International Committee for the Red Cross for non-food assistance to refugees in the Southern African region.

U.S. PVOs worked on their own initiative to channel existing resources and programs to the drought area, or in some cases, raise new money for such programs. InterAction, a private umbrella organization of 136 PVOs who provide humanitarian assistance overseas, reported that over 20 groups were active in the region during the drought. Among them, World Vision planned to distribute approximately 133,500 MT of food to the region in FY93, broken down as follows: Mozambique, 106,000 MT; Lesotho, 1,100 MT; Malawi, 12,365; Swaziland, 5,211 MT; Zambia, 6,000 MT; Zimbabwe, 2,783. Additionally, Catholic Relief Service committed \$2 million in private funds for water projects, medicine supplies, and animal restocking programs.

### CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

Congress held hearings to call attention to the Southern African drought and to oversee the U.S. response to the emergency.<sup>16</sup> Most focused attention on the adequacy of program levels for food aid and disaster assistance requested by the Administration. In early October 1992, Congress passed two bills -- the Foreign Operations Appropriations and Agriculture Appropriations -- containing all foreign aid spending for FY93. The Foreign Operations Appropriations (P.L. 102-391) included the bulk of foreign aid money. Included in the legislation was \$100 million for an African disaster fund to deal with famine relief. The report language encouraged A.I.D. to ask for a supplemental appropriation for Southern Africa if needed later in the year; to use funds for regional transportation and logistics problems; and to urge flexibility in the implementation of structural adjustment programs.

Apart from the hearings, Congress engaged in numerous informal consultations with professionals from A.I.D., the State Department, and PVOs. A Congressional Research Service seminar, held at the request of the House Select Committee on Hunger in April 1992, brought together government professionals and PVO representatives to discuss the drought. Stung by criticism that the U.S. Government had not done enough to respond to previous African famines, Congress used these consultations to discuss the adequacy of the U.S. response to this African crisis, and the possible need for a supplemental appropriation. The consultations allowed most congressional observers to conclude that the executive branch, in cooperation with PVOs, the United

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<sup>16</sup> The House Select Committee on Hunger convened a hearing on the drought in May 1992. Further hearings were held in the House in June, and the African Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee convened a hearing in July. See Selected Readings for citations.

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Nations, and the governments of Southern Africa, was responding in a timely and effective manner. A supplemental appropriation was ultimately not needed.

One major concern during the drought was the availability of U.S. food aid to meet Southern Africa's needs for food imports. Those concerned feared that export subsidy programs, such as the Export Enhancement Program (EEP), which provides surplus commodities to facilitate U.S. export sales in world markets, were depleting surpluses and creating potential shortages in commodity donation programs, such as that under Section 416(b). This could have resulted in fewer commodities being available to donate for drought and famine relief in Southern Africa and elsewhere, but such was not the case. USDA Section 416(b) commodities were available for FY93, despite earlier indications that tighter supplies in 1993 would not make this possible.

Some organizations expressed concern that the United States responded to the crisis by diverting resources away from other regions in Africa, instead of finding new resources. Others believed that the U.S. response was not only adequate, but generous and that other nations should have increased their pledges. There was particular worry that the famine-stricken Horn of Africa was being neglected, despite passage in April 1992 of the Horn of Africa Recovery and Food Security Act (P.L. 102-274) which authorized emergency assistance of relief and rehabilitation in the Horn. A.I.D. acknowledged that it did shift resources, but stressed that it did not divert resources from other emergencies, including the Horn. A.I.D. asserted that it reprogrammed unused funds, by asking its mission to gauge where they could make reductions and by asking PVOs, which administer AID food programs, to indicate what food aid they would not use by the end of FY92.

Proponents of increased assistance to Southern Africa feared the political climate was not conducive to increased foreign aid, even to fund emergency food aid and disaster assistance. With 1992 an election year, the country slowly climbing out of a recession, and a large Federal budget deficit, it was argued that it was difficult for Congress to take on the more remote problem of drought and impending famine in Southern Africa. Others, however, believed that the U.S. Government (including Congress), dealt with the situation in a timely and effective manner.

## PROSPECTS FOR LONG-TERM REGIONAL COOPERATION

Many argue that cooperation with South Africa is a critical issue for the region. Due in great part to the cooperation needed to provide drought relief to the region, experts say that the prospects are now good for lasting regional coordination in Southern Africa. A series of regional cooperation structures including the coordination of six transport corridors, an operations control center in Johannesburg, a logistics center in Harare, Zimbabwe, and a computerized communications system, have strengthened regional integration and prepared the way for South Africa to take part in future regional deliberations.

The Grain Operations Control Center (GOCC) in Johannesburg was cited by relief workers as an excellent example of the regional coordination that resulted from the drought. The Center, setup in April 1992 to coordinate the intercountry flow of drought relief, allowed for daily interaction of representatives from the governments of South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Zambia as they coordinated cross-border port, rail, and road activities. The GOCC was so successful that there were calls for it to remain in operation once the crisis passed. Some government officials expressed optimism that cooperation at the technical level could in the future translate into political cooperation between South Africa and its neighbors.

Aid workers and diplomats believe that the regional cooperation evidenced during the relief effort may pave the way for the inclusion of South Africa in the 10-nation Southern African Development Community (SADC). The Southern African Development Coordination Conference, the forerunner of SADC, was founded in 1980, to promote economic independence from South Africa. In preparing to deal with the drought crisis, SADC officials engaged in quiet cooperation with South African transport, grain and weather officials in planning for the delivery of relief supplies to landlocked countries.<sup>16</sup>

A breakthrough in regional cooperation was achieved in April of 1992 when a meeting of SADC agriculture and transportation ministers decided to establish the Logistics Advisory Center (LAC) in Harare, and to launch a joint United Nations/SADC drought appeal through the World Food Programme. This was followed up by an August summit meeting in Namibia during which SADC leaders signed a treaty changing the mandate of the group from one of economic independence to regional economic integration. Significantly, the treaty states that South Africa will be included in this integration, once a democratic state is in place, although a breakdown of negotiations on power sharing in South Africa could jeopardize these efforts.

A.I.D. played a key role in this move toward regional integration by supporting the LAC and the GOCC, as well as through A.I.D. financing of upgrades for rail links, leasing contracts, and computerized communication systems.

## **LESSONS FOR AVERTING FAMINE**

The drought that struck Southern Africa in 1992 did not lead to mass starvation, despite initial fears of another Somalia or Ethiopia. Analysts suggest several lessons that can be gleaned from this experience for averting future famine.

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<sup>16</sup> Battersby, John. "Regional Coordination Takes Root." *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 16, 1992, p.10.



## Democratic Political Systems

First, the characteristics of democratic government--public accountability, response to popular pressure, decentralized administrative institutions--make a demonstrated difference in the response to drought crises. Namibia, Botswana, and Zambia, three countries with more open and democratic systems of government, operated successful drought relief programs.

Zambia, a multi-party democracy since elections in October 1991, served as a model for drought relief. Zambia developed a highly successful relief program which was run by nongovernmental aid and development organizations. In addition, the country instituted a food-for-work program which rebuilt communities and bolstered the self-esteem of recipients. On the other hand in Malawi, a one-party state, government officials were slow in responding to local-level needs. Consequently, the government delayed appeals for aid, and the placement of orders for commercial grain. A serious shortfall in pledges of food aid resulted along with delays in food deliveries. The drought relief effort in Zimbabwe remained under tight party control, with negative consequences. Food distribution was highly inefficient, and reportedly rife with political favoritism.

Past experience in drought-stricken African countries, such as Botswana, and Cape Verde, had demonstrated that famines are preventable. Despite a persistent drought in Botswana between 1981-1987, no one died from starvation. This country's success is attributed to the design of democratic, decentralized political and administrative institutions, a highly successful cash-for-work program which recognized food insecurity as an income and employment problem, and an effective early warning system.

Political settlements of internal wars and the creation of stable political systems also contributed to a better food situation during this drought. The exceptions were Mozambique and Angola where protracted civil conflict exacerbated food shortages. The signing of the peace accord in Mozambique, however, boosted drought relief efforts and allowed for food to reach remote villages. The eruption of violence in Angola following the country's first democratic election in September 1992, resulted in drought relief grinding to a halt. The planting season was disrupted by the violence, and FAO had predicted that Angola would require a sharp increase in food aid in 1993.

In a search for lessons in averting famine, some observers say that the solution must be, to a significant degree, political. Others doubt that the United States can do very much to effect political change in Southern Africa. It does seem clear however, as many agree, that efforts to promote peace and democracy do make a difference.

## Infrastructure

The importance of an extensive transportation and communication infrastructure was the second lesson that emerged from this drought. Southern

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Africa's regional transportation base, the best in Sub-Saharan Africa, facilitated the delivery of food to the land-locked countries of Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi. A network of ports, railways and roads existed through which governments and organizations transported food. The drought led to the first real regional cooperation between SADC members and South African officials who coordinated six transportation corridors to ensure delivery of food shipments. Such cooperation was vital as close to 100 percent of food imports came via South African ports.

The transport of food aid placed enormous and unprecedented demands on regional infrastructure, especially ports, railways and roads since food imports increased by as much as 400 percent. Bottlenecks did occur with congestion plaguing main transport routes. Coastal countries such as Namibia and Mozambique were responsible for handling enormous quantities of food shipments for their own needs, as well as those of neighboring countries. At the port of Beira in Mozambique, for instance, despite round-the-clock operations, berthed ships at times had to wait three weeks to unload.

Despite these problems, the existence of a solid infrastructure resulted in food reaching drought-stricken areas before widespread starvation occurred. Also, the network of ports, railways and roads meant that aid donors were more forthcoming, confident in the knowledge that food could be transported to where it was needed.

### **Financial Resources**

This drought differed from others that have plagued Africa in that affected countries had more developed economies, and thus could afford to import corn for drought relief. The WFP notes that some Southern African countries had the necessary wherewithal to arrange for commercial imports. This is in contrast to regions such as the Horn of Africa, which have been exclusively dependent on food aid donations.

Zimbabwe, usually a net exporter, imported 2.4 million tons of commercial grain. Regionally, imports increased from 2.3 million tons during the last harvest year to more than 14.5 million tons in the 12-month period ending in March 1993.

Averting famine and increasing long-term food security can be achieved, experts agree, through improved agricultural production, expanded opportunities for employment both within and outside agriculture, diversified sources of income for families, economic growth, and possibilities for international trade.

In recent years Botswana achieved remarkable economic growth through the exploitation of the mining sector. Between 1965 and 1987, the per capita GDP showed a real growth rate of 10 percent per year complemented by a sharp increase in foreign exchange reserves. Zimbabwe has also diversified its manufacturing sector which is based on agriculture and mining. Minerals and

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metals account for 40 percent of exports. Such exports generate the foreign exchange needed to pay for imports of commercial grain.

### Early Warning Systems

The Southern African drought demonstrated the value of regional and national early warning systems which gave governments and donors sufficient lead time to plan and implement relief programs. The Southern African Development Coordination Committee (SADCC), FAO, A.I.D., and local governments employed early warning systems which provided timely notice of the failure of the rains and the potential for serious crop loss. Early on in the drought, A.I.D. expanded the operation of the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) from Sahelian and East Africa to include Southern Africa, so that rainfall could be monitored regularly. FEWS issued its first report on the region on February 27, 1992.

Early warnings of the magnitude of the drought allowed donors, including the U.S. and PVOs, time to plan for emergency food distribution and other activities. The lead time also allowed the affected countries to declare emergencies and begin purchasing food commercially on the world market, before famine became widespread. For instance, Zimbabwe and Zambia planned for and began commercial imports as early as February 1992.

Some critics suggest that formal early warning systems may be focused too narrowly on simple indicators or miss "straws in the wind" to be useful in predicting the onset of famines. However, Botswana's experience during the 1981-87 drought offered evidence that such systems can accurately forecast drought, enabling intervention that stems the loss of life. Costs of early warning systems are not thought to be prohibitive, even for poorer African countries. U.N. Development Program (UNDP) figures show that a combination of nutritional surveillance and early warning allowed Botswana to reach 70 percent of its population for an expenditure of just two percent of GNP during 1985-86.

### Coordinated Donor Response

This drought demonstrated how crucial a well coordinated response can be in averting famine. The U.S. government focused its efforts on moving quickly and coordinating a response to the drought with other donors. Just two months into the drought, an A.I.D. delegation met with representatives from twenty donor countries, the European Community (EC) Commission, five U.N. agencies, and three non-governmental organizations. The drought was discussed during this meeting, and as a result an early commitment by several donors to provide additional funding to the U.N. World Food Program was secured. The U.S. government supported U.N. coordination of international drought activities and maintained regular contact with U.N. agencies during the duration of the crisis. U.S. support was also lent to the joint United Nations (UN)-Southern Africa Development Coordination Committee (SADCC) donor conference held in June

1992. Additionally, the U.S. utilized the World Bank as a venue for meeting with major donors to Africa, and held regular meetings with PVOs.

PVOs launched an immediate response to the drought emergency, beginning in January 1992. Their goal was to avoid situations similar to Ethiopia in 1984-85 where several million people crowded into camps. Voluntary organizations actively planned relief projects and launched special fundraising appeals that raised private funds to supplement government pledges. In addition to carrying out programs funded directly by the U.S. government, PVOs also assisted U.N. agencies in project implementation. Bi-weekly meetings were held in Washington during the height of the crisis under the umbrella of InterAction, a private organization comprised of 136 private voluntary groups. These meetings brought together private relief groups, A.I.D. representatives, and some African diplomats for the purpose of coordinating the donor response.

National NGOs also played a crucial role by facilitating the distribution of donor aid to rural communities. These NGOs worked in conjunction with PVOs to keep people in their homes and villages by instituting water management and conservation systems, establishing seed networks to distribute drought resistant seeds, and drilling new wells and bore holes providing water for people and animals. Frequent meetings were conducted with other groups to assure there was minimum duplication of efforts.

The successful donor and regional coordination, effective early warning systems, and timely planning and delivery of relief supplies resulted in food and other aid reaching people in outlying regions when it was needed, thus preventing widespread famine and suffering. More importantly, the timely and coordinated response prevented internal and cross border displacement of populations and refugees so characteristic of drought and famine in the Horn of Africa. Minimized dislocation of people prevented large-scale epidemics, decreased further threats to national food security, and allowed rural villagers to be in a much better position to resume normal economic activities in the 1992-93 planting season.

The Southern Africa drought demonstrated that famine need not be the inevitable conclusion of drought. Loss of life can be prevented with effective early warning, fast action, and successful donor coordination. The existence of pluralistic political systems, solid infrastructure, and developed economies have been shown to play a crucial role as well.



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**APPENDIX 1: SUMMARY OF U.S. GOVERNMENT SOURCES  
OF ASSISTANCE(FOOD AND NON-FOOD)**

A.I.D.	FY92	FY93	TOTAL
FHA/FFP FOOD AID <sup>17</sup>	\$144,408,100	\$ 75,548,200	\$219,948,300
FHA/OFDA <sup>18</sup>	\$ 32,985,100	\$ 1,868,590	\$ 34,954,965
AFRICA BUREAU <sup>19</sup>	\$ 59,902,000	\$ -0-	\$ 59,902,000
<b>SUB-TOTAL</b>	<b>\$237,925,475</b>	<b>\$ 77,509,790</b>	<b>\$314,805,265</b>
USDA FOOD AID	\$328,546,100	\$ 78,325,000	\$406,871,100
STATE DEPT REFUGEE PROGRAM <sup>20</sup>	\$ 14,557,332	\$ -0-	\$ 14,557,332
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>\$580,398,907</b>	<b>\$155,834,790</b>	<b>\$736,233,697</b>

**Source:** A.I.D., Southern Africa Drought Task Force, December 31, 1992.

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<sup>17</sup> AID's Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance allocation of Food for Peace (PL 480) drought relief assistance (food and non-food).

<sup>18</sup> AID's Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance drought relief assistance.

<sup>19</sup> AID's Africa Bureau provided drought relief assistance in the form of funding for drought-related projects in health, water and infrastructure; expansion of PVO support projects; extension of AID's Famine Early Warning System; project to alleviate transportation bottlenecks.

<sup>20</sup>State Department Refugee Program supported multilateral and bilateral activities conducted by international and non-governmental organizations on behalf of refugees, mostly Mozambican, in Southern Africa.

## CRS-20

APPENDIX 2: FY92 U.S. FOOD AID TO  
SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

COUNTRY		Metric Tons	Amount (in U.S. dollars)
ANGOLA	Title I	-0-	-0-
	Title II	33,984	18,283,100
	Title III	-0-	-0-
	Section 416	20,000	8,725,000
BOTSWANA	Title I	-0-	-0-
	Title II	4,368	1,354,300
	Title III	-0-	-0-
	Section 416	-0-	-0-
LESOTHO	Title I	-0-	-0-
	Title II	8,114	3,864,000
	Title III	-0-	-0-
	Section 416	5,000	1,590,000
MALAWI	Title I	-0-	-0-
	Title II	45,000	17,055,000
	Title III	-0-	-0-
	Section 416	238,000	96,224,000
MOZAMBIQUE	Title I	-0-	-0-
	Title II	42,579	14,781,700
	Title III	246,039	49,210,000
	Section 416	200,000	72,200,000
NAMIBIA	Title I	-0-	-0-
	Title II	-0-	-0-
	Title III	-0-	-0-
	Section 416	10,000	2,580,000
SWAZILAND	Title I	-0-	-0-
	Title II	-0-	-0-
	Title III	-0-	-0-
	Section 416	10,500	3,108,000
ZAMBIA	Title I	-0-	-0-
	Title II	20,000	6,860,000
	Title III	200,772	33,000,000
	Section 416	110,000	37,080,000
ZIMBABWE	Title I	330,339	40,000,000
	Title II	-0-	-0-
	Title III	-0-	-0-
	Section 416	203,000	67,039,000
GRAND TOTAL	Title I	330,339	40,000,000
	Title II	154,045	62,198,100
	Title III	446,811	82,210,000
	Section 416	796,500	288,546,100

Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, January 11, 1993.

## CRS-21

**APPENDIX 3: FY93 U.S. FOOD AID TO  
SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES**

<b>COUNTRY</b>		<b>Metric Tons</b>	<b>Amount (In U.S. dollars)</b>
ANGOLA	Title I	-0-	-0-
	Title II	8,529	5,127,400
	Title III	-0-	-0-
	Section 416	-0-	-0-
BOTSWANA	Title I	-0-	-0-
	Title II	-0-	-0-
	Title III	-0-	-0-
	Section 416	-0-	-0-
LESOTHO	Title I	-0-	-0-
	Title II	10,121	3,775,100
	Title III	-0-	-0-
	Section 416	-0-	-0-
MALAWI	Title I	-0-	-0-
	Title II	9,000	5,666,200
	Title III	-0-	-0-
	Section 416	148,600	59,496,800
MOZAMBIQUE	Title I	-0-	-0-
	Title II	75,586	26,510,500
	Title III	206,000	39,000,000
	Section 416	109,000	34,460,500
NAMIBIA	Title I	-0-	-0-
	Title II	-0-	-0-
	Title III	-0-	-0-
	Section 416	-0-	-0-
SWAZILAND	Title I	-0-	-0-
	Title II	3,455	1,735,600
	Title III	-0-	-0-
	Section 416	10,000	2,590,000
ZAMBIA	Title I	-0-	-0-
	Title II	-0-	-0-
	Title III	-0-	-0-
	Section 416	-0-	-0-
ZIMBABWE	Title I	102,400	10,000,000
	Title II	13,470	5,866,300
	Title III	-0-	-0-
	Section 416	40,000	10,840,000
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	Title I	102,400	\$10,000,000
	Title II	120,161	\$48,681,100
	Title III	206,000	\$39,000,000
	Section 416	307,600	\$107,387,300

**Source:** U.S. Agency for International Development. Amounts shown are for funding sources approved as of March 12, 1993.



## HUNGER: REGIONS IN NEED

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THURSDAY, JUNE 10, 1993

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AGRICULTURE AND HUNGER,  
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m., in room 1302, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Timothy J. Penny (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives McKinney, Baesler, and Allard.

Also present: Representative E (Kika) de la Garza, chairman of the committee.

Staff present: Jan Rovecamp, clerk; Jane Shey, Anita R. Brown, and Lynn Gallagher.

### OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TIMOTHY J. PENNY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA

Mr. PENNY. Good morning. The subcommittee will be in order.

I would like to welcome everyone to the second day of these hearings on early intervention. Yesterday, we heard testimony on the issues surrounding intervention by the international community in cases of emergency. Today, we will be looking at some countries who have already been ravaged by war and famine and where the aid agencies are already present but whose needs are not being adequately met.

We will first hear from Ms. Catherine Bertini, the Executive Director of the World Food Programme of the U.N., which provides much of the food aid in these crises. She will be discussing some "hotspots" which we will need to focus our efforts on in the coming months.

We will then have three country panels looking at the situations on the ground in Sudan, Rwanda, and Armenia.

There are, of course, many countries that we do not have time to consider today: Tajikistan, Angola, Afghanistan, Laos, and Haiti, to name but a few. We hope to be able to focus on the needs of some of those countries in future hearings.

There is much to be optimistic about today in the world: The end of the cold war represents a great opportunity for effective United Nations peacekeeping, and the dedicated efforts of the national and international aid agencies and the NGO's are making great progress in protecting civilian populations from the worst excesses of war and natural disasters.

But as the nightly horrors of Bosnia remind us, there is still a long way to go. We must further our peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts and seek to improve our response to emergencies, both natural and man-made.

If Mr. Allard arrives, I will provide time for him to make an opening statement, but, in his absence, I want to move to call forward our first witness, Ms. Bertini. I welcome her to the subcommittee and ask that you summarize your remarks as best you can. And we hope to conclude this hearing before the noon hour. Proceed.

**STATEMENT OF CATHERINE BERTINI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,  
WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, UNITED NATIONS, ROME, ITALY**

Ms. BERTINI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here, especially after the many times that we worked together either on Hunger Committee work or in Agriculture Committee work.

Also, I wish to congratulate you and Chairman de la Garza for the creation of this subcommittee because I think the issues that you will discuss and work on are critical to the future of so many people in the world.

You have my written testimony which runs through several points. I talk about the process under which we decide and activate our relief operations, some of the risks and the costs that we see involved in this process, the challenges that we face as we proceed and also some of the opportunities that we see.

Before I summarize very briefly that testimony, I would like to go to your point about some of the major operations that we see throughout the world. Emergencies, of course, have increased dramatically, and we are seeing many increased trends where we all have to be involved.

To name a few of the countries:

In Somalia, thanks in large part to Operation Hope, we have been able to deliver and distribute food more safely and extensively in areas throughout Somalia. However, just recently many of us have had to move, temporarily at least, staff to go on extended leave from Mogadishu because of some increase in the fighting. We have been able to say, however, that we have delivered, with the help of organizations like CARE, as much food in the first 6 months of this year as we did in all of 1992, and I think that is a remarkable achievement. We also had many rehabilitation projects ongoing there.

In Kenya, I think we will see additional needs that need to be met, both because of the emergency refugee program there for Somalia refugees, as well as concerns relating to the drought in Kenya.

The Sudan, we are delivering food to over 2.8 million displaced people and drought victims, and, of course, our major focus and the major focus of the international community is in the south. This is the area where major problems exist, and we very much appreciate the work that the United States has done through the U.S. Ambassador to work on a new agreement for corridors so that we can be able to send more food in to reach more people and certainly do so

in larger quantity in a safer situation for all of the involved staff and at less cost.

In Rwanda, a country that you will be spending more time on today, although this is not normally an emergency operation, certainly we have had to expand very rapidly in order to reach the massive displaced population. Over 900,000 people have been displaced, roughly one out of every seven.

I think this is one of the stories, Mr. Chairman, where the international community has been able to move very fast and, as a result, we haven't seen the bad pictures in the papers because, in fact, we think we have averted much of the problem even though many people are still at risk.

We were able to—because we had transport and food in the region, we were able to borrow food to move through into Rwanda quickly with the planes and the trucks that we had and with the staff and volunteers that were there.

We have been able also to use our logistics place in Uganda that we had been using for Sudan to be able to feed people in Rwanda, and just recently we had a breakthrough that was negotiated in large part by the World Food Programme staff that allows—where the Government and the Rwanda Popular Front allow the opening of relief corridors so we can, again, provide more food and decrease the cost of the transportation so that we can spend more of those dollars on food.

In southern Africa—Mr. Chairman, I know you heard much about this yesterday, and you are familiar with the success. Again, it is not a place where we have seen a lot of news stories, but it is a place where we have had—the international community has had—significant success in being able to provide food to the 18 million people that we estimated to be at risk, and the World Food Programme was proud to play a major role as the U.N. organizer in this area.

In Angola, we have probably one of our most tragic and hazardous situations, certainly because of the general insecurity. We think that there are about 2 million people at risk. We can only reach about 70 percent of those people.

Recently, in fact, an FPA plane was shot down, and we lost an engineer when the plane landed in a mine field. Since then we have had other Angolan staff members, three who have lost their lives, and it is certainly a very difficult situation for all of those people who are working in Angola and ultimately for the people who are in need.

In Mozambique, I think your comment about the optimism for the future—we see optimism in Mozambique, many funds for the peace holding and for reconstruction, being very successful there.

In Liberia, of course in that region, after more than 3 years of civil war, there is, again, a case load of over 2 million people in countries in the region.

In Yugoslavia, the World Food Programme has its single largest operation in terms of resource commitments. We, of course, work very closely with UNHCR in Yugoslavia to reach an estimated 3.8 million refugees. So far, there has been over 100,000 tons of emergency food delivered in the country and another half a million tons programmed for delivery before the end of this year.



The operation in Yugoslavia—former Yugoslavia—as well as the operations in the former Soviet Union are dependent upon new sources of income and new commitments for food. The World Food Programme has made a decision not to borrow food from Africa and other countries in need for these operations in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, so we are fully dependent on the commitments that countries make, and I am pleased to tell you that the United States has been generous in the former Yugoslavia.

We are still hoping that we will be receiving additional commitments, especially for Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, and we do have some commitments for Tajikistan.

Iran and Pakistan are still catering to over 1.7 million refugees from Afghanistan, though 1½ million people have moved back to Afghanistan in the last 18 months. Repatriation has slowed so that is still a concern, and in addition, there are still refugees from Miramar and Bangladesh, refugees in Nepal and Cambodia, refugees in Vietnam. We are hopeful that the operation in Cambodia will continue to be successful and that we will be able to complete the repatriation program soon.

Mr. Chairman, this is a quick rundown of a few of the key areas where we will see continued work and continued need in the immediate future.

Just a few comments on my written testimony.

Once we go through the process of evaluating any of these problem areas, we then, of course, look at some major concerns relating to personal safety, relating to the dollar cost, relating to potential losses but objectives that we have, and, certainly, relating to the importance of long-term development.

Some of your speakers yesterday spoke about long-term development. Certainly investment in long-term development is key for the future. It is key for the future of our operations. It is key for the future of the people in these countries. If we are able to help people become self-reliant and self-sufficient through development, we will be able to prevent and mitigate the effects of many future disasters.

We think, as well, we have to emphasize the coordination needs and, of course, the work on these security issues to be able to secure safe passage for food and other humanitarian deliveries.

As we proceed from these, of course, areas, we need to look again at the opportunities for all of us to work together, not only to provide a quick response to these programs throughout the world and to these problems throughout the world but also that we can be in a position to be able to build on our development programs so that over the long term we can look to successful countries, successful regions and know that together we made a difference in strengthening those countries so that emergency situations will be eliminated or mitigated.

In order to do that, we are doing our best at the World Food Programme, the U.N.'s food aid agency, the largest U.N. grant assistance program, to work with the private voluntary organizations, to work with bilateral donors to provide this multilateral assistance in the most efficient and effective way possible.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the United States has been very generous in its contributions to the World Food Programme. I have sug-



gested in my testimony perhaps ways that the United States could even be more helpful. But I also must tell you that in this time of concern in the country about budget priorities that we think that, although the United States has been generous, as an American I can't say that we are overspending in these areas. I think that we have been generous and have been helpful, but I certainly hope that we can work with you in the future to not only improve responses but to be able to strengthen our collective efforts toward development and self-sufficiency for people throughout the world.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bertini appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. PENNY. Thank you. I appreciate your testimony this morning.

You mentioned the practice of borrowing food for emergency situations. I know you gave one example, but could you elaborate as to how you accomplish that and under what timeframe you replace the food shipment to the originally intended country?

Ms. BERTINI. Certainly I can. One example was in Somalia when, as soon as we were able to begin getting food to Somalia, we knew that we had to move it in much faster than if we waited for ships to arrive. So we contacted the authorities in Kenya where we had food available because of our school feeding programs in Kenya and our development programs in Kenya, and, with the agreement of the Kenyan authorities, we moved food from Kenya to Somalia. But we could move it within only days and weeks at the most in terms of the food movement, and we were able to then replace the Kenyan food later when we did have boats arrive to provide food assistance for Somalia.

We do this often. In fact, as I mentioned, every place except in the former Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union when we absolutely have to have food arrive.

In Rwanda, again, we were able to have a very short leadtime. If we had waited for food that we ordered to arrive, obviously we would have had to wait at least a couple of months, but by being able to borrow food from other countries in the region, we were able to get food there within a period of a couple of weeks. And that, I think, made a critical difference.

Mr. PENNY. Mr. Emerson mentioned yesterday his recollection of the Ethiopian situation in 1984 and 1985 where, evidently, we had a normal shipment of grain headed for India. Evidently, this was a normal purchase of grain by the Indians and that was somehow arranged to be redirected to Ethiopia. Do you recall that situation and did I understand him correctly that this is like a sale to India that was somehow diverted and then replaced by a later shipment?

Ms. BERTINI. I would like to respond later on that. My colleague tells me it was China to Ethiopia, but I will have to get more details on that and send it to your office.

Mr. PENNY. What I am curious about is whether this was actually a sale that was moving to China or whether this was a food aid shipment that was moving to China.

Ms. BERTINI. I would like to clarify that for the record if you don't mind.

Mr. PENNY. You are getting a note there.

Ms. BERTINI. I will follow up with you later, thank you.  
[The information follows:]

RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM MR. PENNY REGARDING A DIRECTED SHIPMENT TO ETHIOPIA

The shipment mentioned was not—repeat not—a U.S. commercial shipment that was diverted from China to Ethiopia. Rather, it was a shipment from Australia of approximately 20,000 tons of wheat regularly donated to WFP intended for a Regular Development Operation in China, which was diverted to Ethiopia to meet the emergency requirements.

Mr. PENNY. I was just curious to know if we had even gone to that extent where a country in effect waited several extra weeks for a purchase because an emergency situation required the shipment to be diverted.

Ms. BERTINI. I think we do our best in almost all cases to try not to wait so that we can divert and get the food moving as quickly as possible.

If I could mention one other plus that we have. In addition to being able to borrow food that is on site in a country, because we have many chartered ships at any given time on waters throughout the world, we are also able to divert shipments or partial shipments to countries. Again, ships that are directed somewhere because of our development program, and we would be able to move the food for a fast response.

Our development program, of course, is set up such that we have ongoing projects, and we know where the projects are going to be and what the volume of food is going to be in any particular area, so we have this as a base for one of the reasons why we can move food and I think respond faster.

If I could follow up on one other point about Ethiopia from the early 1980's, Mr. Chairman. One of the carryovers from Ethiopia was the fact that we have been able to use in Somalia trucks that were purchased as a result of the Ethiopian relief effort. There is a large fleet of trucks and drivers in Ethiopia and now Eritrea, and we have been able to borrow 50 of those trucks and 80 drivers and mechanics to be able to be based in Mogadishu providing food shipments from the Mogadishu port.

We work in part with CARE in order to accomplish this, but I think it has been not only successful for our efforts in Somalia, but also a very constructive and further use of what was originally part of a relief effort for Ethiopia and now has been able to be used in a neighboring country.

Mr. PENNY. Staying on the topic of food shipments, would you care to share any thoughts about the cargo preference requirement?

Ms. BERTINI. I can share some figures, Mr. Chairman, with you.  
Mr. PENNY. Please do.

Ms. BERTINI. In 1992, as is in my written testimony, the U.S. contributed \$542 million to the World Food Programme. That was done in commodities and in transport. \$273 million of that \$542 million was actually spent on food, on commodities. \$269 million is the amount that was spent on the transport, on cash and on ITSH, on local transport costs.

Now, of the \$269 million, \$90 million was for ocean transport. So \$90 million of the \$542 million was spent actually on ocean trans-

port, and the difference, because of the requirement for 75 percent U.S. flag carriers, is about 40 percent of that. So about \$36 million is what the U.S. spent to put its food on U.S. flagships in order to make its contribution to WFP.

Mr. PENNY. Thank you. I don't think I will press you any more to express an opinion. I think the statistics are helpful in themselves.

You mentioned in your testimony as it relates to development programs that they are disrupted during an emergency.

Ms. BERTINI. Yes.

Mr. PENNY. Is there any way of getting around that? Is there any way to provide for the emergency assistance without setting aside the development effort?

Ms. BERTINI. It is often very difficult. In the cases where there is a large emergency, complicated emergency operation like Somalia, like Angola, it is almost impossible to continue to undertake development projects because the country is in such turmoil.

Now, however, in Somalia, for instance, we are able to institute some rehabilitation projects that could be described as development, could be described as emergency. For instance, helping to build a police force, helping schools to be recreated and using food for those purposes. So we are able to move back into development from the perspective of rehabilitation.

In some countries like Mozambique, we were able to continue some development programs despite the fact that Mozambique was in turmoil for some time. But, of course, now that there is peace we are able to expand quite dramatically.

But if it is a large-scale emergency situation, it is very difficult to maintain development. And, even if it is not such a complicated situation, it puts a great strain on the development operations.

Also, of course, we have some constraints when we do borrow food. In the case where we borrowed food from Kenya, because then it became shortly thereafter critical to be sure we replaced the food right away. So there also is some drain at times from that.

Mr. PENNY. I want to get back to development in just a bit.

But you noted in 1993 we are feeding through the U.N. High Commission on Refugees more refugees and displaced people than people suffering from natural disasters.

Ms. BERTINI. That is right.

Mr. PENNY. Can you put some numbers and dollar amounts on that?

Ms. BERTINI. Yes, if I could provide those for the record, I will, sir.

[The information follows:]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION FROM MR. PENNY REGARDING THE AMOUNT OF AID DIRECTED TO REFUGEES AND DISPLACED INDIVIDUALS AS OPPOSED TO INDIVIDUALS SUFFERING FROM NATURAL DISASTERS

Generally speaking, WFP relief allocations to refugee and internally displaced feeding operations have constituted on average two-thirds of total WFP commitments to all emergencies over the past 10 years. Even during the peak African drought years of 1984 and 1992, WFP refugee food aid commitments represented 47 percent (333,000 tons) and 61 percent (1.27 million tons), respectively, of the total WFP emergency food aid approvals.

More specifically, during this year alone (through September 24, 1993), WFP has committed 97 percent of its emergency food aid resources to refugee and displaced



person feeding operations. This equates to a total of 2.25 million tons of food aid to 24 million beneficiaries at a cost of nearly \$1.1 billion dollars (US). For this same period, WFP emergency assistance to drought crop failures and sudden natural disasters has totalled only 63,000 tons to two million beneficiaries at a cost of \$23 million dollars (US).

Ms. BERTINI. But if we look at our major operation, last year, of course, it was for the southern Africa drought which was a natural disaster, 18 million people at risk, but if we look at our problems now, the natural disasters is really a very small percentage because in most of the countries most of the problems are man-made.

Mr. PENNY. What do we know about the duration of the displacement for these populations? Do we have any sense of when they might be relocated? I know it varies from case to case.

Ms. BERTINI. Yes. I think that is an important point, and I know the High Commissioner for refugees makes that point often, that we do have ongoing long-term refugee situations. But we also—a major part of her job is to repatriate people, and certainly the operation in Cambodia and the operation in Afghanistan are two prime examples of that repatriation. But, yes, it does vary dramatically from place to place.

And I think that raises another point, and that is our collective efforts that are necessary to deal with these long-term refugee populations. Because when people are living—for instance, Mozambique and refugees in Malawi—living there for years at a time, we, I think, all need to be talking more as well about how we can help those people improve their operation, their own well-being so that they will have potentially new skills to be able to go home with when they do go home, and so that they could perhaps develop their own opportunities even for their own growth potential, income-producing activities while they are refugees.

Mr. PENNY. That is not really part of the High Commission's portfolio at this point.

Ms. BERTINI. There is some of that, Mr. Chairman, but I think together, UNHCR, World Food Programme, and other agencies can work to expand on that quite significantly.

Mr. PENNY. I have several other questions, but I want to give my colleagues, Mr. Allard and Ms. McKinney, an opportunity to ask questions, and I will get back to you with my questions in a bit.

Mr. Allard.

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Ms. Bertini, I would like to personally welcome you to this subcommittee, and I value the comments that you are sharing with us as parts of the World Food Programme.

The World Food Programme, let me see, receives about 20 percent of its commodities from the United States, at least that is the figure I have before me, and what countries provide the remaining portion of the food distributed by your organization?

Ms. BERTINI. The major donors are the United States, Canada, the European Community and its member States, Japan and Australia. There are many other smaller donors. In fact, many developing countries donate small amounts of money, \$2 million or some small amounts of money. Also, Saudi Arabia has been a significant donor in the past.

I would be glad to provide you with a specific list of those donors. [The information follows:]



Response to Question Regarding Small and Developing Country Donors  
to the WFP.

See attached Charts A and B.

REGULAR PLEDGES ANNOUNCED FOR THE BIENNIUM 1991-92 **(A)**  
BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND/OR SMALL DONORS (US\$ 10,000 OR LESS)  
POSITION AS AT 30 JUNE 1993

DONOR	COMMODITIES US\$	CASH US\$	TOTAL US\$
BARBADOS		6 500	6 500
BHUTAN		2 100	2 100
BOTSWANA*		5 101	5 101
C.A.R.		1 786	1 786
CHINA		2 000 000	2 000 000
COLOMBIA	300 000 <sup>L</sup> /	21 373	321 373
COSTA RICA		11 029	11 029
CUBA**	2 400 000 <sup>L</sup> /		2 400 000
DJIBOUTI	1 000 <sup>L</sup> /		1 000
DOMINICA		1 000	1 000
ECUADOR		30 000	30 000
EGYPT	400 000 <sup>L</sup> /		400 000
FIJI*		2 534	2 534
GUATEMALA*		4 098	4 098
HONDURAS*		4 649	4 649
INDIA	1 920 000 <sup>L</sup> /		1 920 000
INDONESIA	189 000 <sup>L</sup> /		189 000
JORDAN		75 000	75 000
KENYA*		772	772
LESOTHO		32 000	32 000
MALTA*		2 500	2 500
MAURITIUS*		6 536	6 536
NEPAL		3 750	3 750
PAKISTAN**	1 040 000 <sup>L</sup> /		1 040 000
PHILIPPINES*		35 569	35 569
SAUDI ARABIA	15 000 000 <sup>L</sup> /		15 000 000
SENEGAL*		35 842	35 842
SRI LANKA*	231 776 <sup>L</sup> /		231 776
SYRIA*		31 720	31 720
TANZANIA*		6 328	6 328
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO*		2 921	2 921
TUNISIA		37 664	37 664
TURKEY	228 017 <sup>L</sup> /		228 017
VIETNAM		18 000	18 000
YEMEN		15 653	15 653
ZIMBABWE*		7 560	7 560
Total:	21 709 793	2 401 985	24 111 778

COMMODITIES:

1/ Coffee	5/ Vegetable oil
2/ Sugar	6/ Rice
3/ Undefined	7/ Dates
4/ Rice	8/ Tea
9/ Tea and dried fish	10/ Dried fruit

\* Pledges announced in national currency

\*\* Pledges announced in quantity only

(B)

REGULAR PLEDGES ANNOUNCED FOR THE BIENNIUM 1993-94  
BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND/OR SMALL DONORS (US\$ 10,000 OR LESS)  
POSITION AS AT 30 JUNE 1993

DONOR	COMMODITIES US\$	CASH US\$	TOTAL US\$
BHUTAN		2 200	2 200
CHILE		5 000	5 000
CHINA		2 200 000	2 200 000
COLOMBIA		30 000	30 000
CUBA	2 400 000 <sup>1</sup>		2 400 000
CYPRUS*		6 316	6 316
DJIBOUTI		1 000	1 000
INDIA	1 920 000 <sup>2</sup> /		1 920 000
INDONESIA	180 000 <sup>1</sup> /		180 000
JORDAN		48 000	48 000
KENYA*		426	426
MALI		1 000	1 000
MALTA*		2 500	2 500
NAMIBIA		1 000	1 000
PAKISTAN**	1 305 600 <sup>1</sup> /		1 305 600
SAUDI ARABIA	15 000 000 <sup>1</sup> /		15 000 000
TANZANIA*		2 447	2 447
TURKEY	120 000 <sup>6</sup> /		120 000
VIETNAM		18 000	18 000
Total:	20 925 600	2 317 889	23 243 489

COMMODITIES:

- 1/ Dates
- 2/ Tea and dried fish
- 3/ Vegetable oil
- 4/ Rice
- 5/ Dates
- 6/ Dried fruit

\* Pledges announced in national currency

\*\* Pledges announced in quantity only

Ms. BERTINI. In 1992, the U.S. contribution was even—overall was higher because of the emergencies and because of the United States large commitment to emergencies. And I think altogether in 1992 the United States contributed about a third of our total-total costs—and the European Community and its member States almost another third, so it was very large. They were very large contributions.

The one point I made in my written testimony where I recommend that the United States might consider some additional support is in the area of supporting basically our overhead, administrative cost. We spent only about 6 percent of our total expenditures on our administrative costs, our accountants, our monitors, our auditors, and managers, and we think that 6 percent is a very good percentage.

The United States is very generous in its gifts, commodities and of the cash to transport the commodities, both overseas and in the countries in need, but the United States gives us a total of \$2 million which comes out of the State Department's international organization budget for our administrative cost. That is less than 2 percent of our administrative cost. I am looking for other opportunities and perhaps making the suggestion that is one way the United States could help us strengthen our accountability and our operations is if there were ways to increase that amount.

Mr. ALLARD. Well, your figures would be most helpful to this subcommittee, so you can—at least to our side—if you would provide those, we would appreciate that.

[The information follows:]

**Response to Question from Mr. Allard Regarding U.S. Contributions to WFP for Overhead Administrative Costs).**

Below is an overview of the U.S. contribution to the WFP in 1992:

<u>Commodities Pledged</u> (including CLC)	\$150.6 million
<u>Cash Pledged</u> (this cash is retained in the U.S. to cover transport costs)	72.80
<u>Total Pledged</u>	<u>\$223.40</u>

Actual and Committed Transport and ITSH

(Based on Actual and Estimated expenditures for each individual's donor's commodity as allocated by WFP.)

	\$ 81.20 million
	(percentage of cash = 111%)
<u>Cash for PSA</u> (potentially available)	3.00
(**Cash grant for PSA)	(percentage of cash = 4%)

(\*\*At the time of the Executive Director's testimony, the U.S. contribution for PSA was \$2 million dollars (US)



Mr. ALLARD. We also heard from a witness yesterday who said that many countries made their commitments but they were slow or failed to meet their commitments on food donations, and they cited the European Community as one example. Do you care to comment on this?

Ms. BERTINI. Mr. Allard, I have a great respect for all of our donors, and we do our best to try to work with them to meet their needs. And so when we do have problems with any donor, with the length of time that it takes, we just try to do our best to work with them to alleviate the problem or to alleviate their concerns.

Mr. ALLARD. Now, the figures that you will be providing us, those are going to be actual portions of food distributed by your organization and not commitments, is that right?

Ms. BERTINI. Yes. We will show you the past—for instance, the 1992, 1991 actual figures.

Mr. ALLARD. That would be helpful.

Ms. BERTINI. We can also show you the breakdown of the donation, what is commodities, what is transport, and what is other cash.

Mr. ALLARD. That would be helpful. Thank you.

Now, the World Food Programme apparently—I understand—has been active in providing help to Somalia. You referred to that in your comments. Can you provide the subcommittee and the staff a report on your activities in Somalia and what you see for the future, particularly in light of the recent things we have been reading about in the paper with attacks on U.N. soldiers?

Ms. BERTINI. Yes, sir. We work with the private voluntary organizations. I mentioned CARE as our major partner in Mogadishu. There are others with whom we work to distribute food throughout Somalia. We have staff throughout the country in Somalia and so far, except for Mogadishu, that staff and the food deliveries have not been affected by what you refer to that has been reported in the paper.

It has, however, affected our Mogadishu operations. We have based in Mogadishu our fleet of trucks that we borrowed from Ethiopia, Eritrea, 50 trucks and trailers, and 80 drivers and mechanics. We, yesterday, had to make the decision to move out 70 of those people because of the insecurity in Somalia, in Mogadishu specifically, so they have flown out and, hopefully, will return as soon as it is appropriate and safe.

We have kept some people there because we can continue some of the food deliveries within Mogadishu with the care local staff who have stayed there. We have in Mogadishu now a total of 15 staff which are made up of trackers, engineers, and international staff, and they are continuing our operations to the extent we can continue them.

However, I would expect that once there is some reasonable understanding that there is more security, we would be able to bring back the people that we sent out.

Mr. ALLARD. Just one question, Mr. Chairman.

Sometimes developing countries are not very receptive to support or contributions from Western countries or Western nations because of the views that they may hold about Western nations. Do

you see this as a problem when countries like the United States prefer to give directly and not through your organization?

Ms. BERTINI. I think some donor countries use the multilateral system for both the overall support of multilateralism as well as a conduit to get to countries where it may be difficult for them to deliver food. I have not found that that is because so much of a reluctance on the part of the developing countries, but I am not an expert in that field, and I would have to defer to others who are.

I can tell you that developing countries make strong appeals at our government body to donor Governments for more contributions to the World Food Programme, and one of the advantages that countries have in donating through us is that we do have people on site in these different countries.

And some countries, whether it is the United States or any other donor, may not have all of the right mechanical operations in place to be able to distribute food, and they may decide that it is a much better option to use the World Food Programme. But we hope that that—we think that is one of the reasons that donors decide to give us money, but we hope that the main reason is because they believe that a strong United Nations system and a strong multilateral food agency will in the long run help strengthen the self-sufficiency of these countries.

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you very much for your frank comments. I appreciate that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PENNY. We have a vote up, and my hope is that in a few minutes Ms. McKinney will return from casting her vote, and she will then quiz you as Mr. Allard and I will rush to make our vote. We will just try to keep things moving this morning.

I would like you to talk a little bit about the Department of Humanitarian Affairs within the United Nations and where you believe this will lead us in terms of our overall efforts in humanitarian aid.

Ms. BERTINI. I would be glad to. I think the creation of the Department was a very important decision taken by the United Nations for several reasons.

First of all, the department—DHA as they call it—acts as an honest broker. They are able to cut through the bureaucratic red-tape and turf discussions to make decisions about which United Nations agency ought to do what, or what NGO, PVO may be strong in that area and they should work with.

DHA started about the same time as I did, Mr. Chairman, so I don't know what it was like before, but I can tell you, in the situations in which we have been involved, having the DHA and having the gentleman who is in the job as Under Secretary, Jan Eliasson, who is very good, makes a big difference, I think, of how it must have been when we decide, for instance, to operate in southern Africa. Because he is able to say, look, this is a food emergency primarily, a drought is a food emergency, and the WFP has strong transport capability, so the United Nations program ought to be the agency in Africa. Everyone else ought to be the coordinator.

I am not sure that could be done as effectively and efficiently if we all had to get together and decide without his leadership.

Second, in addition to acting as an honest broker, knowing what each of us can do well and what we can't, he is able to increase communications among all of us so that we can expand on our own capabilities in each individual region, and I think that is very important, too.

Third, they are able to place a person in some of these complex emergencies to handle humanitarian coordination, and that becomes extremely important in areas like—in countries like Angola and Somalia where it makes much more sense to have a coordinated humanitarian effort than to have the World Food Programme doing this and UNICEF doing that and UNHCR doing something else. It really makes a critical difference for us.

In addition, he is helpful—the function is helpful in New York in the United Nations system because access to the decisionmakers in New York, whether it is to the Secretary General or to the other Under Secretaries General for peacekeeping and other issues, is something he can do right there on the spot.

We, for instance, are located in Rome so I can't wander the corridors of New York to try to find out what to do this minute about Angola, but he can. And it is a very important role that he plays in that regard.

I think that it has been a very important move for the United Nations and it is certainly helpful. It is not without its problems, and I think we work constructively to try to deal with them.

Mr. PENNY. So you feel it has been helpful both in the emergency situations and with the ongoing development programs?

Ms. BERTINI. I don't think it deals much with ongoing development.

Mr. PENNY. Is that it?

Ms. BERTINI. No, I don't think so. We have a separate coordinative group that is basically made up of UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA and the World Food Programme, and we work together to discuss various development issues.

And I think the future for coordination in that area is along the lines of the resolution that was passed last December by the General Assembly, titled as 47/199, the number, and that basically directs more coordination—directs us all to be better coordinated in the countries for regular development and sets up the idea of a strong United Nations coordinator in each country, and I think that is probably the best direction for development.

Mr. PENNY. Do you think that the missions of the various agencies are clearly defined so that when a coordination occurs that everybody understands what they bring to the table? Or is there still a lot of gray area between what one agency does and another?

Ms. BERTINI. I think the functions are fairly well defined, and I think, however, in the area of developing strategy within the country and everyone participating in helping to fulfill pieces of that strategy, that is where we still have more work to do collectively.

Mr. PENNY. And the coordinating council—is that what it is called?

Ms. BERTINI. It would be the resident coordinator in a country.

Mr. PENNY. But you said at a higher level there is a coordinated route?



Ms. BERTINI. The JCGP. I am still learning the United Nations initials, Joint Consultative Group on Policy.

Mr. PENNY. And that meets how frequently?

Ms. BERTINI. It meets at different levels very often. It meets at the executive director level probably about three times a year, I am thinking.

Mr. PENNY. And that provides for the broad policy decisions about where and how the respective groups are going to apply their efforts in a given situation?

Ms. BERTINI. Not exactly, and not yet. I think that we have had conversations about mechanical things like let's share headquarters together, let's share information together, and about some policy frameworks, but I think over the long term the primary answers will be in the countries themselves so that this operation of the JCGP will be kind of setting up broad frameworks for how we should operate together within the country, and I think that is the direction.

Mr. PENNY. And then you said that there will be an in-country coordinator.

Ms. BERTINI. Yes.

Mr. PENNY. And who is responsible for appointing that individual?

Ms. BERTINI. The Secretary General.

Mr. PENNY. The Secretary General, and that is a coordinator for the total development program?

Ms. BERTINI. Yes.

Mr. PENNY. How do you feel that your arrangements with the PVO's are working? Is that satisfactory?

Ms. BERTINI. Well, they are certainly satisfactory, but they are also very critical to us, very important to us to be able to deliver the food because in very few situations does the World Food Programme actually physically bring food to an individual in need. We manage the process, we move the food, we set up the policies, we implement the policies, but, ultimately, we need partners to actually distribute the food.

We are working in different areas to strengthen that relationship, and it always could be strengthened, and it is one of my agenda items as Executive Director to work to strengthen our relation with PVO's. But our relations are critical because we can't do our job without strong partnerships.

Mr. PENNY. One of my colleagues indicated that in Haiti, for example, there were literally dozens of private groups that were involved at some level, and it was next to impossible to coordinate. Do you have any nightmare cases that you would like to share?

Ms. BERTINI. Not yet. Maybe in a few years I will be able to share more, sir. I am just not aware of nightmare situations at all. That doesn't mean there aren't any. I am not aware of them. We do have, though, situations like the one I mentioned in Mogadishu where we couldn't even think about reaching the hundreds of thousands of people without CARE being there delivering the food.

Mr. PENNY. In addition to this coordination that is so important, you are also developing rapid response teams for the emergency situations. How far are you in the development of that approach? Are



you going to be able to do it in every instance? Do you have enough personnel to manage that?

Ms. BERTINI. We don't have enough personnel currently. What we need to have for a rapid response.

Let me back up. We decided it was clear we needed a rapid response team, and we needed to be able to on 24 hours notice, send people to a particular problem area. So we have put a plan together for how we could achieve this. We have presented it, in fact, to USAID to review, and we have also put it in our budget for the next 2-year budget cycle.

What we need in this rapid response is people who are both trained in emergency management and have the personal situation that allows them to go into these difficult situations and to go immediately. Many people, for instance, who may be good at managing the situation have a family that isn't movable and are not able to go to that kind of a situation, so we need to find people who are both mobile and who can manage the process, and we would like to then be able to send them out at a moments's notice.

But right now we have to borrow people from one hotspot that is not quite as hot as the current hotspot in order to be able to accomplish this. So we would like to build our capability.

Mr. PENNY. In providing aid, you are often involved in situations in which there are warring factions, and I know we have had difficulty in providing for safe corridors for the transport of assistance in the past. Are you stuck negotiating these arrangements? Is anyone else involved? Is there anything we can do in the future to provide more leverage or more support for your efforts in that area?

Ms. BERTINI. Often we negotiate these arrangements. We just did negotiate the arrangement in Rwanda, and we were part of the negotiations earlier in Mozambique.

There are other people who do this. For instance, the U.S. Ambassador in Sudan has recently been very involved in these issues in the Sudan, and we are hopeful that that will make for us to have more opportunities to deliver food.

Angola is an area where we are hopeful there will soon be agreement.

And, yes, I think depending on the country and the situation, the local Ambassador, for instance, could play an important role and sometimes does.

Mr. PENNY. I am going to allow Ms. McKinney to take over the chair and pursue a line of questioning with you. I hope to be back within about 5 minutes or so, and I have about two more questions I need to ask, so take my chair, and I will be back.

Ms. MCKINNEY [assuming chair]. Mr. Allard, for a couple of questions.

Mr. ALLARD. A lot of civil wars have been going on in Sudan for 10 years or so, and you mentioned some surplus supplies that you were able to move up there temporarily in order to meet the emergency situation in Somalia.

How do you handle food distribution supplies in a country like Sudan where you have constant civil war, strife? And I am curious to know how you move your food supplies through both of those countries, as a matter of fact, with the civil unrest that you have.

And I am not sure that—it must not have been—even though you had it done relatively quickly, it could not have been too easy a task.

Ms. BERTINI. Yes, sir; it is not easy. We have tried a lot of different routes, for instance, to be able to have food reach southern Sudan. We have a fleet of seven tugs and barges on the Nile and we recently, just a couple of months ago, were successful in getting a barge all the way down the Nile to Juba. It makes a big difference to be able to put food on the barge and send it down compared to having to fly it in, which is our other major way that we reach most of the region.

Just to give you an example, the cost by road in that region for 1 ton of food is about \$140 per ton to move it, the cost by barge is about \$190 per ton, and the cost by air is about \$480 a ton. Yet the air deliveries are about the only ones that we have been able to make for some time other than some truck deliveries in one small area.

We are hopeful that this new agreement that is being negotiated will allow us to be able to have more service deliveries into that region, and that certainly will make a difference.

We have some staff who are actually in this region, but we have others who actually fly in and out each day because of safety reasons, and we are also hopeful that these new agreements, if they occur, will allow us to be able to have more people to be able to live there and help people be more successful in food distribution.

We also, today, are beginning airdrops in selective locations where we haven't been able to reach any other way, and, of course, airdrops are also very expensive ways to deliver food. However, when we have no other method of reaching people and people are starving or at the risk of starvation, we make that commitment to airdrop as well, and we are starting some airdrops today.

Mr. ALLARD. What kind of international arrangement do you make with other international volunteer organizations? The International Red Cross comes to mind. How do you interact with these organizations?

Ms. BERTINI. We hope closely.

For instance, in Somalia, we have had a series of meetings with the ICRC about Somalia from the very beginning of our involvement.

Mr. ALLARD. For the record—ICRC?

Ms. BERTINI. The International Committee of the Red Cross.

And we had a series of meetings with them about Somalia where, basically, we made agreements on what areas they would cover, what areas we would cover, and then we proceeded accordingly with the food deliveries and distribution in Somalia. We work with them in many countries throughout the world and try to do it with agreements wherever possible about who is responsible for what and how we can best coordinate our efforts and our activities.

Mr. ALLARD. Do you get into conflicts as to who is going to serve what area?

Ms. BERTINI. Hopefully not. I mean, I think it is a congenial conversation and discussion about it.

Mr. ALLARD. Based on who has what resources where, I would assume?

Ms. BERTINI. That is exactly right. Who has what strengths and how we can maximize those strengths.

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Ms. Bertini, I have one question. I would like for you to describe the risk mapping project a little bit.

Ms. BERTINI. Thank you.

When we go into these emergency situations, we have a great need to be able to find out exactly where the highest risks are so that we can be able to make determinations about how to establish our own priorities. And we have been talking to USAID about how their experts—because they have expertise in this area, we do not—may be able to help us to be able to actually sit down with a map of a country, background about the country, and make the appropriate assessments about what the needs are so that we can best prioritize our operations.

If it is done properly, it is really a very sophisticated operation, and we are hopeful that with the USAID's help we may be able to use this as one of the ways in which we can help mitigate effective future disaster.

If we could, for instance, look at a country and be able to say, OK, in this particular part—or maybe even several different parts of the country—we really need to work on certain kinds of projects, whether it is an irrigation project or some other related project to help raise the capacity of that area, of that region, to be able to strengthen it, to be able to respond to any future—that is what we would use this system for, this process.

Ms. MCKINNEY. What would you consider as your most successful project?

Ms. BERTINI. I think in terms of emergency alleviation, very clearly the southern Africa drought response is the U.N. success story for 1992.

We looked at that situation early. The U.S. Government, USDA, USAID flagged it early. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N. raised the alert early about the fact that because rains didn't come in southern Africa, there would be the worst drought this century there. We sent in an assessment team along with the FAO, the food network organization, and the World Food Programme, we made an assessment of the needs.

The U.N. incorporated that into an appeal. The donors responded very generously. And, as I discussed with Congressman Penny before, we were able to, through the U.N., establish the World Food Programme as its coordinator for logistics in the region.

So we established an operation in Hawaii, which was our logistic office, and then we also worked in Johannesburg in conjunction with a regional group of all the 10 countries in that region. We worked with the authorities in South Africa because so much of the food had to move through the ports in South Africa into the landlocked countries.

Each of the SADC countries placed a person in the Johannesburg office, which I thought was actually a brilliant move because the person, for instance, that was examining was in the office in Johannesburg, so the Zambian Government moved their persons there so that they could coordinate with and help expedite the shipments to Zambia, and there was somebody for landlocked countries there.



We put out regular alerts not only to the donor community but also to the local governments because we worked very closely with them to fix potential problems, problems initially with cross-border operations at railroads, for instance, problems with port management. All of those kind of problems were addressed and, as a result, we successfully moved food throughout the region, almost 90 percent of what we had originally thought was necessary, and moved it through the region and averted disaster.

We had estimated that 18 million people were potentially at risk, and we do not believe that any of those people ultimately were at risk because of starvation because we got food to them in time to be able to sustain them through this difficult period.

There are two exceptions I have to point out. Angola and Mozambique are in this region. So other problems, of course, in those two countries exacerbated their situation.

But for drought relief, I have to tell you this was clearly a big success. I think it was a success for coordination from the U.N. perspective. It was a success for coordination of all the Governments in the region. And, most importantly, it was a success for 18 million people who otherwise might have starved.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Does this experience then lend itself to be used as a model for interventions in other areas?

Ms. BERTINI. I think so. I think it is a model in terms of the early warning, in terms of the early assessment, in terms of the donor response, in terms of the coordination at all levels, and I hope it can be used as a model for the future.

I think the Rwanda situation is another one where many people acted quickly to avoid what could have been mass starvation because of the displaced people in Rwanda.

And one point I would like to make in this regard is that we don't see the success stories in the newspapers and on television. We see the problems. We see what didn't work in Somalia. We see what doesn't work in southern Sudan. And those are tragedies. But, unfortunately, it is not a news story to show what worked and to show healthy babies instead of starving babies.

But we do, I think, collectively in the international community, with major support from the United States, have very good stories to tell.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Great. That concludes my questions.

Do you have any, Mr. Allard?

Mr. ALLARD. I always have a few questions.

I just want to compliment you on your testimony. I think you are very well prepared, doing a good job for this subcommittee.

Ms. BERTINI. Thank you.

Mr. ALLARD. Do you question at all about what is happening in the Balkans, particularly with Bosnia and that area there? Maybe you could give us a few comments about problems you are running into.

Ms. BERTINI. The main problems I think are on either end of the operation in the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia in particular. Of course, we see, again, it is a story in the news to see the problems of the food delivery which is what UNHCR is faced with.

What we do is raise the food—the resources to the World Food Programme raises the resources to send into the country. We send



them then to 10 different extended delivery points in the former Yugoslavia where the UNHCR picks them up and delivers them to the towns and villages.

So on one end there is the problem of the security, the opportunity to deliver food. On the other end, since we are raising these resources from new sources—in other words, we are not borrowing food from other sources, we are not using any other resources other than what people specifically pledge for the former Yugoslavia, we sometimes end up with shortfalls, and we did.

And, of course, there were stories about empty warehouses because from the time that the food was committed and ultimately arrived, there were shortfalls. The United States moved quickly to help us fill those storerooms and distribute and deliver food, but we still have needs in the former Yugoslavia between now and the end of the year.

And I would be glad to provide for you our latest report on Yugoslavia because after about 4 to 6 weeks we put out a report on exactly the resource situation in Yugoslavia, and this latest one shows what the United States has done, what other countries have done and what the needs are. And with your permission, we will send that report to you.

Mr. ALLARD. That would be most helpful, I think, for this subcommittee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The information follows:]

# Question from Mr. Allard Regarding WFP Efforts in the Former Yugoslavia.

See attached Chart C.



World Food Programme

## RESOURCE MOBILISATION

Since the launching of the first UN Inter-agency appeal by the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs in September 1992, WFP has assumed responsibility for the coordination, mobilization, purchase and delivery of food assistance to the former Yugoslavia. During the nine-month period, November 1992-August 1993, WFP has mobilised over 320,000 metric tons (table 2) valued at some US\$ 225 million (table 1). Assistance has been delivered by WFP to UNHCR or their implementing NGO partners at extended delivery points in the various republics for onward distribution to end beneficiaries.


In carrying out its mandate as the lead UN agency for delivering food assistance to the former Yugoslavia, WFP has developed an information system aimed at tracking food requirements, availability and shortfalls, so as to ensure an adequate food pipeline, month by month. This information system, serves to keep donors up to date on the food situation and requirements on a regular basis and facilitates WFP planning and programming of resources. Requirements and programming of resources are fully coordinated with UNHCR and take into account information concerning distribution and stockpiles.

Current WFP resource mobilisation efforts are directed at responding to requirements against the March-December 1993 appeal, or the Revised Inter-agency Appeal, launched in March this year. Food requirements under the current appeal amount to over 500,000 metric tons valued at US\$ 364 million.

**Table 1: Confirmed Donor Contributions to WFP for the former Yugoslavia since November 1992 (in US dollars)**

	Donor	Date	US\$ Equivalent
1	Canada/1	20 November 1992	6,250,000
2	EC/1	30 November 1992	19,779,312
3	Switzerland/1	11 December 1992	1,388,888
4	EC/2	14 December 1992	6,421,150
5	Norway/1	18 November 1992	769,231
6	USA/1	18 November 1992	1,000,000
7	EC/3	28 December 1992	14,591,242
8	Canada/2	2 February 1993	3,906,250
9	Japan/1	2 February 1993	1,080,540
10	Japan/2	3 March 1993	6,451,613
11	Denmark/1	24 March 1993	537,445
12	EC/4	30 March 1993	9,323,809
13	USA/2	8 April 1993	2,498,240
14	Denmark/2	16 April 1993	3,194,888
15	Norway/2	20 April 1993	214,635
16	Norway/3	20 April 1993	573,890
17	Norway/4	20 April 1993	286,322
18	Netherlands/1	28 April 1993	546,448
19	USA/3	29 April 1993	15,000,000
20	Sweden/1	29 April 1993	2,066,444
21	Switzerland/2	4 May 1993	699,300
22	USA/4	14 May 1993	14,999,400
23	Netherlands/2	17 May 1993	2,732,240
24	USA/5	25 May 1993	20,000,000
25	Germany/1	25 May 1993	9,487,416
26	Japan/3	25 May 1993	8,547,000
27	Netherlands/3	25 May 1993	672,630
28	USA/6	4 June 1993	7,000,000
29	Italy/1	28 June 1993	2,100,000
30	EC/5	29 June 1993	23,301,205
31	USA/7	30 June 1993	1,500,000
32	UK	16 July 1993	14,015,000
33	Spain	8 July 1993	1,000,000
34	EC/6	16 July 1993	3,400,000
35	Denmark/3	16 July 1993	1,000,000
36	USA/8	16 July 1993	7,030,900
37	Australia	28 July 1993	201,342
38	USA/9	30 July 1993	11,492,470
39	Germany/2	27 July 1993	286,050
	<b>Total</b>		<b>215,365,300</b>
Date of Report: 1 September 1993			

**Confirmed Donor Contributions to the former Yugoslavia through WFP since November 1992 (in US\$ millions)**



A United Nations Inter-agency Assessment mission in early September 1993 is expected to identify requirements for the six-month period January-June 1994 leading to the third Inter-agency appeal scheduled for launching in October 1993. In view of the rapidly approaching winter period and the deteriorating security situation, WFP has already been pursuing actively the mobilisation of food assistance to preposition contingency stocks and to meet requirements during the period January-March 1994. Provisional requirements during the six-month period are at estimated at 386,986 metric tons valued at approximately US\$ 273 million

assuming the current target population of 3.6 million. The September inter-agency assessment mission will verify these estimates.

### Food Availability and Shortfalls:

Approximately 86% of all food aid requirements for the period September-December 1993 have been met, with an estimated shortfall of approximately 40,000 metric tons valued at approximately US\$ 43 million. The commodities in shortest supply include high cost items such as protein foods, dried whole milk powder (DWM), as well as

sugar and salt (table 3). For the six-month period January-June 1994, there is an estimated shortfall of 79% against the provisional requirements of 386,434 metric tons.

The following describes the overall food supply situation during the remainder of 1993 by republic:

For Bosnia-Herzegovina, the food supply situation is good with respect to wheat flour, beans, vegetable oil and high protein biscuits up until the end of December, provided that pledges are delivered on time. However, shortfalls exist for canned fish/meat/cheese (49%), DWM (66%), sugar (68%) and salt (77%),

Table 2: Confirmed Donor Contributions to WFP for the former Yugoslavia since November 1992 (in metric tons)

Donors	Wheat Flour	Pulses	Veg Oil	F/M/C	Sugar	Salt	DWMT	HRH	Total (mt)
1 Canada/1	0	8,825	1,355	729	0	0	0	0	10,909
2 EC/1	13,277	7,133	2,132	2,004	2,633	786	910	1,000	29,875
3 Switzerland/1	2,000	0	0	360	0	0	0	0	2,360
4 EC/2	18,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	18,000
5 Norway/1	0	0	667	0	0	0	0	0	667
6 USA/1*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7 EC/3	15,200	0	375	2,920	0	0	1,430	0	19,925
8 Canada/2	2,060	2,300	0	800	0	0	0	0	5,160
9 Japan/1	0	0	0	0	690	300	340	0	1,330
10 Japan/2	0	0	0	1,321	0	0	0	0	1,321
11 Denmark/1	0	0	179	150	0	0	30	34	393
12 EC/4	8,600	0	3,184	0	0	0	0	1,635	13,419
13 USA/2	2,342	0	1,320	0	0	0	0	0	3,662
14 Denmark/2	5,000	0	0	0	0	0	393	0	5,393
15 Norway/2	0	0	170	0	0	0	0	0	170
16 Norway/3	0	0	461	0	0	0	0	0	461
17 Norway/4	0	0	230	0	0	0	0	0	230
18 Netherlands/1	0	0	0	188	90	70	0	0	348
19 USA/3	31,000	2,208	0	0	0	0	0	0	33,208
20 Sweden/1	4,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,000
21 Switzerland/2*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22 USA/4	21,800	3,000	3,000	0	0	0	0	0	27,800
23 Netherlands/2	2,000	0	0	0	0	0	600	0	2,600
24 USA/5	24,400	7570	3,795	0	0	0	0	0	35,765
25 Germany/1	10,000	0	0	1,300	0	0	0	0	11,300
26 Japan/3	22,236	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	22,236
27 Netherlands/3	0	0	0	0	0	0	190	0	190
28 USA/6	14,500	400	200	0	0	0	0	0	15,100
29 Italy/1 1)	1,238	0	0	0	413	62	413	0	2,126
30 EC/5	12,000	0	0	4,500	0	0	2,480	0	18,980
31 USA/7*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
32 UK/1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8,200	8,200
33 Spain/1	2,365	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,365
34 EC/6	5,800	0	0	500	0	0	0	0	6,300
35 Denmark/3	0	0	0	0	0	0	410	0	410
36 USA/8	5,960	4,000	1,900	0	0	0	0	0	11,860
37 Australia*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
38 USA/9***	0	0	5,470	0	0	0	0	0	5,470
39 Germany/2	0	0	0	95	0	0	0	0	95
Total	223,778	35,436	24,438	14,867	3,826	1,218	7,196	10,869	321,628
* each contribution towards administration costs ** commodity and quantity under negotiation *** Butter Oil 1) Rice									
Date of Report: 1 September 1993									



taking into account the prepositioned contingency stocks under the winter programme and the 15% reduction in the requirement estimates due to access constraints.

Food requirements in Croatia, excluding the UN Protected Areas (UNPA's) are being met by the European Community Task Force (ECTF). Requirements for all commodities, except for wheat flour, have been met up until the end of February 1994. WFP is delivering high protein biscuits to Croatia, with assistance provided by the United Kingdom.

Serious shortfalls exist in the UNPA's for canned fish/meat/cheese (100%), DWM (96%), sugar (25%) and salt (25%).

Due to earmarking by donors, Serbia and Montenegro are extremely short of all commodities except high protein biscuits and dried whole milk. In overall terms, approximately 52% of the food needs for September-December have been met, taking into consideration a 20% reduction in the calculation of requirements due to logistical constraints. The available food does not take into account ECTF's family pack programme which although targeted at host families rather than lodging refugees, is acknowledged to be shared by all.

Requirements for the remainder of 1993 in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have been met.

For Slovenia serious shortfalls remain for canned fish/meat/cheese (100%), DWM

(100%), sugar (25%) and salt (25%).

It should be highlighted that WFP assistance in the former Yugoslavia has been targeted at refugees and displaced persons and not to other vulnerable groups of the population. Due to the deteriorating economic situation, these groups could also become a target group to be assisted in the future.

## Donor Response

Pledges made through WFP since November 1992 in response to the first appeal of September 1992 and the one in March 1993, amount to approximately US\$ 225 million. The European Commission (EC) and the United States of America (US) represent the two largest donors to WFP in the former Yugoslavia, with the US accounting for 35% (at US\$ 80.5 million) and the EC accounting for approximately 34% (at US\$ 77 million) of all pledges received to date. Generous contributions have also come from Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Spain and Australia. A pledge by the Government of France is also expected in the near future.

WFP wishes to bring to the urgent attention of the donors the imminent shortfalls during the remainder of 1993, especially for protein foods and dried whole milk, and hopes that further contributions will be forthcoming to help meet these shortfalls. Similarly, we urge donors to make early

pledges towards meeting the requirements during the period January-June 1994. The specific requirements will be announced to donors shortly following the completion of the UN inter-agency mission scheduled to be completed by mid-September 1993.

# OVERVIEW SEPT.-DEC. 1993

## Table 3: Summary Overview of Food Requirements and Pledges

Date of Report: 1 September 1993

FOR THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER - DECEMBER 1993									
Requirements	Available			Total	Pledges/Requirements %				
	Thru WFP	Bilat/NGO		Available	Shortfall				
Total: 280,646	213,486	47,057		260,543	39,621	86%			
Estimated cost of unmet requirements: 43 (\$Million)									
Total number of refugees, displaced persons and war affected: 3,605,000									
Note: Requirements take into account constraints, and include winter contingency stocks for Bosnia-Herzegovina									
	Cereals	Pulses	Veg Oil	F/M/C	Sugar	Salt	DWM	HPB	Total
Requirements	199,204	25,299	13,123	18,054	10,857	2,266	6,768	5,076	280,646
Estimated Stocks	48,580	3,476	1,478	648	537	141	287	2,270	57,417
Pledges Through WFP:									
Japan/WFP/3	22,236	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	22,236
UK/WFP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,405	2,405
Spain/WFP/1	2,385	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,385
EC/WFP/5	0	0	0	0	4,000	1,000	0	0	5,000
Germany/1	0	0	0	125	0	0	0	0	125
USA/3	20,010	408	0	0	0	0	0	21	20,418
Italy (tentative)	3,038	0	203	0	169	0	112	0	3,522
EC/WFP/6	0	0	0	4,735	0	0	2,500	0	19,235
Netherlands/WFP/1	0	0	0	188	90	30	600	0	908
UK/WFP/2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,200	3,200
EC/WFP/1	5,800	0	0	500	0	0	0	0	6,300
USA/WFP/8	1,980	600	340	0	0	0	0	0	2,900
USA/WFP/4	3,210	1,108	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,318
USA/WFP/4	18,590	1,392	3,000	0	0	0	0	0	23,452
USA/WFP/5	0	7,670	3,800	0	0	0	0	0	11,370
USA/WFP/6	0	400	200	0	0	0	0	0	600
USA/WFP/5/6	5,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5,000
USA/WFP/8	4,000	3,400	2,065	0	0	0	0	0	9,465
DENMARK/WFP/3	0	0	0	0	0	0	410	0	410
Subtotal WFP (incl. stock)	144,849	26,025	11,582	7,345	4,357	1,143	3,737	6,050	218,851
Known Pledges through Bilateral/NGOs									
EC/ECTF	950	900	383	270	105	270	285	0	3,163
EC/ECTF	3,950	0	383	1,125	735	0	0	0	6,193
EC/ECTF	3,000	900	382	770	420	0	0	0	5,472
EC/CARITAS	0	0	0	440	0	0	0	0	440
EC/ECTF	3,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,000
LWF	0	0	0	32	0	0	10	0	42
ICRC (tentative)	2,100	500	500	330	500	0	0	0	3,930
USA/CRS	21,706	1,910	1,070	0	0	0	132	0	24,817
Sub Total others	34,705	4,210	2,718	2,967	1,760	270	427	0	47,057
Total available	192,484	24,864	13,824	9,163	6,556	1,441	4,238	7,875	260,543
Pledges/requirements	97%	98%	105%	51%	60%	64%	64%	185%	86%
Outstanding Requirements	17,641	2,307	1,530	9,146	5,195	1,088	2,712	39,621	39,621

# OVERVIEW JAN-JUNE 1994

Table 4: Tentative Indication of Food Aid Requirements and Pledges

Date of Report: 1 September 1993

## FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY - JUNE 1994

Requirements	Available Thru WFP	BlaUNGO	Total Available	Shortfall	Pledges/Requirements %
Total: 386,454	71,326	9,900	81,226	305,236	21%

Estimated cost of unmet requirements: 215 (\$Million)

Total number of refugees, displaced persons and war affected: 3,605,000

Details	Cereals	Pulses	Veg Oil	F/M/C	Sugar	Salt	DWM	HPB	Total
Requirements	277,225	32,589	17,935	25,992	14,673	2,263	8,445	6,334	386,454
Projected Stocks	48,269	6,287	5,014	256	1,370	392	300	3,970	65,838
Pledges Through WFP:									
USA/9	0	0	5,470	0	0	0	0	0	5,470
Subtotal WFP (incl. stock)	48,269	6,287	10,484	256	1,370	392	300	3,970	71,326
Known Pledges through Bilateral/NGOs									
EC (ECTF)	3,750	900	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,650
EC/ECTF	4,500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,500
EC (ECTF)	750	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	750
Sub Total others	9,000	900	0	0	0	0	0	0	9,900
Total available	57,269	7,187	10,484	256	1,370	392	300	3,970	81,226
Pledges/requirements	21%	22%	58%	1%	9%	12%	4%	68%	21%
Outstanding Requirements	219,958	25,402	8,091	25,736	13,303	2,675	6,202	2,633	305,236

Mr. PENNY [resuming chair]. I have just a couple of different questions, and I hope this wasn't covered in my absence.

But when I left I had asked you to respond to the issue of who negotiates the safe passage, et cetera. I want to follow that up with a question about security forces and who should decide when security forces are used and what recommendation would you put forward as to the nature of the security force, the authority under which they operate, et cetera.

Ms. BERTINI. Well, certainly I believe the Secretary General or the Security Council should make decisions on such matters, and I think they have recently become much more active in this regard. I think it is also important that those security forces have the ability to be able to secure areas which usually necessitates the ability to respond.

I know that the Security Council just recently authorized the Secretary General in Somalia, for instance, to be able to allow the people to respond to attacks. And, certainly, if they are going to be helpful to us to be able to distribute humanitarian aid, then if it means—they need to be strong. Because if they are not strong, then our humanitarian aid workers are just as much at risk whether or not the security is there. So we need them to be strong. And I think that that definitely is the situation in Somalia.

Certainly we saw that from the initial posting of the U.N. troops and then the strengthening of the U.N.—the whole U.N. operation once Operation Restore Hope began. We saw a big difference in terms of the security of our people and their ability to be able to operate within the region with a strong force.

Mr. PENNY. Yesterday I asked one of the witnesses whether it made any sense to tie an ongoing development aid program to our emergency food assistance, and I suggested the possibility of a dollar-for-dollar pledge where if you go in with 800 million dollars' worth of emergency aid we also pledged 800 million dollars' worth of development aid.

I know that the two questions ought to be treated separately, but it just seems to me that the development aid is a rather abstract notion. Emergency aid pulls at your heart strings, so it is easier for us to come up with the money when there is an emergency. And it just occurred to me that maybe that is the time we ought to lock in a commitment to some amount of development aid.

Ms. BERTINI. Mr. Chairman, I would heartily endorse the idea. I think it is an excellent approach.

We see development aid now across not just the World Food Programme but other agencies either remaining the same or slightly decreasing, yet the emergency aid is increasing dramatically. And we see commitments on the part of the public, of not only the United States but the other countries to help with the emergency situation, because nobody wants the—everyone wants to help the situation where they see a great need. If there were a combination of the two, hopefully that would be a better way to support both.

As I mentioned in my testimony, it is critical that we strengthen development operations because over the long term that is the only way we are going to eliminate the need for emergency aid.

Mr. PENNY. Certainly there are some countries in which a crisis is an every-other-year event. Is there a way that you could quantify



the degree to which we might minimize the next crisis if we had an aid program in the aftermath of a crisis that was comparable in size to the amount of crisis aid?

The point I am making is if we are to sell this notion—I think we have to say that in a country like Ethiopia, where about every fourth or fifth year we have a very serious problem of famine and starvation, if we were to invest \$800 million in development aid in the aftermath of a \$800 million emergency aid program, it could do this, this, and this and minimize the degree to which a drought might lead to widespread shortage the next time around.

Ms. BERTINI. I would propose, Mr. Chairman, that we could do a short paper for you with some scenarios in several different countries that might be able to answer that question, and Bangladesh is one of the areas where we can use as an example.

Mr. PENNY. I think that might be useful. Thank you.

[The information follows:]

#### QUESTION FROM MR. PENNY REGARDING CRISIS PREVENTION

To be sent to Chairman under separate cover.

Mr. PENNY. I have one last question, and this deals with an issue that was raised during our Russian hearings.

One of our witnesses, Keith Severn, who worked for the U.S. Department of Agriculture for many years, suggested something on the nature of an international WIC program. He thought particularly for Russia, which has elementary schools and preschools and day care centers, that it might be a way of reaching some of the vulnerable populations in a nation that otherwise has a pretty good supply of food, but there are spot shortages, and oftentimes it is among the younger children in large cities.

Is there anywhere else where that kind of an international WIC program might be able to be implemented and might serve some useful purpose?

Ms. BERTINI. Yes. We have quite a few projects which we call vulnerable group feeding which are essentially projects to provide nutrition education, food assistance to children under five and pregnant mothers, and it is roughly similar to what—

Mr. PENNY. What we call the WIC program?

Ms. BERTINI. Yes. And there are many countries in the developing world that there is a critically important operation.

In Malawi, it is operated through many different small centers throughout the country. One thing I learned when I visited there was actually the mortality rate for children was higher for those during their weaning time than for those when they were born and that this program was one of the efforts to undertake to be able to help mothers get through this time and be able to help their children grow.

So I think there are many areas that—

Mr. PENNY. But I know during the war in Nicaragua, Congressman Dorgan and I sponsored a child survival assistance program, and as a part of that program there was an effort to provide WIC-type supplements at a number of health clinics within Nicaragua, and I know that, in a general sense, there has been something of that nature in our international aid programs.

Ms. McKinney, I know, shares my interest in this issue, and I don't know whether we could plug this into the next Russian aid package, but it is certainly something we are looking at.

Ms. BERTINI. The United States has had a lot of success with its domestic food programs. It certainly puts a major investment in them.

And, as someone who has worked with those programs before, I would strongly encourage you to use some of the lessons learned from those programs and some of the people, too, frankly. I mean, there are people who have been with the Food Nutrition Service, for instance, for a long time who helped set up the WIC program in the United States, who manage the school lunch program. And there is some of those folks—they could be very helpful elsewhere in terms of getting some of these programs off the ground.

Mr. PENNY. Well, thank you. Your testimony this morning has been very helpful, and I appreciate your willingness to return to Washington. I know you were here a few weeks back, and we talked about coming back to this hearing. We really appreciate your presentation and your thoughtful answers.

Ms. BERTINI. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the chance to come and visit with you and certainly look forward to a strong collaborative relationship this year.

Mr. PENNY. Thank you, again.

Our next panel will deal with Sudan: Jeanne Downen, assistant regional director for CARE; and Jim Kunder, former director, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, the Agency for International Development.

Welcome, and we will begin with you, Ms. Downen. Ms. Downen, pleased to see you.

#### **STATEMENT OF JEANNE DOWNEN, DEPUTY REGIONAL MANAGER, EAST AFRICA, CARE**

Ms. DOWNEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of CARE, I would like to say we appreciate very much this opportunity to discuss the needs in Sudan in terms of early warning systems and famine prevention.

I have just spent the past 2 weeks in Sudan looking at the CARE operations in the northern part of Kordofan State where our program is centered, and so for us it is a very timely opportunity to give some feedback on how we see ways in which the United States can assist in responding effectively to help prevent emergencies and also to provide humanitarian assistance on a timely basis in these areas.

As is discussed in my written testimony, there are a combination of factors in insuring an effective response to pending food shortages. One is instituting supporting early warning systems in countries that provide information on slow-onset disasters, such as famines, before they get fully developed.

Second is support from the U.S. Government to provide development assistance to programs that center on early warning systems which concentrate on data collection and early detection of impending food shortages in countries like Sudan.

Third, and another important factor, is host Government willingness to allow international nongovernmental agencies access to areas that are affected by natural or manmade disasters.

And, fourth, support of appropriate emergency response policies that emphasize early intervention, particularly market-oriented interventions rather than emergency free food distribution.

CARE has been in Sudan since late 1979, and during that time our program has evolved to focus on household food security. We have seen in our experience there that the target population has been continually disrupted by droughts and civil conflict, which have made what is in the best of circumstances a vulnerable population even more likely to suffer from devastating food shortages. On the part of CARE this has required us to look at a broad area of people's food needs and to look at ways to creatively program the resources that we have to help ensure that there is some margin of safety among these people against unforeseen droughts and other disasters that cause food shortages.

Briefly, I would mention that we work primarily in the northern part of Kordofan State with rural farmers. We also work with displaced people in and around Khartoum who have moved in from other areas of the country, and have just begun working in southern Sudan under the Operation Lifeline Sudan operation of the United Nations.

In that area we will aim at assisting returnees to return to Sudan from neighboring States of Zaire and Uganda.

We also hope, under Operation Lifeline Sudan, to begin operation in part of Bahr el Gazal State with a technical assistance team to help people recover their activities in agriculture and livestock.

One of the main points that we would like to make in regard to famine prevention in countries like Sudan is the importance of early warning systems. That involves the collection, the analysis, the evaluation, and dissemination of data from local sources such as households, public markets, local government offices, health and social services, and the many sources of information that do exist and could constitute an effective early warning system if they are supported and used in an organized fashion. This is vital to Government and to international aid agencies if they are to recognize an impending food shortage far enough in advance to be able to respond with preventative rather than emergency intervention.

Some of the work which CARE has undertaken in Sudan in this regard has involved working with the state government in Kordofan State to develop new surveillance systems, to set up data collection and gathering systems that look at variables relating to household food security, including harvest levels, animal wealth, nutritional status of members of the household, debt levels of the household, regular income sources.

Looking at these factors within a comprehensive system will allow Government and international organizations to recognize triggers and indicators of impending food shortages when certain characteristics begin to show up that suggests there will be in several months time a major food emergency. These are all indicators that would be recognizable several months before any widespread food shortages set in and before households have depleted all of their available assets with which to purchase food.



Another area in which CARE has been active with the Kordofan State Government has been in discussing food relief strategy, means of intervention, target groups and, again, nutritional surveys to continually assess the status of the population there. We believe that these activities have strengthened our partnership role with Government agencies in the area, and we very strongly advocate the institutionalization of early warning systems like this within a statewide network that can feed into a national network.

We would like to see more support for the Government of Sudan and encouragement to continue to collect early warning system information and to be able to provide technical assistance where this is needed.

One instance that we would like to see continued was the famine early warning system, which was in operation in Sudan as one of the few in-country systems related to early detection of food shortages. This program was closed in June of 1992 when U.S. development assistance was curtailed. We believe that these type of programs should be examined as vital emergency prevention programs and should not be targeted as part of a development funding program.

As Ms. Bertini had mentioned, there are fewer and fewer resources available to international NGO's for early intervention. Free food assistance has been available, and the classic response is often free food assistance to food shortages. We would like to see more resources available for early detection of impending food shortages and for more flexible and creative responses, such as employment generation through food-for-work programs, rather than waiting until a food emergency develops and responding with free food.

We do feel that one strength of the United States' program in the food assistance area is its ability to preposition commodities in the event that an emergency is declared in an area. We support this type of flexibility, which has also been evident in the U.N. in the southern Sudan operation where UNICEF, in particular, has been able to preposition emergency medical supplies and has made it easy for international NGO's to react very quickly where there is need.

Finally, I would like to mention that, for international NGO's such as CARE, the World Food Programme plays a vital role, if somewhat unglamorous, in providing primary transport of commodities and in specific countries of getting them from ports down to the provincial level where international NGO's can take them over and deliver them.

It is an important role played by the U.N. because it allows international NGO's to avoid what otherwise would be a very high profile role that would be fraught with all sorts of problems and would distract them from their main interest, which is the delivery of food at the community level.

We would encourage U.S. support for WFP, particularly in respect to support for greater funds to meet its storage, transport, handling, and management costs and view this as a crucial support not only to the U.N. but to international NGO's like CARE in meeting emergency food needs.



Just to briefly summarize some of the points that are made in my testimony and which we believe are important in preventing food emergencies in vulnerable countries like Sudan, we would like to encourage support for early warning information and collection systems and the provision of technical assistance to Governments to develop and institutionalize and effectively use these systems.

We would like to point out that relief activities related to famine prevention should be viewed as integrated programs and we request the U.S. Government to continue to fund famine prevention programs as relief activities and to look at them as essential parts of famine prevention rather than considering them under development programs.

We advocate greater donor support to international NGO's for work in early warning systems for Governments and in meeting other humanitarian needs in countries.

We would like to see additional resources other than free food assistance made available and the flexibility to use food resources in more positive ways than general ration distribution in times of emergency.

We would like to encourage support of the United Nations by the U.S. Government to continue to play a coordinating role and to provide leadership in countries such as Sudan where numerous agencies are undertaking large-scale assistance programs.

We would also support the U.N. Special Coordinator for Relief in Sudan in the U.N.'s efforts to gain greater access for international aid agencies to southern Sudan and, more importantly, to the transition zone in Central Sudan where we have been pursuing our own efforts with the Government to gain access into areas of southern Kordofan.

Thank you. That concludes my testimony.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Downen appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. PENNY. Thank you. Mr. Kunder.

#### **STATEMENT OF JIM KUNDER, FORMER DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF U.S. FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

Mr. KUNDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee today on this timely and important topic.

Until last Friday I was the Director of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance which worked very closely with the Select Committee on Hunger, and I know the staff there is looking forward to working with your subcommittee as well on these types of issues.

As you know, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance—or OFDA as it is called—is charged with coordinating and leading the United States in response to disaster situations around the world, both natural and man-made.

The past several years, Mr. Chairman, have presented us with unprecedented challenges in the number and complexity of humanitarian crises we face. The future promises more of the same. Whether we like it or not, these crises—at least these crises that cost most human lives—are increasingly conflict related.

An analysis I requested of funding last year by OFDA indicated that over 90 percent of U.S. disaster outlays were not for floods, hurricanes, or earthquakes but rather for nations like the Sudan engulfed in civil or ethnic strife.

I would argue that we as a government and as an international community have much to learn about intervening early and effectively in these crises. The cost of poor performance is unnecessary death for thousands and the grimmest possible human suffering. We can do much better.

Before addressing the current humanitarian crisis in the Sudan, if I may, I would like to suggest several guidelines that United States and international agencies should follow when we learn of humanitarian crises overseas.

First, we should ask what we can do to head off the crisis. Our most effective intervention may not be flooding the country with food and vaccines after the fact but in better understanding what we can do before the skeletal pictures start appearing on our TV screens.

The U.S. Agency for International Development has authority to formulate and update contingency plans for providing disaster relief. We can do a much better job in building our capacity for early warning of conflict, in developing techniques of conflict resolution and training to prevent civil strife.

Second, and I believe of special interest to this subcommittee, we must develop a better understanding of early interventions in food production and delivery systems that work in the local context. It is well known that the rich do not generally starve in most famines. Markets continue to operate.

When I visited Somalia last year in July near the height of the famine, you could still have a fine lamb and rice dinner in downtown Mogadishu if you had the money in your pocket.

Our crisis interventions must be disciplined enough to take advantage of local market conditions, indigenous expertise and talent to be effective.

Third, our crisis interventions must help solve the crisis. Endlessly supplying thousands of tons of food, often delivered by expensive airlifts, without using this vast resource to prod the peace process is a mistake. In other words, we must use America's humanitarian largess as a tool in disaster diplomacy to bring factions to the negotiating table, to establish corridors that will spur cooperation rather than conflict.

The recent work of our Ambassador, Don Peterson, in Sudan to bring warring factions of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army to the table and to create demilitarized zones for the delivery of relief supplies deserves special mention in this regard.

Fourth, our early humanitarian interventions must move up and down. Up quickly to the highest forums and down quickly to the field level. By getting down to the field level, I mean we must quickly engage the PVO community, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the U.N. agencies to get on the ground and establish the field assessment and delivery capacity only they can provide. This we generally do fairly well.

What we do not do well is raising these nascent humanitarian crises to the highest United States and international forums, con-

gressional hearings, the NSC and the U.N. Security Council. Too often, Sudan and Somalia are examples. Thousands, tens of thousands die in relative silence far from the corridors of power.

Fifth and finally, the international community must have the will early in humanitarian crises to act decisively, I would argue even coercively, to deliver assistance.

There are few secrets in Sudan, Somalia, Bosnia, or Liberia about what needs to be done to save innocent lives. What is lacking is the will to take all measures necessary to deliver the aid in the face of men with guns who block assistance.

In short, Mr. Chairman, as the subcommittee displays this intense interest in how we can improve our performance in early humanitarian intervention, for which interest I am very grateful, I am suggesting the following: The U.S. Government should resist the temptation to look just at how many tons of food we get to the crisis scene. Although delivering those tons is important and America's willingness to provide and move its agricultural bounty has saved countless lives, effective early humanitarian intervention is as much about how we deliver assistance as what we deliver.

Mr. Chairman, the situation in the Sudan, from which I returned last month, is complex, daunting, and deadly for thousands of civilians, especially in the conflict zone of southern Sudan.

I have made available to the subcommittee copies of the latest situation report on Sudan from the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance. The report will appear as an attachment to my prepared statement. This report describes in detail the level of suffering there and efforts by the international relief community. While the report focuses on the especially critical situation in southern Sudan, the subcommittee should be aware that suffering also continues in other regions of this vast nation, especially among displaced individuals in the vicinity of Khartoum, in the Juba mountains, the scene of recent fighting, and in the so-called transition zone between north and south.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to use the map I have brought of southern Sudan. I believe you have copies of a small map entitled Aid Routes and Territorial Control.

[The map follows:]





Mr. KUNDER. I found this a helpful tool in understanding the collection—of the humanitarian crisis in southern Sudan.

I apologize to the audience. In a cost-cutting measure we use an old South America map for the back of this.

The first point I would make is the map shows the vast distances that are involved. Across the narrowest belt of southern Sudan is a distance of 500 miles. And while this map just shows the southern third of the country, the entire Sudan is comparable in size, just slightly smaller than the United States east of the Mississippi river, so we are talking about vast distances.

The second thing that shows on the map is general areas of control. The area in the white is generally controlled by the Government of Sudan, the area in the pink by one of the two Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army or SPLA factions, that are controlled by John Garang. And this area in yellow controlled by the other major SPLA faction.

But further complicating the situation, if you look at your maps or those areas that are dots with a circle drawn around it, are Government-controlled towns, garrisoned towns that are scattered throughout the south and were taken in fighting during the dry season offensive last year.

So what you have on the ground is a most complex political situation and control by various factions.

Second, the map also shows those areas along the railroad line, Ayod in this area controlled by the Riak faction, Kongor, here at the borderline, and Nimula, along the Ugandan border, that were the sites visited by our recent Centers for Disease Control assessment team to which I will refer later.

The map also shows the proximity to the countries from which relief is being delivered, primarily Kenya and Uganda, and also the concentration of displaced camps along the Uganda and Kenyan borders.

A great number of people have fled the fighting and are still within the Sudan but are clustered along the southern border.

There has been much discussion in recent months of what relief workers have called the starvation triangle. That is the area bounded by Kongor, Ayod, and Waat, and, as you can see, this is on the frontline between several of the factions.

While there is a cease-fire in effect between the Government and the major SPLA faction, there is still fighting—there has been fighting until recent weeks along this frontline, and it points out the fact that it is the fighting, the conflict, that has led to the disruption of relief activities.

The final point that I would like to make with the map is that these towns generally represent those areas in which there are airstrips, and there is a great deal of relief going in because of the vast distances involved, because of the inaccessible roads. And especially now because of the mud and rainy season, a lot of aid is being delivered by air from the U.N. logistics base in northern Kenya, and these towns are the area generally to which aid is being provided.

Operation Lifeline Sudan, to which Catherine Bertini made reference, the U.N. framework for delivering aid provides a combination of air routes agreed to by all the warring factions, rail access,

barge access down the Nile, which is navigable as far south by barge as Juba, and also overland road corridors from the south, from Uganda and Kenya.

I will go back to my testimony, but, in general, I found this useful. I could not find a good map so our famine early warning system at AID put this together. I think it paints a good picture of the complexity and difficulty in conducting relief operations there.

As in other case studies that the subcommittee is going to be considering, conflict is at the heart of the crisis in the Sudan. Civil war has raged intermittently in Sudan since the 1950's. Relief efforts have been complicated in recent years by the spread of fighting beyond Government SPLA conflict to struggle among SPLA factions.

In fact, the most gruesome starvation in recent months has been reported in areas being contested not by the Government but by SPLA groups along the line I pointed out on the map. The relief effort is being brokered by U.S. Ambassador Peterson, and the idea is to have these factions withdraw from their frontlines to permit access to those most in need.

Despite this progress and the continuing holding of a cease-fire between SPLA leader John Garang and the Government, over 600,000 people are in severe need in the south. An OFDA-sponsored team from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, which visited four sites in southern Sudan in March, reported local malnutrition rates in the range of 75 to 80 percent, among the worst ever recorded anywhere, including Somalia last year.

The breakdown of immunization programs and health delivery systems during the conflict as well as weakness from food shortages has left hundreds and thousands of Sudanese subject to death from preventable disease. The onset of the rainy season in recent months will close many airstrips and otherwise severely complicate the delivery of relief aid.

In some ways, the mechanism, the structure for delivery of aid to southern Sudan can be considered a success. The U.N.'s Operation Lifeline Sudan, the series of agreements worked out since 1988 among all factions to open relief corridors, provides a multi-lateral, multisided system in which impediments to relief shipments can be addressed. In this sense, the world community's early response to the latest escalation of fighting in the late 1980's can be considered timely and appropriate.

In many regards, OLS, as it is called, can be considered a model for how the international community should address the delivery of aid in complex, conflictive emergencies.

The bad news is that the combination of logistics—impediments, warfare, threats to relief workers and denied access—means that Operation Lifeline Sudan is meeting only about one-third of its food aid targets for the hungry in southern Sudan.

In terms of the guidelines I outlined earlier in my testimony for effective humanitarian response, the critical issue in southern Sudan for Sudanese and for the donor community is clearly political will. What is essential to prevent massive starvation, not just this year but repeatedly in future years, is for the Sudanese parties to the conflict themselves to get serious about peace. Recent peace

talks regrettably, sponsored by the Nigerian Government, were unsuccessful.

In the absence of leadership by those claiming the mantle of leadership in Sudan, the international community, I would argue, has two basic choices. It can either continue its heroic and expensive efforts—\$60 million in U.S. aid alone this year to reach a fraction of those in need—or it can insist that all necessary steps be taken, political, diplomatic, military, to ensure the starving are fed.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kunder appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. PENNY. Thank you. I appreciate your presentation.

Ms. Downen, you expressed concern about U.S. guidelines that inhibit the ability to implement food-for-work programs. Could you elaborate a little bit?

Ms. DOWNEN. Well, the concern is both with limitations on how emergency assistance can be used, the amount of resources available to NGO's in general and also the dividing line between what is considered emergency assistance and development assistance.

CARE feels that support for early warning systems in particular and for programs that support data collection analysis and the institutionalization of early warning systems within Government should be considered, if not part of emergency aid, then programs that are worthy of support, even when development assistance is reduced for other areas.

We do feel it is very important that continued funding for means of preventing food shortages, and means of providing timely and early warning of impending shortages should be provided so that disasters can be averted.

Mr. PENNY. Mr. Kunder, could you respond to that same question? What are the guidelines that prohibit the use of aid for food for work purposes and why are they in place there?

Mr. KUNDER. In Sudan specifically?

Mr. PENNY. No, not Sudan specifically. I think she was making a more generic—

Ms. DOWNEN. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. My point is in regard to Sudan.

Mr. PENNY. Is it in regard to Sudan? OK.

Mr. KUNDER. The basic issue, sir, is with the various requirements in law under the Foreign Assistance Act, including the overthrow of a duly elected government by the current regime in Khartoum, nonpayment of debts, and other outstanding problems. AID is prohibited by law from running a development assistance program. What is being run there are emergency programs which are useful—

Mr. PENNY. Emergency programs do not allow for a food-for-work trade-off?

Mr. KUNDER. It would be possible. It would be possible in some cases to use Public Law 480, title II, for food-for-work programs as well. Beyond that, I am not familiar with the specifics of that program.

Mr. PENNY. But if development programs are not allowed because of those restrictions which are based in law and, typically, a food-for-work program would be part of the development effort.



Mr. KUNDER. Generally, although I don't want to mislead you.

Mr. PENNY. It is not expressly prohibited as part of a food aid effort, is it?

Mr. KUNDER. That is correct.

Mr. PENNY. Ms. Downen, has CARE approached AID about some kind of ruling in this regard?

Ms. DOWNEN. Well, we have extensive and ongoing discussions between our CARE office in Sudan and between the USAID office there, as USAID is one of our major donors there. So we have made it clear that we would like additional opportunities to carry out food-for-work programs for whatever assistance can be provided for early warning systems, as I have mentioned already, and for general support of famine prevention programs.

Mr. PENNY. You also mentioned your support for the prepositioning of food aid.

I think maybe Mr. Kunder is the one to answer this—what are some of the factors that stand in the way of a prepositioning policy? You know, if we have early indicators—it seems to me in many cases we do—then take steps to preposition. What are some factors that may make it impossible for us to prepare in advance so that we can be on the ground immediately?

Mr. KUNDER. In general, the comments that Jeanne has made about the need for early warning and preparedness activities is something we are completely in agreement with.

Within the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance we created several years ago a division of prevention mitigation preparedness so that we could start allocating more resources toward these kinds of activities.

While I do not claim to be the expert on programming of food for peace resources, my response to your question would be generally that the primary concern is in an area of constrained resources and the need to continually reallocate and reprogram during the course of the year as crises arrive.

There is, to some extent, a tendency to keep as much flexibility in the system as possible. Right now, for example, food that was planned early in the year to go to Somalia because of the food—previously looted food coming on the market, because of the reasonable stability caused by the U.N. troops—despite the recent surge in fighting—and because of better-than-expected harvest, some of that food is being repositioned now, in fact being sent to Sudan and some other locations.

So my general response would be that it is the desire to have as much flexibility in the system as possible.

Mr. PENNY. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, did you have any questions of this panel?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me commend you for the good work you are doing in your subcommittee in this area.

And although she is gone, but for the record, Ms. Bertini and I have been missing each other for the past 6 weeks, I guess. She is always where I am not, and I am not where she is, and we haven't been able to connect yet. I may have to go to Rome to see her.



Mr. Kunder, let me ask, one of the other witnesses mentioned that there is a delay in grants or they believe that FAO could improve. What can you tell is the problem as you foresee it? What is the situation? Why does it take 6 to 8 months or longer?

Mr. KUNDER. As a general rule, it does not take that long, Mr. Chairman. I would say that there is no question that we can always improve the turnaround on grants.

The fundamental problem, in all frankness, is that you are talking about a disaster response office that just a couple of years ago was programming \$20 million to \$30 million a year in emergency grants around the world, and this year, with the combination of a \$49 million appropriation, a special congressional appropriation of \$100 million for sub-Sahara and Africa relief, rehabilitation and recovery, \$20 million for Bosnia-specific relief, a requirement to help the DOD program another \$40 million in northern Iraq, that the same staff is now programming \$200 million instead of \$20 million and, in the meantime, they got three positions cut in a move to save personnel at AID.

I know the staff there are highly motivated, and I can think of some steps that we could take to improve on the margin some of our response. And we have taken some of those steps to create task forces, to bring on board some contract employees, to help us take the grant proposals as far as we can with contractors before we actually send them to be signed by our contract office, but the fundamental underlying reason is that the amount of dollars flowing through the office, because of the amount of crises around the world, has increased by five or tenfold in the last several years.

The CHAIRMAN. So your statement then is that it is a physical problem. You just don't have enough people to physically do it.

Mr. KUNDER. The same 21 people or so are basically programming 10 times as much grant money as they were just a few short years ago, yes, sir. We always look for ways to improve efficiency in all seriousness, and we have done some things to try to speed up the grants process, but we have had some complaints from NGO's in the last year or so that we have slowed down the process. And I think they are right. And we have had a number of meetings on how we can speed up the process because we don't want to slow down the NGO's who want to get out there in these crisis situations and get on the ground. But it is, literally, a tenfold increase in disaster dollars that have flowed in the last several years.

The CHAIRMAN. I know that there are limitations to prepositioning, and there is a lot of technical and maybe even political problems, but to what extent have you—as the chairman asked—to what extent have you gone forward in prepositioning?

Mr. KUNDER. Mr. Chairman, I may have to get back to you on that. I simply am not familiar enough with the Public Law 480 program on that issue.

The CHAIRMAN. What about section 416? Can you give us any report on amounts you have used this year from section 416?

Mr. KUNDER. I brought along—because of this panel on Sudan—I brought along the figures for Sudan itself. Under USDA section 416 there have been 10,300 metric tons of corn valued at \$5.3 million in this fiscal year alone. So I would say, in general, those of us at the Disaster Response Office have found section 416 to be an

invaluable addition with a number of humanitarian crises around the world right now.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any, to your knowledge—and I don't know—you may want to answer or not answer this—I wouldn't hold you to an answer—but do we still have policy and political implications? Is there any restriction from State or from National Security or are you free to do your thing under the law?

Mr. KUNDER. In general, sir? Not just in Sudan?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, in general. I am not talking about Sudan.

Mr. KUNDER. The procedure for a disaster response by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance requires a disaster declaration either by the U.S. Ambassador on the scene or, in the absence of the U.S. Ambassador when we don't have diplomatic relations, by the appropriate Assistant Secretary at the State Department.

I would say that in the overwhelming majority of cases we attempt to respond, regardless of the political situation on the ground.

There have been times where there have been appeals issued in the last couple of years by foreign Governments for assistance where, for foreign policy reasons, a disaster declaration was never made. There was a case in Nicaragua several years ago and recently a case in Iran where disaster declarations were not made.

So there have been a few cases, Mr. Chairman, where disaster declarations were not made, and, therefore, we could not proceed any further. But, in general, we gave very large amounts of aid to Ethiopia during the period we did not have diplomatic relations. We have given assistance to Vietnam following the flooding there in the last year. In general, we find relatively few strings attached to humanitarian assistance.

The CHAIRMAN. I have a general frustration, and it is not aimed at anyone on the panel today or so on. But 20 years ago the chairman of the Agriculture Committee—for another reason, I was the youngest member and he would take me wherever he went, and I may be the only Member of Congress who has visited every country in the African Continent—but 20 plus years ago he says there is going to be a lot of problems in this area because the desert is moving south and one shouldn't have to move south, but that is the nomadic existence of many of the people. He foretold the weather patterns that we are having today. And my frustration is that I pick up the newspaper and it says, my gosh, we are having a drought in Africa. He knew that 20 years ago.

I saw hunger 20 years ago in Sudan and sections of Uganda, Rwanda, Leone and Chad. I may be the only Member of Congress who has been to Nouakchott, Mauritania, but I don't know.

My frustration is that we are dealing as if this is a new phenomena, that, my gosh, they are having problems in Somalia. They were having problems in Somalia 20 years ago—same political problems, same warlords, same hunger. I hope that the new people in all of the agencies, including the PVO's that have been on the ground all the time, have known that. We have always seen that. That is why I asked about repositioning.

It has been part of our effort here in Congress for funding. We lost a Member of this House. He wasn't taking food. He was shuttling between rival factions to let the food through. It is a sad in-

dictment of the leadership in that area of the world that we lost our very valued Member because he was shuttling between rival factions to let the food go through.

We now have this Subcommittee on Foreign Agriculture and Hunger, and the distinguished chairman is going to do a great job. We decided that it was time for us to grab ahold of the situation from the legislative end and work or prod or do whatever we need to do. But for someone to wake up one morning and say we have a problem in Somalia, it is unacceptable. It is almost criminal that here in June of 1993 we will still be talking about how can we help other areas of the world.

I mean, it surprises me that the testimony of AID says, they had another typhoon in Bangladesh. They have a typhoon in Bangladesh twice a year, and it knocks out all of the little bridges. It knocks out all of the levees. And we have to do tremendous work in that area.

But the cost. I saw something in the testimony about \$5,000. In Peter Shira's, I guess, testimony it mentions \$5,000 a month for a house or for housing in Mogadishu.

Mr. KUNDER. He is here in the audience, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that \$5,000 a house or a month or for housing?

Mr. SHIRAS. No, in Rwanda, I mentioned monetization as a—

The CHAIRMAN. Was it in Rwanda? I have been to Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda. But let me see your testimony. Do you remember the \$5,000?

Mr. SHIRAS. I actually don't offhand. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Because that is something I saw as I was glancing through the testimony. You don't remember that? That is not part of your testimony?

Mr. SHIRAS. No. I mentioned monetization.

The CHAIRMAN. It is in Ms. Bertini's testimony I am told. Can any of you shed any light on that? I wish I could have asked this of Ms. Bertini.

Mr. KUNDER. I see it here, Mr. Chairman. She says, \$5,000 a month house rentals in Mogadishu.

I have no doubt that before the troops arrived, when all of these things were being negotiated with a gun stuck in your face, that a lot of people paid \$5,000 a month for a house in Mogadishu. I don't doubt that happened. They were charging for the relief planes. The people who controlled the airplanes were charging for the relief planes to land at the airport, extorting money from the various relief agencies. I saw with my own eyes.

So I don't doubt that in the chaos of last year where the social fabric completely degenerated that some people were ripping people off for \$5,000 a month for housing.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a further indictment of the human element. I had a friend that used to say that if it weren't for humans messing up this world, we would all be in heaven.

Mr. KUNDER. Mr. Chairman, could I respond briefly to your comment about Bangladesh and seeing the famine?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. KUNDER. My sense is that we have made, as an international relief community, tremendous progress in responding to those kinds of crises.



Ms. Bertini mentioned, in response to a question from Ms. McKinney, a success story. The famine in southern Africa last year—or the drought in southern Africa last year, if you look at the headlines a month ago—I am sorry, a year ago last February—they were predicting it was the worst drought in the century in southern Africa and up to 1 million people might starve to death.

Because of the early warning system, because of the prepositioning, because of the negotiations with all the SADC countries and the Republic of South Africa and getting people who normally don't talk to each other to talk to each other and because more than 1 million tons of U.S. food that went in there, basically, except for the conflict zones in Mozambique and Angola, no one starved. It was a tremendous success.

And the last tidal wave in Bangladesh, because of early warning systems that were put in there hundreds of thousands of people were evacuated before it hit and were saved.

I would argue that there is a lot of data to indicate that we have learned a lot over 20 years. That when it comes to the natural disasters, we have good systems in place, and we can head them off.

The problem is, as I said, that 90 percent of our expenditures last year weren't for natural disasters but were for the conflict disasters, and that is the area where I think we need to break some new ground. We can see ethnic tension coming. We can see these societies breaking apart. But it is a much more subtle and difficult question of how you intervene in a Bosnia where there is fighting going on or in a Sudan in the middle of a conflict than in a Bangladesh, Zambia, or Zimbabwe that is at peace.

So I would argue that there has been progress, but the issues we are facing now are the conflict ones, and they are the ones that are costing the human lives.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that, and I would agree with it. It is a far different situation to go into a drought, natural disaster area than to go where there is AK-47's and fighting all around you. And all of the agencies—United Nations, PVO's and the AID—I know are making tremendous sacrifice and some degree of personal bravery and risking personal safety in going into some of the areas. We appreciate their efforts. The world might not.

You may not get on the front page of the newspaper or the 6 o'clock news for the good you do, and some of us have a tendency to question your effort, but you always have to ask the questions of why not and how come, and that is what we do.

I have taken too much time, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate and commend you for the work that you are doing in this area.

Mr. PENNY. I thank the gentleman from Texas for his strong interest in this area, and, if anything, I try to follow his lead on these international questions and appreciate his participation in the subcommittee meeting.

I don't have any further questions for this panel. Unless Ms. McKinney or Mr. Allard do, we will dismiss this panel with our appreciation. Thank you very much.

Next we will call forward a panel to discuss the situation in Rwanda: Mr. Jeff Drumtra, policy analyst, the U.S. Committee for Refugees; Mr. Peter Shiras, senior director of the African region, Catholic Relief Services.



Please come to the witness table. I would ask that you present your testimony in the order that you were introduced. That would be Mr. Drumtra first. Summarize your remarks for the record. Your entire written statements will be included in the record.

I have to make, hopefully, a short visit to the House floor for a statement on the rule on an impending bill. I am going to leave my colleagues in charge here, and I will be back as quickly as I can.

**STATEMENT OF JEFF DRUMTRA, POLICY ANALYST, U.S.  
COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES**

Mr. DRUMTRA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am Jeff Drumtra with the U.S. Committee for Refugees which monitors refugee issues around the world, including emergencies—humanitarian emergencies involving large numbers of internally displaced people. And, as you might expect, where there are large populations of displaced people, there is invariably a shortage of food, and hunger.

I would like to applaud this subcommittee for holding these 2 days of hearings on international hunger issues and for trying to look at ways that the international community and the United States can respond more effectively. And, in particular, I would like to commend you for spending a few minutes this morning focusing on the central African country of Rwanda.

I just returned from Rwanda several weeks ago, and in the opinion of my organization, the U.S. Committee for Refugees, we find that the humanitarian emergency in Rwanda is one of the most unreported humanitarian emergencies in Africa. Some 900,000 Rwandese have been displaced over the last several months. 12,000 tons of food assistance are required on a monthly basis.

Mr. Chairman and Madam Chairman, I thought by way of explaining to you, describing the situation in Rwanda, what I might do is draw upon some of the general points that were made in testimony yesterday and to try to explain how those general points relate or do not relate to the situation in Rwanda. There are five principles that were discussed yesterday that I would like to highlight in relation to Rwanda.

First of all, I understood one of the witnesses yesterday from AID to say that many of the food shortages around the world are the cause of natural disasters. That certainly is not the cause of the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda, and I think other witnesses over the last 2 days have emphasized that by and large these are man-made catastrophes.

In the case of Rwanda, this latest emergency is the result of political and military violence in the last 5 months which triggered the displacement of 600,000 Rwandese in addition to 300,000 other Rwandese who were displaced by violence earlier. So there are now nearly 1 million Rwandese who have been displaced.

To make a bad situation worse, most of the displacement has occurred in the most fertile farm belt of Rwanda, so the food security of Rwanda will be jeopardized for some time to come as a result of this emergency.

The international community has—many of the NGO's have tried to respond as this emergency has developed. It has been a struggle. To take one example, the International Committee of the Red

Cross, which is one of the larger NGO's operating in Rwanda, has increased its budget there eightfold. ICRC, the International Committee of the Red Cross, is now devoting 30 percent of its budget in Africa to the situation in Rwanda, second only to its program in Somalia.

So this is not due to climate changes. This is not due to earthquakes. This displacement is the result of political conflict, and, ultimately, it must be resolved through diplomatic means.

The second principle that was mentioned yesterday by Representative Emerson, I believe, and others, was the need for early warning to respond to these humanitarian emergencies around the world. And I would say that, in the case of Rwanda, early warning was given by a number of organizations, including officials of the U.S. Government on the ground in Rwanda. They were cabling back to Washington within days of the displacement in February that, "A disaster exists in Rwanda. A catastrophe is in the making."

I know our organization tried to bring this to the attention of the American media, with very little success, I might add. And the International Committee of the Red Cross, among other NGO's, were talking in February and March about, "A major human catastrophe occurring in Rwanda." So people in the field did their jobs.

A third principle mentioned yesterday, again by Representative Emerson, was the difficult difference that exists between delivering food and distributing food. Those are two separate steps.

In Rwanda that has been a problem. Adequate food has been delivered to central Africa to address the immediate needs in Rwanda. The problem is distributing the food, transporting the food into Rwanda and to the places where it is needed. This is due to a number of logistical factors.

There has been some airlifting of food, but when I was there in May there was a fuel shortage and the airlift had been cut by two-thirds. There have been attempts to truck food in. That has been difficult due to a shortage of trucks in some cases, and road closures in other cases, and also insecurity.

Rwanda is extremely small. The capital of the country, Kigali, is 75 miles from all borders, so the violence and the potential violence is always close, and that breeds a certain insecurity which hampers relief efforts by the NGO's.

Although food is in the region, more food will be required over the next 6 months to deal with this crisis, and there is a strong need for nonfood items. Especially, I found a need for such simple items as plastic sheeting for shelter against the rain and the cold, and blankets.

A fourth principle that was articulated yesterday by both AID and the Department of Agriculture is that there is a problem moving these humanitarian relief efforts into longer-range development when the immediate emergency is over, moving into longer-term solutions on the ground. Especially, they pointed out, that is a problem when there has been a war, and there has been destruction and a large number of displaced people.

Rwanda is a very good example of this problem. There are about 300,000 Rwandese who are now in the process of returning home. Their homes have been destroyed by the war. Their homes have

been pillaged in their absence. They are returning home to nothing. They are returning to a demilitarized zone where there are no services, no health clinics, nothing of that kind.

The NGO's on the ground have had a great deal of difficulty getting into the demilitarized zone, feeling that they can set up programs there and do so in a secure manner. Hopefully, this problem will be partially or totally addressed by a new agreement that I understand was signed just a few days ago between the rebel faction and the Government which will, hopefully, allow relief workers access to the demilitarized zones so that people can go back.

And the fifth point that I think was raised yesterday by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs is that better coordination is needed between peacekeeping efforts and relief efforts. This is key for Rwanda right now. The Government and the rebels have reached this limited agreement which will allow people to return to their homes in the demilitarized area, but this remains a very dangerous area. Supposedly, the demilitarized zone will be policed by neutral international observers, but at last report there were fewer than 50 neutral international police to provide security in this area which stretches for about 800 square miles. The U.N. and the international community are going to have to respond to this opening in the diplomatic process.

Finally, I would like to thank you again for holding this hearing and for focusing on Rwanda. I know quite a few relief workers in Rwanda who will receive a much-needed morale boost, if not a budget boost, from knowing that there is a committee in Congress that has taken the time to focus on Rwanda's needs. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Drumtra appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. ALLARD [assuming chair]. Thank you for your comments, Mr. Drumtra.

Mr. Shiras.

We have a vote that is coming up in this committee so we are going to have to rotate through here a little bit, if you will forgive us, on this side.

#### **STATEMENT OF PETER SHIRAS, SENIOR DIRECTOR, AFRICA REGION, CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES, USCC**

Mr. SHIRAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me also say that I am very pleased to be here today and that this committee has taken an interest both in the topic of early intervention as well as the specific case of Rwanda.

Let me begin by contrasting the case of Rwanda with some of the comments made earlier about southern Africa where the response to a major drought was very successful.

Rwanda is a small, landlocked country in Africa, has few of its own financial resources to respond to a major emergency, faces a very difficult logistical system for receiving food, lacks the kind of internal democratic systems or effective governance which are critical to responding to emergencies, has very little political significance on the international level, and is, consequently, of marginal interest to Western countries and is competing with a host of other emergencies in both Africa and the rest of the world for diminishing resources which are available to foreign assistance programs.



Given this context, I think it is both understandable that in many respects the response to the emergency in Rwanda has been found wanting but also quite remarkable that it has been as good as it has been.

Let me make four specific recommendations for Rwanda and then make some general recommendations on the topic of early intervention.

In the case of Rwanda, first of all, the problem of diminishing resources and the large number of emergencies that exist in the world today argues for increased appropriations for emergency programs. We are faced with a situation where the U.S. Government and the PVO community is scraping around, trying to come up with adequate resources to respond to the growing number of emergencies, and this has certainly been a problem in Rwanda, both in terms of material resources and in terms of experienced managers who can be there to respond to the problem.

The second problem is donor coordination and coordination amongst implementing agencies on the ground. This has been a recurring theme throughout today's hearing. It is a very specific problem in Rwanda, and there is a need for improved coordination, both on the side of donors and on the side of implementing agencies on the ground in Rwanda.

The third recommendation is to improve the competency of the relief organizations working in Rwanda, and in this I would include both the international agencies and the national agencies involved. This, again, relates to the plethora of emergencies besetting international agencies around the world, the lack of trained and experienced managers available to put into a situation like Rwanda, but also the fact that in Rwanda itself, because there has not been a history of emergencies in the country, there are problems of the national agencies involved and the need for improved training for national agencies.

And the fourth recommendation is to support a more vigorous role of the Organization of African Unity to meet some of the security needs in Rwanda. For the first time I think the OAU has taken a small, largely ineffective, but symbolically very important role in sending 50 observers into Rwanda as a means of trying to deal with the conflict.

At the meeting next week in Cairo, the OAU is going to consider a more vigorous role they can take in peacekeeping, and I think this is something which should be supported and encouraged and built upon as we look forward to more and more emergencies in Africa.

In terms of general recommendations to deal with the question of early intervention, let me mention five points.

First is the question of preventive diplomacy. A number of the panelists this morning have talked about the need to try to prevent emergencies from occurring or to mitigate their intensity.

The U.S. Government, I think, can do a number of things to support this process. First, through active, informed, and consistently engaged diplomacy the United States, as the world's only remaining superpower, has a very important role to play in trying to prevent emergencies from occurring and to deal with the political and diplomatic roots of many of the current emergencies we see.



Second, I think the United States and the world community needs to support a strong role for the U.N. and regional organizations such as the OAU in dealing with emergency situations and the political and diplomatic origins to them.

And, third, I think that the relationship between the U.S. foreign aid program and its role in preventing and mitigating emergencies should be understood in the sense that support for democratic reform and support for sustainable development, which is equitably shared in a society, will go a long way toward diminishing the kind of conflicts that give rise to emergency situations.

The second recommendation is for greater professionalism in responding to emergencies. The kinds of humanitarian crises we face now are complex and require a high degree of professionalism and sophistication in understanding the origins of them and the most effective response.

There is a need both for increased training of relief organizations, both PVO's, the U.N. and the U.S. Government, and there is a need for an institutional commitment on the part of agencies involved in emergencies to be willing to undertake the very difficult types of tasks involved in responding to emergency situations where security is often a very difficult problem. Understanding international humanitarian law, understanding the connections between relief and development and building on local capacities which exist in any emergency situation, no matter how difficult it is, are some of the basic tenants that go along with increasing professionalism in responding to emergencies.

The third recommendation is improved mechanisms for coordination. I believe that the creation of the DHA on the part of the U.N. is an important step forward, but there is still a long way to go in terms of improving coordination, both within the U.N. system and between the other major actors involved in emergency response, including the U.N., NGO's, bilateral Governments and the ICRC.

Fourth, there needs to be greater understanding of the appropriate response to emergency situations. Here two major points include, one, the need for greater support for nonfood items in responding to emergencies, and, two, the importance of tying emergency response into rehabilitation programs and understanding how relief responses can actually undermine rehabilitation programs if they are not properly managed.

For example, putting too much relief food into a situation where you are trying to rehabilitate the agricultural system can undermine that work in agricultural rehabilitation.

And, finally, a specific comment which has already been referred to earlier is the importance of timeliness on the part of OFDA in responding to emergency grant proposals from PVO's. As has been referred to, we face this problem with long delays on the part of OFDA in issues which are not related to the substance of the emergency grant proposal but are related to, one—I would agree with Jim Kunder—staffing restraints within OFDA, but also bureaucratic procedures which delay timely response to emergency grant proposals.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shiras appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. ALLARD. I am going to go ahead and recess the subcommittee here for 4 minutes and that is to allow me time to go over and cast a vote on the floor of the House and then, hopefully, Ms. McKinney might be back. If she is back before then, she can call the subcommittee back to order.

So I beg your indulgence and allow us to go over and vote, and we will be right back. Then I will have some questions to ask you, as I think Ms. McKinney might have, too.

[Recess taken.]

Mr. ALLARD. I will call the subcommittee back to order. It took longer than we anticipated.

Would you care to explain to the subcommittee how you interact with other organizations as far as food relief and aid to Rwanda?

Mr. SHIRAS. There are a number of different levels of interaction. I think the most important takes place at the field level and we take the initiative to coordinate our activities with those of the other major players in the different sectors which are involved.

So this would include with ICRC in terms of food assistance and the food program, and with UNICEF and other PVO's that are involved in the nonfood sector. In Rwanda, the official coordinating role is played by a governmental so-called crisis committee. But our sense is that it lacks the resources and the training to be able to carry out that role effectively so there has been a gap in effective coordination there and nobody else has picked up that role except insofar as individual agencies on a somewhat ad hoc basis have assumed responsibility to do it themselves.

Mr. ALLARD. You mentioned that the civil war in Rwanda resulted in displacement of 900,000 to 1 million people. Recently food has been delivered to these people.

What are the plans for food assistance from this point on?

Mr. SHIRAS. Up until February of this year, there were approximately 350,000 displaced persons. As of February, the escalation went up to 900,000 to 1 million. The current problem therefore is getting in additional quantities of food to meet that increased need. Generally speaking commitments have been fairly good.

The problems have been logistical in terms of getting food into the country because of the long and difficult road system to get through; political because the roads in Uganda have been blocked for political reasons so there has been a costly airlift necessary from Uganda to get food into the country. It also resulted in not enough food getting in. So what is needed are a resolution of the political problems to get the roads open into Rwanda from Uganda and increased funds in order to ensure that if that doesn't happen on the political side there are adequate aircraft or other means in order to insure that food gets into the country.

Once it gets in, there is a need to insure that it gets out to those, is that need it in a timely and effective way, and that there is a tight monitoring system to ensure that it gets to those that need it.

Mr. DRUMTRA. The U.N. recently issued an appeal for about \$78 million in funding for Rwanda, and about half that money is for food assistance. About \$38 million is for food assistance and for food production, agricultural programs when the situation on the ground allows those programs to take effect. The U.N. appeal also

asked for \$15 million to deal with some of these logistical problems that we have been referring to, the road problems, truck and airlift problems. About \$3 million is designated for water, sanitation, and other assistance needs.

Mr. ALLARD. I don't believe there are other questions from the subcommittee. I would like to thank both of you. We may have some questions from the chairman. With that I will turn it over to the chairman.

Mr. PENNY [resuming chair]. In fact, I don't. I have read your testimony and it is very thorough and very helpful and I do want to apologize that I had to run to the floor for a statement, followed by these two votes. But we do appreciate your participation this morning in this hearing.

With that we will move to our final panelist: Mr. Ross Vartian, executive director, Armenian Assembly of America.

Welcome. We look forward to your presentation.

#### **STATEMENT OF ROSS VARTIAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ARMENIAN ASSEMBLY OF AMERICA**

Mr. VARTIAN. I am the executive director of the Armenian Assembly of America, a national nonprofit association headquartered in our Nation's Capital to represent the views of our community. Our current priority is to encourage the unique and growing relationship between the Governments and peoples of the United States and Armenia.

I would like to summarize my written statement in the time available and ask that my full statement be made part of the record.

I have recently returned from Armenia where our delegation participated in the principal meetings between Senators Simon, Brown, and Reid, the Armenian Government and the Western NGO community active in Armenia. The assembly is privileged to be the Armenian Government's designated coordinator of over 20 nongovernmental organizations active in Armenia. In that capacity, we convene various meetings in the field to provide an environment for NGO cooperation as well as constructive NGO/Armenian Government relations.

Mr. Chairman, Armenia is part of a Fourth World of formerly developed nations set free by the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Armenia is a young, landlocked, robust, newly independent democratic state struggling to provide the most basic necessities of food, heat, and safe hot and cold water to its 3.6 million citizens.

Only in its second year of independence, Armenia is in a state of perpetual crisis brought on by blockades imposed by neighboring Azerbaijan and Turkey. During the Soviet era, 80 percent of Armenia's imports and exports were shipped through Azerbaijan. With that route suspended and with the route to the west currently blocked by Turkey, Armenia's only other transport route is via Georgia.

As a consequence, Armenia is forced to do with far less as the Government is reduced to devoting a preponderance of its time in keeping its people alive. My visit to Armenia last week was not nearly as bleak as February.



The mile long breadlines of the winter have been replaced with a bread rationing system of 250 grams per person per day. The daily struggle for subsistence continues. One sad legacy of a winter without energy is a country denuded of trees, the only source of heat for most of the population.

The average monthly salary in Armenia where unemployment is the norm because of severe energy and supply shortages occasioned by the blockade is some 3,000 rubles per month, about \$3. Pensioners receive 2,500 rubles per month. In preinflation days, these benefits were reasonable. Today they provide less than two-thirds of the cost of a survival basket of goods.

According to the Government of Armenia's projections, which are corroborated by nongovernmental organizations present in Armenia, almost 50 percent of the population is at risk. These include pregnant women, single mothers, and young children, 447,000; elderly pensioners, 440,000; destitute families and the disabled, 565,000; refugees and displaced persons, 150,000; and earthquake victims, 200,000.

Mr. Chairman, we commend the U.S. Government for taking the lead in providing substantial emergency humanitarian assistance. USDA surplus commodities of butter, oil, wheat and flour played an important role in providing bread, a staple food stuff in Armenia, and other basics.

The provisions of wheat seed and fuel for spring planting, the Department of Defense provision of transport, the crucial monitoring and logistics work provided by the NIS Coordination Office at the State Department under the direction of Ambassador Armitage and now Ambassador Simons, all contribute significantly to Armenia's survival.

Simply put, the U.S. Government, nongovernmental organizations, and the American people have saved tens of thousands of lives in Armenia. This is a tremendous success story. However, I must point out on behalf of those knowledgeable about the situation in Armenia, that an even greater effort may be required this winter.

I believe that it would be the consensus recommendation of those active in Armenia to do the following: Expand humanitarian assistance programs; increase longer-term development assistance in order to strengthen indigenous capacities; continue financial support for organizations such as the Centers for Disease Control in order to assist Armenian officials in the monitoring of food availability and nutrition levels in the country; establish regular monitoring of and reporting on humanitarian relief operations in the region, and immediate approval of the Transcaucasus strategy designed by the USAID Task Force on Emergency Humanitarian Assistance Office in order to establish assistance delivery mechanisms prior to the coming winter.

In conclusion, without peace and an end to the blockade by Turkey and Azerbaijan, the coming winter will be worse than the last. The food supply situation in Armenia is alarming. Supplies of rationed commodities are irregular, and stockpiles of staples are few to none.

Once again, the United States Government is in the forefront of Western assistance by aiding Armenia and planning ahead for the



winter of 1993–1994. You can be assured that the Government and people of Armenia are keenly aware and deeply appreciative of this leadership.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide this update on the situation in Armenia.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Vartian appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. PENNY. Thank you. I appreciate your testimony.

As we look to the future, what are the prospects for economic advancement in Armenia, and what are the drawbacks to attempting to rebuild their economy and to provide employment?

Mr. VARTIAN. The prospects for the medium- and long-term future are very positive. Armenia has always been a Western-oriented State. Throughout the Soviet era, there has been substantial contact with Armenians throughout the diaspora and with non-Armenians as a result of that.

They have always been a mercantile people. They are ready to become market-oriented and market-reformed as quickly as possible. The independent variable that prevents that from happening most quickly is the fact of the blockade to the east and west of them, the Turkish blockade and the Azerbaijani blockade, effectively are driving Armenia in reverse speed, going backward in time. You can actually see it happening.

Each time I visit Armenia, I see that Armenia is driven further and further backward on the development continuum. Once the blockades are lifted and permanently lifted, there is substantial opportunity for development, first in oil and gas and then in agriculture and in many other areas where not only Armenia but the Transcaucasia will flourish.

The conflicts in and around that region have to be resolved in order for that to take place, but the United States is in the forefront of that as well.

Mr. PENNY. Turkey's blockade—I know of the dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Turkey's involvement is based on historical identity with the—

Mr. VARTIAN. People of Azerbaijan. There is an ethnic affinity there. Regrettably, Turkish policy with regard to Armenia and the disputed area of Karabakh is in lockstep with Azerbaijan. They have not developed an independent policy yet. As a consequence, blockades have intermittently been put on by Turkey against Armenia and Karabakh.

The United States has expended substantial political capital and diplomatic activity behind the scenes each time to get Turkey to lift its blockade, but at the moment it is on, it is thorough, and even American Red Cross food parcels which were being assembled and shipped via Turkey to Armenia have been suspended.

Mr. PENNY. I don't have a map in front of me. What are the routes that are available?

Mr. VARTIAN. The current routes are the ones that are available. As I indicated in my testimony, 80 percent of Armenia's goods and services; exports and imports, came through Azerbaijan from the balance of the Soviet Union. About 20 percent came through Georgia.

Azerbaijan suspended its routes, so that takes care of 80 percent. The balance of 20 percent through Georgia is at risk. Oil and gas lines have been blown up connecting Georgia to Armenia. Railroad bridges have been blown up connecting Georgia to Armenia, and that has been done by Azerbaijan.

The route through Turkey is primarily a railroad crossing and a truck crossing. The railroad crossing is capable of carrying up to 2,000 tons per day, I believe, and has not reached that capacity ever. So there aren't very many viable options for Armenia in the short term other than Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.

Mr. PENNY. What are the limitations on airlift?

Mr. VARTIAN. Fiscal, primarily, Mr. Chairman. There are none other than fiscal. There are over 20 NGO's on the ground who have substantial experience in Armenia and moving goods and assistance through the country. The Armenian Government has organized its own coordinating body institutionally in order to interact with NGO's as well as our coordination function there.

So there is a great deal of ability to receive material and account for it, but that is minimized by fiscal constraints as well as the access routes. It is regrettable that another Western country, Turkey, who is itself receiving a substantial amount of assistance from the United States is in turn blocking U.S. assistance to another State. That is the primary impediment to making things happen in Armenia now.

Mr. PENNY. What is the political situation in Armenia in terms of the nature of the Government, stability of the Government?

Mr. VARTIAN. It is a democratically elected Government, elected in a contested seven-party election. There have been no states of martial law or any other type of State control ever since that election. Unlike its neighbors, Azerbaijan has gone through periods of declarations of emergency and martial law, as has Georgia. There is a robust free press in Armenia and there are frequent demonstrations for and against the Government.

So while it is a robust democracy, it is a fragile one, and how the Government ameliorates the human suffering of its people in the short term will in large part determine how stable that democracy continues to be.

Mr. PENNY. What is the timeframe for elections?

Mr. VARTIAN. The President is in his second year of a 5-year term and the Parliament is on a 5-year cycle as well.

Mr. PENNY. Coincidental.

Mr. VARTIAN. That is correct. There are seven to nine political parties represented in the Parliament also.

Mr. PENNY. We have had and discussed in another context the development of an international WIC program. It seems to me that definitely in terms of reaching the tens of thousands of children who are at risk from malnutrition, that that might be an appropriate assistance approach for Armenia. Do you have any reaction to that?

Mr. VARTIAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. While school is in session, that would be entirely appropriate. However, Armenia has been forced to shutdown all of its school systems in the winter because of lack of heat because of the energy crisis and because of the blockade that I referred to earlier. As a consequence, the families keep their

children in the homes as virtual prisoners of the climate throughout the winter, and because of that, the program would not work.

Frequently refugees are warehoused in vacated schools that are unheated so as a substitute it is a way to reach out to refugees. In Armenia there are always people waiting to be served or warehoused somewhere in what are essentially windbreaks, because there is no heat and services to those facilities.

Mr. PENNY. Is there hope for a political settlement to the question of these refugees; and if so where does that stand?

Mr. VARTIAN. Yes. This is a dispute essentially over the status of Karabakh, which is an autonomous region within Azerbaijan. There are scores of such autonomous areas scattered throughout the former Soviet Union so this is not a problem unique to relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan or between Karabakh and Azerbaijan. The CSCE has been a primary instrument through which negotiations have taken place on this subject. And the CSCE talks have reached an important milestone in the past few weeks.

There have been a number of multilateral and ad hoc initiatives within the umbrella of the CSCE, but at this point the record indicates that Armenia and Azerbaijan have said yes to a plan including all other nations of the CSCE Minsk group that was created to deal with this issue, save the authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh itself.

There are two reasons for this: First, that the Karabakh authorities have not genuinely been included in the negotiating process and therefore have less confidence in the language and the commitments and the context in which these negotiations have taken place.

Second, they are the ones whose security is at risk, so they are in fact the last hold out. There is substantial dialog taking place with the Karabakh authorities, and there is reason for hope that they also in a few weeks will seek and get clarification as to some of the points in this very long and deliberate process of negotiation spearheaded by the United States and it is a hope, and I think a realistic hope, that all parties will come to some understanding within the CSCE context.

A cease-fire can be permanent. The blockades can be lifted, and all parties can return to the negotiating table to ultimately decide what the status of Karabakh will be in the future.

Mr. PENNY. The refugees are ethnic Armenians?

Mr. VARTIAN. Yes. Who have fled there because of the conflict within Azerbaijan and within Karabakh itself.

Mr. PENNY. What is your attitude about the U.N.'s role in all this in terms of trying to create a climate in which these issues are appropriately addressed not only a humanitarian effort, but the blockade, et cetera.

Mr. VARTIAN. On the political front the U.N. has deferred to CSCE supported by the United States. So on a political front, the U.N. has been, relatively speaking, inactive. On the humanitarian front, the U.N. is represented in Armenia by a broad array of its own agencies; assistance could be greater. The U.N. has issued appeals in the past and currently there is a conference in Geneva, informal, but nevertheless a conference is taking place there as we speak on Armenia to solicit greater involvement of donor countries

so that the U.N. could expand its activities in Armenia. They would desire to do so.

Mr. PENNY. Thank you.

Mr. Allard.

Mr. ALLARD. I just have one question. Are there other routes other than through Georgia and Azerbaijan?

Mr. VARTIAN. Yes. The Turkish route is the route of the future.

Mr. ALLARD. So some effort now is being made to develop that?

Mr. VARTIAN. A considerable amount of U.S. Government effort, but thus far without success. Private diplomacy, in my opinion, has reached its limits on the subject of Turkish cooperation. It is a sad irony that by putting the blockade on Armenia, Turkey prevents itself from penetrating all the Eastern markets including the entire southern rim of the former Soviet Union.

So by blockading Armenia in essence it is blockading itself. That is a sad irony that we are currently stuck with, but the U.S. diplomacy is aware and is doing all it can to break it down. I know I would welcome and our organization would welcome a little nudge from Congress as well.

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you.

Mr. PENNY. That was excellent testimony. This has been a productive session. I appreciate the participation of all those involved. With that, the subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene, subject to the call of the Chair.]

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]





**World Food  
Programme**

The Food Aid Organization of the United Nations System

The Executive Director

**Statement  
by**

**Catherine Bertini  
Executive Director  
World Food Program**

**on**

**Early Intervention**

**before the**

**United States House of Representatives**

**Committee on Agriculture**

**Subcommittee on Foreign Agriculture and Hunger**

**June 10, 1993**

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### Early Intervention

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee:

Providing food to the poor of the world quickly, efficiently, effectively -- is indeed a great challenge and responsibility. Yet we owe those in need nothing less.

The World Food Programme, as the food aid agency of the United Nations, provided food assistance to over 42 million people last year, including an estimated 27.5 million people in emergency or refugee feeding.

WFP is the largest source of multi-lateral food aid -- indeed it is the largest source of grant assistance in the entire U.N., with an expenditure budget last year of \$1.7 billion funded by donor governments. The largest contributor in 1992 was the USA. WFP work closely with the governments of developing countries and with PVOs in implementing WFP projects and in delivering food aid to needy individuals.

Our involvement in emergencies has increased dramatically over the last few years. In fact, during 1991 and 1992, our emergency/refugee deliveries surpassed those under our development portfolio.

## Process

Our involvement in emergencies begins early. Once early warning mechanisms are triggered, we conduct assessment missions with the U.N.'s Food and Agriculture Organization. Often we work side by side in the field with USAID on assessments. Once we know the size of the vulnerable population, the weakness of the markets, the availability of local food, the deprivation and malnutrition levels, we launch an appeal for resources to the international community. Also, we immediately put in place the arrangements to move the needed food to the appropriate location.

Time frames, of course, depend on the nature, size, scope and complexity of the emergency. Obviously, the longest time frame is the procurement and movement of food.

The way in which we shorten this process is to borrow food. Because we have a large development portfolio, we have thousands of tons of food moving around the world in WFP-chartered ships at any given time. WFP borrows food destined for one country to meet critical emergency needs in another. The food is then repaid later. This cuts the lead time for food deliveries dramatically from months to critical days. This was the case recently in Rwanda, where nearly a million displaced people were sustained by WFP-diverted food.

## Risks & Costs

There are, of course, very serious risks and costs involved in all of these operations.

1. Personal safety. In complex emergencies brought on by conflict and civil strife, safety of staff is our first concern. Unfortunately, the cost is high. In Angola, four lives were lost this year of people delivering relief food. Similarly, lives of many relief workers were lost in Somalia, Southern Sudan, Northern Iraq and Cambodia last year.

The brave men and women who serve the U.N., as well as national and international PVOs, do so at great personal risk.

2. Dollar cost. The cost of providing food in these situations is extremely high. Extra insurance for transport vehicles and staff entering conflict zones, exorbitant prices for all goods and services on site (like \$5,000/month house rentals in Mogadishu), and extremely high costs of airlifts make for very expensive operations. We use airlifts only when people are in desperate situations risking starvation, and no other transport options are available. The cost averages \$470/ton, compared to \$87/ton for all food moved.



3. Losses. Emergencies always mean there are many people in desperate need of food. Although WFP and other agencies put in place as many controls as possible, we are building systems from scratch in regions with little or no infrastructure and often with a government under siege. Our absolute first objective is to reach as many people as possible who are at risk and to do so as quickly as possible.

We strive for losses not to occur, but some do. It's a cost of doing this kind of work.

4. Development. Development programs -- infrastructure or health or agriculture or any other -- are disrupted in the country in question during an emergency. In fact, commerce, education and most day-to-day work is negatively affected.

### Challenges

Some of the broad challenges the international community faces for early intervention are:

1. Prevention. First, of course, our challenge is to prevent a catastrophe if possible. Usually, this is a political process requiring diplomatic leadership. Could we have avoided the problems in Somalia or Angola with earlier intervention? What can be done now to avoid future potential problems in South Africa or in the former Soviet Republics or in Cambodia?

In 1993, we are feeding, through UNHCR, more refugees and displaced people affected by war, civil, or ethnic strife, than people suffering from natural disasters. Good governance is obviously of fundamental importance.

2. Mitigation. Particularly for regions prone to natural disasters, we face the challenge to institute programs to help mitigate the effects of future disasters. Examples would include building irrigation operations in dry countries, or pre-planting watersheds to help prevent disastrous floods. WFP has undertaken a new disaster mitigation program for Africa, and

we are currently discussing with USAID potential U.S. support for related projects including risk mapping to promote better targeting of vulnerable areas and populations.

3. Coordination. The U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali has taken bold steps to create strong coordinative mechanisms in emergency situations. He has created the Department of Humanitarian Affairs charged with coordination of the overall humanitarian response in emergencies. He has also created the role of special representative of the Secretary General in Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, and elsewhere to insure on-site direction and coordination. For the largest natural disaster seen in years, the southern Africa drought, the U.N. moved quickly, aggressively and effectively. The region needed millions of tons of food to avert disaster. The U.N. named the World Food Programme as its coordinator for logistics and transportation. Eleven million, six hundred thousand tons of food were moved to and through the region, thus avoiding famine and starvation for the 18 million people at risk.

Effective coordination is key to early intervention and success.

4. Security. In addition to personal security for staff, quick and effective intervention requires safe passage by food transporters to those in need. Again, this is a political issue, but is often negotiated by humanitarian agencies because it is essential for aid distribution.

Just ten days ago, WFP completed negotiations with the government of Rwanda and the opposing Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) for the opening of a direct land corridor between Uganda and Rwanda. On Tuesday, June 8th, the first convoy of 745 tons of food successfully reached Kigali for the first time. Deliveries had been done previously by air, and even the largest aircraft can carry only 45 tons per trip. The deliveries by WFP's truck convoy from Uganda cost approximately \$95/ton, whereas aircraft cost \$285/ton.

Other examples of newly-opened access corridors include the renewed use of barges down the Nile to reach southern Sudan, and approval by both parties in Angola for renewed relief flights throughout the country.

5. Emergency Development Interface. It is obvious that the nature of problems of desperately poor communities creates long-term emergency problems, such as years of refugee camp operations and



feeding, and exacerbated development problems. Over the long term, we face the problem of reintegration and rehabilitation of communities of people and their skills.

6. Developing Emergency Managers. Currently, WFP has a minimal amount of staff trained in emergency management and available for immediate development in new emergency situations. Therefore, we have proposed the formation of a Rapid Response Team, capable of 24 hour placement to tackle emerging problems.
7. Food Movements. Of course, together we can always seek to improve the timeframes in which we purchase and move food to critical areas.

### Opportunities

Always, opportunities exist for us to work together to improve our global response. This requires thinking not just about each country in need, but about the totality of the world's needs.

Emergencies have grown so dramatically that we have all been forced to respond quickly and sometimes in isolation. But with our response, we must remember that our long term objectives are to help people become self reliant - to build self

sufficient communities and countries. Watching the successes of countries like South Korea or Mexico reminds us about our goals.

When the emergencies lessen, we must be prepared to renew and strengthen our resolve to help individuals and countries to help themselves. While the needs for emergencies are great, we must still continue our development efforts and - whenever possible - strengthen them (through U.N. organizations like WFP, UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA and others, as well as through PVOs like CARE, CRS and others, and through U.S. bilateral aid) to help sustain the long-term efforts to pull people out of dire poverty.

Strengthening development through additional resources is not always easy -- certainly not in the U.S. budgetary environments during the last few years.

Even so, the United States has been generous.

To the World Food Programme, through USAID and USDA, using primarily PL 480 Title II and Section 416 programs, the U.S. gave \$542 million in 1992.

Also, the U.S. traditionally plays a strong leadership role in the governing body of our organization (through the State Department, USDA, and USAID) ever since WFP

began 30 years ago, largely at the initiative of the Kennedy Administration through George McGovern and Orville Freeman.

If there is one area, however, where the U.S. could significantly strengthen WFP's operational effectiveness -- with a limited investment -- it would be in providing additional support to our general operating program. Currently, the United States contributes primarily food and the costs for its transport. It's contribution to our operations -- our accountants, auditors, purchasers, transporters, monitors and managers, and to the new Rapid Response Team -- is \$2 million, less than 2 percent of our total. And, by the way, our general operating program budget presents no more than 6 percent of our total expenditures. Additional support from the U.S. would go a long way to increasing our effectiveness, efficiency and accountability.

Again, in the context of budgetary concerns, may I make some comparisons?

The 1992 expenditures of WFP -- the largest U.N. grant assistance and the largest multi-lateral food aid agency -- was \$1.7 billion. The 1992 expenditure for Food Stamps for the State of New York was \$1.7 billion. Over the last 30 years, the U.S., WFP's largest contributor, has given \$2.5 billion to WFP's regular development program. This is approximately the same amount as one current year of WIC funding.

Don't get me wrong, the U.S. domestic food assistance programs are extremely important. But as an American, I don't think we are over-spending for food assistance to the poor in the developing world.

### Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, providing food to the poor quickly, efficiently, effectively -- is indeed a great challenge and responsibility. We applaud your efforts to improve our collective response and we look forward to working with you as we proceed together.

We owe those in need nothing less.

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(Attachment follows:)





**World Food  
Programme**

The Executive Director

The Food Aid Organization of the United Nations System

## **PROFILE OF THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME**

### **Overview**

The World Food Programme (WFP) is the food aid organization of the United Nations.

WFP plays a dual role as a principal channel for the provision of relief food aid to victims of natural and man-made disasters and as a major supplier of food aid in support of development activities. Indeed, WFP is the largest source --- in the U.N. system --- of grant resources for developing countries.

In the 1991-1992 biennium, WFP handled \$2.98 billion (US) worth of resources, including cash and commodities.

WFP now handles more than one quarter of all food aid moved globally. In 1992, this amounted to approximately 4.3 million tons of food. The bulk of the food is donated by developed nations. However, the WFP frequently purchases food from developing countries for use as food aid in other countries.

WFP has a large and extremely efficient transport and logistics operation, moving relief food by land, sea, and air. As a result, the Programme also arranges the purchase and transport of a growing share of the food aid provided bilaterally by individual countries.

Founded in 1963 and based in Rome, Italy, WFP has become one of the U.N.'s key players in mounting emergency relief operations for victims of natural disasters and food shortages caused by war, civil strife and ethnic or religious violence. In 1992, WFP's total expenditure was nearly US\$1.7 billion, of which US\$1.3 billion was for refugee and emergency operations.

WFP's 1,800 regular staff members work closely with other governmental and non-governmental agencies and U.N. agencies. In a given situation, for the most part, WFP handles needs assessments, soliciting of contributions from donors,

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transportation and management of the distribution process on a country-wide basis: WFP turns to governments or local and international N.G.Os -- such as the Red Cross or CARE -- to ensure that the relief food actually reaches the hands of the beneficiaries.

### **Relief Efforts**

The past year saw WFP commit a record amount of emergency food aid to meet acute food shortages in 48 countries. Whether it was Somalia or Yugoslavia, Haiti or Nepal, in 1992 the Programme committed 3.2 million metric tons of life-sustaining food rations to feed 27.5 million needy people.

The bulk of WFP's emergency operations in 1992 went in aid of victims of man-made crises: in many countries in Africa, such as Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, Angola, and Mozambique, drought combined with war to produce humanitarian tragedies.

Delivering life-saving food to Somalia was one of WFP's most difficult and frustrating emergency operations in its 30 year history. In May, with 2.5 million people at risk of starvation from a combination of drought and civil strife, WFP was the first international relief agency to open the port of Mogadishu to cargo ships carrying large quantities of vital food aid.

WFP also mounted an air bridge, beginning in August, to shuttle food from Nairobi to locations inside Somalia. The airlift/drop operation used both privately-chartered planes as well as military aircraft donated by Germany, the U.S.A. and Canada.

Despite WFP's expertise in logistics, moving food into the interior of Somalia by air and by road proved dangerous, and sporadic, at best. Armed looters in Mogadishu and Berbers made off with more than 15,000 tonnes of relief rations. Local and international relief workers were threatened at gunpoint, ships and aircraft were shot at, and in general, WFP was prevented from doing its job.

The turning point came in December, with Operation Restore Hope, the U.N./U.S.A. military intervention to secure transport routes for WFP's relief convoys. By the end of 1992, WFP had transported over 103,000 metric tons of food to Somalia, and a further 113,000 tonnes were scheduled for delivery in the first three months of 1993.

International relief operations in the war-ravaged territory of ex-Yugoslavia became so complex and extensive that towards the end of 1992, WFP was asked to intervene with emergency food aid. The Programme committed US\$145 million worth of humanitarian assistance to meet the basic needs of nearly 3 million refugees and internationally displaced people during the winter of 1992/93. The

food shipments were destined for six of the former Yugoslav Republics, including Bosnia-Herzegovina. Part of the relief food is meant to help supply therapeutic-feeding centres for malnourished children, pregnant or nursing mothers, the elderly and the sick.

WFP has been running an emergency operation in Iraq since April 1991, in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Much of the food aid is destined for the Kurds in the northern part of the country, but WFP also committed relief food for 450,000 people in central and southern Iraq.

WFP has large emergency operations in Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea. All of these crises were caused by armed conflict, either in their own countries, or in neighbouring ones. Some disasters such as in Sudan and Kenya were made worse by drought.

In 1992, Southern Africa faced the worse drought in living memory. The World Food Programme was asked by the U.N. to mobilize relief food and to help donors deliver it to the region. WFP established a regional Logistics Advisory Centre in Harare, Zimbabwe to monitor the flow of all international food aid entering the ten affected countries in the region. As well, WFP committed to raise approximately 712,000 tonnes of food for free distribution to famine victims.

New WFP and UNHCR working arrangements, which came into effect in 1992, have resulted in WFP handling most food provided to refugees. WFP has assumed full responsibility for mobilization of all basic food commodities, and funds for meeting transport costs, for all UNHCR-managed refugee feeding operations in developing countries involving more than 1,000 beneficiaries.

WFP also participated in the U.N.'s major refugee repatriation operations, working closely with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in Afghanistan, Angola, Namibia, Guatemala and Cambodia. With the peace treaty signed to end the war in Mozambique, WFP's major feeding operations and development programmes will continue in 1993 as part of the country's rehabilitation effort.

### **Development Efforts**

WFP has committed three billion US dollars of its resources to projects designed to assist developing countries improve their economies and social programmes. Sub-Saharan Africa receives the largest proportion of WFP development aid. However, the Programme also has projects underway in Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East and North Africa.

WFP assistance is specifically targeted to projects assisting the poorest people in the poorest countries. Programme activities are supervised from 85 country offices and cover a wide range of categories designed to promote rural development and help increase agricultural and food production. Activities also include environmental protection, settlement and resettlement of communities, health and nutrition, education and human resources development, forestry, infrastructure and transportation, and fisheries.

In food-for-work projects, food is used as an incentive or part payment for beneficiaries who participate in the various projects. For instance, villagers will receive food rations in exchange for planting trees to reforest an eroded mountainside.

Food aid may also be sold to the beneficiaries at subsidized prices and the money generated used to build vital infrastructure for the poor communities, such as schools, health clinics, piped water systems and latrines.

Food aid is also distributed in school-feeding programmes to promote school attendance and improve learning by overcoming short-term hunger and to mothers and young children at MCH centers to encourage attendance. Food is also provided as part of institutional feeding for the disabled, the elderly and the sick. All of WFP's environment projects attempt to hold true to the principles of sustainable development. WFP also makes a special effort to ensure its development work does not hurt the environment.

Some of WFP's projects are specifically designed to alleviate the effects of structural adjustment programmes on the poor, particularly those which involve reductions in public spending and in subsidies for basic foods.

Food aid should have as its basic objective its own elimination, and should simply be a tool to help countries become more self-reliant. Over the past 30 years, great strides have been made in increasing food production, particularly in Asia. In sub-Saharan Africa, in contrast, countries have experienced a 40 per cent shortfall in food production. WFP is still in business, operating on a scale unimagined when it was established.

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Updated May 1993



TESTIMONY OF JEANNE DOWNEN  
DEPUTY REGIONAL MANAGER, EAST AFRICA  
CARE

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

My name is Jeanne Downen. I am CARE's Deputy Regional Manager for East Africa. I have just returned from a visit to Sudan where I reviewed CARE's program operations in the North and our efforts to establish operations in the South and the Transition Zone. I am pleased to be able to share some of my observations from that trip with you.

CARE has been asked to discuss its views on how to ensure that United States and United Nations agencies are able to respond effectively to emergencies and provide humanitarian assistance on a timely basis, specifically in relation to Sudan. As the following discussion highlights, ensuring effective and timely response requires a combination of factors: 1) early warning systems that provide information on slow-onset disasters such as famines before they are fully developed; 2) U.S. government policies that provide development assistance to programs of data collection and early detection of impending food shortages in vulnerable countries; 3) host government willingness to allow international agencies access to areas affected by natural or man-made disasters, and 4) appropriate emergency response policies that emphasize early, market-oriented interventions over emergency free food distribution.

CARE ACTIVITIES IN SUDAN

Sudan is a large and complex country whose size and climatic diversity require a varied, flexible and comprehensive approach to the detection of and early response to food emergencies.

CARE has been active in Sudan since late 1979, and in our 13 years of operation in Sudan we have worked through drought emergencies, participated in food relief programs that assisted over one million people, supported assistance to displaced persons camps, and pursued a development program that seeks to enhance food security among vulnerable populations.

In North Kordofan, where CARE's major activities in northern Sudan are based, our program is focussed on problems common in the drought-prone western region. These include desertification, severely limited access to water, low agricultural productivity, poor nutrition, a high prevalence of childhood diseases and very limited health

services. In response, CARE has introduced in North Kordofan a number of projects focused primarily on rural farmers and displaced persons. As droughts and civil conflict have continued to disrupt the target population over the years, CARE has increasingly focused its activities on the complex and challenging problem of food security. This has required a broad analysis of people's food needs - the causes and effects - a more varied mix of program modalities using food as a resource, and an increasingly integrated approach to our programming. Underlying the design of these programs are the concerted efforts to institutionalize these programming approaches through the Sudanese government, national non-governmental organizations, and the communities in which we work.

Outside of North Kordofan, CARE continues to work with displaced communities relegated to camps and settlement areas north and south of Khartoum. Assistance to these communities has taken the form of short-term survival inputs, although efforts are being made to stress longer-term and more sustainable interventions to secure some future for these populations.

In southern Sudan, CARE has recently joined other international relief agencies operating under the Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) program of the United Nations. We have assessed and identified opportunities to provide relief and rehabilitation assistance to the states of Eastern and Western Equatoria and Bahr el Gazal. CARE has engaged in what we call a transparent process with the Government of Sudan in seeking and receiving official approval to explore opportunities for assistance to southern Sudan via the neighboring countries of Kenya and Uganda. CARE expects that the Government will give CARE approval to deliver assistance via the southern corridors to Government-held areas, and to consider acceptable the assistance planned for the opposition-held areas. Our interventions specifically focus on establishing a program to assist Sudanese refugees and returnees from Zaire, Uganda and the Central African Republic in the area of Yambio in Western Equatoria. In Bahr el Gazal state, CARE will field a multi-sectoral technical team to expedite rapid delivery of supplies and provide assistance and training in water supply, agriculture and livestock rehabilitation, and health to communities in areas affected by civil conflict.

In addition to these efforts, CARE has been seeking permission from the Government of Sudan to conduct or participate in a needs assessment of South Kordofan. This area, part of the Transition Zone between northern and

southern Sudan, has been severely affected by disruptive civil conflict and food shortages. Many of the people living in South Kordofan are displaced persons from the south who have moved in South Kordofan in search of relief assistance and physical security. Unfortunately, all attempts to solicit Government of Sudan approval for access to this area have met with strong resistance. CARE has not received formal approval or rejection of our request for access to South Kordofan, but we are not optimistic that international NGOs will be allowed into South Kordofan to assess relief and rehabilitation needs and develop a suitable response.

#### INFORMATION AND EARLY WARNING

One of the building blocks of CARE Sudan's relief efforts, and of any early warning system, is information. The collection, analysis, evaluation and dissemination of regular, timely and accurate information from local sources such as households, public market activity and sales, local government offices, health and social services, specialized agencies and other sources is what constitutes an early warning system. Information collected on a regional or international basis such as population movements due to war or natural disaster, and satellite imagery of environmental phenomena, also constitute elements of an early warning system. This process of information collection and analysis is vital if Government and international aid agencies are to recognize an impending food shortage far enough in advance of its occurrence to respond with preventative rather than emergency interventions.

During the past two years CARE Sudan has undertaken many types of activities to gather data on household food security, data that was then used to formulate action or monitor on-going activities. A few examples of these activities include:

- 1) The Provincial Nutrition Information and Surveillance System (PRONISS). A joint project with the Kordofan State Ministry of Health, its goal was to develop nutrition surveillance systems to provide regular and reliable information on the nutritional status of children under five. The project, which was phased over to Government in late 1992, was designed to assist Kordofan State to develop its capacity to gather and analyze data to provide to various government bodies.

- 2) 1992 Needs Assessment Study to assess the immediate food assistance requirements for CY 93 and provide information for multi-year programs. This study, conducted with the assistance of the University of Khartoum, looked at a number of variables relating to household food security, including net harvest, animal wealth, nutritional status, debt levels, and income sources. The responses will be used to provide indicators of food security and levels in which triggering mechanisms should be set. Another expected output will be the more refined input into development and revision of food security codes and national guidelines.
- 3) As a member of the Kordofan Drought Relief Operations Group (KDROG) in Kordofan State, CARE Sudan has participated in discussing food relief strategy, intervention modalities, ration sizes, and target groups, based on food availability and supported by the collection of nutritional surveys. CARE has found that Government and donors have displayed great interest in establishing reliable and accurate food and nutrition information systems.

Through these activities we have strengthened our partnership role with government counterpart agencies and consistently advocated the institutionalization of early warning systems through a state-wide network that feeds into a national system. CARE also supports the development of a community-based information exchange network that would provide narrative reports for monitoring and developing appropriate interventions. The combination of data from key indicators and narrative field reports should provide a balanced understanding of a region's food security situation for Government and donors.

The Government of Sudan should be encouraged to continue to collect early warning information supported by the provision of technical assistance when needed. Efforts such as those of the Ministry of Planning's Food Security Coordination Unit, which is pursuing uniformity across the country in collecting indicators, should be supported. INGOs can work with government ministries to do pre- and post-harvest assessments and collect survey information on household food security. INGOs can play a valuable role by using their village extension work to collect qualitative data at the household level to support wider scale quantitative data collection.



However, there are increasing obstacles to implementing effective early warning systems in Sudan. One is the lack of donor support. The Famine Early Warning System, one of the few in-country systems related to early detection of food shortages, was closed June 1992 when USAID curtailed development assistance to Sudan. There is not enough available funding from the U.S. government to INGOS to meet humanitarian needs in Sudan. USAID has given priority to southern Sudan, the Transition Zone, and the displaced, but without funding for other areas, organizations like CARE cannot address needs as effectively as we would like to. As CARE has found through its own experience in food security interventions relief, rehabilitation and development activities related to famine prevention should be integrated into the same program portfolio rather than treated as two unique and self-contained programs.

We see fewer and fewer resources available to INGOS other than free food assistance. Although there are some opportunities for food for work, there are meager funds available to assist in developing large scale public works projects or in carrying out other employment generation projects. The classic response to emergencies is free food distribution, which should be the last rather than the first intervention.

CARE is endeavoring to use food more creatively for employment generation in communities during the "lean period" before harvesting. We also advocate the need to look at food-related market interventions, such as grain and livestock price stabilization before households exhaust both their food stocks and purchasing power. However, in Sudan, U.S. government guidelines say that emergency food can only be used for free food distribution and not food for work. CARE would like to see more flexibility and more resources available for prepositioning food and for market interventions in order to avoid widespread famine.

#### EARLY RESPONSE AND FAMINE PREVENTION

Once support for an institutionalized early warning system is secured, an effective disaster prevention and mitigation system is needed. This capability the U.S. government and the U.N. agencies in particular, constitutes a second important building block of an effective disaster prevention mechanism.

Food emergencies are usually slow-onset disasters. Donors and aid agencies generally have several months to act between indications of crop failures or economic dislocation and the time when actual food shortages set in and household supplies are exhausted. Such disasters can be exacerbated by bureaucratic procedures and unflexible policies. Donors need mechanisms to respond quickly to needs and allocate assistance before a full-blown emergency is underway.

A strength of United States aid programs in this respect is its ability to preposition commodities before an emergency is declared. This flexible response policy allows the U.S. to respond quickly, where other donors cannot even start the process of allocating funds for an emergency until an official emergency declaration is made by government and an appeal for help publicized.

Similarly, UNICEF under the OLS has prepositioned medicines and medical kits for southern Sudan in Lokichokio, Kenya for delivery by NGOs to local communities. These commodities are put together according to the level of delivery and the training of the medical assistant and available for immediate delivery. The U.S. government should encourage and support all U.N. agencies to take on this responsibility and to effectively preposition essential supplies in anticipation of widespread need.

U.N. agencies play another crucial role in emergencies that is deserving of strong U.S. government support. This is the unglamorous but essential role of providing primary transport of goods in an emergency situation. If each agency were to take care of its own commodities, they would be competing with one another at port level, distracted from their main purpose and vulnerable to exploitation by private groups. When primary transport is handled by the U.N., it relieves INGOs of a high profile role often fraught with political problems and allows them to work at the provincial level to deliver needed assistance.

More importantly, INGOs look to the U.N. to play a coordinating role and provide leadership in countries such as Sudan and Somalia where numerous agencies are undertaking large scale emergency assistance. We encourage support of the U.N. by the U.S. government in this crucial role.

#### OBSTACLES TO HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

There are other major problems impeding a potential humanitarian response in Sudan today. One is that the World

Food Programme does not have the funds to deliver food until it receives donor commitments for storage, transport and handling and management costs can they move food from international donors or Government. We support any efforts of the U.S. government in encouraging a timely response by international donors to meet the financial requirements of WFP in emergency programs.

As stated above, a second major problem is that of access to areas of need. Following the agreements in December 1992 between the Government of Sudan, the SPLA, and the U.N., INGOs under Operation Lifeline Sudan increased their access to the south. Though several years into the civil conflict in the south, this increased access is viewed as a positive move on the part of Government.

In January 1993, the U.N. once again facilitated discussions between Government and selected INGOs, including CARE, working in Sudan. The purpose was to resolve major issues impeding INGO operations in Sudan. The outcome of these talks included significant agreements on a number of issues, including the creation of a Government focal point for all NGO issues, the streamlining of administrative procedures, and the improving of access for INGOs to areas in need. International agencies were quite optimistic about the cooperative tone and constructive approach of Government during these talks.

The implementation of these agreements has been slow and partly satisfactory. Improvements have been experienced on a number of administrative issues, and in the lifting of travel restrictions in northern Sudan. Additionally, the focal point, the Commission of Voluntary Agencies has been established although is not yet fully operational.

However, CARE has been attempting without success to obtain Government approval to conduct a needs assessment in the areas of Abieye and Meriem in South Kordofan. The U.N. has already documented the existence of displaced and needy persons in the Transition Zone area, which includes South Kordofan. The position of the Government of Sudan is that national NGOs are present in these areas and capable of meeting the needs, a position with which we do not agree. CARE believes, based on its experience in North Kordofan, that it can effectively work with national NGOs in the Transition Zone to augment their food delivery capacity and enhance their food management skills to better provide needed relief to people in South Kordofan.

The U.N. Special Coordinator for Relief in Sudan has also pursued the access issue, and we encourage support of the U.N. efforts to keep up a continuing dialogue with Government.

CARE has maintained a transparent process with Government in initiating its activities in southern Sudan. The continuing lack of access to the Transition Zone leads us to surmise that a feeling of mistrust of our intentions as an international relief agency persists within the Sudanese Government. However, we shall continue to seek access to South Kordofan and hope our initiative will be favorably received.

CARE requests once again, in the forum provided by this Subcommittee, that the Government of Sudan allow CARE access to people in need in the Transition Zone. We emphasize that CARE's only concern is to reach vulnerable groups in need and to work in cooperation with national and other international institutions to assist them.

On the broader issue of the conflict in southern Sudan, CARE feels that there is no satisfactory way of resolving human needs in a war zone. For CARE, the fundamental problem affecting southern Sudan today is the existence of civil conflict. For humanitarian actions to be effective, much more emphasis needs to be put on negotiations, conflict resolution, including in the process those countries that are actively supporting factions in Sudan.

#### SUGGESTIONS FOR MORE EFFECTIVE RESPONSE MECHANISMS

To summarize the points made above, CARE urges the Subcommittee to give its support to more effective early warning and early response capabilities within the international aid community. We have made a few, but by no means comprehensive, suggestions on how this can be done:

1. Government should be encouraged to continue to collect early warning information supported by the provision of technical assistance when needed.
2. Relief and development activities related to famine prevention should be viewed as an integrated program deserving of U.S. government support rather than treated as two separate programs. We request the U.S. government to continue to fund famine prevention programs as relief activities in Sudan, instead of denying funding to them on the basis that they are development activities.



3. Make greater donor support available to INGOs for famine early warning systems and other humanitarian needs.

4. Make additional resources available to INGOs other than free food assistance. Allow more flexibility in using U.S. emergency food in Sudan to assist in developing large scale food for work projects and other employment generation projects, rather than only free food distribution. Avoid relying on free food distribution as the first intervention.

5. Encourage and support all U.N. agencies to effectively preposition food and other essential supplies in anticipation of widespread need. Support funding for early and appropriate market interventions in order to avoid widespread famine.

6. Encourage support of the U.N. by the U.S. government to play a coordinating role and provide leadership in countries such as Sudan and Somalia where numerous agencies are undertaking large scale assistance programs.

7. Support the U.N. Special Coordinator for Relief in Sudan and INGOs such as CARE in the efforts on the access issue, and encourage U.N. efforts to keep up a continuing dialogue with Government.

#### CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I would like to thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify before you on food security, early warning systems and responses in Sudan.

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF U.S. FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE  
(OFDA)

SITUATION REPORT NO. 5

May 26, 1993

**SUDAN - Civil Strife/Displaced Persons**

Note: New information since the last situation report (May 3) is underlined.

**Areas Affected:** CIVIL STRIFE throughout southern Sudan and parts of the transitional zone. **DISPLACED PERSONS** in Khartoum, southern Darfur and Kordofan, Upper Nile, Central and Eastern States, and throughout the south. **REFUGEES** in Ethiopia, Uganda, Zaire, Kenya, and Central African Republic (C.A.R.).

**No. Affected:** An estimated 4 million civil war displaced Sudanese citizens remain in need of emergency food and non-food assistance in FY 1993. Current estimates indicate there are over 270,000 Sudanese refugees: 16,000 in Ethiopia; 95,000 in Uganda; 120,000 in Zaire; 20,000 in C.A.R.; and 19,000 in Kenya. It is estimated that Sudan hosts approximately 650,000 refugees: 430,000 from Eritrea; 200,900 from Ethiopia; 5,000 from Chad; 3,800 from Uganda; 2,000 from Zaire; and 380 from Somalia.

Total U.S. Government Assistance FY 1993 ..... **\$56,002,269**

**General Situation**

Intensified fighting between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), as well as interfactional fighting within the SPLA, over the past two years severely limited access of the United Nations (U.N.) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) into many areas in Sudan until a few months ago. In December, the U.N. gained permission from the GOS and SPLA to visit areas in southern Sudan. Since then, the U.S. Ambassador, A.I.D. assessment teams, the media, congressional staff, and advocacy groups have also been able to go into this region. Their findings begin to reveal the extent of the problems.

A team from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) returned in mid-March from a two week trip to four areas in the south and reported that the situation there is critical. The CDC team, sponsored by OFDA, reported that 75%-81% of the children under five sampled in two feeding camps, Ame and Ayod, were either moderately or severely malnourished. (A malnutrition rate greater than 8% is considered a nutritional emergency.) The annual population growth rates in Ame and Ayod were negative (i.e., the number of deaths were greater than births), and the crude death rates were 234 and 276, respectively, per 1000 per year, or almost 1/4 the population. By comparison, the annual death rate is usually between 20 and 24 deaths per 1000 during non-famine times in Africa. Approximately half the deaths in Ame and

Ayod were attributed to starvation; the next most common cause was diarrheal illness.

In late April, U.S. Ambassador Petterson, OFDA Director Jim Kunder, and other A.I.D. staff visited four areas in southern Sudan. The group met with the main rebel faction leader, John Garang, and representatives from the SPLA/Riak faction, the U.N., and several NGOs operating in the region. Their trip highlighted the fragility of the relief operations and the need to increase deliveries before the rainy season severely limits operations.

For people living in the transition zone, the belt between the north and south, conditions are not much better. Since the GOS has limited access by the U.N. and international NGOs into this area, the international community does not have a clear picture of the extent of suffering there. However, it is clear that the GOS is actively involved in relocating some 30,000 displaced people from the Nuba Mountains into camps located in insecure zones that lack necessary food and medical supplies.

In the north, the Khartoum State Government continues to forcibly relocate squatters and displaced people to camps that lack proper food, water, and sanitation and health facilities. To date, some 700,000 people have been relocated.

Sudan's history of civil war and drought has not only forced an estimated one million to become internally displaced during 1992, but also continues to force hundreds of thousands to seek refuge across the borders in Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, Ethiopia, and the Central African Republic. To escape fighting, many refugees have trekked more than 900 miles to reach camps, where they are entirely dependent on the international community for food, water, and other essentials. Officials from the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in Pakele reported that as many as 1,000 Nuer people crossed the border from Equatoria into Uganda in January. According to one unconfirmed report, as many as 40,000 Sudanese refugees in Zaire may have returned to southern Sudan due to chaotic conditions there.

In addition to people leaving Sudan, it is estimated that Sudan still hosts approximately 650,000 refugees, primarily from Ethiopia and Eritrea. In April, the Government of Ethiopia, the GOS, and UNHCR signed an agreement for the repatriation of 100,000 Ethiopians from Sudan. UNHCR hopes to begin the actual movement of these refugees within the next few months. There is yet no agreement on a repatriation program for some 430,000 Eritreans from Sudan.

While the current infestation of desert locusts seems to be under control, there are a few areas along the Red Sea Hills still infested with locusts. In addition, the current stock of pesticides is inadequate given the expected summer buildup of locusts coming from Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

Pestilence has also caused intense suffering, widespread cattle loss, and thousands of deaths in Sudan. Kala azar, a very infectious disease transmitted by sand flies, afflicts thousands of Sudanese in addition to malaria, tuberculosis, diarrhea, meningitis, and tropical ulcers. Except for Kala azar, these diseases could be treated by vaccines and inexpensive drugs, if available.

Based on a recent assessment by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), this year's wheat production was the lowest recorded in the last four years due to a number of factors, including the high cost of fuel and fertilizer, infestation, late planting, and higher than normal temperatures. With an annual consumption rate of almost 900,000 MT and no carry-over stocks, the GOS would still need to import about 450,000 MT of wheat to fill the gap.

As an acknowledgement of the need for relief in Sudan, the GOS signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with WFP on March 31 pledging to make available roughly 155,000 MT of sorghum for relief operations in Sudan. On May 7, the GOS offered to double the quantity of sorghum pledged for relief purposes to 300,000 MT. As of May 11, WFP has officially received only 15,846 MT of sorghum. An additional 19,000 MT is under inspection by WFP. OFDA has provided funding for the internal transport and storage of the sorghum.

#### Relief Efforts

The major mechanism to deliver assistance to the people in southern Sudan is Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), a plan designed by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and actively supported by A.I.D. In its four years of existence, OLS, with the help of NGOs, has provided emergency food and non-food aid to over two million people in the south. In addition, OLS has established health clinics and feeding centers, trained health workers, vaccinated children, restarted schools, and assisted farmers to replant crops.

OLS achievements are truly remarkable considering efforts by the GOS and SPLA and its various factions to restrict or even halt relief operations, to the point that many U.N. agencies and NGOs have pulled out of the country completely. NGOs have been denied access to many areas, particularly in the south; relief flights have been suspended; trains and barges carrying humanitarian aid have been delayed or looted; registration and travel permits have been denied; and, of utmost concern, in 1992, two Foreign Service Nationals employed by A.I.D. were executed, and several relief workers and one journalist were killed.

Due to continued insecurity in some areas, U.N. agencies and NGOs have been forced to pull out completely on numerous occasions. In March, U.N. staff evacuated from Kongor, Ayod, and Nasir after a monitor from the U.N. World Food Program (WFP) narrowly escaped death at the hands of the Garang faction of the SPLA. During a skirmish between Garang and Riak factions, the WFP monitor was forced to open WFP stores, stripped, tied up, forced to walk for three hours, and then shot at several times while trying to escape. After the cessation of delivery of all relief assistance for several weeks, U.N. personnel returned to Kongor at the end of April, but are being flown in every morning and taken out each

night. The U.N. has still not returned to several places.

Currently, OLS is delivering relief supplies into the south by airlift, road and barge convoys, and rail. WFP aircraft flying into southern Sudan now include two Buffalos, 2 Hercules C-130s (both funded by USAID), one Caravan, and one Twin Otter. OLS flies to over 20 destinations out of its main logistics base at Lokichokio, Kenya, compared to 6 destinations in December 1992. To increase the airlift capacity out of Kenya, USAID is contributing to the refurbishment of the logistics base at Lokichokio.

USAID is also partially funding WFP barge convoys that deliver food to the south. On March 11, the first barge arrived in Juba after delivering relief supplies to areas along the Nile River, which would otherwise be inaccessible by road or air. Despite the December agreement for renewed access along this corridor, the barge encountered difficulties from both sides of the conflict. It was delayed 45 days after being hijacked eight times and most of its cargo looted. As of May 9, three other barges that were loaded with relief supplies since early April were still awaiting clearance to deliver food along the Nile corridor to Juba. A WFP relief train from Babanusa arrived in Wau on May 18 after delivering 1,000 MT of cereals, lentils, and vegoil to 16 locations. Within 24 hours of departure, the train had been looted of 70 MT of food by SPLA forces. The train was also attacked twice by indigenous people.

The rainy season is now underway, posing further problems to the relief effort. Road access to many areas is becoming increasingly difficult, and six airstrips in the south have already closed due to heavy rains. In less than a week, 16 flights were canceled out of Lokichokio due to poor weather and waterlogged airstrips.

#### International Efforts

There have been numerous attempts by the U.S. and international community to remove some of the obstacles facing relief operations in Sudan. A U.S. Congressional Resolution was passed in October condemning GOS abuses of human rights. This was followed by a U.N. General Assembly resolution in December that strongly condemned all sides of the conflict for their efforts to obstruct relief operations as well as human rights abuses.

In December, the U.N. gained permission from both the GOS and SPLA to access 31 locations in southern

Sudan. As a result, the U.N. and NGOs mobilized quickly to assess the needs and begin delivering relief to areas in the south, many of which had not been visited in over a year.

In late January 1993, the GOS met with representatives from the U.N. and several international NGOs operating in the country to discuss concerns of the international NGOs and changing longstanding policies which have impeded NGO relief operations. To date, there has been very little, if any, progress on the agreements reached during this meeting.

On March 17, the Chairman of the SPLA, John Garang, announced a unilateral cease-fire, effective immediately, which the GOS announced that it would observe. Despite this and other cease-fire declarations, fighting between the SPLA factions continues, once again disrupting relief operations. The ceasefire announcement came approximately one month before peace talks resumed between the GOS and SPLA in Abuja, Nigeria. The Abuja Peace talks broke up on May 17 without making any progress on peace.

After being accused by the GOS of siding with the rebels and then expelled from the country last year, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was granted permission by the GOS in April to resume operations. After finally receiving clearance, ICRC is now undertaking assessments in Juba and Kongor, among other places. Its May flight plan to 16 locations in Upper Nile and Eastern Equatoria has been approved.

On April 3, Senator Paul Simon (D-III.) introduced Senate Resolution 94, calling for, among other things, the increase of relief assistance to Sudan; the appointment of a U.N. special representative for Sudan; the establishment of demilitarized zones; and an end to human rights abuses in Sudan.

Following earlier testimony by the Acting Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Food and Humanitarian Assistance before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa George Moose and OFDA Director Jim Kunder testified in May before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Africa. Both highlighted the importance for both parties to press for a peace agreement at the Abuja peace talks, granting NGO access to southern Sudan and the transition zone, and



maintaining pressure on the GOS, SPLA, and its factions.

The U.N. is appointing a Special Coordinator to focus on the crises in Sudan. The U.S. will also appoint an Ambassadorial-level official to coordinate USG activities as well as work with the U.N. Special Coordinator.

#### Situation by State

**UPPER NILE:** Significant interfactional fighting and counteroffensives between SPLA factions have had disastrous affects for the people in Upper Nile.

Insecurity has prevented U.N./WFP relief workers from maintaining a permanent presence in Ayod, Yau, Waat, and Nasir. Relief workers are being flown in each morning and out again at night. Relief workers are anxious to reestablish a permanent presence in these areas.

Relief planes landing at the airstrip in Pangyagor near Kongor were reportedly met by skeletal figures who are so weak they have trouble unloading the cargo. Since the resumption of sporadic relief flights, an estimated 5,000 arrived in Kongor, with another 30,000 in the surrounding area. The CDC team reported in March that 84% of the children sampled in Kongor were moderately or severely malnourished. It is suspected that the people in Kongor and Ayod seen by the CDC team in March are now dead. Most were women and children. Relief workers from Irish GOAL and CONCERN, the only two NGOs currently operating there, returned to Kongor at the end of April, following a cessation of all operations for about a month due to the brutal attack of a WFP monitor in Kongor. Relief workers are now being flown in every morning from their base in Kenya and taken out each night. After a determination was made in mid-May that the security situation was stable, U.N. flights were granted permission to return to Kongor.

UNICEF/OLS is operating with OFDA funding in Kongor and Ayod to repair water pumps and provide training on simple pump maintenance procedures. In addition, UNICEF/OLS is providing enough drug kits for up to 300,000 patients for three months as well as blankets, plastic sheeting, cooking utensils, and badly needed seeds and tools for areas that have experienced crop failure.

Past interfactional SPLA fighting and intertribal Nuer/Dinka fighting have caused immense suffering for an estimated 8,000 people from the town of Ayod

and nearby area. Insecurity and fighting in Ayod in mid-May temporarily suspended relief flights and resulted in the looting of all pre-positioned food supplies for Medecins du Monde (MDM) and CONCERN. Although the current population remains small, a large influx of displaced are expected to converge in Ayod and Waat from Yui and nearby areas. Like Kongor, Ayod is located around an airstrip, which attracts many from nearby areas who know food is being airlifted into the area. After returning with the CDC team from Ayod in March, an OFDA employee wrote that in Ayod, "the Nuer people drag the bodies of those who starve to death out beyond the village for the vultures to pick over and the hyenas to drag away. In the therapeutic feeding center, ward after ward of near death children -- literally black skins over white skeletons -- lay motionless." One of the CDC team members reportedly feared that the trauma of weighing and measuring the children would kill some of them. The only source of water is a contaminated, stagnant pool that is shared by the people and the few remaining cattle. Malaria, severe diarrhea, scabies, and guinea worms are widespread.

Reports in May estimate the number of displaced north and northeast of Waat to be 30,000, compared to 8,500 reported in mid-March. Most of the displaced have come to Waat to escape fighting in Kongor, Ayod, and Yui. Like other NGOs that depend on the airlift for the delivery of supplies, SCF/UK and MDM are having trouble maintaining a continuous supply of supplementary food in Waat now that the rainy season has begun to hamper airlift deliveries.

Relief flights have again been suspended to Yui due to interfactional fighting. Originally there were an estimated 25,000 displaced in Yui. That number has reportedly fallen to less than 150 people, now that most have moved to Ayod and Waat.

Large numbers of displaced are arriving in Malakal. In the span of two days in early May, 1,300 people arrived in search of food and shelter. Due to the large influx, food stocks in Malakal are at a critical low.

In mid-March, WFP reported an estimated 7,100 displaced living in Bor, with a daily mortality rate of eight. However, the situation in Bor is improving due to a steady delivery of relief assistance by air.

The displaced population in Bentiu was 10,500 in mid-March and rising, due to an estimated daily

arrival of 70-100 people in search of food and health care. Foodstocks in Bentiu have been completely exhausted and health facilities are severely limited.

A joint WFP/UNICEF assessment team reported in mid-January that Kala azar had reached "catastrophic proportions" in the Pariang area in the last four years. According to WFP, if there is no medical intervention, nearly the entire population may die from Kala azar in the next several years. Already hundreds of children have reportedly been orphaned by the disease. The nearest Kala azar treatment facility is a five day walk away. For security reasons, however, those seeking treatment have been unable to make the trek. In mid-February, a U.N. plane carrying medicine and drugs intended for Kala azar patients was robbed of its cargo. OFDA is currently funding a Kala azar/medical treatment program for MSF/Holland in Upper Nile as well as Bahr el Ghazal.

In Nyarweng, a three-hour walk from Pariang, the people live under trees, survive on wild fruits and grains, and must walk six hours to the nearest river for water. The three schools in the area are without supplies, and many children do not have time to attend because they are searching for food. In addition to Kala azar, the population suffers from meningitis, bilharzia, tropical ulcers, malaria, and scabies. Due to insecurity and the food need, the population in Nyarweng is very transient.

WFP relief flights from Lokichokio into Nasir resumed on April 21. However, the number of scheduled flights has been reduced due to poor weather. As a result, the situation is tense for the estimated 26,000 displaced in Nasir. Due to insecurity in the area, U.N. and NGO personnel are being flown in on a daily basis.

So far this year, approximately 30,000 displaced persons in very poor health condition arrived in Renk, a town in the transition zone. Despite this large influx, CONCERN's emergency health/nutrition program, which is funded by USAID and provides supplementary feeding and immunizations to malnourished children, and assists war displaced, is making positive results. The malnutrition rate has dropped 7.7% since 1991, and as many as 60% of the children identified as malnourished are registered in the feeding program.

BAHR EL GHAZAL: With the rainy season underway, airlifts of relief supplies to many areas in

Bahr el Ghazal are impossible. As is, weather permitting, only a few flights will continue to be possible. Many people are migrating north in search of food. WFP monitors reported in May that some people had walked up to 100 kilometers for only small amounts of food and seeds. Some were too weak to make the journey and some of the stronger who did receive rations were robbed along the way by armed soldiers.

A U.N. team reported in December that Thiet and Akon were in urgent need for food grain and seeds, and health services, which were barely functioning, having been without a delivery of drug supplies since 1991. WFP operations in Thiet are attracting as many as 12,000 people in search of food handouts. When the air deliveries arrive, the food is immediately distributed leaving nothing available for food stocks. UNICEF is currently repairing water pumps and training nationals on simple pump maintenance procedures with OFDA funding in Bahr el Ghazal. The CDC team reported in March that 32% of the children sampled in Akon were moderately or severely malnourished.

The condition of the general population in Mayen Abun is "fair" to "good" with a market economy operating in the area. WFP is currently targeting 12,500 people as well as some very vulnerable groups, such as the young, elderly, and very sick.

It was reported in early April, that an estimated 200 people arrive in Wau per day. Of the new arrivals, 10% have tuberculosis. In May, a joint E.C./ French/U.N. team reported that the displaced in Wau were in miserable condition, having not received food deliveries since December 1992. There are no health services available to the displaced camp.

The food situation in Aweil for 17,000 displaced people is of concern. Food in the open market is limited and prices of basic commodities are exorbitant. There are no feeding centers or NGOs currently operating in Aweil.

EQUATORIA: In April, an estimated 109,000 displaced people lived in the Triple A camps: 47,000 in Ame, 27,000 in Atepi, and 35,000 in Aswa. The displaced are primarily Dinka who have walked between 2 to 3 weeks from the Kongor/Bor area to these camps which are close to the Uganda border in search of food or to escape fighting. They are in desperate need of food, clothing, soap, and blankets. Diarrhea, scabies, hepatitis, and malaria are

widespread throughout the three camps. The poor nutrition and health is attributed to lack of protein in the diets and contaminated water.

Following the SPLA shootings of three OLS relief workers and one journalist in September 1992, most NGOs and the U.N. pulled out of the Triple A camps. The few NGOs which remain are unable to meet the needs of the displaced who are forced to supplement their survival ration with fruits and grasses. Three of the NGOs now operating in the camps are funded by OFDA. Catholic Relief Services is the major relief supplier in the area and is operating an emergency food program in the camps. The International Rescue Committee is providing primary health care training on the prevention and treatment of diarrhea, hepatitis, and measles in the camps. Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF)/France is working to restore basic health services in Ame and Aswa, including upgrading the dispensary in Ame. In April, UNICEF resumed operations in the Nimule/Triple A camps, and several other NGOs are currently considering resuming operations in the area.

The health condition of the displaced in these camps is very poor. In Atepi, they use the same river for bathing, drinking, and washing clothes and utensils. The Ame camp gets its water from 7 poorly functioning bore holes, forcing the people to get their water from other less safe water sources. Another major factor contributing to the poor health of the people in the camps is that even when latrines are available, the displaced do not make a practice of using them. The standing water and increased humidity from the rainy season only further exacerbates the situation. Large numbers from Ame are migrating to Aswa, where there is a hospital staffed by Norwegian People's Aid, and apparently more food available.

In October, U.S. Ambassador Donald Petterson and OFDA Director Jim Kunder, the first U.S. government (USG) officials to visit Juba in eight months, met with the remaining Foreign Service Nationals, and negotiated an agreement with the GOS to evacuate these employees. By December 27, 1992, four of the eight USAID employees remaining in Juba and 24 family members had been voluntarily evacuated to Khartoum. While the security situation in Juba now remains calm, food stocks were quickly exhausted when the WFP airlift stopped at the end of February due to lack of funding. The WFP airlift resumed on April 24, but is again suspended. General

food distribution began on May 8 for an estimated 237,000 people in town.

In February, the GOS bombed the most heavily populated area in Kajo Keji days before Rep. Frank R. Wolf (R-Va.) visited the town of 10,000 people. Wolf reported he was shocked by the amount of suffering he witnessed. A WFP monitor has been posted in Kajo Keji to monitor the distribution of emergency food aid which recently arrived from Kampala.

The number of displaced arriving in Torit in search of food is increasing daily, with over 7,000 new arrivals in the last month alone. Recent assessments report 9,000-12,000 people in town require relief assistance. After the cessation of operations for almost one year, the WFP airlift out of Lokichokio has resumed flying into Torit.

There are an estimated 120,000 people in the Yambio/Tambura area in western Equatoria, most of whom migrated there in the past five years to escape fighting. The majority of the displaced are from Wau, refugees from neighboring countries, or internally displaced who chose not to cross the border into Zaire. It is reported that an estimated 300-500 people arrive each month in the Yambio/Tambura area. While food stocks are not low, the situation could deteriorate, especially if an adequate supply of seeds and tools is not provided very soon. A sufficient supply of materials exist for the displaced to build their own dwellings. However, the people are in desperate need of clothing and blankets.

**KHARTOUM:** The GOS continues to forcibly relocate displaced people and squatters to areas outside Khartoum, despite attempts by the U.N., donors, and NGOs to stop this forced removal policy. A year ago, as many as 520,000 displaced and 873,000 squatters lived in more than 64 settlements. Today all but two displaced camps have been demolished. The Khartoum State Minister of Housing recently said that 200,000-300,000 additional residents will be affected by future relocation activities.

Between 65,000-70,000 of the estimated 520,000 displaced persons in Khartoum last year were moved to two GOS "official" displaced camps, Jebel Aulia and Al Salaam, that lack necessary food, potable water, sanitation facilities, and health services. To avoid relocation and remain close to sources of employment, the remaining displaced disappeared into

the general population in Khartoum, making it difficult for relief organizations to count them or provide general food distribution and basic health services.

Both camps are guarded by the military and located far from the center of town, making it very difficult to commute to sources of employment and for NGOs to provide assistance to the displaced. Until October 1992, international NGOs were prohibited from operating in Jebel Aulia. Today, AICF operates two OFDA-funded clinics, and MSF/Holland runs two clinics and a sanitation program funded by USAID in Jebel Aulia. Despite recent GOS-NGO meetings, NGOs still must obtain permits for their expatriate staff to visit or work in the camp. With USAID funding, the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) has provided for the Khartoum displaced in Al Salaam. However, ADRA has been deterred from fully completing its distributional survey, and the results of the partial survey were confiscated by local officials, who prohibited ADRA from analyzing them.

Unlike the displaced, squatters are relocated to stable communities in two "peace villages" and given land rights. USAID currently funds a health, water, and sanitation project operated by ADRA near one of the camps, and MSF/Holland is implementing a USAID-funded sanitation project in both camps.

**DARFUR:** The Darfur state relief committee reported that food aid was required from March through December in crop deficit areas of Darfur, where 300,000 displaced live. In Ed Da'ein alone, an estimated 100,000 displaced arrived from Bar el Ghazal to escape fighting and food shortages. They arrived in very poor condition and suffering from hunger, malnutrition and disease. An estimated 80% of the total displaced are women and children. NGOs and the European Community have provided substantial funding to the province for food for supplementary feeding centers, jerry cans, fuel, clothes, and shelter. While regular food deliveries have reduced malnutrition rates and stabilized the food situation, NGOs continue to stress the need to provide a more balanced food ration and improve water and sanitation facilities.

**KORDOFAN:** An estimated 10,000 displaced people live in Sidra and Um Ruwaba in northern Kordofan, 50% of whom are children under the age of five. The numbers of displaced arriving in southern Kordofan are rising due to an influx from Bahr el Ghazal and

the relocation of thousands from the Nuba Mountains of southern Kordofan.

While the current total population for Meiram in southern Kordofan is unclear, reports in early May estimated 100-150 displaced arriving each day from Gogrial and northern Bahr el Ghazal. Due to a food shortage, people in Meiram were given only half the ration during the general distribution in May. The severely malnourished children in the camp are receiving only 3 meals of UNIMIX per day. (The Sudan Ministry of Health (MOH) guidelines require five to six meals per day for the severely malnourished.) There are three health clinics in the camp: one treats 200-250 people per day, indicating the very poor health condition of the new arrivals. The displaced are building their own shelters out of grass and wood, which will not weather the rainy season.

Unlike Meiram, Abyei is inaccessible by road during the rainy season. Estimates of the total population of Abyei vary depending on the source, ranging from 20,000 to as many as 60,000 in May, with relief officials estimating the number of displaced at 13,000. There are two supplementary feeding centers in the camp, both run by the Sudanese Red Crescent. As in Meiram, the severely malnourished children are not receiving the required daily food allotment as stated by the MOH guidelines. There are two health clinics and a hospital, with one doctor, 12 nurses, and 3 medical assistants who treat 100-200 patients per day. The 20 beds in the hospitals were covered with dirty sheets or did not have sheets on at all. The most common diseases are chest infection, diarrhea, malaria, measles, dysentery, bilharzia, and eye diseases. While sanitation is a problem in Abyei, UNICEF is presently constructing latrines. The only water pump in the camp works about 6 hours a day which is insufficient for the displaced, who resort to the river for their water needs. Since housing is inadequate for the displaced, most live under trees.

Between April and July 1992, an estimated 30,000 Nubans were forcibly relocated from the Nuba Mountains to Arab villages in northern Kordofan. Since then, the GOS has been forcibly relocating Nubans to some 100 "peace villages." The "peace villages" are located in areas of high military activity, near mechanized farms where the displaced are exploited for cheap labor. The Kordofan Minister of Housing reports that 163,000 people, or 1/6 of the population of the Nuba Mountains, have been relocated. Many have died during the relocations.



Motivations behind a GOS campaign to relocate the Nuba displaced remain unclear. According to government officials, the Nuba displaced were moved for their own good as heavy rains in Kadugli will cause serious logistical constraints on the delivery of relief supplies. Ironically, many of the "peace villages" located in areas of southern Kordofan will be inaccessible during the rainy season. There is concern that the GOS campaign is part of a military strategy to depopulate the Nuba Mountains and reallocate the land to popular defense force militias. Investigations of alleged human rights abuses in the Nuba Mountains continue.

In early May, the acting Commissioner of the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission informed international NGOs that they would not be involved in relief operations in the transition zone and reaffirmed an earlier statement that NGOs would not be permitted to participate in an upcoming U.N. assessment of the Nuba Mountains, despite having being involved in U.N. assessments in the past. The U.N. assessment of the Nuba Mountains has been indefinitely postponed due to an ongoing dispute between the GOS and U.N. over international NGO access to the transition zone. Though international NGOs and U.N. personnel have limited access to the Nuba displaced, those who have been able to assess part of the region report that the displaced are in urgent need of relief assistance. However, efforts by the local NGOs operating in the region are too limited to meet the needs of the displaced.

With funding from A.I.D.'s Office of Food for Peace, Save the Children is running a food for work operation in Showak and Um Ruwaba.

#### Assistance Provided by the U.S. Government (USG)

On Oct. 26, 1992, U.S. Ambassador Don Petterson redeclared the civil strife/displaced persons disaster in Sudan, determining that USG relief assistance would be needed for FY 1993. USG relief assistance to Sudan is provided through the A.I.D. Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), A.I.D. Office of Food for Peace (FFP), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs (RP).

On June 1, 1992 A.I.D.'s Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance became the responsible bureau for USAID/Khartoum, whose status has now changed to an A.I.D. Affairs Office with the role to monitor programs supported with USAID funding

and/or commodities. Responsibilities associated with the management of P.L.480 Title II and section 416 programs were transferred to AID/Washington.

#### OFDA Assistance

Funding for TDY contractor to assess the displaced camps in Khartoum . . . . .	\$32,307
Replacement cost of 16,520 blankets . . . . .	\$93,232
Transport of 16,520 wool blankets . . . . .	\$16,520
Grant with CARE for internal transport of plastic sheeting . . . . .	\$70,647
Transport of 1,000 rolls of plastic sheeting from manufacturer to Leghorn . . . . .	\$35,000
Replacement cost of 1,000 rolls of plastic sheeting from stockpile . . . . .	\$273,046
Grant with WFP for airlift into southern Sudan . . . . .	\$700,000
Cost of services for a Food for Peace Officer . . . . .	\$177,742
Cost of services for an Emergency/Disaster Assistance Coordinator for southern Sudan, based in Nairobi . . . . .	\$182,958
Grant with WFP for funding of Nile barge shipments to Juba, two food monitors, and Buffalo air operations . . . . .	\$1,075,000
Grant with ADRA for emergency food distribution to the Khartoum displaced . . . . .	\$183,924
Grant with Southern Air Transport to provide emergency airlift operations to southern Sudan for WFP . . . . .	\$1,131,450
Cost of communications equipment for A.I.D. Affairs Office in Khartoum . . . . .	\$10,182
Cost of two modems for use with satellite transmission between Khartoum and AID/W . . . . .	\$1,428
Cost of installation of communications equipment . . . . .	\$8,365
Cost of services for 8 Foreign Service Nationals . . . . .	\$256,278

Cost of services for a personal services contractor (PSC)/Emergency Specialist based in Khartoum ..... \$12,305

Cost of services for a Program Assistant to assist the southern Sudan Relief Team in Nairobi ..... \$9,235

Cost of services for a 3-man CDC team to visit areas in southern Sudan ..... \$6,430

Grant with CRS for emergency feeding program in southern Sudan ..... \$607,053

Grant with IRC to provide primary health care in Nasir and the Triple A camps (first tranche) ..... \$415,530

Grant with UNICEF for emergency operations, health, water, seeds, and food (first tranche) ..... \$1,000,000

Grant with SAT to extend the airlift for 2 more months and add a second C-130 for one month ..... \$3,432,065

Grant with MSF/France to restore basic health services in Ame and Aswa ..... \$289,180

Grant with Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) for an emergency medical program in Aswa ... \$125,300

Grant with NPA for emergency agricultural assistance in the Triple A area ..... \$415,900

Grant with NPA for emergency road convoys to Lafon and Boma ..... \$300,000

Grant with MSF/France for emergency health program in Bahr el Ghazal ..... \$204,700

Cost of services for a PSC to assess relief situation in the south ..... \$4,005

Grant with WFP for airlift and ITSH of GOS-donated sorghum for 30 days ..... \$2,100,000

Grant with MSF/Holland for a Kala azar medical program ..... \$498,000

Costs of services for a PSC ..... \$11,486

Grant with UNDP for an Urban Displaced Advisor for the U.N. Emergency Unit ..... \$160,000

Grant with OLS/WFP for the repair of Lokichokio base, food monitors, tractor/trailers ... \$1,605,000

TOTAL OFDA FY 1993 ..... \$15,444,269

#### FFP Assistance

Grant with ADRA for Title II ITSH for Khartoum displaced ..... \$334,000

Grant with CRS for 11,890 MT for relief feeding in southern Sudan (first tranche) ..... \$6,076,300

Grant with World Vision Relief & Development for 5,036 MT for relief feeding in southern Sudan ..... \$3,170,500

Grant with WFP for 16,318 MT for feeding Ethiopian refugees in Sudan ..... \$5,564,700

Grant with CRS for 7,792 MT for relief feeding in southern Sudan (second tranche) ..... \$6,181,300

Grant with Save the Children for 4,030 MT for food for work in Showak and Um Ruwaba .. \$1,104,600

Grant with WFP for 18,000 MT Title II for distribution in the transition zone and south through WFP's Emergency Response Food Facility ..... \$12,147,000

TOTAL FFP FY 1993 ..... \$35,231,000

#### USDA Assistance

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has contributed 10,300 MT of corn through Section 416 of the U.S. Food Program, valued at \$5,327,000.

TOTAL USDA FY 1993 ..... \$5,327,000

#### RP Assistance

In 1993, RP to date has contributed \$43 million to UNHCR and \$29 million to ICRC for their Africa-wide programs, a portion of which will be applied for refugee and conflict victims in Sudan.

TOTAL FY 1993 USG Assistance \$56,002,269

  
James Kunder  
Director  
Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance



FEWS: April 23, 1990

**Testimony of Jeff Drumtra, Policy Analyst  
U.S. Committee for Refugees  
on  
Hunger and Humanitarian Issues in Rwanda**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the U.S. Committee for Refugees, I would like to thank you and your Subcommittee colleagues for holding these two days of hearings on international hunger issues, and for devoting this morning's panel to an examination of hunger and other emergency humanitarian needs facing internally displaced persons in the central African country of Rwanda.

I am Jeff Drumtra, Africa policy analyst for the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR). USCR is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization that regularly monitors and assesses the situations of refugees and internally displaced people around the world. As you might expect, hunger is usually a deadly companion of displaced populations. I have recently returned from Rwanda, where some 900,000 Rwandese who fled their homes before and during February now live in temporary, squalid camps that are short on food and other necessities of life. I appreciate your invitation to testify on this emergency today, which is one of the most underreported humanitarian crises on a continent filled with underreported emergencies.

As my testimony will discuss below, an effective humanitarian response to Rwanda by the U.S. should help Rwandese to:

- overcome transportation and logistical difficulties hampering food relief distributions;
- distribute critical non-food assistance such as plastic sheeting, blankets, and health care;
- station larger numbers of neutral military observers in Rwanda's demilitarized zone; and
- reach a political settlement to Rwanda's underlying conflict.

Before I delve more deeply into Rwanda, Mr. Chairman, I would first like to thank you for recently enlarging the scope of your Subcommittee to address international hunger issues. Your Subcommittee's expanded oversight can help partially to fill the large gap left by the unfortunate termination of the House Select Committee on Hunger earlier this year.

You have indicated, Mr. Chairman, that your Subcommittee's two days of hearings will serve at least two purposes: to examine general mechanisms that can enable U.S. and UN humanitarian assistance agencies to respond more quickly and effectively to emergencies worldwide; and to help Congress better understand the humanitarian conditions and needs that currently exist in specific countries such as Rwanda. Therefore, I will try to address both levels of concern. My testimony begins with a brief review of the political and historical roots of this latest



humanitarian crisis in Rwanda. Surely one of the recurring themes in your two-day hearing is that emergency food shortages are often the result of politics rather than acts of Mother Nature. This is the case in Rwanda. Secondly, I will describe the current humanitarian needs in Rwanda based on my site visit there last month. Thirdly, I will offer several concrete policy recommendations for your consideration. Finally, my testimony points to some general lessons from the Rwanda emergency that the Subcommittee can apply to other humanitarian crises around the world.

## II. BACKGROUND OF RWANDA'S CURRENT HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY

### *Pre-1990 Roots of Ethnic Conflict*

Today's humanitarian emergency in Rwanda is rooted in the country's history. Rwanda's estimated 7.6 million people are divided into two principal ethnic groups: about 87 percent of Rwandese are ethnic-Hutu; most of the remaining 13 percent are ethnic-Tutsi. These two ethnic groups have endured a sordid history of mutual slaughter since independence in 1962.

This ethnic animosity is largely the legacy of Belgian colonialists and, later, Rwandan demagogues, who have used divide-and-rule tactics to retain their own power and privilege. Belgian colonialists, for example, allowed only Tutsis to attend school until the late 1940s, installed Tutsi chiefs over Hutu regions, and pressed Hutu men into forced labor gangs under Tutsi overseers who were themselves often forced to work against their will.

Prior to independence, therefore, the Tutsi were politically dominant despite their minority status. In the pre-independence turmoil of 1959-62, representatives of the majority Hutu took control from the Tutsi. More than 20,000 Tutsi were butchered in the power struggle, and several thousand persons fled to surrounding countries, where they became--and remain--refugees. By some estimates, 40-70 percent of Rwandese Tutsis fled their country during 1959-64.

Deadly ethnic upheaval has continued sporadically inside and around Rwanda into the 1990s, in large part because the government did not lead all Rwandans toward a way of living together that would have enabled a half-million Rwandese refugees who are outside the country to return home.

### *1990 Invasion by Exiles*

The half-million Rwandese exiles forced to live outside their country were largely forgotten by the outside world until they forced their way into the world's consciousness by forcibly re-entering Rwanda in October 1990. An armed force of Rwandese exiles composed mostly—but not exclusively—of Tutsi invaded Rwanda from neighboring Uganda on October 1, 1990. A vicious civil war ensued which initially uprooted some 300,000 persons and left the rebels in control of much of northern Rwanda. President Juvenal Habyarimana and his ruling party, which is largely composed of select northern Hutu clans, have survived militarily only because of substantial French military assistance. The invading exiles and the government declared a cease fire in July 1992.

The 1990 invasion triggered important social reforms. The country's apartheid-like identity card system was eliminated, and the ruling party was pushed closer to multiparty democracy. Human rights abuses continued, however, including large-scale massacres of Tutsi civilians by the President's supporters. In January 1993, a distinguished international team of human rights experts announced its findings that soldiers and agents of the Rwandan government have conducted systematic murder, rape, and other violations against civilians, mostly against ethnic Tutsis. Human rights investigators also discovered widespread evidence of genocide and other war crimes. The human rights team concluded that the perpetrators "were following superiors' orders" and that "the failure and/or refusal of the authorities, at the highest levels, to investigate all these massacres and punish those responsible indicates complicity in this." The human rights investigators criticized government and rebel forces and concluded that "a climate of terror pervades Rwandan life."

Despite these atrocities against civilians, the July 1992 cease fire between government and rebel armies remained in effect, and multiparty talks on power sharing reached a tentative accord in January 1993. The power sharing agreement raised expectations that multiparty elections were imminent. The European Community hailed the political pact as a "dynamic quest...for a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict."

### *1993 Resumption of War*

The January 1993 power-sharing accord appeared to bring all Rwandans tantalizingly close to peace after decades of bloodletting. Within days of the accord, however, cause for optimism vanished. Violence erupted. Terrified Rwandese fled their homes. This rapid chain of events led to the current humanitarian emergency in Rwanda which, thanks to you, Mr. Chairman, is receiving much-needed attention at today's hearing.

The violence erupted in late January when youthful supporters of Rwanda's ruling party, the National Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND), went on a rampage clearly intended to scuttle the peace agreement that had been reached days earlier. President Habyarimana and his hardline supporters protested that the accord negotiated by duly appointed officials did not adequately protect the MRND's hold on power. President Habyarimana fired the negotiator who had been a chief architect of the peace plan. Party zealots, fueled by the President's action, initiated violence in Kigali, the capital city, which then spread to the countryside. Rwanda's President, in effect, invited a relapse into bloody chaos.

Hundreds of Tutsi civilians were then murdered. Houses were systematically destroyed. In reaction, the rebel Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), which had agreed to the negotiated accord, but whose record is also blemished, scrapped the cease fire and attacked on February 8, advancing within a few miles of the capital, Kigali. Some 600,000 Rwandese fled the renewed fighting, adding to the 300,000 persons who had fled warfare in previous years. The massive population displacement left empty the most fertile farm land in an overcrowded country which struggles to feed itself even in normal times.

A new cease fire took effect on March 9, and the RPF agreed to withdraw its troops to positions held before the February 8 attack, thereby creating a demilitarized but highly dangerous buffer zone some 20 miles wide and approximately 40 miles long between the two armies. Today, an estimated 600,000 Rwandese remain internally displaced at some 30 camps south of the buffer zone, while another 300,000 or more have returned to live in the dangerous no-man's land between the two armies.

### III. RWANDA'S HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY & ASSISTANCE NEEDS

The U.S. Committee for Refugees and a handful of other agencies and officials have closely monitored humanitarian conditions in Rwanda affecting the 900,000 Rwandese who have fled their homes in the past 30 months. In early February this year, USCR notified newspapers across the U.S. that Rwanda was undergoing a crisis that "almost no one is watching adequately." On February 18, U.S. officials in Rwanda cabled their superiors in Washington that "a disaster exists" in Rwanda and warned that "the food situation is grim." On February 23, U.S. officials cabled a warning about "a catastrophe in the making" and noted that "more displaced are arriving every hour." On April 13, the ICRC announced that "900,000 displaced people in Rwanda face a

major humanitarian catastrophe." Throughout March and April, we at USCR continued our efforts to bring Rwanda's emergency to the attention of the American press, which has nonetheless remained willfully oblivious to the Rwandan crisis. In May, as the misery of Rwanda's internally uprooted people entered its fourth month, I went to Rwanda to assess the conditions of the war-displaced people first-hand.

### *Needing the Basics of Life -- Food, Shelter, Clothing*

Remember that Rwanda is small, extremely mountainous, and ranks as the most densely populated country in Africa. This means that the 900,000 people who were forced to flee their homes had almost nowhere to go. I saw the desperation that has led them to construct crowded, makeshift camps that cling precariously to the steep slopes of denuded hills north of the capital, Kigali. This is the rainy season, and I fear that mud slides could easily sweep the huts--and the families within them--down the steep hillsides.

Mr. Chairman, the most basic requirements of human life are food, shelter, and clothing--none of which exists in adequate supply for Rwanda's uprooted people. Many of them told me they fled their homes wearing only the clothes on their back in the frantic nighttime hours of February 8 when the war suddenly erupted anew. The small huts used for shelter provide scant protection from Rwanda's rainy season and the chilly night air in the mountains. Two of the most urgent--and simple--needs are plastic sheeting so that families can protect their huts from the rain, and more blankets for warmth against the cold. I saw that much of the plastic sheeting donated by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which local relief officials distributed in February, is beginning to tear and wear out, and entire families are trying to stay warm by sharing a single small blanket. In addition, these hastily constructed camps lack sanitation systems, water wells, regular health care, or education systems.

Food distributions in the camps are irregular, and some Rwandese families in the camps must make their 10-day food rations stretch for 20-25 days. The result, according to Red Cross field workers with whom I spoke, is that some persons receive less than 1,000 calories per day--half the minimum caloric intake humans require. Malnutrition is climbing and affects about 100,000 displaced Rwandese, according to a recent study. Red Cross doctors told me that dysentery, malaria, and other infectious illnesses associated with malnutrition and weakened immune systems are on the rise. One series of camps near Kigali, where food distributions are somewhat more frequent, nonetheless suffers 28 deaths per week among its population of 25,000, according to the Red Cross.



Rwandese families are going hungry even though, by all accounts, international donors have contributed enough relief food to meet the immediate need of 12,000 tons per month. The problem is transportation. Rwanda is a landlocked country and must rely on shipments by air or by truck. When I visited Rwanda in early May, three daily airlifts of food had been reduced to one plane per day due to a shortage of aviation fuel. Relief workers told me they have encountered a shortage of large trucks as they try to ship 20 truck loads of food per day into Rwanda, and road closures have blocked food deliveries from Uganda.

Delivering relief assistance to needy Rwandese is further complicated by the fact that as many as 300,000 Rwandese have begun leaving the camps and are returning to their war-damaged homes in the still-dangerous demilitarized zone, where food is scarce and general insecurity has hampered relief efforts. I visited this buffer zone and found a total absence of medicines and basic services. On March 12, the UN Security Council had passed Resolution #812 urging the RPF rebels and the government forces to grant safe passage for relief supplies and Rwandese wanting to return home to the demilitarized zone. On March 17, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) asked the two sides to hasten negotiations so that displaced persons could go home. On May 5, NGOs operating in Rwanda, including Oxfam, Caritas, the Belgian Red Cross, and Medecins Sans Frontieres, publicly urged the Rwandan president and the RPF to reach a security agreement "without the least delay" so that NGOs could begin providing desperately needed humanitarian assistance in the dangerous buffer zone.

Finally, on May 30--less than two weeks ago--the government and the RPF signed an agreement allowing resettlement and humanitarian aid in the demilitarized zone. It remains too early, however, to assess the effectiveness of this agreement. The May 30 accord further states that neutral unarmed international military observers will provide security in the demilitarized zone and pledges both armies to identify land mines they have left behind in the war area.

#### *Now Is The Pivotal -- But Expensive -- Moment*

Humanitarian conditions in Rwanda have reached a pivotal moment. As the crisis drags into its fifth month, medical workers told me that health conditions will deteriorate at an accelerated pace if food distribution remains sporadic at the camps and large numbers of war-affected Rwandese in the buffer zone remain inaccessible to relief workers. On the other hand, relative normalcy could return within six months if all displaced families are able to return home safely and receive reliable deliveries of food and medicine until the next harvest in December. Rich soil in the war-affected region offers two and sometimes three growing seasons annually.

Rwanda need not be a long-term humanitarian emergency if the appropriate political and assistance steps occur now and over the next six months. Perhaps the requisite political steps are beyond the influence of this Subcommittee, but the humanitarian assistance steps are not. United Nations agencies have issued a consolidated appeal of \$78.5 million to donors for April-December 1993. The UN appeal includes \$38 million for food relief and food production, \$15 million to resolve the logistical problems described above, nearly \$15 million for health and special nutrition programs, and \$3 million for water, sanitation, and other needs. UN agencies are also wisely seeking \$5 million for conservation programs to counteract the alarming deforestation that occurred as 900,000 displaced persons desperately chopped trees to make room for their huts and to find wood for cooking and warmth. I saw recent deforestation and soil erosion that will last for decades, affecting the livelihoods of local residents long after all 900,000 internally displaced persons have finally returned home.

The Belgian Red Cross is devoting some \$4.8 million to Rwanda in the first six months of this year to distribute sorely needed non-food items such as blankets and plastic sheeting. The International Committee of the Red Cross has launched an emergency appeal of \$88 million--nearly one-third of the agency's entire Africa budget--for food and medical aid, sanitation programs, and tracing of separated Rwandese families. ICRC's appeal remains \$22 million unfunded, however. Other organizations such as Catholic Relief Services, Africare, CARE, Oxfam/U.K., and Medecines Sans Frontieres/Belgium are also operative in Rwanda and will attempt to expand their programs.

I am pleased to learn that USAID plans virtually to double its commitment to Rwanda due to the emergency. USAID's 1993 budget will be approximately \$40 million, most of which will go to emergency relief.

#### IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

##### *1 • Provide funds to improve local transportation/distribution of food relief.*

Even if all displaced Rwandese are able to return home in the near future, food relief will remain necessary for at least six months. Although international donors have supplied food, sufficient amounts fail to reach beneficiaries in Rwanda due to transportation difficulties. Expensive airlifts of food from neighboring countries may remain necessary on a limited basis. Most food can reach beneficiaries by less expensive truck transport if adequate funding is available for road repair and fleet maintenance. Funds for improved monitoring of food distributions can reduce food assistance needs by 20 percent.

**2 • *Provide funds for critical non-food assistance such as plastic sheeting, blankets, and health services.***

Shelter is a critical problem in the camps for displaced Rwandese. Even if all displaced Rwandese are able to return home in the near future, adequate shelter will remain problematic as Rwandese rebuild their permanent houses that were destroyed by war and pillagers. A simple investment in more blankets will reduce health problems later. It is unacceptable that five or more persons are forced to share a single blanket in Rwanda's chilly night climate. All reports agree that the health status of displaced Rwandese is deteriorating. Even if all displaced Rwandese are able to return home in the near future, they will find local health clinics stripped bare.

**3 • *Provide diplomatic assistance to the neutral international military observers who must police the dangerous demilitarized zone to which displaced persons are trying to return.***

Most displaced Rwandese cannot--and should not--return home until it is safe to do so. At last report, fewer than 50 neutral military observers, sponsored by the Organization of African Unity, were in Rwanda. They are too few to provide the security necessary in the demilitarized zone. Their expanded presence is essential to bolster the tentative agreement governing the demilitarized zone.

**4 • *Supply strong diplomatic support to the overall peace process under negotiation between the Rwanda government and the RPF.***

I realize this recommendation stretches the purview of this Subcommittee, but ultimately the humanitarian emergency in Rwanda is rooted in political problems. The U.S. should rally behind Rwanda's ongoing peace process in an unbiased fashion. The peace process is more likely to reach a final resolution if the U.S. provides a much-needed counterweight to the blatantly pro-government position of French diplomats and the French military. The goal must not be for one side to win, but for an accommodation that yields a democratic system that responds to the legitimate needs of all Rwandans.

## **V. LESSONS FROM RWANDA'S HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY**

Mr. Chairman, you have indicated that one of the purposes of these two days of hearings--beyond exploring the dire needs of Rwanda--is to examine mechanisms that can enable U.S. and UN humanitarian assistance agencies to respond more quickly and effectively to emergencies

worldwide. Surely many of the operational relief agencies testifying at this hearing can offer you excellent, specific recommendations that would improve their operational abilities in the field.

Although the U.S. Committee for Refugees does not operate relief programs in the field, USCR regularly makes assessment visits to emergencies around the world. Our experience has caused us to note repeatedly that effective humanitarian response requires at least five components: **early warnings** from the field about the emergency (which we at USCR attempt to provide); **rapid response** and **sustained response** from donors and relief organizations; **close coordination** among relief organizations in the field and at headquarters; and **political resolution** of the underlying conflict that caused the humanitarian crisis.

### *Early Warning*

One absolutely essential mechanism is that relief workers and other officials in the field must supply quick, early warnings of an unfolding emergency to their headquarters in Washington, New York, or Geneva. Reports from the field must credibly assess humanitarian needs and must not shy away from prescriptions for bold action, where appropriate. As I detailed in Part III, the record clearly demonstrates that NGOs and U.S. officials in the field in Rwanda provided ample warning of the emergency to any donors and others who were willing to listen.

### *Rapid Response*

Several nongovernmental relief organizations (NGOs) in Rwanda complain that slow responses from international donors have hindered the ability of NGOs to respond rapidly to the emergency needs of Rwanda's internally displaced population. It seems clear to me that a shortage of such basics as blankets and plastic sheeting five months into the emergency is unacceptable. We at USCR see this systemic problem repeated around the world. The UN system--and the nations that fund it--must devise a better staffed and better financed emergency response capability. NGOs must have immediate access to a larger pool of emergency funds so that time-consuming fundraising appeals do not slow their operations.

### *Sustained Response*

Whether the world will mount the sustained response required to alleviate Rwanda's crisis remains to be seen. UN agencies and NGOs in Rwanda have explained the financial needs of their emergency response programs in Rwanda through December, but it is too early to know if their appeals will receive funding.



### ***Close Coordination***

The international community must devise a stronger international mechanism to decide which relief agencies are best equipped to respond to an emergency in a given corner of the world. Currently the international relief community addresses humanitarian emergencies in an ad hoc manner, and precious response time is lost. The UN formed its Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) last year to improve coordination within the UN, and DHA has issued a consolidated funding appeal for Rwanda on behalf of other UN agencies, but DHA must cultivate closer links with NGOs in order to coordinate effectively during humanitarian emergencies. In Rwanda, NGO workers told me that they lack adequate coordination with the Rwanda government, primarily due to some government officials' unresponsiveness at crucial moments in the crisis.

### ***Political Resolution***

These emergencies are political as well as humanitarian. Rather than wait for conflict to erupt before we respond, the world community, led by the U.S., should engage in preventive diplomacy which could nip political disputes in the bud before they produce humanitarian tragedies. The UN Security Council, for example, should operate a permanent mediation office. If conflict erupts nonetheless, the UN should ensure that aggressive diplomatic efforts accompany--and complement--relief programs. In Rwanda, for example, final peace can occur only when repatriation occurs for refugees currently forced to live outside the country. The slow peace process in Rwanda would, I am convinced, respond favorably to international diplomatic pressure.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to testify.

Testimony of Peter Shiras, Senior Director, Africa Region,  
Catholic Relief Services, USCC

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for this opportunity to speak on behalf of Catholic Relief Services (CRS) on the question of early intervention in emergency situations, particularly in reference to the current situation in Rwanda. Let me also say that I welcome the timely initiatives on the part of this Subcommittee to fill the void left by the abolition of the Select Committee on Hunger.

1993 marks the fiftieth anniversary of CRS's work as a development and relief organization. The organization has been working in Rwanda for over thirty years, supporting both development projects and emergency relief initiatives.

I would like to focus my remarks today on two main topics. First, I will address the specific situation in Rwanda in terms of the timeliness and adequacy of the response to the humanitarian crisis. Second, I will make some recommendations of a more general nature about how the international community can strengthen the response to emergencies.

I. The Emergency Response in Rwanda

The CRS response to the current emergency began in 1990 when the initial invasion from Uganda into Rwanda took place. CRS has provided emergency assistance in blankets, plastic sheeting, household items, housing rehabilitation and food aid using both our own private funds and resources provided by the Agency for International Development (AID). We have worked primarily through our local partner organization, Caritas of Rwanda, which has an

extensive network of parish committees which provide assistance to all of the needy.

Generally speaking, the response of the international community to the humanitarian situation in Rwanda prior to the February 8 attack was satisfactory.

In the wake of the renewal of hostilities between government forces and those of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR) in February and the consequent upsurge in the number of displaced persons from approximately 350,000 to one million, the gravity of the humanitarian crisis escalated sharply. Needless to say, the displacement of that number of people, 14% of the total population, in such a small, densely populated country has had enormous repercussions for the displaced themselves, for the communities inundated by the displaced and for the very fragile environment already suffering from high population pressure. For many of the displaced living in squalid camps of up to 70,000 people with inadequate supplies of food, water and shelter and without public health facilities, the conditions were nothing short of horrific.

The tripling of the number of displaced persons in Rwanda from 350,000 to 1 million in February outstripped the capacity of relief agencies on the ground to manage the situation. While donor response has generally been good, several factors contributed to the current situation of inadequate relief and growing malnutrition in the displaced person camps. Let me mention five issues of primary importance.

First, a major problem has been competition for resources with

other major emergencies in the immediate area and world-wide. Rwanda is competing for human as well as material resources with both Sudan and Somalia in the East Africa region and with a host of other emergencies world-wide. This has been a major constraint in terms of the availability of experienced emergency managers and of both food and non-food aid. Being a small country, with a small AID Mission, without a constituency to support increased levels of aid and without publicity have all contributed to the resource problem faced by Rwanda.

The second constraint has been a logistical one. While Rwanda itself has fairly good infrastructure, the roads to Rwanda are long and in poor condition. The trip must either be made through Kenya and Uganda or through Tanzania.

The logistical problems have been compounded by the third constraint which is a political one. As a result of the fighting in February, the roads into Rwanda from Uganda have been closed, greatly complicating the delivery of relief supplies. Most relief has had to be flown in by air from Uganda which has been both expensive and limited in supply. It appears that after initial attempts by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the World Food Program (WFP) has now reached a tentative agreement with the government and the rebels to open the road. Nonetheless, the closure of that road due to political issues has hurt the overall relief effort.

A fourth problem in Rwanda has been weak coordination among and between donors, the host government and implementing



organizations. While the host government has assumed responsibility for coordination, it has not received adequate support and training to carry out this task effectively. On the side of implementing agencies, there is some regional coordination in the field, but no effective coordination nationwide between the U.N agencies, the ICRC and the non-governmental organizations (NGO's).

Finally, a specific problem for organizations requesting support from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is the lack of timeliness of their response to funding requests. In the case of Rwanda, OFDA responded very quickly at the outset with a material aid shipment of shelter materials. However, in response to specific funding requests, delays in OFDA funding stretch into months.

## II. Recommendations for Improving Timely Response to Emergencies

The Congressional Research Service recently completed an interesting report entitled "Drought in Southern Africa: Impact and Lessons for the Future." The report underscores five areas which contributed to the largely successful effort to avert famine as a result of the devastating 1992 drought in southern Africa. These were: democratic political systems, good infrastructure, adequate financial resources, early warning systems, and a coordinated donor response.

In looking at the situation in Rwanda, I am struck by the fact

that Rwanda lacks a democratic political system, suffers from problematic infrastructure, lacks adequate financial resources, had no early warning system, and has not benefited from very effective donor coordination. Add to that the fact that the crisis in Rwanda has received virtually no press attention and that Rwanda is of marginal political significance to the West, and it is no wonder that the response has been found wanting. Unfortunately, I believe that future humanitarian emergencies in Africa and the rest of the world will more closely follow the Rwandan paradigm than that of southern Africa.

Therefore, Rwanda offers an illuminating example of strategies which can and should be developed to respond effectively to humanitarian emergencies which are sudden in nature, which emerge out of civil conflict, which have political origins, and which affect large numbers of people, both as refugees and as displaced persons.

I would like to offer five specific recommendations which, while certainly by no means a comprehensive listing of all the issues important to early humanitarian intervention, would go far towards improving responsiveness.

#### A. Preventive Diplomacy

The first and most important way to improve the international community's response to emergencies that result from civil conflict is to prevent them from occurring in the first place and/or to

limit their intensity. This can only be accomplished through active and sustained diplomatic initiatives in which the United States, as the world's only remaining superpower, must play a leading role. The U.S. role, however, should not be primarily unilateral in nature, but rather the U.S. should work with multilateral institutions, both global such as the U.N. and regional such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to develop diplomatic solutions to emerging conflicts. The U.S. government should also work closely with other regional powers (such as France and Belgium in the case of Rwanda) to ensure coordinated policy approaches.

The lesson which should be drawn from Somalia more than anything else is the tremendously high cost, both in terms of human lives and in financial terms, of the world's neglect of a growing humanitarian crisis. The gravity of the situation in Somalia was known, but not until it had reached unspeakable proportions did the international community act. Informed, sustained and early diplomatic involvement would likely have limited the magnitude of the disaster.

U.S. support for democratic reform and sustainable development are not only appropriate foreign aid policies of the U.S. government, but will also help to prevent and mitigate humanitarian emergencies. As the Congressional Research Service report referred to earlier argues, countries with democratic systems are less likely to suffer from acute humanitarian emergencies. Likewise, countries pursuing economic development policies which seek to

share the results of development equitably in society will be less subject to the political pressures that lead to civil conflict.

#### B. Emergency Preparedness

There is now more than ever before an awareness that emergencies must be planned for and staff must be trained to respond to them in a highly sophisticated and professional manner. Particularly in the case of sudden-onset emergencies, planning and preparedness are of the utmost importance.

I would like to make several recommendations on this point. First, humanitarian emergencies demand the highest standards of professionalism and non-partisanship from aid providers. Training in international humanitarian law and in guidelines which several organizations, including CRS and the Humanitarianism and War Project of Brown University, have developed on the provision of humanitarian assistance in conflict situations should be increased for all practitioners whether they be in NGO's, the U.N. system or the U.S. government. Training should also focus on identifying the appropriate resource mix for emergency response and the links between relief and rehabilitation.

Second, preparedness also requires a greater institutional and financial commitment to emergency response than has often been the case in the past. The low priority accorded to emergency compared to development programs in AID and the security restrictions in the U.N. system are symptomatic of institutional limitations in terms of emergency response and the effectiveness of early intervention.



### C. Coordination

Coordination among and between both donors and implementing agencies is a key constraint to effective early intervention. There is no one agency responsible for emergency coordination despite the fact that the United Nations claims that mantle. However, on too many occasions, the U.N. has been absent from critical emergencies, has delegated the coordination task to UNDP Resident Representatives who have been unfamiliar with emergency operations, or have only operated on the government side of a conflict when humanitarian relief must work on both sides.

The need for effective coordination is axiomatic. The U.N. system should provide that coordination and should be supported to do so. The U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) should have the authority, first of all, to harmonize the operations of the U.N. agencies and then to coordinate all emergency response operations. To do so, DHA must be adequately staffed with emergency professionals, adequately funded, and adequately trained to work with governments, NGO's and other irregular providers of humanitarian assistance.

### D. The Appropriateness of Relief Interventions

Emergency operations require a mix of resources broadly characterized as food and non-food inputs. Typically, emergency appeals have received adequate responses to the food aid requests, but inadequate levels of non-food assistance. In order to make early intervention effective, more funding should be made available

both for non-food items that are critical to relief and for local purchase of food when it is available. Too much of a dependence on in-kind assistance can have detrimental results in both the short and long-term.

In addition, innovative solutions to emergency preparedness can help to promote early intervention. For example, CRS has developed an emergency preparedness fund in Burkina Faso for quick response to emergencies in that country and Niger with support from AID to monetize food commodities and use the funds to purchase food locally. This and other similar initiatives can improve timely emergency response.

Similarly, the U.S. government and other donors should ensure that non-food items receive as much priority as food items in responding to appeals. Not only does too much food damage rehabilitation efforts, but also small amounts invested in public health and agricultural rehabilitation programs can save both lives and resources spent on continued food aid.

#### E. Responsiveness of OFDA

Generally, as the recent General Accounting Office report documents, CRS has been satisfied with the performance of OFDA in terms of its support for emergency operations. There are, however, several areas where I believe OFDA could improve.

First, is the timely approval of grants. In some cases, CRS has had to wait over eight months for approval of emergency grants. This is unacceptable. Given the number of emergencies throughout

the world to which we are currently responding, we simply do not have the capacity to respond to them all with private funds. It should be emphasized that often the delay in grant approval has nothing to do with the substance of the proposed response but rather is due to the bureaucratic procedures within AID. These should be streamlined for emergency responses. It is our hope that the recently issued guidelines will expedite OFDA's response to emergencies and not further impede it.

Second, OFDA should replicate the highly effective structure which they put in place to respond to the Somali crisis. I am referring here to the Disaster Response Team, (DART) which was put into place in the field with the necessary authority to make quick decisions. While not every emergency lends itself to this approach, it was highly successful in Somalia and should be replicated elsewhere.

Finally, I recommend that OFDA continue the very positive trend which we have seen recently of strong support for efforts aimed at disaster mitigation. While the first priority must be saving lives, support for mitigation activities accomplishes that end as well as setting the stage for recovery. OFDA can do much to support the training and preparedness which is so essential to effective emergency response.

Mr. Chairman, let me close by thanking you for this opportunity to present the views of Catholic Relief Services and I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have.

## SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AGRICULTURE AND HUNGER

STATEMENT OF ROSS VARTIAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR  
ARMENIAN ASSEMBLY OF AMERICA

## OVERVIEW

Mr. Chairman. Armenia today is a nation without adequate food, energy, medicines, and shelter for its people. Only in its second year of independence, this country of 3.6 million is in a state of crisis brought on by the blockades imposed by Azerbaijan and by Turkey as a result of the conflict in Nagorno-karabakh.

This dire situation is compounded by the continuing effects of the 1988 earthquake, which left thousands dead and half a million homeless, and the influx of 380,000 refugees from Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. Currently, over one third of the population in Armenia is without permanent shelter.

In December 1992, the President of Armenia accurately characterized his country to be in a "state of national disaster" when he called upon the international community for humanitarian aid. Without the generous response of the United States, and others, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees' prediction of 30,000 dead during the bitter winter months of 1992/1993 would have become a reality.

I just returned from Armenia last week. While the mile long breadlines of the winter have been replaced with a bread-rationing system of 250 grams per person per day, the daily struggle for existence continues. One sad legacy of a winter without energy is a country denuded of its trees, the only source of heat for most of the population.

The average monthly salary in Armenia, where unemployment is the norm because of severe energy and supply shortages occasioned by the blockades, is 3,022 rubles/month (about \$3.00); pensioners receive 2,500 rubles/month. In pre-inflation days, these benefits were reasonable; today, they provide less than two-thirds of the cost of a survival food basket of goods.

On average, prices of basic food items (non-meat) increase by 10-15 rubles per day. Meat and cheese and other non-basic staples, as defined by Armenians, increase at about 30 rubles per day. At today's prices, one kilo of cheese costs 1,300 rubles, one kilo of sugar costs 1,000 rubles, and one chicken is priced at 1400 rubles.



## VULNERABLE GROUPS

In an effort to coordinate more effectively the in-country needs and responses to those needs, the Armenian Government produced a document detailing the emergency humanitarian assistance required from July 1993 through June 1994. This document is being distributed to many inter-governmental, UN and non-governmental agencies in Geneva during a UN sponsored humanitarian conference on Armenia taking place today. I would like to submit a copy of that report as part of the record Mr. Chairman.

The report identifies almost 50 percent of the Armenian population as being "at risk" for the upcoming winter. The populations designated as most vulnerable in order of priority for emergency humanitarian support include:

- Pregnant women, single mothers, and young children  
447,000
- Elderly pensioners  
440,000
- Destitute families and the Disabled  
565,000
- Refugees and Displaced persons  
150,000
- Earthquake victims  
200,000

There are 640,000 elderly pensioners (approximately 440,000 of them among the most destitute) in Armenia, of whom about 20 percent live alone. According to the results of a CARE survey undertaken in December 1992, between 15-20 percent of pensioners have had measured weight losses of at least 5 kg (11 lbs.) in the last six months. The Centers for Disease Control report of January 1993 on elderly concludes that the number of pensioners who have sold personal possessions in order to buy food has increased from 13% in April 1992 to 38% in 1993, and 20% no longer have food reserves in their houses.

The very young in Armenia are also particularly susceptible. A UNICEF team, based on an assessment mission to Armenia in November 1992, concluded that 500,000 children, aged between 0 and 6 years, were at risk because of the current situation. Severe malnutrition (below 70 percent weight-for-height) in children was measured at 8.6 percent, versus 0.7 percent just six months earlier.

According to the State Refugee Affairs Commission in Armenia, more than 380,000 refugees from Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh have arrived in Armenia since the conflict began in 1988. These educated, hard working people now find themselves living in sub-standard conditions in communal refugees centers, unemployed and with no means of providing for their families except for meager state stipends. Due to financial restrictions, the UNHCR and IFRC can provide supplemental food packets to only 130,000 out of the total 380,000 refugees currently in Armenia.

Also, Turkey's escalating participation in the blockade of Armenia (now a total blockade) has halted the American Red Cross refugee feeding program in Armenia. By not permitting food stuffs already purchased in Turkey to cross from Turkey into Armenia, 50,000 refugee families dependent upon this vital food aid are left wanting.

Earthquake orphans continue to be a group in need of humanitarian assistance. More than four years after the earthquake, over 200,000 people remain without permanent housing.

As outlined in the UN's Inter-Agency Task Force Report on Humanitarian Assistance Requirements for the Newly Independent States, the latest food assessment mission carried out by our colleagues from Food and Agriculture Organization and World Food Program (FAO/WFP) show that Armenia has a substantial structural deficit of grains. Armenia lacks foreign exchange and has few prospects, in the near term, for earning sufficient hard currency resources. Domestic agricultural production can supply only part of Armenia's food needs. Food available under arrangements concluded to date, assuming these supplies can be transported into Armenia through Georgia, still leaves large gaps for important staple foods.

In addition to the serious food grain deficit, animal feed is needed as well. Shortages over the past two years caused a nearly 60 percent decline in poultry and a 28 percent decline in cattle, sheep and pigs. Out of 400,000 tons of animal feed required per year, Armenia can produce only 150,000 tons due to shortages of raw materials.

According to the Republic of Armenia's Ministry of Agriculture, local production of milk and dairy products are estimated at meeting less than 24 percent of the country's needs, severely increasing the risk to pregnant and lactating mothers and children under 5 years of age. Due to inadequate diets and stress, the Ministry of Health in Armenia reports that 63 percent of mothers are no longer able to breast feed their infants past the age of four months. This serious condition is compounded by a critical shortage of baby formula and baby food, all of which must be imported.

## U.S. ASSISTANCE

In FY 92, the Republic of Armenia received 3.5 million from the United States Government for developmental assistance and \$50 million worth of US government humanitarian assistance including medicines, wheat, dry milk and baby formula. The combined figures for FY 93, including transportation costs, are approximately \$195 million.

We commend the United States Government for taking the lead in providing substantial emergency humanitarian assistance. USDA surplus commodities of butter oil, wheat, flour, and butter played an important role in providing bread, the staple foodstuff in Armenia, and other basics. The provisions of seed and fuel for spring planting, the Department of Defense provision of transport, the crucial monitoring and logistic work provided by the NIS Coordination Office at the State Department under the direction of Ambassador Armitage and now Ambassador Simons, all contribute significantly to Armenia's survival.

## INTEGRATED HUMANITARIAN AID SYSTEMS

Since the December 1992 appeal by Armenia and the influx of humanitarian assistance, the Armenian government, with the help of USAID, Western PVOs, and active international support, has organized its Ministry of Economy as the point of contact for all humanitarian assistance.

The Ministry of Economics acts as the coordination unit with all UN agencies, bilateral donors, the European Community, and various PVOs in country. This approach ensures better coordination, avoids duplication of effort and enhances Armenia's ability to absorb incoming aid.

The Humanitarian Assistance Commission, a consultative group made up of government and non-government representatives, works together to identify vulnerable groups not currently receiving assistance. Our organization, the Armenian Assembly, is a member of this Commission.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is currently in Yerevan and will be providing training and advisory services (through a USAID grant) to the Ministry of Economy to strengthen its capacity to plan, receive and distribute aid from abroad.

The USAID/InterAction mission is an excellent example of joint governmental and non-governmental cooperation in the design of a strategic program of emergency response for vulnerable groups exposed to life-threatening living conditions in the TransCaucasus region. Initiated by the USAID Task Force on Emergency Humanitarian Assistance, the group, which includes representatives from USAID, USDA, Centers for Disease Control, State NIS office, and 10-15 various private voluntary organizations (PVOs) interested in becoming project oriented in the region, will travel to Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan for purposes of proposal writing later this month.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS:

- o expand humanitarian assistance programs
- o increase longer-term development assistance in order to strengthen indigenous capacities
- o continue financial support for organizations such as Centers for Disease Control in order to assist Armenian officials in the monitoring of food availability and nutrition levels in the country
- o establish regular monitoring of and reporting on state interference in humanitarian relief operations in the region
- o immediate approval of the TransCaucasus strategy designed by USAID Task Force on Emergency Humanitarian Assistance office in order to establish assistance delivery mechanisms prior to the coming winter

#### CONCLUSION

Without peace and an end to the blockades by Turkey and Azerbaijan, the coming winter will be measurably worse than the last. The food supply situation in Armenia is alarming. Supplies of rationed commodities are irregular and stockpiles of staples are few to none. Once again, the United States Government is in the forefront of Western assistance by aiding Armenia in planning ahead for the winter of 1993/1994.

(Attachments follow:)



## Republic of Armenia

### Emergency Humanitarian Support For The Vulnerable Population Groups And Related Critical Import Needs (July 1993-June 1994)

#### SUMMARY

This report presents information on the overall needs of Armenia for food, fuels, medicines and other imports essential to the well-being of the general population, including in particular those items needed for the survival of the most vulnerable groups. The document covers the period from July 1, 1993, until the harvest of significant local agricultural production (winter-sown wheat), which starts in July of 1994. The intervening period will be extremely difficult.

Armenia's severe economic problems are one result of the confluence of extraordinary changes buffeting Armenia: the collapse of traditional trade arrangements with the break up of the Soviet Union and instability in Georgia; the blockade resulting from the fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh; the withdrawal of Union fiscal subventions; structural changes such as the sudden use of world market prices for Armenia's imports instead of the former (administered) prices; and the strongly negative effects on living standards and the economy of Armenia's inability to supply adequate fuels--all on top of the lingering problem of refugees and displaced persons.

By the end of 1992, Gross Domestic Product had fallen to just 36 percent of its 1989 level. With a continuation of the conditions now facing Armenia, production cannot remain even at current levels in the future. Further, the country's productive capacity is ill-suited for the efficient growth needed in the future. Armenia lacks foreign exchange and has few prospects for earning sufficient hard currency resources in the near term. (The Government projects a balance of trade deficit of \$200-250 million for 1993.) In addition, the Government's tax revenues are small vis-à-vis the many social problems facing the population.

The country has survived two hard winters with little fuel or electricity--and no heating. As part of the ruble zone, Armenia participates in Russia's raging inflation. Employment is falling. Critically needed fuel imports are not available without problems that included pipeline sabotage; medicines, vaccines and related supplies are largely unavailable without the cooperation of the international relief and donor communities and the generosity of Armenia's diaspora. Domestic agricultural production can supply only part of Armenia's food needs. Food available under arrangements concluded to date, even if those supplies can be transported to Armenia, will leave large gaps for important staple foods.

People of modest means are struggling to maintain their well-being. Health problems associated with malnutrition and hypothermia have increased dramatically. The minimum

pension and minimum wage are only 3,000 rubles a month (under than \$4, up from the 2000 rubles paid from January 1-April 18). The new level is still less than two-thirds of the cost of a strictly defined survival food basket. Between 15 and 20 percent of pensioners have had measured weight losses of at least 5 kg in the last six months. With real incomes falling rapidly in the face of inflation and decreasing productive employment possibilities, large segments of the population are spending almost all of their meager incomes on food. Nonetheless, severe malnutrition in children was measured most recently at 8.6 percent, versus 0.7 percent just six months earlier. Sufficient food, medicine and fuel is needed. The pre-conditions exist, after the past winter, for a major trauma for the people of Armenia, especially the vulnerable groups--those most at risk of not surviving a period of large food shortages, especially another harsh winter without fuel and medical attention.

Armenia needs to arrange for significant imports of fuels, cereals, and several other staple foods (butter, sugar, milk and vegetable oil). Medicines and medical supplies are in critically short supply. Moreover, Armenia's vulnerable groups--which account for almost 50 percent of the total population--urgently require emergency humanitarian support, with next winter being a clear crisis point. The Government of Armenia estimates that over 1.7 million Armenians and refugees will need various quantities and kinds of emergency support during the coming period, especially the harshest months--December 1993 through February 1994. These vulnerable groups and proposed food support are described in detail in this paper, along with heating and fuel requirements for the most vulnerable groups and estimated overall medicine and medical supply needs. The estimated total value of the request for food for the most at-risk groups is \$42.6 million, plus international freight and internal transport, shipping and handling costs as summarized in the table on page 17; emergency heating and related transport and fuel needs are summarized on pages 4 and 5 and urgently needed medicines/medical supplies are summarized on page 6. Other essential food requirements for the general population appear as import gaps in the tables on pages 9 and 10.

The Government of Armenia, at the same time that it thanks its international partners who have provided support to date, urges that immediate preparations be undertaken to quickly provide food and other critical supplies. Winter will undoubtedly be a period of crisis for these most at-risk target groups. Food support for pregnant and lactating mothers and small children is needed and should be started immediately. It is imperative that shipments of food assistance for other categories of the at-risk populations be initiated in time to allow pre-positioning and then distribution of supplementary foods before the onset of winter in November. The Government is determined to carry out the democratization and economic reform processes it has undertaken. Without adequate humanitarian assistance, that process may be delayed if not seriously jeopardized.

While the people of Armenia have survived the past winter, and the arrival of spring gives hope that conditions are getting better, the basic conditions remain: without the humanitarian support described in this document, next winter will undoubtedly bring a wide-spread national crisis even worse than at present. Decisions are required now, while there is sufficient time to mount effective relief programs.

The Government pledges that the emergency humanitarian support programs provided through official bodies will receive all the coordination and material and human support that the Government's limited resources can provide. It welcomes the contributions of non-governmental organizations, which it will facilitate as much as requested and is possible.

The Government, on behalf of the 3.7 million Armenians who elected it into office and whom it represents in this gathering, asks your help in averting a national tragedy. Until the Government can announce--and hopefully it will be sooner than we can predict at this point--that this grave crisis is over and no further emergency support is needed, the Government reiterates that programs implemented through official bodies will be implemented effectively and efficiently, in accordance with the clear prioritization laid out in this report (and as improved over time), but also in accordance with strict accountability standards. It also pledges its active support for all non-governmental programs directed to responding to this urgent humanitarian effort.

#### SUMMARY - EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN NEEDS FOR VULNERABLE GROUPS

CATEGORY	PAGE REFERENCE	ESTIMATED COST
Food	see pp. 13-17	\$42,561,820
Heaters	see pp. 4-5	\$2,500,000
Fuel	see pp. 4-5	
- kerosene for heaters		\$7,200,000
- diesel for transport		1,900,000
- mazut for power generation		1,500,000
Drugs and medical supplies	see page 6	\$8,295,293
TOTAL		\$63,957,113

(The complete report is held in the committee files.)





# INTERNATIONAL CHILD NUTRITION AND CHILD SURVIVAL

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TUESDAY, JULY 20, 1993

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AGRICULTURE AND HUNGER,  
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE,  
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:40 a.m., in room 1302, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Timothy J. Penny (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representative Allard.

Staff present: Glenda L. Temple, clerk; Jane Shey, James A. Davis, and Lynn Gallagher.

## OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TIMOTHY J. PENNY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA

Mr. PENNY. The subcommittee will come to order. I want to welcome everyone here to today's hearing, the purpose of which is to examine issues in child nutrition and child survival overseas. According to the United Nations Children's Fund, whose executive director we are very honored to have before us today, there is something like 35,000 children who die every day in the world from malnutrition and preventable diseases. No one can ignore suffering on such a large scale.

The world already has a plan of action to address these problems. In September of 1990, at the World Summit for Children, 159 U.N. member nations, including the United States, made a commitment to address the needs of the world's children. They pledged at that conference to reduce child and infant mortality by one-third, to halve child malnutrition, to reduce maternal deaths by half, and to provide universal access to basic education.

The plan has yet to be implemented, but efforts are underway in this session of the Congress to enact legislation endorsing the goals of the summit. Representative Tony Hall has taken the lead on this issue and is our lead-off witness this morning.

However, much is already being accomplished by UNICEF, USAID and other bilateral donors as well as the PVO community who are on the ground with child immunization programs, oral rehydration therapy, vulnerable group feeding, and other programs targeted to women, infants, and children.

Because of all these programs, child mortality rates have been substantially reduced, and many millions of lives have been saved.

Unfortunately, money remains an obstacle. At a time in which we are reevaluating the way in which U.S. foreign assistance is allocated and the instruments through which it is provided, we must not forget the world's children. In the words of the Chilean poet, Gabriela Mistral, "Many things we need in life can wait, the child cannot. Now is the time his bones are being formed; his blood is being made; his mind is being developed. The child cannot wait until tomorrow. His name is today."

It is in that spirit that we hold this hearing today, with thanks to our panelists and others for their commitment to the cause of the world's children.

I want to apologize for the late start. I just came from a breakfast in which Chairman de la Garza and I hosted the president of AKKOR, a Russian agricultural cooperative. Dr. Bashmachnikov is leading the movement toward free and independent agriculture in Russia. Those numbers now total about 200,000 private farms.

His organization is working very closely with the American farm cooperative, Land O'Lakes, and the development of cooperatives on the American model within the Russian society. So we were quite excited to learn from him the progress they have made.

And I do apologize that that caused me to start this hearing a few minutes behind schedule.

Our ranking minority member, Mr. Allard.

#### **OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WAYNE ALLARD, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO**

Mr. ALLARD. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

I am pleased once again to welcome an impressive array of witnesses before this subcommittee. I am particularly pleased to have Congressman Hall with us to lend his expertise in the important area of child nutrition. I am also pleased to have James Grant, the director-general of UNICEF, with us.

Child nutrition is not a Republican or Democrat issue. It is an issue of equal concern to all of us. Children are the most vulnerable of our society. We need to help ensure that in the developmental stages they are given an adequate diet.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to today's proceedings and to working with you on this issue in the future.

Mr. PENNY. Thank you, Wayne.

With that, we will call forward Representative Tony Hall for his presentation.

We welcome you back, Tony, and we appreciate your continuing efforts on this issue and pledge our cooperation to you as you work to develop a hunger caucus within the Congress to continue your long-standing involvement with this hunger issue.

#### **STATEMENT OF HON. TONY P. HALL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO**

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Allard.

I appreciate very much your ongoing concern, your commitment to world hunger. I certainly appreciate this subcommittee meeting concerning child nutrition and the implementation of the goals of

the World Summit for Children. I commend you for holding this hearing.

As you said, at the World Summit for Children of 1990, 71 heads of state and delegates from a total of 159 nations made promises to the world's children. When they signed the declaration and plan of action at the summit, they pledged by the year 2000 to reduce child death rates by at least one-third, to reduce maternal deaths and child malnutrition by one-half, and to provide children with universal access to basic education. They also said in the declaration, "We are prepared to make available the resources to meet these commitments."

Despite the rhetoric and promises, we are not implementing a multiyear plan to make available the resources to meet these commitments. And while some programs directed toward children's basic needs have received increases in the years since the 1990 summit, there is little sense of direction and leadership to target the aid increases necessary to meet the summit's goals and to leverage increased contributions from other nations.

UNICEF estimates that the overall cost for achieving the summit goals and saving the lives of millions of children is an additional \$25 billion worldwide annually. Two-thirds of the resources would come from the developing nations themselves, with the remaining one-third provided in development assistance from the industrialized nations.

While more money alone is not the complete answer, there has to be a sustained commitment to allocating more resources to summit implementation. In a foreign aid budget of over \$14 billion, certainly we can find the funding to sustain increases in programs that can both save and improve the lives of the world's most vulnerable children.

Congressman Jim Walsh and I have introduced the World Summit for Children Implementation Act of 1993, H.R. 2501. The point of the bill is that we need to draft a specific blueprint and start shifting some dollars in foreign aid funding to make the summit's objectives a reality.

The legislation recommends increases in funding for the next 2 fiscal years for programs like child survival, basic education, UNICEF, micronutrients, and refugees. I want to emphasize these increases would be realized by reallocating money within the foreign aid budget. The increases funded since the summit have occurred through offsets of funding within carefully constructed foreign aid appropriations.

Although the fiscal 1994 foreign operations legislation does not earmark funding for programs like child survival and basic education, it expresses the view that such appropriations should not be reduced, but maintained at their fiscal 1993 levels. And while a freeze certainly is preferable to a cut, especially in a tight budget, a freeze will not move implementation of the summit forward in terms of the resources required.

If the administration ultimately is given great discretion by Congress for foreign aid spending priorities, the sponsors of the World Summit for Children Implementation Act and I are urging the administration to start carrying out this year a multiyear strategy of increases for children's basic needs programs. We cannot expect to

make progress in addressing the serious challenges to the health and well-being of the world's children by running in place with respect to our financial support of effective children's programs.

In addition to proposing specific funding commitments, the bill asks the President to call upon other countries to do their fair share to help meet the goals of the summit. The legislation also requests an annual report from our Government on the progress being made to implement the summit and an accounting of our spending to achieve the goals.

We have it in our power to reduce the suffering of children all around the world. One of the dividends of the post-cold war era is the chance to join with other nations to tackle the plight of the most vulnerable among us. The World Summit for Children of 1990 offered great hope that countries could come together for real action to help children. We must not allow that summit to become yet another dusty collection of unrealized dreams.

Today, you will hear from experts on issues like micronutrient deficiency, breast feeding, and child immunization. You will learn how simple, low-cost interventions can save children's lives.

I would urge this subcommittee to join in the effort to create the political will to make at-risk children in the world a top priority. For a few million dollars, many millions of lives can be saved and even more millions of lives can be made better.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. PENNY. Thank you, Tony. We appreciate your participation.

In your view, what would the U.S. share be for this fund? I think you indicated two-thirds of the commitment would be expected to come from the developing nations themselves, one-third from the industrialized world. What amount would be expected from the United States as our share of that \$8 or \$9 billion attributed to industrialized nations?

Mr. HALL. We are thinking in terms of somewhere between \$700 million to an extra \$1 billion.

Now, remember, this is not an increased appropriation. This is an increased amount of money within the total foreign aid budget that we give now, which is about 1 percent of our total budget.

Of the 1 percent, only 25 percent of that money goes really to poverty programs, to Third World nations. We are saying that is too little. Within that 1 percent we can do much better. And we want to increase it. We want to try to implement this world summit program. So we are talking \$700 million to \$1 billion, which is doable.

Mr. PENNY. What are the specific programs toward which we would apply those funds? Have you suggested how much ought to go to AID, how much ought to go in terms of increased contributions to UNICEF or other—

Mr. HALL. We have suggestions, and we can—if you don't have that file here, we can send it to you.

We would put most of the money, of course, in the child survival activities: Immunization, OIT, nutrients, development assistance, moneys to UNICEF, vitamin A therapy, basic education. But we do break it down.



Mr. PENNY. How do you feel about the—I think it is kind of a four-point policy that the new AID Administrator, Brian Atwood, has established. How do you feel about the areas of emphasis that he has established for his agency's work?

Mr. HALL. To tell you the truth, I haven't read them or studied them. Do you have them in front of you?

Mr. PENNY. I don't have it in front of me.

One is to help with the democratic development. Another is to focus more on the humanitarian side. One was population control. And then the final was economic activity. And I don't know that he breaks that out in terms of microeconomic aid. But those seem to be the four criteria or four priorities that he intends to bring to the work of that agency.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, if it was up to me, I would be very careful about those particular areas, especially the democratic development and the economic development.

When you talk about economic development, I think it is very important that we do everything we can to provide jobs for people. I was just in Haiti a couple of weekends ago and well over 50 percent of the people there are unemployed. So, obviously, these people need to get back to work. We need to help them whenever we can to extend credit, to work with programs we do best.

But we want to be very careful about spending our money within AID that can be better done through the Department of Commerce.

As far as democratic development, I would change AID completely around. I would make it an agency that deals strictly with serving the human needs of the world. And democratic development should be left to other Departments. I would not waste my money on that.

We have such few resources in the world to deal with the human needs. And the most important thing that we do is to take whatever little money that we have, which is 25 percent of 1 percent, and get it to the people who are hurting.

I know you have traveled a lot, Mr. Chairman, but I would like to take you to Haiti. We went a couple of weekends ago. Eighty-five percent of the people are illiterate for the most part. Ninety percent of the people live in poverty where they make less than \$300 a year. Well over 50 percent of the people are unemployed.

In parts of Haiti they live in sewers and wash in sewers. They are lucky to have power for 2 hours a day. And power outside of Port-au-Prince is a joke. And the people are really suffering.

To tell them we are going to spend our money that we spend on foreign appropriations to develop their democratic institutions is a joke. Not that that is not important, but their most important need is to help those people pick themselves up, both short and long term.

So I am not sure what the Administrator is talking about, but those two categories, the democratic development and the economic development, I would be very careful about.

Mr. PENNY. Mr. Allard.

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Congressman Hall, for testifying again before this subcommittee.

In regard to your recent visit to Haiti, recently there was a report on Haiti that found AIDS is spreading quickly there and tu-

berculosis has reached epidemic proportions. What suggestions do you have to address these problems given the political situation in Haiti?

Mr. HALL. We went several places, especially to hospitals, we went to a place called Gonâves, which is about 4 hours by car or by bus from Port-au-Prince. It is up in the northwest in a rural area. And we also, in Port-au-Prince, went to a hospital that was handled for the most part by the Sisters of Charity. That is the group of nuns headed by the ministry of Mother Theresa.

And I said, well, how do you take care of these people? Because to take care of AIDS patients, it is very difficult you need a lot of chemotherapy. You need a lot of different types of drugs. They said, well, we don't have anything. The way we treat them is tender loving care.

The only thing they did really is to keep them quiet. They kept the place immaculate. It was very clean. And they, in my opinion, were allowing them to live and die in dignity. That is how they treat the AIDS patients down there.

They need a tremendous amount of help. It is not only AIDS. It is tuberculosis, which oftentimes, as you suffer from AIDS and HIV, what happens is your immune system goes down. Of course, TB comes in. Almost anything can attack you and kill you—pneumonia, et cetera. So you see a big increase in tuberculosis, in malaria, in typhoid, measles, and malnutrition.

So I wouldn't just address the AIDS problem. I would address the whole gamut of human needs, starting with those of the children. And they need everything.

Haiti has been suffering—it has been 200 years of absolute corruption on the part of the Government officials down there. But in the last 20 months—and it doesn't seem possible—it is worse.

And they have a short-term problem. They have a malnutrition problem down there that I think we are going to need to address. And the embargo supposedly, allegedly, could be lifted in the next 10 days, which would help. But if it is not, we are facing a major catastrophe in this country.

That sounds impossible, because everybody always says that about Haiti. But I met with 32 private voluntary organizations in Haiti one night, and some were international agencies like CARE and others were Haitian NGO's, and I am telling you that they are very concerned and almost near the panic stage.

So, Mr. Allard, I wouldn't just worry about AIDS. I would start with the most basic medicines and items like gauze. We went to one hospital, and the lady didn't even have any bandages.

Mr. ALLARD. I would like to try and clarify some terms.

When I think of starvation, I think of a lack of caloric intake, basically. When I think of malnutrition—a vitamin A deficiency in the diet may be malnutrition but yet the population may carry a pretty good body weight, for example.

When you refer to malnutrition, essentially, are you saying the same thing as starvation?

Mr. HALL. We saw children that were starving. We saw children that were hungry—and adults. We saw adults standing in line. There wasn't enough food for them. And the center that was giving

out food did not anticipate these people coming. We are talking about starving people here.

Mr. ALLARD. Do you think the problem in Haiti—what is more severe? The health problem we have there? Or is starvation more severe?

Mr. HALL. I would say—and this is my third trip and by no means am I an expert—I would say the health care, the health problem, the lack of medicines and health care.

Mr. ALLARD. Do we have other agencies trying to provide health care down there other than through our hunger programs?

Mr. HALL. Well, you have the NGO's, the nonprofits like CARE and Catholic Relief Service. They are doing a great job as well. And almost all of the agencies down there, both private and public, church-related, they have—actually, they have hundreds and hundreds of nonprofits down there working.

But since the embargo has occurred 18 to 20 months ago, what has happened is a lot of people wouldn't be fed. A lot of nations, especially the Western nations, have taken their hands off of Haiti, even though under the embargo you are still allowed to bring in humanitarian aid. They need everything.

Did I answer your question?

Mr. ALLARD. Yes.

It seems to me like maybe the medical care is pretty well fractionated out between yourselves and maybe other groups. It seems to me that maybe we need to have more consolidated effort providing health care down in that small country.

Mr. HALL. Well, we have a lot of groups down there that have contracts with the U.S. Government. Some have contracts with Canada, and France, et cetera. But many Western nations are not participating like they used to.

They are starting to consolidate down there. They are starting—with what little resources they have, they are working together as best they can.

Mr. ALLARD. How would you compare the situation in Haiti with other less developed countries in the world?

Mr. HALL. In 1984, I went to Ethiopia, and I have been to Sudan during their famine, drought, and civil war. In those countries—Ethiopia has 40 to 45 million people. I saw masses of people starving, thousands upon thousands of people in one place actually starving. And I saw 25 to 30 children die one morning. I have never seen anything like that.

Haiti is the poorest nation in our hemisphere. Haiti is different than Ethiopia and Sudan. It is different in this respect. It only has about 7 million people. But those 7 million people are on our back door. If we don't address this issue, we are going to continue to see political problems, refugee problems, and boat problems. And they are going to be continuing to come to Florida.

And what happens is, politically, we continue to look at them, and we try to address the political situation. We forget about the human needs.

Haiti is different than Ethiopia and Sudan because Ethiopia and Sudan are so far away. Logistically, it is a nightmare trying to place aid in there, but the countries of the world have done a ter-



rific job. But Haiti is in our own hemisphere. We ought to be doing a much better role.

Haiti is kind of like a relative that we don't really want to introduce to anybody. It is somebody that doesn't look so good. We hear about this AIDS problem, and all of these people—we treat them like second-class citizens.

And we need to understand that these people are people; they are important, and they have great gifts; and they have been hurt, maligned, and oppressed for so many years; they are in our hemisphere; and they are our neighbors. We ought to be doing a better job with them, and we aren't.

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you very much.

That is all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PENNY. Tony, I thank you again for your participation in this morning's hearing. We are most appreciative of your leadership on this issue, and we again pledge our cooperation to you as you develop a hunger caucus here on the Hill.

We want to make sure your work and our work is complementary and that we maximize the effort applied to the question of world hunger here within the Congress, between your caucus and our subcommittee. We hope to do at least as much as you did so well as chairman of the Select Committee on Hunger over these last several years.

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your time.

Mr. PENNY. With that we call forward our next witness, James Grant, executive director of UNICEF.

Mr. Grant, we welcome you here this morning. Your entire written remarks will appear in the record. You are free to summarize as you wish, and then we will have some questions for you. Thank you.

#### **STATEMENT OF JAMES P. GRANT, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND [UNICEF]**

Mr. GRANT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Allard. It is a privilege to appear before this Subcommittee on Foreign Agriculture and Hunger and present UNICEF's views on the sensitive issues before us.

In my testimony, I basically argue that in this area of development that we are most concerned with—people, their nutrition, their survival, their health—there is a major opportunity now to jumpstart the process and that children and women can, in effect, be the cutting edge of new efforts to overcome the worst manifestations of poverty and underdevelopment.

Such efforts, I argue, would not only radically improve the lives of the world's poor, but also significantly slow population growth and environmental degradation, strengthen democracy and help prevent conflicts, spur economic growth, and improve the status of women.

In short, it would address all four of the goals that Administrator Brian Atwood testified to, which also were laid out in the report by Deputy Secretary Wharton.

We believe that really major progress can be made at relatively modest cost, at an affordable cost, and that it can produce measurable results even by the middle of the decade.



And one of the things that Deputy Secretary Wharton emphasized in his report was that the foreign aid program should seek to define results against which one could measure the success of their efforts.

And, finally, I do argue that U.S. leadership is the key missing link to accomplish the historic unfinished business of the 20th century, which is overcoming the worst aspects of poverty.

What do I mean by jumpstarting development? In essence, we are seeing in the world today a series of situations where major improvements become possible relatively unexpectedly, because of the change in the surrounding environment.

In the political field, one would say that what has happened in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was just such a circumstance, 1989, 1990, and 1991. Due to the power of communication, attitudes so changed that political transformation occurred at a pace—to a degree that nobody had anticipated.

Developmentally, I would say that our analogies are the green revolution in the late 1960's and the early 1970's, the universal child immunization effort of the 1980's. In both cases, most reasonable observers would have said before these efforts started that they were highly unlikely to succeed and would require vastly greater sums than actually were required.

Prior to the green revolution in the late 1960's, high-yielding grain varieties had already been known for some years. The high-yielding wheats had been developed in Mexico in the late 1940's and early 1950's. But they had not spread to Asia because of the fact that, for the success of these new high-yielding varieties farmers needed to have fertilizer, pesticides, controlled irrigation. And this didn't exist in the 1950's.

By the mid-1960's the circumstances had changed, changed in large part due to USAID programs, the point 4 program and others. The concept of the use of fertilizers, pesticides, and controlled irrigation had spread across Asia, and at the same time there was a new level of political concern that the population increase in Asia was going to outrun food production, which historically had in no part of the world ever increased by more than 1.5 to 2 percent a year for any sustained period.

Suddenly, with the drought in south Asia, a new level of political will emerged, and there was a significant increase in the price of food for the cities, and foreign exchange was made available for fertilizers. And we suddenly saw in 7 or 8 years country after country doing what no country in history had ever done before, which is double, a major crop like wheat or rice within less than a 20-year period.

We have the same situation on the immunization front. The vaccines have been around for 15, 20, and 25 years. The polio vaccine was invented in the early 1950's, and the measles vaccine in the early 1960's. But they really hadn't spread through the developing world.

And what made it possible was that over a period of years, radio, television, schools in every village, religious groups had developed their communications systems, retail commercial outlets reached every hamlet, and we discovered in the mid-1980's that if the head of state of a country would get behind the immunization effort and

mobilize the schoolteachers, the imams, radio, television, et cetera, one could bring the technology and the vaccines together in such a way that, at a very low price, it became possible to reach practically every hamlet in the world.

And today the vaccination program has replaced the postal system in most developing countries as by far the most universal Government service. And what we see today is that there are a whole series of opportunities for major breakthroughs at low cost if only the leadership is provided. And I give examples in my paper.

One of them is iodine deficiency, the single biggest cause of mental impairment in the world. Some 200 million people are affected by iodine deficiency. A billion people are at risk. This problem can be virtually eliminated from the face of the Earth if all salt were iodized at a cost of 3 to 5 cents per consumer per year. Cost is not a major problem. There is a system for paying for it. But somehow the world has to decide to do it.

Similarly on oral rehydration therapy. The single biggest killer of children in the world still remains the dehydration from diarrhea. And, as the chairman mentioned in his opening testimony, there is today a very low-cost response to this dehydration. A simple packet—and it costs less than 10 cents to manufacture—can be made available, can be bought by families and mixed with water at home.

Again, the challenge is, how do you inform and motivate the public to be aware that for the biggest killer of children in the world the remedy exists? And in the last 10 years progress has been made, and the number of children being saved by this are more than 1 million a year now. This number could increase to 3 million if it really could be made universal.

Similarly, we still have close to 1 million children a year dying from measles. The system exists to push the measles immunization coverage up to 90 percent relatively easily.

Vitamin A is also a very low cost approach, which, if it were universally available, would probably save 1 million lives a year. And distribution of vitamin A could be piggybacked now on the immunization system that has been developed to reach the entire world.

Clearly, one of the most critical areas for very young children in nutrition is breastfeeding. We know that some 1½ million children died last year because they were not effectively breast fed by their mothers for the first several months of their lives. This is not a cost problem. It is how do you change attitudes and cultures.

We have just demonstrated in the last 3 or 4 years that it is possible, for example, to get the cooperation of the infant formula companies. In all developing countries but one, free distribution of formula at the hospitals has ceased.

Again, we have had to get heads of state to intervene in all of these situations. We know now that it is possible through changes in techniques to provide children—especially girls—in most of the least-developed countries in the world a 4-year education for \$15 per pupil a year.

Finally, we now see the possibility of the green revolution extending to Africa. And it has been inhibited in Africa because of the foreign exchange and debt crisis, which made it difficult to have the fertilizers, the pesticides, the oil for irrigation pumps on any

predictable basis. But there are now new varieties of cassava and other household crops which offer dramatic increases in yields and grow in shorter periods of time and that don't require these external inputs, although they do require a push.

Now, what are the prospects for all this? I think we are off to a good start. These are all goals that emerged from the 1990 World Summit for Children. Some 140 countries have either finished or are finishing national plans of action to achieve these goals.

And last fall and this past winter, the developing countries, getting together to discuss these goals, did come up with a conclusion that a series of these goals should be achieved by 1995. Thus, they concluded they would commit themselves—all the African heads of state committed themselves to universal iodization of salt by 1995.

The chairman had referred to the cost of this global effort to achieve these goals: \$25 billion. That encompasses water and sanitation, which is the biggest cost item in this package for all families. The particular programs I mentioned can be done for a much lesser sum.

Now, what do we need from the United States on this? I think what we need most of all is real leadership from the United States on these issues. And it is leadership that has started but has been very slow in getting going.

The Congress has repeatedly been in the lead on these issues for 10 years. They have supported the child survival revolution since 1983. They have been in the forefront, in effect forcing the administration to move on this.

In my statement I list a series of recommendations for action. I argue that for the United States to support the Convention of the Rights of the Child, which affects the whole attitude toward nutrition, toward health, toward education of children, the United States ought to join the 144 countries that have now ratified the convention. Congress has urged the administration to do so.

Secretary of State Warren Christopher, when he testified in his confirmation hearings, promised the United States would sign shortly. But this has yet to happen.

Second, and this is already underway, I think we need to demonstrate additional concern for our own children. And this is a pattern that has been underway for the last several years, with increased attention being paid to head start, to immunization, and other domestic programs.

Third, we argue that at least 20 percent of foreign aid should be devoted toward developmental programs that meet priority human needs. Roughly \$1 billion of foreign aid a year is now being spent by the United States on basic education, primary health care, water supply and sanitation, and this figure should be at least doubled. And if you were to take 20 percent of the total international affairs budget, it would be something like a total of \$3 billion a year; 20 percent of the development component would be roughly \$2 billion a year.

Fourth, for Africa south of the Sahara, they clearly need debt relief.

And, fifth, and very important, we need a revitalized USAID that is given a mission to accomplish instead of being an agency which



in recent years has not been given a strong direction on these areas, except from the Congress.

And, finally, there should be more active support for the multi-lateral cooperation system with respect to these goals. And if the United States would take the leadership in these areas, we would expect dramatic results in this decade. We would expect by the end of 1995, among other results, some 2 million children wouldn't be dying each year who are now dying.

This would have a profound impact on the new democracies because what they most desperately need are programs for the bottom half that produce results fairly quickly and tangibly if they are going to survive during these difficult transitional periods.

Finally, it would have a major impact over the next 15 to 20 years on the population problem with success in basic education, particularly of girls, and with increased family confidence in children surviving, plus family planning, it is possible to get truly dramatic reductions in fertility rates, as we are now seeing in Mexico, for example.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Grant appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. PENNY. Thank you, Mr. Grant.

My first question, based on the first page of your testimony, was going to be how do you propose the United States provide that leadership? And then in your later testimony you went down point by point the suggestions as to how we might do that.

But I do want you to share with us some of your observations on the U.S. role during the green revolution in the 1960's, and what were the key elements of our leadership at that point.

Mr. GRANT. Well, it is a participation that we take a lot of pride in. U.S. foundations, USAID's predecessors had financed the research that produced the high yielding varieties. AID's predecessors played a major role in introducing the whole concept of fertilizers to India, Pakistan, and the Philippines. The U.S. leadership role from the top came in the mid-1960's when President Johnson and others became very concerned with the population explosion in Asia, and in the fact that population growth was all over Asia exceeding food supply.

There really was a combination of very effective AID leadership with Orville Freeman and Lester Brown in the Department of Agriculture pressing for these policies of change required in developing countries, and then Walt Rostow was the National Security Adviser at the time and he convinced Orville Freeman and David Bell convinced the President that he should personally provide leadership on this.

So there were many communications with President Johnson to the top leaders in Asia to press the changes. And they were often difficult because it meant two things were required. It meant that in almost every country, the price of grains had to be raised.

They had gotten accustomed, thanks to Public Law 480, in depending upon food imports to keep the cities happy. And they were able to keep the prices low at the time, and this meant a change in price policy in their country.



Second, it meant allocating large amounts of foreign exchange away from industrial plants, that kind of infrastructure to the import of fertilizers and pesticides in most of these countries. And the revolution just wouldn't have happened in Asia, in my judgment, without this strong political leadership. Clearly we would have never gotten the universal child immunization effort through.

In this case, there was not a strong U.S. Government leadership, but there were many heads of state that got involved, because to make these changes, it involves multiple sectors, and unless you get the heads of state involved—I mean, take iodine deficiency, if you want to iodize all the salt, it certainly isn't enough to talk to the Ministry of Health.

This is a Minister of Commerce concern. There are lots of local producers often, so it is a Ministry of Interior concern. There are often imports, so it is a Ministry of Foreign Trade concern. These multiple sectors rarely work together without strong leadership on the part of the head of state.

Now, if I may comment briefly on U.S. leadership, I would say that two items I didn't mention in that leadership role are, one, the United States needs to come to a conclusion about what it is going to do about development, these kinds of measures soon, because the foreign aid budget is rapidly being eroded by aid to Russia, the tremendous increase in emergency aid that is required, pressures for shifting funds from the international affairs budget to deficit reduction.

And at the moment, the development component has not yet been articulated in any kind of a solid way that can compete in the budget process, including the budget process this October and November that starts inside the Government.

Second, I would say that an ideal place for the United States to assert this leadership would be at the time of the—when the President addresses the General Assembly in late September. Clearly his statement is going to speak to peacekeeping, the problems of Eastern Europe. But we badly need to have a statement that relates to this part of the world that so affects, ultimately, environmental issues, population issues, as well as our sense of justice that Congressman Hall spoke of so effectively.

Mr. PENNY. You mentioned on page 3 of your testimony the contrast between Calcutta, Mexico City, Washington, DC, and New York City in terms of child immunization levels. Could you discuss in additional detail what the elements are of the program in these developing nations—and also in New York City and Washington, DC—that result in those higher levels?

Are these all—well, to what degree are the international efforts a factor and to what degree have Mexico, India, and other nations kind of picked up the ball and dealt with these programs on their own?

Mr. GRANT. Well, in essence, what we have seen happening is that the latecomers on the scene frequently apply much more modern techniques than the people who started in the field. And this, of course, is what the auto industry of the United States and Europe suffered from when the Japanese appeared on the scene as latecomers, they came up with new techniques.

And what Calcutta, Lagos, and Mexico City have done is to use—to a far greater degree than we have ever used—the mobilization using all the elements of communication of society, radio, television, priests, schoolteachers, and they track down every child.

And these techniques have proved extremely successful and they are far more thorough than the techniques that we have applied in the United States. Calcutta today has 80 percent of the children at age 1 fully immunized. New York and Washington have less than 50 percent at age 2, just to draw the contrast.

Washington, DC, Mayor Sharon Pratt Kelly went to Mexico for a meeting of mayors earlier this month. One of her explicit purposes was to see how Mexico City got its immunization levels to over 90 percent, and she pledged that Washington, DC would reach the 80 percent level by age 2 by next summer and we are trying to introduce into Washington, New York, and elsewhere, the techniques that have been used successfully in places like Calcutta and Lagos.

Mr. PENNY. It seems to me that in the early 1980's, we were talking about a child mortality level of about 40,000 per day. The statistic you shared this morning is closer to 35,000, most of that attributable to the immunization effort that we have undertaken on an international scale over the last several years particularly, so that it clearly speaks to the success that can be achieved if we have a focused effort.

I am distressed, however, that we continue to follow a pattern in which our aid arrives only after the crisis. A colleague of mine who is now in the Senate, Senator Dorgan, often lamented that the only way we mobilize public support for foreign aid is when we see the masses on the TV screen suffering and dying.

How do we bring a greater focus to this issue when so much of the suffering, the pain, the malnutrition, occurs in quiet ways and doesn't manifest itself the way it does periodically in Somalia or Sudan, or as it did in the aftermath of the Iraq war in northern Iraq?

What do we need to do through international institutions or through our Government to bring a focus to the quiet crisis that exists on a day-to-day basis?

Mr. GRANT. Clearly public opinion plays a tremendous role in this and the response to Somalia, to the Kurdish situation in northern Iraq, were triggered very much by public reaction to what they saw on television, and one of our challenges is, as you correctly indicate, is how to dramatize the quiet emergencies not shown on TV.

When 1,000 children were dying a day in Somalia, the world public opinion rose up in arms and you ultimately ended up with the unprecedented, and in my judgment, welcomed action by President Bush to put U.S. troops in there under the U.N. auspices.

At the same time, we have 5,000 children dying in the world every day from dehydration caused by diarrhea for which there is a simple remedy, five times the dimension of Somalia. But there is no global compulsion yet saying to Governments that they should act.

This, I think, is one of the challenges: How to make the public aware and leaders aware that relatively doable remedies exist for two-thirds of the 35,000 child deaths that occur each day.

I mean, when you realize that there has been no flood in history, no disaster in history that has ever taken the 250,000 weekly child death toll, we have not been able to dramatize it, and people tend to say this has been with us since the beginning of history.

What is new is that we can do something about child deaths and relatively easily. If somebody is dying halfway up Mt. Everest and you don't do anything about it, people don't blame you, because it is very difficult to get there. Yet if somebody is dying across the street from you, been hit by a car or something, and you don't do something, people consider that you are acting morally irresponsibly.

In essence, we are now in a situation where, thanks to medical technology, thanks to the new capacity to communicate and reach people, it is becoming increasingly almost obscene not to move in these areas and the pressure generates.

Now, what we are finding in the developing countries is that developing country leaders are finding these programs good politics. They are ways of reaching lots of people quickly at low cost at a time when they are still in economic difficulties. And one reason immunization and rehydration moved in the 1980's was that all these countries were in difficulty. These countries needed something to demonstrate that they were doing things for their people and these were low cost ways of doing it.

The U.S. Congress has been playing a major role, as I indicated earlier, since 1983. The U.S. Congress has, resolution after resolution, supported all of these programs. I myself am convinced that if President Clinton would now lead this administration in a major program along these lines, that it could be done within the current, overall foreign aid allocation and that it would really trigger a worldwide response.

It is almost like coming up in the last inning of a ball game with the bases loaded, and there is an opportunity to hit a home run, and the United States could be that hitter and the cost would be relatively modest. It is doable, and over the longer run it would have a mammoth impact on the population explosion. It would have a tremendous impact upon the survival of the new democracies.

It would make a great difference to the economic growth in most of these countries. What is not known when people go back to Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong was that all of those countries right after World War II invested very heavily in health and education because their only resource was their people.

And instead of treating health, education, and nutrition as welfare programs, they were treated as some forward-looking investment. They followed the right economic policies, but basically their success came from regarding the people as their most precious resource.

Mr. PENNY. Mr. Allard.

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you for being with us, Mr. Grant. You seem to imply in your comments, maybe you made the direct statements, you think the children in Calcutta are better off than those in New York City; is that correct?

Mr. GRANT. They are on immunization.

Mr. ALLARD. And for which group of diseases?



Mr. GRANT. For polio, measles, diphtheria, and tetanus.

Mr. ALLARD. Why is that?

Mr. GRANT. It is basically because in Calcutta, they have found a way to immunize a far higher proportion of their children than we have in the United States and at a far lower cost.

Mr. ALLARD. Because there is not a liability associated with a vaccine like there is here?

Mr. GRANT. There is not the liability, but in essence they have treated immunization as something that you involve the whole population in and people have been informed and motivated in a way that we are not informed and motivated.

Mr. ALLARD. Well, but you see, the thing that we have here in this country, the vaccinations, we have a reaction to measles vaccine, and it hits the media so nobody wants to have a measles vaccine. And they look at the side effects of measles or polio or whatever and decide on their own not to have those vaccinations.

And I think we have to bear that in mind because there is a difference in where we are and the amount of population that we have vaccinated and the concern about the reactions.

Obviously, the people in Calcutta consider the public health risk from measles, diphtheria, and polio greater than a reaction from a vaccine. But if you get somebody in the United States who hasn't seen a case of polio, they may view the reaction from the vaccine a more greater risk than actually the disease.

Mr. GRANT. That may be the case, Mr. Allard. I think it is worth emphasizing that the risks of an adverse reaction from modern day vaccines in the United States are, with the exception of pertussis, virtually nil.

I mean, as far as I know, there have been no——

Mr. ALLARD. It is minimal, I agree, but it gets a lot of coverage in the media and creates a lot of concern I think in the public. I just thought that needed to be brought out in the record, perhaps clarified a little bit.

Mr. GRANT. It does. I would argue that there is a leadership responsibility to try to inform and motivate people to get their children vaccinated, even though there is some small risk. People are engaging in a far greater risk by not vaccinating their children.

I would say that in recent years, we have not put behind the immunization effort in this country, in most parts of this country, the kind of energy and creativity to convince people.

Mr. ALLARD. Yes, but in this country, if somebody wants a vaccine, it certainly would be available through health clinics or whatever. Would you agree?

Mr. GRANT. Yes, but what you find is that in many parts of the country, the vaccine is hard to get. Sometimes there is a cost problem, but even in a public health clinic, where it is given without charge, they are open at irregular hours. They are not readily available. They are not that user friendly.

I would suggest, actually, when you get to discussing this in your child immunization segment with Mr. Foster, you talk with him about that.

Mr. ALLARD. Be glad to. The other comment I would say on dehydration, and you seem to be thinking that we need to push the electrolyte solution, whatnot, to protect and treat dehydration, it seems



to me that we would be much further ahead to look at the causes of dehydration, what causes diarrhea, parasite problems, enteric infections, and those kind of intestinal problems.

Wouldn't we be much further ahead to concentrate on that area instead of trying to get at just the symptoms, actually get at the cause of the diarrhea?

Mr. GRANT. Right. Clearly you are indicating the long-run direction, because the prevention is better to focus on than the cure, even though in this case, the cure is so low cost that we would argue that every family in the world should have access to either the packets or to knowledge of how to make the homebrew, which does 90 percent of what the packet does.

The prevention side takes time and it takes money. When you look at the \$25 billion figure, \$10 billion of that \$25 billion is for water and sanitation. Compare this to the low cost of the ORT packets, if we were prepared to spend only \$100 million a year disseminating this knowledge and encouraging people to use it would probably reach our goal.

The second thing you need for prevention is, clearly people need to know about washing hands so that even if you have clean water, it doesn't get contaminated before you use it.

Mr. ALLARD. I guess my concern is that if you have diarrhea in a child who dehydrates very rapidly, and it is a very severe case of dehydration, I don't think oral fluids are going to—don't meet all the needs. It seems to me, we still have to get at the cause of diarrhea and that to do this, to promote this at the end, in effect isn't getting at the root problem. And in that regard, we can spend our money better on treating the—trying to prevent diarrhea. I was concerned about that comment.

The other thing is on Public Law 480, in your comments, were you saying that the Public Law 480 program was inhibiting markets to develop in some of these countries and, consequently, prevented local markets developing for local food with local producers, and it was inhibiting the development of those markets within those countries?

Mr. GRANT. This was true during the mid—late 1950's and 1960's, yes.

Mr. ALLARD. Is that still a problem today?

Mr. GRANT. I do not believe it is a major problem today, but it was at that particular time. Countries had very limited amounts of foreign exchange. They knew they could get Public Law 480.

Mr. ALLARD. What is the difference today than in 1950 on the Public Law 480 program?

Mr. GRANT. I think that, at least as far as Asia is concerned, they have learned the lesson that they have to keep their food production up and that if they are going to keep their food production up, they have to keep the prices right, both on the price of the grain, and on availability of agroinputs. There is, I think, a much more sophisticated understanding of this process today than there was 20 years ago.

Mr. ALLARD. And because of the rapid—you said there has been a rapid growth in the ability of countries to produce the food supply, was it the 1960's, 1970's?

Mr. GRANT. In Asia.

Mr. ALLARD. In Asia, and you attributed a lot of that because of high technology in regard to fertilizers and pesticides; is that correct? And that you felt like the environmental side-effects of pesticides and fertilizers was a lesser concern than having inadequate food supply for the population in those areas?

Mr. GRANT. I would, if I may say so, in the mid-1960's, the concerns were less with the environmental side-effects of fertilizer and pesticides than they are today.

Mr. ALLARD. Because of the hunger situation?

Mr. GRANT. Because of the hunger situation and generally inadequate awareness of the environmental problems. And this has been one of the factors that has affected the moving of the green revolution into Africa.

There are greater concerns for these problems, plus the fact that with Africa having such severe foreign exchange problems, there is virtually no sub-Saharan African country that you can reasonably predict will have the foreign exchange for fertilizer or pesticides over a multiyear period.

And this has inhibited use of the new varieties of wheat, rice, and corn, and it is one reason why so much attention has been given to improved varieties that are not dependent on heavy use of fertilizer or pesticide—the cassavas, which produce a lot of calories, even though they don't produce high protein.

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Grant, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. There is a lot of things we could talk about and—but in the spirit of trying to move these hearings along, we will maybe get an opportunity to visit with Mr. Grant later.

Thank you very much.

Mr. GRANT. Thank you. And may I thank this committee very much for taking on this topic and pushing it.

Mr. PENNY. Thank you so much.

Could I ask you one last question before we dismiss you, and that is to elaborate a bit on where we are still falling short in terms of world population control efforts, what you would recommend at this stage in terms of furthering our goals in that regard?

Mr. GRANT. Well, the United States has taken an important step in that regard by resuming our support, at least the proposal is up now before Congress, to the U.N. Fund for Population Activities, which we ourselves were largely instrumental in creating in the late 1960's, and clearly increased support in that area is called for.

I should say that the United States has been providing quite significant funding all through the years for the population question. I myself feel at this stage that the most dramatic impact on population growth would come from accelerating the progress on child mortality and on basic education, particularly of girls.

What we are finding in country after country is that when people become confident that their first children are going to survive, and that when women, the mothers, are educated, big changes in family size take place. I was just in Mexico City, and there the fertility rate is down to almost two. It is about the same as Washington, DC, which is basically a level of replacement of existing children.

There has been a plummeting of birth rates in virtually every country that has had breakthroughs in education and child health,

with family planning programs. When those three elements come together, one almost invariably sees far faster drops in birth rates than most people have been anticipating.

If we were able to achieve the World Summit For Children goals by the year 2000, my own prediction would be that world population would stabilize at levels even lower than the U.N.'s low-end projections.

Mr. PENNY. I thank you for your testimony this morning.

Our next witness is Dr. Ann VanDusen, Acting Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Research and Development at the Agency for International Development. And, welcome. Your entire written testimony will appear in the record. You are free to summarize as you wish.

**STATEMENT OF ANN VANDUSEN, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

Ms. VANDUSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Allard. I am grateful for the opportunity to testify and to present some of AID's programs and priorities in this very important area of child nutrition and child survival.

We know that the period of infancy and early childhood is a period of extreme vulnerability. Children are vulnerable to the conditions that surround their birth, to a variety of communicable diseases, to lack of adequate nourishment, water, sanitation, and shelter.

We know that one-third of all deaths occur among children under the age of 5, and this is mainly in the developing world and mainly, as we have heard in earlier testimony, from preventable causes.

Now, since approximately 1984, with the very strong bipartisan support from Congress, AID has mounted a child survival program that has been designed to try and address some of the root causes of high infant and child mortality in the developing world.

Over the last 8 years, AID has committed approximately \$1.5 billion specifically to programs to try to reduce infant and child mortality. We have worked with and through international organizations such as UNICEF, a variety of private voluntary organizations, other donors, and a variety of private groups in the United States.

As several people have noted already, there have been dramatic improvements, both in terms of the number of children now surviving who would not have survived infancy a decade ago, and in terms of infant mortality rates. In AID-assisted countries, just over the last 7 years, infant mortality has declined by 10 percent. Ten percent may not seem like much, but it is a hard statistic to get to move on a national and international basis and a 10 percent decrease in infant mortality is significant.

The principal elements of AID's child survival programs have been immunizations, expanding the use of oral rehydration therapy which we have just been talking about, reducing high risk births, improving maternal health, and improving nutrition among infants and young children.

In my testimony, I give a fair amount of background on the nutrition aspect of our program. Just to highlight here, the program



has focused on improved infant and child feeding, growth monitoring, breast feeding promotion, promotion of weaning foods, reductions in micronutrient deficiencies, improvements in public education on nutrition and hygiene, and improving the nutritional status of adolescents and women in the reproductive years.

I think an important thing to recognize about AID's program, because the child survival program is embedded in multisectoral development assistance programs, is that these nutrition efforts have been complemented by a wide variety of programs designed to increase the availability and access to food. This is through both food aid programs and development projects that have focused on increasing agricultural production, income, and employment in the agricultural area.

I would like to take just a few minutes to talk about the new priorities that have been articulated by Brian Atwood, the new Administrator of AID, because I very much agree with Jim Grant that progress in the four areas that Mr. Atwood has identified is critically linked to the goals of the child survival program.

Basically, Brian Atwood has said that what we must be about is sustainable development. It is easy to agree with and hard to define, but basically we are looking for durable solutions to a variety of global challenges.

As we look for durable solutions, solutions that survive emergencies, one of the critical features is human capacity development. It is a theme that is woven throughout the four priority areas that Mr. Atwood has identified. Those include population and health, where we are looking at a much broader approach to population that emphasizes not only reproductive health care, but also child survival, girls' education and womens' status; the environment, a critical global issue that we are all concerned with; and democracy and governance.

I would be happy to come back to the links between democracy and governance and what we are trying to achieve in the child health revolution; and economic growth.

In the economic growth area, Mr. Atwood is interested not simply in employment opportunities, although that is critical. He has asked that we look at the policies that inhibit the growth of economies. He has asked us to look at all productive sectors, agricultural production, commercial, and industrial production. I think, most important for this hearing, he has asked us to look at human capacity, the education and training it will take to build societies and economies that can grow.

Because of this focus on people first, which is played out throughout our programs, I think the health and well-being of children and their families is going to continue to be a very high priority for AID. AID is also increasingly recognizing the synergies among its programs, and we have talked about some of them with the last witness. For example, improvements in child health and education are mutually reinforcing.

We know healthy children can learn better, and succeed better in school. We know that mothers who have some education are much better at protecting the health of their children. Similarly, we find synergies between child health and fertility, as Mr. Grant



mentioned; and certainly we find links between adequate micronutrients and health and educability.

What we are trying to do, especially with very constrained resources is to look for opportunities to build on these synergies, and choose the programs that are going to have the multiplier effects in terms of improving the lives and the health of children.

I just want to say a couple of words about the World Summit For Children in 1990 and the International Conference on Nutrition which was held last year. These meetings are extremely important, and play a very useful role for all countries in forcing a stock-taking on how are we doing in particular areas. They also have been very important catalysts for future action.

The emphasis that both of these meetings have brought to establishing quantitative targets and benchmarks by certain set dates, resonates very well with AID, certainly an AID that Brian Atwood has committed to make much more results oriented than perhaps we have been in the past. AID has been doing its own stocktaking in the area of child survival and child nutrition.

Finally, I would like to share just a couple of the conclusions that we have reached because I think they will help us direct the program over the next several years and are conclusions that we would welcome your comments on.

The first is one that the chairman raised earlier, namely focus—the programs must stay clearly focused. One of the reasons for the successes that we have had over the last 7 years is that we have clearly defined a program focused on infant mortality and chosen the interventions that are most likely to bring rapid decreases in infant mortality.

Clearly focusing the program is important. Second, we have concluded that a limited number of additional interventions are going to be necessary if we are going to achieve even greater infant and child mortality reductions. I think, in particular, we recognize that as we begin to lick the problems of child immunization and reducing deaths from diarrheal diseases, child pneumonia, and respiratory infections are increasing as a priority and a cause of infant and child death. Maternal health and nutrition are also increasingly important. I think probably 7 years ago we didn't appreciate how important they were to overall child survival.

The third conclusion goes to the question of how we move beyond emergencies into sustainable programs. Our conclusion is that our programs in child survival must start integrating interventions if they are going to sustainable programs. For example, it may be very important to jump start a program with an immunization alone effort, but, eventually, for countries to maintain these programs, they have to find ways of integrating packages of services.

A fourth area is basically this: Important gains in both reduction of child mortality and in sustainability can now be made by improving the efficiency and the effectiveness of the systems that deliver child health services.

I think there was a sense for a long time that somehow issues of quality of care were luxuries; that clearly is not the case. The quality of care is both important in its own right and integral to finding solutions that countries themselves can maintain. I think improving the quality of the services that are being provided in the

developing world will be an important feature of aid programs in the future.

Fifth, Mr. Grant talked about communications and marketing and we know that they are essential. It is essential to provide families with the information they need to stimulate behavior change where that is necessary, and to create demand for child health services. You might call it the creation of educated consumers, but just as we have educated consumers here, it is necessary to have consumers in the developing world who are asking for services for their children and who know what services they need. This is an area where the United States has played an important role, and in which we will continue to work.

A sixth area has to do with looking beyond the public sector. Much of what we have talked about involves engaging and working with Governments. To build sustainable programs, we have to look to the private sector: private voluntary organizations play a very important role in our programs, but so does the private commercial sector. I think this is a lesson that not only have we learned, but we are trying to encourage other donors to learn as well.

A seventh area has to do with building national capacity and technologies to sustain child survival services. In addition to making sure that the services are available, Governments need to be able to design and manage programs.

The training of health workers and the training to manage programs are important. In our programs, in addition to focusing specifically on the services that we know will reduce infant and child mortality, we are focusing on the systems' improvements that will allow these countries to provide the services over the long term.

The final conclusion I would share with you has to do with how to institutionalize child survival programs. I think we increasingly recognize that we have to pay attention to the policies that support or undermine child health and child health services: Excessive costs for medicines, excessive medical requirements that are not necessary can undercut progress.

There are a range of policy issues that need to be addressed. AID sees a continuing role in what we call policy dialog, not only with host Governments to make sure that their policies are in line with their goals of achieving substantial infant mortality declines, but also with other donors because, sad to say, often donors have policies that work at cross-purposes. In this area of both major opportunities and tight budgets, we can't afford poor or ineffectual policies.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. VanDusen appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. ALLARD [assuming chair]. Thank you, Dr. VanDusen, for your testimony. I just want you to know that your entire statement will be made a part of the record.

The chairman had another conflict so he had to step out. Hopefully, he will be back before we finish the hearing.

Dr. VanDusen, AID is—the United States is the largest food aid donor, and through your organization, several programs operate to improve child nutrition. Would you please explain where the ma-

ternal and child health programs operate and how you measure the results of those programs?

Ms. VANDUSEN. We have child health and nutrition programs, or maternal health and nutrition programs, in probably 60 to 70 countries right now. The major programs have been focused on a relatively smaller set of approximately 25 countries where infant mortality is particularly high; where the Government is willing to work with us and allow private voluntary organizations to work to improve child health; where there are opportunities to work with other donors. On the "where" question, it is a global program with focus in some emphasis countries where we hope for and, in fact, have seen dramatic improvements.

On measurement issues, ultimately we measure the success of the programs in terms of infant and child mortality declines. Through surveys such as the demographic and health surveys, we are able to monitor, as well, a variety of nutritional and nutrition-related factors. We are monitoring for instance exclusive breast feeding and growth retardation.

We try to develop information systems so we can track the impact of our programs, as you will hear from the next panel of speakers.

You will get a lot more detail about some of the monitoring systems and some of the methods that we have used to assess impact.

Mr. ALLARD. Another program, I guess, of AID is the food for work program. Could you please give the subcommittee examples of where this program operates and how it works?

Ms. VANDUSEN. This is the title II program, is that correct?

Mr. ALLARD. I believe it is, yes.

Ms. VANDUSEN. It works in a number of countries.

An example in my written testimony is a title II program in India sponsored by CARE, an international PVO, where we have used food assistance in addition to other support for a private voluntary organization to focus food in particularly needy areas. There has been a remarkable decrease in malnutrition in the areas where this program has worked.

I can certainly get a complete listing of the title II programs, but what we are trying to do is target—

Mr. ALLARD. I am particularly interested in the food for work program, wherever that is. So if you could maybe get some additional written comments to this subcommittee, I think it would be helpful on how that program is being applied, and, again, I think in the previous question, along with the maternal and child health programs, how you are measuring successful results or how you are measuring results in that program.

Ms. VANDUSEN. I will be glad to supplement that.

[The information follows:]

FOOD FOR WORK  
Agency for International Development

Food for Work (FFW), provided under Title II of Public Law 480 (P.L. 480), is used by Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) and the World Food Program (WFP) in development projects and emergency operations. It is a mode of food aid delivery which requires a work response from the individuals receiving the food. The "work test" is a proven means of targeting resources on the truly needy, including both poor individuals and communities in food deficit areas. The requirement for active participation also creates an opportunity to achieve development results with FFW.

The following is a list of cooperating agencies and their acronyms:

ARDA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DOULOS	Doulos Community
EOC	Ethiopian Orthodox Church
FHI	Food for the Hungry International
INTLIFE	International Lifeline Incorporation
LWR	Lutheran World Relief
OIC	Opportunities Industrialization Centers
PCI	Project Children International
SAVE	Save the Children Fund
SCF	Save the Children Federation
WFP	World Food Program
WVRD	World Vision Relief and Development

For example, in Bangladesh, the A.I.D. Food-for-Work project (managed in-country by CARE) distributes each year an average of 120,000 tons of wheat to from 500,000-900,000 otherwise unemployed and predominantly landless persons as compensation for their labor. Many of the laborers are single female heads of family, with no other means of sustenance.

Under this project in Bangladesh, the participants maintain rural, dirt roads, upgrade footpaths to dirt roads suitable for light vehicles, repair and maintain river embankments and irrigation/drainage canals. Each year, about 6,000 miles of roads are repaired and maintained through the program. In order to increase the developmental impact of Bangladesh's FFW program, CARE and A.I.D. are initiating pilot food-for-work programs in afforestation, women's education and disaster preparedness.

Attached is a current listing of A.I.D. Food for Work Programs, by country and sponsoring agency.



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**From FY 1992 To FY 1993  
For Category FFW  
Country, Sponsor, Category  
Metric Tons and Total Dollars**

<u>FY</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Commodity MTNS</u>	<u>Total Value</u>
1992	Bangladesh	CARE	65,000.	12,150,100.
		WFP	30,000.	6,461,700.
		<i>Subtotal</i>	<b>95,000.</b>	<b>18,611,800.</b>
	Bolivia	ADRA	13,844.	6,467,787.
		CRS	7,738.	3,644,980.
		WFP	1,217.	1,060,830.
		<i>Subtotal</i>	<b>22,799.</b>	<b>11,173,597.</b>
	Burkina Faso	CRS	1,823.	809,474.
		WFP	6,441.	2,093,792.
		<i>Subtotal</i>	<b>8,264.</b>	<b>2,903,266.</b>
	Cameroon	WFP	116.	106,604.
	Cape Verde Islands	WFP	1,000.	427,000.
	Central African Rep.	WFP	1,600.	654,400.
	Chad	WFP	2,370.	1,198,640.
	Comoro Islands	WFP	775.	414,725.
	Congo	WFP	805.	408,295.
	Costa Rica	WFP	166.	152,554.
	Cote de Ivoire	WFP	1,500.	741,000.
	Dominican Rep.	WFP	398.	200,862.
	El Salvador	WFP	1,593.	1,364,251.
	Ethiopia	CARE	8,600.	2,209,000.
		CRS	2,885.	661,010.
		EOC	1,237.	216,080.
		FHI	1,449.	357,135.
		WVRD	3,250.	758,750.
	<i>Subtotal</i>		<b>17,421.</b>	<b>4,201,976.</b>

CLASS: adhoc

FFPIS

REPORT: ctryspocat

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**From FY 1992 To FY 1993  
For Category FFW  
Country, Sponsor, Category  
Metric Tons and Total Dollars**

<u>FY</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Commodity MTNS</u>	<u>Total Value</u>
	Gambia	WFP	4,976.	2,458,144.
	Ghana	ADRA	1,533.	601,680.
		CRS	605.	203,986.
		WFP	1,115.	627,130.
	<i>Subtotal</i>		<b>3,253.</b>	<b>1,432,796.</b>
	Guatemala	CARE	777.	392,747.
		CRS	1,835.	704,537.
		SHARE	1,235.	620,670.
	<i>Subtotal</i>		<b>3,847.</b>	<b>1,717,954.</b>
	Guinea	WFP	2,150.	1,058,750.
	Honduras	CARE	415.	217,827.
	India	CRS	16,496.	5,484,280.
		WFP	48,966.	19,342,755.
	<i>Subtotal</i>		<b>65,462.</b>	<b>24,827,035.</b>
	Indonesia	CRS	4,177.	2,061,382.
	Kenya	CRS	44.	40,528.
	Lesotho	WFP	8,114.	3,863,966.
	Madagascar	CRS	29.	14,800.
	Mali	WFP	600.	611,400.
		WVRD	180.	102,528.
	<i>Subtotal</i>		<b>780.</b>	<b>713,928.</b>
	Mauritania	DOULO	37.	13,809.
	Mauritius	WFP	850.	284,750.
	Mexico	WFP	21,591.	4,020,209.
	Mozambique	WFP	7,238.	1,355,122.
	Nicaragua	ADRA	497.	294,885.

CLASS: adhoc

FFPIS

REPORT: ctryspocat

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**From FY 1992 To FY 1993  
For Category FFW  
Country, Sponsor, Category  
Metric Tons and Total Dollars**

<u>FY</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Commodity MTNS</u>	<u>Total Value</u>
		WFP	1,397.	698,183.
	<i>Subtotal</i>		<b>1,894.</b>	<b>993,068.</b>
	Niger	WFP	6,600.	1,762,200.
	Pakistan	WFP	250.	229,750.
	Panama	WFP	2,279.	486,215.
	Paraguay	WFP	650.	200,850.
	Peru	ADRA	11,953.	4,676,742.
		CARE	35,490.	15,931,885.
		CARITAS	15,006.	5,851,987.
	<i>Subtotal</i>		<b>62,449.</b>	<b>26,460,613.</b>
	Sao Tome	WFP	1,855.	805,087.
	Senegal	WFP	3,118.	520,706.
	Sierra Leone	CRS	443.	157,701.
	Sudan	SCF	1,250.	522,735.
	Togo	OIC	378.	131,841.
		WFP	1,899.	327,333.
	<i>Subtotal</i>		<b>2,277.</b>	<b>459,174.</b>
	West Bank	CRS	110.	48,358.
<i>Subtotal</i>			<b>359,944.</b>	<b>119,286,427.</b>
1993	Bangladesh	CARE	38,000.	8,170,000.
		WFP	29,541.	11,421,670.
	<i>Subtotal</i>		<b>67,541.</b>	<b>19,591,670.</b>
	Benin	CRS	120.	60,566.
	Bolivia	ADRA	8,840.	4,549,992.
		CARITAS	10,434.	4,814,446.

CLASS: adhoc

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**From FY 1992 To FY 1993  
For Category FFW  
Country, Sponsor, Category  
Metric Tons and Total Dollars**

<u>FY</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Commodity MTNS</u>	<u>Total Value</u>
		PCI	2,181.	912,280.
	<i>Subtotal</i>		<b>21,455.</b>	<b>10,276,718.</b>
	Burkina Faso	CRS	1,394.	626,932.
		WFP	5,480.	2,490,600.
	<i>Subtotal</i>		<b>6,874.</b>	<b>3,117,532.</b>
	Colombia	WFP	2,284.	762,856.
	Congo	WFP	175.	73,500.
	Costa Rica	WFP	500.	167,000.
	Ethiopia	CARE	3,605.	858,305.
		CRS	7,872.	1,806,493.
		EOC	1,381.	233,996.
		FHI	1,261.	298,883.
		SCF	1,789.	395,115.
		WVRD	5,854.	1,377,692.
	<i>Subtotal</i>		<b>21,762.</b>	<b>4,970,484.</b>
	Gaza	CRS	1,252.	485,139.
	Ghana	ADRA	944.	379,632.
		CRS	289.	112,800.
	<i>Subtotal</i>		<b>1,234.</b>	<b>492,431.</b>
	Guatemala	CARE	629.	216,932.
		CRS	1,152.	420,381.
		SHARE	997.	413,209.
	<i>Subtotal</i>		<b>2,778.</b>	<b>1,050,521.</b>
	Haiti	ADRA	1,804.	760,092.
		INTLIFE	310.	138,600.
	<i>Subtotal</i>		<b>2,114.</b>	<b>898,692.</b>
	Honduras	CARE	770.	288,359.
		WFP	1,160.	739,200.
	<i>Subtotal</i>		<b>1,930.</b>	<b>1,027,559.</b>

CLASS: adhoc

FFPIS

REPORT: cryspocat



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**From FY 1992 To FY 1993  
For Category FFW  
Country, Sponsor, Category  
Metric Tons and Total Dollars**

<u>FY</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Commodity MTNS</u>	<u>Total Value</u>
	India	CRS	15,804.	6,294,149.
		WFP	8,230.	4,177,250.
	<i>Subtotal</i>		<b>24,034.</b>	<b>10,471,399.</b>
	Indonesia	CRS	7,778.	3,266,861.
	Kenya	CRS	94.	81,589.
		WVRD	20.	17,400.
	<i>Subtotal</i>		<b>114.</b>	<b>98,989.</b>
	Lesotho	WFP	4,824.	1,970,094.
	Madagascar	CRS	56.	24,041.
	Mali	WVRD	70.	39,605.
	Mauritania	DOULO	49.	19,320.
	Nicaragua	ADRA	2,428.	1,176,419.
	Paraguay	WFP	771.	260,850.
	Peru	ADRA	15,174.	5,791,228.
		CARE	33,226.	15,700,355.
		CARITAS	15,042.	5,915,513.
		WFP	1,802.	1,081,200.
	<i>Subtotal</i>		<b>65,244.</b>	<b>28,488,296.</b>
	Sao Tome	WFP	1,520.	421,487.
	Sierra Leone	CRS	431.	178,904.
	Sudan	SCF	2,573.	1,104,640.
	Togo	OIC	433.	140,303.
	Uganda	WFP	200.	95,400.
	West Bank	CRS	95.	38,371.

CLASS: adhoc

FFPIS

REPORT: ctryspocat

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**From FY 1992 To FY 1993  
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Metric Tons and Total Dollars**

<u>FY</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Commodity MTNS</u>	<u>Total Value</u>
<i>Subtotal</i>			240,640.	90,769,648.
<b>Grand Total</b>			600,584.	210,056,075.

# MEASUREMENT OF RESULTS

## Agency for International Development

To measure the results or success of child survival activities, A.I.D. puts a high priority on program monitoring and evaluation. The child survival program has a detailed framework for collecting information and utilizing that information to bring about program improvements. For example,

- At the global level, A.I.D. works with national governments and other donors to assemble a global body of knowledge and an unusually comprehensive record of experience. Demographic and Health Surveys, for example, helped standardize global data collection and reporting on a number of indicators while stimulating better use of data at the country-level to guide policy and implementation decisions.
- At the Agency-level, A.I.D. has instituted a program performance information for strategic management system (PRISM). PRISM has enabled A.I.D. country programs to: develop focused strategic objectives (many countries have child survival/health objectives); formulate more rigorous and credible program performance indicators; and make better use of performance information in management decision-making.
- At the country level, the child survival program's focus on monitoring and evaluation has enabled developing countries to develop the capacity to track progress with ongoing health information systems. In conjunction with the availability of low-cost micro-computers, A.I.D. resources and technical assistance help give national governments accurate information about the health status of their populations.
- At the program level, A.I.D.'s Center for Development Information and Evaluation conducts periodic evaluations of the Agency's child survival program. These evaluations focus above the project level and give less attention to inputs and outputs and more attention to results. The conclusions of these evaluations help guide future child survival efforts to ensure that such efforts are more results-oriented.
- At the project level, A.I.D.'s approach to monitoring and evaluation has resulted in constant improvement and refinement of data collection and analysis procedures which, in turn, have been applied to strengthen project activities.

Mr. ALLARD. How does AID coordinate activities with other international organizations involved with child nutrition? You touched on that in your testimony, but I wonder if you would like to elaborate on that.

Ms. VANDUSEN. We have very active collaboration, especially with UNICEF and with the World Health Organization. We do that through a variety of channels.

In the case of UNICEF, in addition to participating on the UNICEF executive board, we have technical staff exchanges at least yearly. We invite UNICEF staff to participate on our technical advisory committees to review progress in particular technical areas.

At the field level, where the coordination is very strong, there is a great deal of interaction between the AID fieldworkers and the UNICEF fieldworkers.

In the case of WHO, similarly, we participate in the World Health Assembly and a variety of technical meetings, sharing our program goals and engaging them programmatically, and occasionally even criticizing these organizations when we think that they are perhaps not directly on target.

We again invite WHO and its suborganizations to sit on our technical advisory panels. There is a great deal of technical exchange on particular elements of the child survival program.

So I would say there is a great deal of interaction between AID and the international organizations.

Mr. ALLARD. The concern about waste sometimes in these programs has come up. How can we respond to colleagues' concerns on some of the waste that they suggest may be going on in some of these programs?

Ms. VANDUSEN. I think we are all concerned about waste. I think the challenge is so great and resources so constrained that we cannot afford waste.

Obviously, we need very careful management of programs. In addition, there should be clearly articulated results, regular monitoring to see that we are achieving our results. A willingness to change programs when we are not achieving results is also extremely important.

I think one way to minimize waste where it exists is by keeping the focus on the end goal and by paying attention that adequate progress is being made.

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you for your testimony.

Ms. VANDUSEN. Thank you.

Mr. ALLARD. I would like to call the next panel on infant feeding and maternal health. I am sorry, the next panel is micronutrient deficiency.

And we have Dr. Tina Sanghvi, senior adviser, International Science and Technology Institute, Washington, DC. We appreciate you taking the time to testify before us. Go ahead and begin your testimony when you are ready.

#### **STATEMENT OF TINA G. SANGHVI, SENIOR ADVISER, INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE [ISTI]**

Ms. SANGHVI. Thank you. It is an honor to be here today and present some information on micronutrients.



We have already heard from previous speakers some allusions to the excitement in this area. In particular, we have recently discovered that highly cost-effective solutions are available to address some of the seemingly intractable problems of malnutrition overseas.

The term micronutrient applies to all vitamins and minerals which are essential to health but cannot be manufactured by the human body. Because only small amounts are needed, a few micrograms or milligrams every day, they are called micronutrients. In fact, they should be called meganutrients or supernutrients, because of the enormous impact that they have and the wide range of functions that they affect.

Attention in micronutrients has been mainly directed to the most commonly found deficiencies of vitamin A, iron and iodine. But there are others—calcium, vitamin C, vitamin B, and zinc, for example. We have only recently learned that the physiological and economic importance of these substances has been vastly underestimated.

Until a few years ago, they were known as preventive agents for specific disorders such as goiter or night blindness. Recent research, however, has shown that they have a far broader role in mental and physical development and performance, in protecting the immune system, and in saving the lives of young children in particular.

The effects were also found in communities where the physical signs of deficiencies were not visible, indicating that the less severe forms of deficiency are equally dangerous. It is for this reason that micronutrient deficiencies are sometimes called hidden hunger.

As diagnostic procedures have improved and have been more widely applied, we have learned how widespread the deficiencies are. Current estimates are that over 2 billion people are affected.

I would briefly like to draw your attention to the fact that the Agency for International Development had a very critical role to play in the 1970's and 1980's in investing in research on the effect of vitamin A deficiency on child mortality. Were it not for that program, the kind of interest, enthusiasm, and commitment worldwide that we have today would probably not have been generated for micronutrients in general and vitamin A in particular.

The economic implications of micronutrient deficiencies are substantial for individuals, families, communities, and nations. For example, in a recent assessment, the potential loss in agricultural productivity due to iron deficiency in Bangladesh was estimated at \$3.2 billion over a 7-year period. The rate of returns from investments in education now are considered potentially much higher if we can control malnutrition and, in particular, iron deficiency in young children. In the case of health sector costs, the hospital costs of treating measles, for example, can be reduced by half through vitamin A supplementation.

It is only recently that we have really understood the full magnitude, and in particular, the economic ramifications of micronutrient deficiencies. Fortunately, there are several options for dealing with them. In broad terms, the technical solutions exist, and they have proven highly cost-effective, both in developed countries and also in developing countries.

Some vitamins and minerals such as vitamin A and iron abound in nature and are found in low-cost foods that need to be incorporated into the diets of those at risk for deficiencies such as young children and pregnant women. In Indonesia, deficiencies in vitamin A was found even in families with access to green, leafy vegetables, but children were not consuming them.

In Haiti, increasing consumption of vitamin A called for communities to build simple solar driers so they could preserve mangoes in the growing season for use later.

In Guatemala, seeds and extension education are being given to encourage production of home and community gardens, and at schools so that a supply of vitamin A can be provided.

Some micronutrients such as iodine and selenium may be missing from the soil altogether in certain parts of the world. Therefore, they need to be added either to the food supplies or water supplies or provided as supplements.

Where naturally enriched food sources cannot be found, fortification provides us with a highly cost-effective option for dealing with micronutrient deficiencies on a large scale. We have seen this repeatedly in the Western world. Here we have a good record of almost eliminating micronutrient deficiencies through the use of fortification, supplements, and a varied diet.

Some of our own studies in the area of cost-effectiveness of nutrition interventions have shown that the solutions need to be developed and applied within the context of the particular problems and constraints in a particular country. For example, vitamin and mineral supplements can be highly cost-effective. However, in many of the programs studied, there was virtually a total disruption in supplies for long periods of time. Thus, when sustainability is taken into account, a particular intervention may not be as important as another. The promotion of vitamins and minerals through the private sector, however, may be potentially a very important way to deal with micronutrient deficiencies.

Also, education programs in isolation and in combination with other inputs such as food production and preservation is a very important method for bringing about improvements in micronutrient deficiencies.

Today, micronutrient program development is at a stage where these experiences need to be adopted and expanded rapidly in developing countries.

At the international level, there is widespread recognition and awareness that micronutrient deficiencies are important, that they can be taken care of fairly cost effectively, and in the near term.

We have already heard that global targets have been set in the area of micronutrients for the virtual elimination of iodine and vitamin A deficiencies and in iron deficiency, substantial reduction by the year 2000.

Finally, the economic value alone of addressing micronutrient deficiencies, especially in terms of enhancing the payoff from investments in other sectors such as health, child survival, primary education, agricultural productivity, for example, greatly exceeds the cost of investments in micronutrient programs. And considering the widespread nature of these deficiencies, and the wide array of low-

cost solutions, there is a new imperative now to maintain the high visibility that has been accorded to micronutrient programs.

I would be happy to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanghvi appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you for your testimony.

As a former employee of AID, Agency for International Development, please tell me how you would improve AID's programs for children in developing countries.

Ms. SANGHVI. I have been away from AID for a few years. But it is very important to recognize that nutrition is not a subsidiary of another sector. It cannot be tucked away into health, agriculture, or education as a part or component of any one sector. It needs to be expanded and given high priority across many sectors, as we are talking about important nutrition effects of commerce and trade policies, food technology, changes in food systems, in agricultural production, in development of new varieties of foods that may be rich or deficient in micronutrients, for instance, as well as in the health and education sectors.

It is very important to keep a cross-sectoral focus for nutrition, both by working within sectors but also by having an overarching mandate within AID so that these other sectors are accountable for nutrition effects. This is sometimes lost in the shuffle, I think.

Mr. ALLARD. You discuss the partnership between countries and food and pharmaceutical companies to improve food fortification. Can you give me an example of how this works in Asia and South America?

Ms. SANGHVI. In the case of Guatemala, due to national legislation, vitamin A fortification of national sugar supplies is mandatory. So sugar manufacturers are importing approximately 2 million dollars' worth of vitamin A every year and fortifying all of the sugar supplies in Guatemala. This is reaching a very high proportion of the population there.

In the case of Jamaica, the major wheat milling company has added iron and some of the B vitamins to the wheat flour and, as you know, in the Caribbean iron deficiency is a major problem. This program has now been expanded to other Caribbean countries.

Unfortunately, there are only a few examples. It needs to be done much more vigorously and across the board in a lot more countries.

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you very much for your testimony, Doctor.

We will call the next panel on infant feeding and maternal health, Dr. Sandra L. Huffman.

Again, I would like to welcome you to this subcommittee, and I apologize again for the fact that we don't have the chairman here because of a conflict in his schedule. We all deal with conflicts in schedules. It is very frustrating at times. This has been very interesting testimony.

I would just remind you that your entire statement will be put in the record. If you would summarize your remarks, we would appreciate it. Thank you very much, Dr. Huffman.

#### **STATEMENT OF SANDRA L. HUFFMAN, PRESIDENT, NURTURE/ CENTER TO PREVENT CHILDHOOD MALNUTRITION**

Ms. HUFFMAN. Thank you.



Each year 500,000 women die in childbirth. This is similar to the number of births in California every year. There are 185 million malnourished children under the age of 5 in developing countries, and that is more than 10 times the number of children we have in this country.

Aside from the obvious humanitarian reasons for supporting the goals of the World Summit for Children, there are important policy reasons for adopting them as well as part of the U.S. foreign aid strategy. Poor maternal nutritional status, including high rates of anemia, is one of the major causes of child mortality, as well as lack of services for women.

Children start their lives in a malnourished state, one that is difficult to reverse. In developing countries, 19 percent of all infants are born at low birth weight.

The chart I have—you have a copy of it, Mr. Allard—shows the prevalence of low birth weight throughout the world.

In the United States we have a prevalence of about 7 percent. The developing countries in general have around 19 percent low birth weight. The rate is about 10 to 12 percent in Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East and east Asia; 16 percent in sub-Saharan Africa; and up to 33 percent in south Asia.

Stan Foster and I worked together in Bangladesh where we see these very high rates of low birth weight. Improving maternal nutrition is really the major way we have of reducing low birth rate, which, as you know, is highly correlated with child mortality.

Actions to improve nutritional status of women must occur not only during pregnancy and lactation but throughout a child's life, through childhood and adolescence, so women arrive at pregnancy in a well-nourished state.

Many households depend on female labor. One family out of three worldwide is headed by women. Women invest proportionally more income on children, on feeding and health care. And, thus, improving maternal nutritional status will yield benefits for health and economic benefits.

As we discuss AID's strategy, improving maternal nutrition is one way to focus that strategy. The three major causes of child mortality in the world are diarrhea, as has been mentioned, acute respiratory infections or pneumonia and perinatal causes, primarily related to low birth rate that I just talked about.

I was so glad to hear you mention the need for prevention, because it leads right into my testimony. One of the major causes of death from diarrhea and illness is malnutrition. Half of all deaths due to diarrhea are because of persistent diarrhea, which is much more common in malnourished infants. For example, a study in India found that case fatality—the likelihood of dying from diarrhea—is 24 times greater for severely malnourished infants.

We know breast feeding plays a major role in preventing diarrhea mortality. For example, a study in Brazil showed that a child who is not breast-fed was 25 times more likely to die in the first 2 months of life than a child exclusively breast-fed.

And the World Bank recently released a report on how to prevent deaths from childhood mortality. Two of the major four reasons were to improve breast feeding rates and improve weaning practices or feeding of children from 6 to 24 months. Those are two



ways to really decrease diarrhea which are important factors and not expensive ones to do.

Similarly, with acute respiratory infections. In this country, each year 3 to 4 percent of children under the age of 5 contract pneumonia, a low rate. In developing countries, the rate is 10 to 20 percent. In areas with high rates of low birth weight, incidence can be as high as 80 percent. We have to improve the nutritional status of children to prevent acute respiratory infections.

To summarize, the top three killers of infants and young children can be addressed through preventive measures to reduce low birth weight through better maternal nutrition and to improve child feeding. Breast milk, as you know, provides all the energy and nutrients a child needs during the first 6 months of life and continues to play an important role for infants and toddlers.

As you can see from the graph, we see very little malnutrition among children less than 6 months of age. For example, in Bangladesh where you have severe malnutrition among adults and children, you can see a 6-month-old healthy infant who is well-nourished because it is being breast-fed. We see an increasing rate of malnutrition from 6 months to 24 months. This is where we need to focus our efforts.

But, in general, we talk about children under 5 years of age. It is not this group but children under 2 where we need to target the programs. Once children reach the age of 3, they have already become stunted, and it is very hard to reverse. So we need to focus on how to prevent that.

In my testimony, I talk about some of the problems of malnutrition, why children are malnourished. It is not just a lack of food but because young children need different types of food than older people. In developing countries, it is even more of a concern because a typical adult diet of rice and beans is not sufficient for a young child. It doesn't have enough calories and micronutrients.

By concentrating efforts on these programs we can show successes similar to those obtained by previous efforts by USAID in diarrhea and disease control. Our programs can be used to improve child feeding while at the same time meet goals for sustainable development that AID has set up.

I talk about how we can use them to focus on the environment and also population and fertility reduction. However, to do this, as Dr. Sanghvi mentioned, we really need to strengthen nutrition programming at USAID. We need to improve it not just in health, but focus our food for peace program on nutrition.

You would be surprised to know we have one nutritionist in the whole food for peace program. One of the best ones we have is sitting in the audience. We really need to strengthen that division with nutrition. And agricultural programs, as Tina mentioned, have to be focused with nutritional objectives. So we need to have a central focus for nutrition in USAID.

In addition, food aid should be targeted to meet nutritional objectives, with most of the food aid going to those at risk of malnutrition. We need to focus on girls and women to improve nutritional status. We need to enable mothers to exclusively breast feed for up to 2 years. We need to focus efforts on child feeding, on the age

from 6 to 24 months, to help children get the appropriate complementary foods they need.

Congress has put mothers and children at the center of its domestic agenda, as illustrated by your support and all the support here for the WIC program. It can do even more in development activities by making sure that the goals of the UNICEF's World Summit for Children become a reality.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Huffman appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you for your testimony.

A couple of questions on measuring infant mortality. I notice on your chart here where you have developed it—you have broken it out between developed nations and eastern Asia and Latin America and south Asia.

I guess one of the thoughts on my mind is, if you take a highly developed country like the United States, where medically we have the capability of bringing childbirth closer or maybe we can have a live childbirth further away from the term date—in other words, there is a higher risk because of our medical capability. And as far as low birth weight, I think sometimes that gets reflected in the figures. Do you try to factor that in in your figures?

Ms. HUFFMAN. In fact, it is interesting. In developing countries we see much more low birth weight that is related to malnutrition, whereas in the United States we see it primarily as a problem of prematurity, and that is where the issue of prematurity comes in in this country. But in developing countries we can do a lot to reduce low birth weight substantially because most of these are full term infants—full term but malnourished—because the mothers are so malnourished during and prior to pregnancy.

Prior to pregnancy, mothers in Bangladesh weigh about 100 pounds. They are only 4 feet 8 inches tall, and they gain 10 pounds during pregnancy. That is the major cause of low birth weight in developing countries.


Mr. ALLARD. I think that is all the questions I have beyond the infant mortality. I appreciate your bringing the charts before this subcommittee. They are very interesting.

Thank you very much, Dr. Huffman.


Ms. HUFFMAN. Thank you.

[The charts follow:]

# Percent of Infants Born Low Birth Weight



# Nutritional Status of Ghanaian Children 1988





Mr. ALLARD. Let me call the next panel forward.

On child immunization, Dr. Stan Foster, Center for Disease Control.

Dr. Foster, welcome to the subcommittee, and I look forward to your testimony.

**STATEMENT OF STANLEY O. FOSTER, M.D., DIRECTOR, FIELD SERVICES, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES**

Dr. FOSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As somebody not unfamiliar with immunization, I will not go into the basics of how immunization works. Each year 5 million children are at risk of dying of six disease preventable by immunization: Tetanus, whooping cough, measles, diphtheria, polio, and TB.

As measles is the disease that has the biggest impact on nutritional status, it has received emphasis in the statement. As can be seen in figure 1 on page 3 of the testimony, over the last decade great progress has been made in immunizing the world's children. Coverage has increased from 20 percent to 80 percent. An estimated 100 million children are being immunized each year. This achievement represents a global triumph of WHO, UNICEF, technical assistance from agencies such as USAID, voluntary organizations, and of all, the developing countries themselves.

Vaccines have been effective in reducing disease mortality and increasing child survival. An estimated 3 million lives were saved through immunization in 1991.

From a developmental perspective, global capacity to delivering vaccines has increased. Many countries can continue on. However, others, especially those in Africa, lack the financial capacity to cover that one-third of costs needed for immunization. Many countries in Africa do not have adequate vaccines to provide their needs for this year.

As shown on page 12, figure 5, measles vaccine coverage has fallen in 1992, at least for the 17 countries providing data to WHO. This reflects in part a lack of continuing commitment on the part of all donors to immunization, a shift to other priorities and lack of global commitment to child survival.

And a big question is, do we, the global community, have the will and the resources to close the gap and continue the current levels of coverage that were achieved in 1990 and 1991 and to move toward the goals set for the summit for the years 1995 and 2000?

Recognizing the needs of the United States, why should we allocate scarce resources for the poor? First, we live in a global village. What happens in one part of the world affects us all. Second, social justice. As pointed out frequently by this committee, caring for the poor and sharing our resources is the right thing to do. And, third, it is a good development for the United States.

Yesterday, I participated in a meeting on global polio eradication. Polio used to affect 20,000 Americans annually. With leadership and support from the Rotary, Rotarians around the world have raised \$250 million for polio eradication. With money from AID and

the Inter-American Development Bank, we have eradicated polio. No cases in the last 24 months.

I realize that a polio-free world is a legacy we can give the future. When successful, polio eradication will save the United States \$200 million annually in vaccines and delivery costs.

In conclusion, I would call attention to the last paragraph of my statement from the recently released World Bank's World Development Report: "Intensified Government support is required to extend the Expanded Program of Immunization [EPI] which currently protects about 80 percent of the children in the developing world against six major diseases at a cost of \$1.4 billion a year. Expanding EPI coverage to 95 percent of all children would have significant impact on children in poor households who make up a disproportionately large share of those not reached by the EPI. Other vaccines, particularly hepatitis B and yellow fever, could be added to the six currently included, as could vitamin A and iodine supplements. In most developing countries such an EPI plus cluster of interventions in the first year of life would have the highest cost-effectiveness of any health measures available in the world today."

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Foster appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you very much for your testimony, Dr. Foster. Your entire written testimony will be made part of the record.

You are a public health professional. What percentage of the population is the general figure that most people use to assure adequate protection? Is it 80 percent? I think 80 percent used to be the figure I heard all the time. Is it higher now or is it still 80 percent?

Dr. FOSTER. Having spent my life in trying to control measles in Africa, it is 100 percent.

In other words, the disease is so infectious, especially in the dense urban cities of Africa, with the mothers carrying them on their backs in markets and on crowded public transport, any kid you miss is going to get measles. Measles is going to seek that kid out. It may delay a little bit the age of onset if you have 80 percent coverage, but our goal is to immunize every child.

Otherwise, the children—we usually don't protect those kids who need it most.

Mr. ALLARD. What is the role of the Centers for Disease Control in overseas child immunization? How do you coordinate your activities with the Agency for International Development? And does CDC—or does CDC work independently from AID?

Dr. FOSTER. CDC as part of HHS has a very limited international mandate, and almost all of our international work is done either on behalf of USAID or in cooperation with WHO and UNICEF. So the project that we have been working on most closely is the CDC project for 13 countries. This is supported by AID, and we have been working with them in implementing child immunization.

Mr. ALLARD. So the total figure you gave us earlier in your testimony—what is it—35 million children you have vaccinated? Was that the figure you gave us early on in your testimony from CDC?

Whatever that figure is, that includes the United States as well as foreign——

Dr. FOSTER. That is the global figure.

Mr. ALLARD. So it also includes this country?

Dr. FOSTER. It includes this country. It includes WHO's figures from the whole world, including this country. About 125 million born each year; 100 are born in developing countries. And the coverage rates, 80 percent was achieved in 1990, but they are at risk of slipping, as I showed in the figures from Africa for 1992.

Mr. ALLARD. And you think the greatest risk of slipping, then, is in the African Continent, is that correct?

Dr. FOSTER. That is true.

Mr. ALLARD. Now, the immunization program you discuss reaches 80 percent of children in developing countries. What would the effect be if 90 or 95 percent of children were covered?

Dr. FOSTER. We would save probably an additional 1 million lives a year. And that is primarily measles. And, for the reason pointed out in the World Bank report, that we get 80 percent coverage. Our coverage is lowest in the groups at greatest risk. So the higher you go the more likely you are going to get to the high-risk children.

Mr. ALLARD. Then the measles in the African countries is much more virulent than the measles virus we have in this country?

Dr. FOSTER. It is the same virus because the urban elites in Africa have the same disease patterns we have here. But children in poverty and living in crowded conditions, they get infected at earlier ages, and 3 to 5 percent die of measles, whereas the United States is less than 1 percent.

In refugee populations like Sudan or Somalia, it is up around 30 percent.

Mr. ALLARD. Thank you very much, Dr. Foster, for your testimony.

I would like to thank all of you for being here with us this morning. We don't have any more on our schedule, any more testimony, so I will go ahead and adjourn the subcommittee.

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene, subject to the call of the Chair.]

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]

## STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE TONY P. HALL

## Subcommittee on Foreign Agriculture and Hunger

July 20, 1993

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this hearing on child nutrition and implementation of the goals of the World Summit for Children. I commend you for holding this hearing.

At the World Summit for Children of 1990, 71 heads of State and delegates from a total of 159 nations made promises to the world's children. When they signed the Declaration and Plan of Action at the Summit, they pledged by the year 2000 to reduce child death rates by at least one-third, to reduce maternal deaths and child malnutrition by one-half, and to provide children with universal access to basic education (with 80% of children to complete primary school). They also said in the Declaration: "We are prepared to make available the resources to meet these commitments."

Despite the rhetoric and promises, we are not implementing a multi-year plan "to make available the resources to meet these commitments." While some programs directed toward children's basic needs have received increases in the years since the 1990 Summit, there is little sense of direction and leadership to target the aid increases necessary to meet the Summit's goals and to leverage increased contributions from other nations.

UNICEF estimates that the overall cost for achieving the Summit goals and saving the lives of millions of children is an additional \$25 billion worldwide annually. Two-thirds of the resources would come from the developing nations themselves, with the remaining one-third provided in development assistance from the industrialized nations.



While more money alone is not the complete answer, there has to be a sustained commitment to allocating more resources to Summit implementation. In a foreign aid budget of over \$14 billion, certainly we can find the funding to sustain increases in programs that can both save and improve the lives of the world's most vulnerable children.

Congressman Jim Walsh and I have introduced the World Summit for Children Implementation Act of 1993, H.R. 2501. The point of the bill is that we need to draft a specific blueprint and start shifting some dollars in foreign aid funding to make the Summit's objectives a reality. The legislation recommends increases in funding for the next two fiscal years for programs like child survival, basic education, UNICEF, micronutrients, and refugees. I want to emphasize that these increases would be realized by reallocating money within the foreign aid budget. The increases funded since the Summit have occurred through offsets of funding within carefully constructed foreign aid appropriations.

Although the fiscal 1994 foreign operations legislation does not earmark funding for programs like child survival and basic education, it expresses the view that such appropriations should not be reduced, but maintained at their fiscal 1993 levels. While a freeze certainly is preferable to a cut, especially in a tight budget, a freeze will not move implementation of the Summit forward in terms of the resources required.

If the Administration ultimately is given great discretion by Congress for foreign aid spending priorities, the sponsors of the World Summit for Children Implementation Act and I are urging the Administration to start carrying out this year a multi-year strategy of increases for children's basic needs programs. We cannot expect to make progress in addressing the serious challenges to the health and well-being of the world's children by running in place with respect to our financial support of effective children's programs.

In addition to proposing specific funding commitments, the bill asks the President to call upon other countries to do their fair share to help meet the goals of the Summit. The legislation also requests an annual report from our government on the progress being made to implement the Summit, and an accounting of our spending to achieve the goals.

We have it in our power to reduce the suffering of children all around the world. One of the dividends of the post-Cold War era is the chance to join with other nations to tackle the plight of the most vulnerable among us. The World Summit for Children of 1990 offered great hope that countries could come together for real action to help children. We must not allow that Summit to become yet another dusty collection of unrealized dreams.

Today you will hear from experts on issues like micronutrient deficiency, breastfeeding, and child immunization. You will learn how simple, low-cost interventions can save children's lives. I would urge this Subcommittee to join in the effort to create the political will to make at-risk children in the world a top priority. For a few million dollars, many millions of lives can be saved and even more millions of lives can be made better.



United Nations Children's Fund    Fonds des Nations Unies pour l'enfance    Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para la Infancia  
 Детский Фонд Организации Объединенных Наций    联合国儿童基金会    منظمة الأمم المتحدة للطفولة

Statement by Mr. James P. Grant  
Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)  
before the  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Committee on Agriculture  
Subcommittee on Foreign Agriculture and Hunger

Washington, DC - 20 July 1993

"How U.S. Leadership Can Help Jumpstart Development --  
Children and Women as Cutting Edges of Social Progress"

I am honored, and delighted, to have the opportunity to testify on behalf of the United Nations Children's Fund before the House Subcommittee on Foreign Agriculture and Hunger. Today I would like to share with you UNICEF's strong conviction -- born of almost half a century of development work for the world's young and underprivileged -- that there is now a way of "jumpstarting" solutions to many of the seemingly intractable problems facing humankind on the threshold of the 21st century.

Our proposition is this: children should be the cutting edge of new efforts to overcome the worst manifestations of poverty and underdevelopment. Such efforts would not only radically improve the lives of the world's poor, but also significantly slow population growth and environmental degradation, strengthen democracy and help prevent conflict, spur economic growth and improve the status of women. In short, it would significantly advance achievement of all the major goals for foreign aid set forth in the encouraging report issued last week by the State Department Task Force headed by Deputy Secretary Wharton, and in the recent testimony of USAID Administrator Brian Atwood. Further, we believe this is doable at an affordable cost and can produce major, measurable results by the middle of the decade. And finally, I will argue that U.S. leadership is the key missing link needed to accomplish this historic "unfinished business" of the 20th century. When President Clinton said that "People must feel responsible not only for improving their own lives, but also for helping those in need...There is no them; there is only us," he was articulating precisely the kind of global vision that will be needed if the U.S. is to assume such a leadership role.

Hidden behind the dark headlines that greet us when we open our newspapers is the evidence that the world is now able to make vastly greater progress on many problems that have long resisted solution. Rather than merely reacting to situations after they have become critical, as in Somalia, the world has an opportunity

in the 1990s to make a number of effective -- and efficient -- social investments which will substantially contribute to preventing future crises and building healthy societies.

The situation today may be analogous to that of Asia in the mid 1960s, when population growth seemed set to outrun the food supply. Many predicted widespread famine, chaos, and instability for the last third of this century. But then, quite suddenly, within four or five years, the Green Revolution took hold in Asia, extending from the Philippines through South Asia to Turkey. In country after country, wheat and rice production increased at annual rates unprecedented in the West. The immediate cause was not so much a scientific breakthrough -- strains of the miracle wheats had been around for as many as 15 years -- as a political and organizational one. Only by the mid 1960s had fertilizer, pesticides, and controlled irrigation become widely used, thanks in large part to earlier aid programs. At the same time, the combination of South Asian drought and increasing awareness of the population explosion created the political will to drastically restructure price levels for grains and agroinputs, and to mobilize the multiple sectors of society--rural credit, marketing, transport, foreign exchange allocations, media--required for success.

While most accounts of the period appropriately highlight the critical role of U.S. agricultural institutions and foundations, they do not, in my opinion, give sufficient credit to President Lyndon Johnson, who was deeply, personally involved, or to his colleagues Walt Rostow in the White House; Orville Freeman and Lester Brown at the Department of Agriculture; and David Bell and Bill Gaud at USAID, all of whom fervently pushed the Green Revolution like a cause, a mission.

We may be in a similar position today -- poised for advances, but on a much broader front, including primary health care, basic education, water supply and sanitation, family planning, and gender equity, as well as food production--and covering a much wider geographical area, including Africa and Latin America as well as Asia. With an earnest effort from the major powers -- first and foremost, the United States -- the 1990s could witness a second Green Revolution, extending, this time, far beyond agriculture to the reaches of human development.

Frequent illness, malnutrition, poor growth, illiteracy, high birth rates, and gender bias are among poverty's worst symptoms. They are also some of poverty's most fundamental causes. We could anticipate, therefore, that overcoming some of the worst symptoms and causes of poverty would have far-reaching repercussions on the national and global level. The recent experiences of such diverse societies as China, Costa Rica, the Indian state of Kerala, Sri Lanka, and the Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs) suggest that high population growth rates, which wrap the cycle of poverty



ever tighter, can be reduced dramatically. Reducing poverty would give a major boost to the fragile new efforts at democratization that will survive only if they tangibly improve the lives of the bottom half of society. As we know from the experience of Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and the other Asian NICs, such progress would in turn accelerate economic growth. By breaking the "inner cycle" of poverty, we would increase the capacity of the development process to assault poverty's many external causes, rooted in such diverse factors as geography, climate, land tenure, debt, business cycles, governance, and unjust economic relations.

We are uniquely positioned to succeed in the 1990s. Recent scientific and technological advances--and the revolutionary new capacity to communicate with and mobilize large numbers of people--have provided us with a host of new tools. The world's leaders can now use them together to produce dramatic, even unprecedented, results.

For example, the universal child immunization effort--the largest peacetime international collaboration in world history--has since the mid 1980s established systems that now reach virtually every hamlet in the developing world and are saving the lives of more than 8,000 children a day--some 3 million a year. Here, too, the technology was not new; vaccines had been available for some 20-30 years. Success has been the result of applying new communication and mobilization techniques to the immunization effort, often led personally by heads of state, making use of television and radio advertisements, and supported by a wide range of local leaders. School teachers, priests, imams, local government officials, nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers, and health personnel all joined the effort. By 1990, more than 80 per cent of the developing world's children were being brought in four or five times for vaccinations even before their first birthdays. As a result, Calcutta, Lagos, and Mexico City today have far higher levels of immunization of children at ages one and two than do New York City, Washington, D.C., or even the United States as a whole.

A similar effort is now being made to spread the use of oral rehydration therapy (ORT) to combat the single greatest historical killer of children, diarrhea, which takes the lives of some 8,000 children every day, down from 11,000 daily a decade ago. ORT was invented in the late 1960s, but only recently have leaders mobilized to use this lifesaver on a national scale. Every year it now saves the lives of more than 1 million children, a figure that could easily more than double by 1995 with increased national and international leadership.

Our workshops are now well stocked with other new tools, technologies and rediscovered practices that can bring tremendous benefits with inspired leadership and only modest funding. Thus, the simple iodization of salt--at a cost of five cents annually per

consumer--would prevent the world's single largest cause of mental retardation and of goiter, which affect more than 200 million people today as a result of iodine deficiency. Universal access to vitamin A through low-cost capsules or vegetables would remove the greatest single cause--about 700 cases per day--of blindness while reducing child deaths by up to a third in many parts of the developing world. For the very young, the best source of vitamin A is breastmilk. The scientific rediscovery of the miracles of mother's milk means that more than a million children would not have died last year if only they had been effectively breast-fed for the first months of their lives, instead of being fed on more-costly infant formula. In such diverse countries as Bangladesh, Colombia, Senegal, and Zimbabwe, it has proven possible to get poor children, including girls, through primary education at very little cost. Recent advances have shown how to halve the costs of bringing sanitation and safe water to poor communities, to less than \$30 per capita. New varieties of high-yield crops--from cassava to corn--are now ready to be promoted on a national scale in sub-Saharan Africa. Their potential has already been demonstrated in such diverse countries as Nigeria, Ghana, Zimbabwe and Tanzania.

Meanwhile, with such tools in hand, the new capacity to communicate--to inform and motivate empowers families, communities, and governments to give all children a better chance to lead productive lives. In short, we are now learning to "outsmart" poverty at the outset of each new life by providing a "bubble of protection" around a child's first vulnerable months and years. Strong international leadership and cooperation--facilitated enormously by the end of the Cold War and the expansion of democracy--could leverage that new capacity into wide-ranging social progress.

Notwithstanding the media image of the Third World as a lost cause, there is real momentum there for change. In fact, for all the difficulties and setbacks, more progress has been made in developing countries in the last 40 years than was made in the previous 2,000, progress achieved while much of the world freed itself from colonialism and while respect for human and political rights expanded dramatically. Over the past forty years life expectancy has improved more than during the entire previous span of human history, as the World Bank highlights in its latest World Development Report, focusing on health. Life expectancy has lengthened from 40 in 1950 to 65 today, and continues to increase at a rate of 9.5 hours per day. Forty years ago, approximately three out of four children born in the developing countries survived to their fifth birthdays; today, some nine out of ten survive.

At the same time, the birth rates in countries as disparate as Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, Korea, Mexico, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Tunisia have been more than halved, dramatically slowing

population growth and the inherent strains it places on limited natural resources and social programs. Among the factors that have helped contain population growth, improving children's health is undoubtedly the least well-known and appreciated. Vice-President Al Gore underscored the connection between population and infant mortality in his address to the UN Commission on Sustainable Development, quoting Julius Nyerere to the effect that "the most powerful contraceptive is the confidence by parents that their children will survive." While they are important priorities themselves, reductions in child mortality, basic education of women, and the availability of family planning make a strong synergistic contribution to solving what Yale historian Paul Kennedy calls, in Preparing for the Twenty-First Century (1992), the "impending demographic disaster."

In fact, a children's revolution is already under way in the developing world, often led by those in power. Developing country leaders took a major lead in seeking history's first truly global summit--the 1990 World Summit for Children--with an unprecedented 71 heads of state and government participating. They also pressed for early action on the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which was adopted by the General Assembly in November 1989 and which has since been signed or ratified in record time by more than 160 countries--with the United States now being the only major exception.

The experience of the past decade showed it possible--even during the darkest days of the Cold War and amid the Third World economic crisis of the 1980s--to mobilize societies and the international community around a package of low-cost interventions and services, building a sustainable momentum of human progress. Called by many the Child Survival and Development Revolution, this effort has saved the lives of more than 20 million children; tens of millions are healthier, stronger, and less of a burden upon their mothers and families; and birth rates are falling. Much credit for these remarkable gains is due the U.S. Congress, which has provided consistent and meaningful support to the global effort since 1983.

Leaders are learning that productive things can be done for families and children at relatively low cost, and that it can be good politics for them to do so and bad politics to resist. More than 135 countries have issued or are actively working on National Programs of Action to implement the goals set by the World Summit for Children, all of which were incorporated into Agenda 21 at the June 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Those ambitious goals--to be met by the year 2000 --include controlling the major childhood diseases; cutting child malnutrition in half; reducing death rates for children under five by one-third; cutting in half maternal mortality rates; providing safe water and sanitation for all communities; and making family planning services and basic education universally available. In 1992, most regions of the

developing world took the process a step further by selecting a core of targets for 1995, when the first World Social Summit will review children's progress within the broader development process. Just reaching the 1995 targets will mean that 2 million fewer children will die in 1996 than died last year and will die this year. For the first time since the dawn of history, humankind has both committed itself to achieving measurable goals for improving the lives of the young, and has at its disposal the financial and technical wherewithal to achieve them.

In part, that new concern has its roots in the communications revolution that brings daily pictures of large-scale famine or violence into our homes. At the same time, the new communications capacity has permitted deprived populations everywhere to see how much better people can live, further fueling grassroots movements for reform and democracy. But most of the Third World's suffering remains invisible. Of the 35,000 children under age five who die every day in the developing countries, more than 32,000 succumb to largely preventable hunger and illness. No earthquake, no flood, no war has taken the lives of a quarter million children in a single day; but that is the weekly death toll of the invisible emergencies resulting from poverty and underdevelopment. In 1992, 500,000 children under the age of five died in the kind of dramatic emergencies that attract media attention, but that is a small portion of the nearly 13 million children under five who are killed every year by grinding poverty and gross underdevelopment. The tragic deaths of 1,000 children per day in Somalia last year captured far more public attention than those of the 8,000 children around the world who die every day from the dehydration caused by ordinary diarrhea, which is so easily treated and prevented.

As the international community assumes greater responsibility for responding to proliferating civil strife and other emergencies, it must come to terms with the realities of limited resources. How many operations to rescue failed states like Somalia can the international community afford? It is estimated that the U.S. component of the Somalia operation alone will cost more than \$750 million for just four months' involvement, nearly comparable to UNICEF's average annual global budget of recent years, much of which is used to prevent future crises. There are now 48 civil and ethnic conflicts in progress around the globe. The United Nations is involved in 14 peacekeeping operations on five continents. Last year, those operations cost more than \$3 billion, about four times higher than the previous record. This year, the price-tag is projected to rise to \$4.5 billion. Those operations are a most expensive way to relieve suffering, and it is clearly time to invest far more in preventing emergencies and conflicts, and in buttressing the new democracies, even as we put out the world's fires. As U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali argues in his Agenda for Peace, prevention can prove far less costly--and produce far greater results--than relying on expensive and sometimes ineffective rescue operations.



As the international community shifts toward prevention--as it must--it makes the most sense to focus on eradicating poverty's worst manifestations early in the lives of children, breaking the cycle of poverty from generation to generation. At the World Summit for Children, the international community identified the basic package of high-impact, low-cost interventions that can make a difference in the short and medium term, while helping to build a stronger foundation for sustainable development. Now it has only to make them work, albeit on a massive scale.

The overall cost of reaching all the year 2000 goals for children and women, which would overcome most of the worst aspects of poverty, would be an extra \$25 billion per year. The developing countries themselves might be expected to come up with two-thirds of that amount by reordering their domestic priorities and budgets. The remaining third--slightly more than \$8 billion per year--should come from the industrialized world in the form of increased or reallocated official development assistance (ODA) and debt relief. That is a small price for meeting the basic needs of virtually every man, woman, and child in the developing world in nutrition, basic health, basic education, water and sanitation, and family planning within this decade.

In Russia and the other former Soviet republics, such aid could produce rapid grassroots results at an affordable cost, easing pain and helping to buy time until democratic and macro economic reforms show concrete progress. Plans for restoring democracy to Cambodia, Haiti, and Mozambique will need to alleviate suffering among the poor quickly; and targeting the essential needs of children and women can produce the biggest impact at the lowest cost. International relief programs for Somalia must rapidly give way to assistance that constitutes an investment in human development, and no such investment has been found to be more cost effective than primary health care, nutrition, and basic education for children and women. The road to power for many of the world's extremist movements--whether based in religion or political ideology--is paved with the unmet needs of the poor.

Sadly, the U.S. has stagnated or regressed over the past decade with respect to children, even while much of the developing world has been making impressive progress. The United States has provided little leadership for that progress, except for that provided by the bipartisanship of Congress, which for ten years has actively encouraged U.S. support to child survival and development programs abroad, including the steadily increasing support provided UNICEF. But by increasing investment in American children and strengthening American families, and by reordering foreign assistance to reflect that new priority, the United States, the world's sole superpower, could once more set the global standard and give a major boost to human development and economic growth.

First, few actions would have more immediate impact than the signature and ratification this year of the historic Convention on the Rights of the Child. President Bill Clinton's signature of the convention and its submission to the U.S. Senate for early ratification, as has been urged by bipartisan congressional leadership, would send an important message to the world, bringing the rights of children close to becoming humanity's first universal law.

Second, the United States needs to demonstrate a new culture of caring for its own children. The much-needed reordering of priorities for American children, women, and families is already under way, with initiatives on Head Start, universal immunization, parental leave, family planning, and health services for all. The Clinton administration is taking important -- historic -- steps in this regard and should be supported in its efforts. A "Culture of Caring," the American plan in response to the World Summit for Children that was issued at the end of the Bush administration--in January 1993-- reminds us that this is a cause for bipartisan action.

Third, the United States needs "20/20 vision." It should support the May 1991 proposal of the United Nations Development Program, which had two components: It called on developing countries to devote at least 20 per cent of their budgets to directly meeting the basic human needs of their people, roughly double current average levels. It also argued that 20 per cent of all international development aid should go to meet those same basic needs: primary health care, nutrition, basic education, family planning, and safe water and sanitation -- the very programs that are most popular with the American people. Today, on average, less than 10 per cent of already inadequate levels of ODA are devoted to that purpose. Different ways of defining and reporting social sector allocations within national and ODA budgets make precise quantification of those proportions somewhat difficult, and efforts are therefore underway to achieve a common form of reporting. But even if subsequent research changes the target percentages, the "20/20 vision" concept underscores the importance of restructuring both sets of budgets in line with the priorities established at the World Summit for Children, which may require--on average--a doubling of existing allocations.

On the ODA side, the United States today devotes only some \$1 billion of its bilateral development resources to meeting priority human needs. Of the projected \$25 billion extra annually that will be required globally by mid decade to meet the World Summit year 2000 goals, the U.S. share would be \$2 billion. The roughly \$3 billion total would then still be less than 20 per cent of all U.S. foreign and military assistance. It is a small price to pay for jumpstarting solutions to so many of the overwhelming problems of population, democracy, and the worst aspects of poverty, to say nothing about saving tens of millions of young lives this decade.

The additional funds can be obtained from reductions in the military and security component of the U.S. international affairs budget.

Fourth, the new spirit of democratic change and economic reform in Africa will not survive if its creditors do not give it some debt relief: Together, the sub-Saharan African countries pay \$1 billion in debt service to foreign creditors every month, and its debt is now proportionally three or four times heavier than Organization of African Unity-sponsored International Conference on Assistance to African Children, donor countries and lending agencies alike pledged to promote more debt relief while expanding or restructuring ODA in order to help Africa protect and nurture its children. Here again the United States could help lead the way, preventing Africa from deteriorating into a continent of Somalias. The industrialized world should make a definitive commitment to debt relief, with much of the local currency proceeds going to accelerate programs for children, women, and the environment through a variety of debt-swapping mechanisms. With the right mixture of domestic and international support, and with apartheid ending in South Africa, we could see dramatic progress in most of Africa by the year 2000. That could include a food revolution every bit as green as Asia's--but African countries will need help. The alternative could be a return to authoritarian rule, corruption, and conflict throughout large parts of the continent.

Fifth, the United States must actively support multilateral cooperation. With human development and poverty alleviation increasingly accepted as the focus for development cooperation in the 1990s, the United States has an opportunity to transform rhetoric into reality. Active U.S. support and leadership along those lines in the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the regional banks, and throughout the U.N. system will go a long way toward overcoming, in our time, the worst aspects of poverty in the South, where it is most acute. Landmark U.N. conferences have been held on human rights (1993), and scheduled, on population (1994), and women (1995); U.S. leadership at those conferences and at the U.N. Summit for Social Development in 1995 will strengthen their impact. The U.S. role will also be critical in reducing poverty in the North and in the transitional societies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Sixth, the time has come to "revitalize" USAID -- as envisioned in the encouraging report issued just last week by the State Department Task Force headed by Deputy Secretary Wharton. Refocusing AID in line with the "investment in people" approach to development cooperation called for by President Clinton and the holistic vision articulated by Vice-President Gore in his book Earth in the Balance, could turn US bilateral cooperation into a dynamic and powerful engine for global progress even during these times of fiscal constraint. To the extent that bilateral and multilateral cooperation programs pursue common goals through

proven, cost-effective strategies, the whole of development assistance will be greater than the sum of its parts. Children and women should be at the center of our development strategies, not just because it is morally right, but also because it is economically sound. Investing in children and women would significantly advance every one of the four goals for U.S. foreign policy outlined by AID Administrator Atwood in his recent congressional testimony.

Finally, the United States must strengthen its commitment to the United Nations. The new administration's initiative to seek restoration of U.S. funding for the United Nations Population Fund is a welcome step--a step that Congress should rapidly implement. That and a decision to rejoin the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) would not only give an important boost to family planning and global education, but--together with full payment of its U.N. arrears--it would signal long-term U.S. commitment to the United Nations as the global village's central vehicle for development cooperation and safeguarding the peace.

Focusing on children and women as a means of attacking the worst aspects of poverty will not solve all the world's problems, but it would make a historic contribution--at this all-too-brief juncture of opportunity--to the better world we all seek. It could -- it will -- change the course of history. Global progress on a whole series of fronts depends, in great measure, on decisions made -- or not made -- actions taken -- or not taken -- in this country, in this capital city, in this legislature, in this very Subcommittee.



STATEMENT OF  
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me this opportunity to testify today on the problems faced by children in the developing world. I would like to highlight some of the critical issues in child nutrition and child survival, and outline A.I.D.'s programs to improve the health and well-being of women, infants and children.

The Problem

In developing countries, the period of infancy and early childhood is one of extreme vulnerability -- to conditions surrounding birth, communicable diseases, lack of adequate nourishment, and a myriad of other threats to growth and development. Indeed, in the world's developing countries, over one-third of all deaths occur among children under five years of age. Today, thirteen million infants and children die annually, most of them in developing countries, most of them from preventable causes.

Nutritional status, like the rate of infant mortality, is a dramatic and revealing indicator of the welfare of a population. The stark reality is that over one-third of the developing world's

children are malnourished. Compared to an adequately nourished child, the risk of dying is doubled for a mildly malnourished child, tripled for a moderately malnourished child and 11 times higher for a severely malnourished child. Undernutrition creates a higher risk of growth retardation, morbidity and mortality. These already distressing numbers of malnourished children are increasing in parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Nutrient deficiencies are severe. More than 1 billion people -- mostly women and children -- are deficient in one or more micronutrients. Iron deficiency in infancy and childhood is associated with significant loss of cognitive abilities and impaired resistance to disease. We know that iodine deficiency in pregnancy causes stillbirths and infant deaths. In childhood, it can cause mental retardation, growth failure, lack of energy, muscular disorders, and speech and hearing defects. Vitamin A deficiency affects some 40 million children; severe deficiency causes eye damage to 13 million preschoolers. Every year at least half a million children go partially or totally blind due to vitamin A deficiency. Furthermore, there is a documented increase in child mortality among children in vitamin A deficient populations.

A.I.D.'s child survival program has developed from the recognition that the majority of the deaths and ill health of children in the developing world are preventable: they are the result of common childhood diseases. Principal among these

diseases are vaccine preventable diseases such as measles and neonatal tetanus, as well as diarrheal diseases, pneumonia, and malaria in some areas. These diseases form a deadly cycle of interaction with progressive undernutrition that often begins as low birth weight.

#### Child Survival and Sustainable Development

Brian Atwood, the Administrator of A.I.D., has stated emphatically that the overall goal of our foreign aid program must be sustainable development. We are seeking durable solutions to the global challenges we collectively face. Central to our search for durable solutions is human capacity building, including improvements in the health, well-being and opportunities of children and their families. Healthy children today are the building blocks for tomorrow.

Evidence of the interdependence of child health and development is ample and comes from many sectors. For instance, there is no question that health and school performance are closely tied. Impairment of vision and intelligence due to nutritional deficiencies have a devastating impact on school performance. But there are more subtle impacts as well -- the cumulative impact of disease and malnutrition in the early years hold back a child throughout childhood.

Fertility reduction and child survival are also closely linked. It is common sense on a family level -- parents don't want to limit their number of children if they aren't confident that the ones they do have will survive. Evidence is ample that significant fertility declines can follow reductions in infant and child death. The reverse is also true: the availability of family planning services that enable couples to space births can have a dramatic impact on infant mortality. More specifically, infant mortality drops significantly when births are spaced 2 or more years apart.

Improvements in child health also save money. Some of the savings are because lower cost interventions such as ORT have been substituted for higher cost treatments like intravenous therapy -- which is 10 times as costly. But some of the greatest savings are due to prevention. Economists have estimated that the total cost of one case of measles is 23 times the cost of preventing it through measles immunization. Capitalizing on such savings is critical to development. And for A.I.D., administering scarce funds in the health area, a sharp focus on prevention must dominate our resource allocation choices.

Finally, A.I.D. has found that programs to improve child health and survival also build national and community institutions, and this too is central to our search for durable solutions. In part, child health programs strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of government institutions and programs. But perhaps an



even more important part is the institutional development at the community level: the mothers club in Bolivia, the Rotary clubs in India, the local research and advocacy groups like the Child Health Institute in Haiti. Programs which train female health workers in Bangladesh or strengthen researchers working on diarrheal disease in Peru and Cameroon are building capacity while they are saving lives.

In short, the benefits to improved child health and nutrition go well beyond the reduction in illness and death -- important as these benefits are. But just as the consequences of improved child survival are far-reaching and multifaceted, so too are the determinants. Poor health and inadequate nutrition are the result of multiple causes: poor water and inadequate sanitation; inadequate housing; high fertility; lack of information about preventive health care; inadequate food production or import capacity; insufficient incomes and assets or unstable food prices; the absence of social and political structures to assure equitable access to basic service; civil disorder; failures in weather.

With the exception of the weather, most of these factors are susceptible to development program interventions. But where to start? The sheer variety of factors that directly and indirectly influence health and nutrition point to the need for integrated, multisectoral solutions.

### The AID Strategy

A.I.D.'s child survival program builds on a history of commitment to and experience with primary health care programs. Our strategy has been to focus on a limited, manageable mix of low cost interventions proven to have a direct impact on reducing mortality. The four main interventions involve:

- increasing immunization against common childhood diseases,
- extending the use of oral rehydration therapy to prevent death from diarrhea-related dehydration,
- reducing high risk births and improving maternal health, and
- improving nutrition among young children.

### Improving Nutrition

I would like to focus on the last of these interventions: nutrition. A.I.D.'s efforts to reduce malnutrition in developing countries include virtually every element of the foreign assistance program. Title III food aid, cash transfers conditioned on reforms, development projects to increase production, employment and income -- all contribute to improved nutrition by, among other things, increasing availability of and access to food.

But there are direct interventions as well, especially in the areas of improved infant and child feeding, growth monitoring, breastfeeding, promotion of weaning foods, nutrition management, reducing micronutrient deficiency, improving public education on

nutrition and hygiene, and improving the nutritional status of adolescent girls and women of reproductive age.

A.I.D.'s nutrition-focussed programs are a mix of efforts to generate new knowledge and technologies, and to strengthen the capacities of developing country institutions and people to address nutritional needs. They include applied and operations research, technical assistance, training, and dissemination of informational materials. I would like to provide highlights on some of these programs.

#### Micronutrients

A.I.D. has played a pioneering role in supporting research in Vitamin A and iron to develop a sound scientific foundation for action. A central theme of A.I.D.'s work is that nutrition education and dietary diversification are the most sustainable, permanent ways to improve the micronutrient status of children.

Examples of A.I.D.'s work include:

- Vitamin A fortification of processed agricultural commodity donation programs (such as P.L. 480 titles II and III)
- A slow release iron tablet that improves the efficacy of absorption for anemic individuals
- Gardening and nutrition education programs to encourage the production and consumption of micronutrient rich foods
- A vitamin A rich mango weaning food that provides a much needed first food for infants in Senegal.

Infant Feeding/Maternal Health

Breastfeeding, a key to good infant nutrition and health, is practiced at less than optimum levels in many parts of the world. On average, only 15 percent of mothers in developing countries practice exclusive breastfeeding on their infants through four to six months. Given the enormous direct impact that breastfeeding has on child survival, in addition to the critical role breastfeeding plays as an enhancer of key child survival interventions -- diarrheal disease control, nutrition, and child spacing -- A.I.D. has been at the forefront of a special breastfeeding promotion initiative. For example:

- Wellstart International, a U.S.-based PVO, provides lactation management education for LDC health professionals, who return to their home countries to develop high quality training programs, materials, and policies that support breastfeeding. Wellstart also provides assistance in developing mother-to-mother support groups, research programs, country assessments, and national policy formation.

- The Nutrition Communication Project works with NGOs and government officials to develop sound interpersonal and media messages that promote breastfeeding. Written and audiovisual breastfeeding materials are tested and disseminated through numerous NGO and public health channels.



- The Clearinghouse on Infant Feeding and Maternal Nutrition provides up-to-date and culturally appropriate information about breastfeeding. The Clearinghouse network is about 45,000 field health workers worldwide.

- The Institute for Reproductive Health's breastfeeding program will sponsor a meeting this fall entitled "Breastfeeding as a Women's Issue: A Dialogue on Health, Family Planning, Work and Feminism". This meeting will address some of the issues facing women employed in both the formal and informal sector, as discussed at the ICN.

Finally, many other child survival projects -- including Technology for Primary Health Care (PRITECH), Technology and Resources for Child Health (REACH), Communication and Marketing for Child Survival (HEALTHCOM), the Quality Assurance Project, and the Applied Diarrheal Disease Research Project -- are helping to reduce the damaging effect of illness on infant and child nutrition by promoting appropriate feeding -- especially breastfeeding -- during and after illness. They are also promoting breastfeeding as a way to prevent illness in infants.

#### Child Nutrition Field Support Programs

A.I.D. designs and administers a variety of central programs to support nutrition projects in developing countries. These projects make current research and technology available to a wide

variety of public and private institutions which finance and carry out field nutrition programs. Examples of current central support programs include:

- Our Maternal and Neonatal Health and Nutrition (Mothercare) program is designed to improve pregnancy outcomes by strengthening and increasing the use of prenatal services and influencing behaviors that affect the health and nutrition status of mothers and their newborn infants.

- The Women and Infants' Nutrition program addresses the entire continuum of child nutritional needs from birth through three years of age from the period of exclusive breastfeeding and the child's complete transition to the family diet. The thrust of the WINS program is technical assistance in project design, evaluation, and program and policy planning.

- The Nutrition Communication Project has worked with PVOs in Mali to develop counseling strategies and training materials that are now being used by 15 community-based child health projects affecting about 750,000 people in the region. A mid-term assessment revealed that after one year of intense promotion, nutritional status dramatically improved in the participating villages.

- Our Latin America and Caribbean Health and Nutrition

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Sustainability program supports A.I.D.'s efforts to develop, monitor and evaluate projects in health management, financing, and nutrition. Services include technical assistance, special studies and sectoral analysis, workshops, operations research and information exchange. A recent report, "Current Trends in Food and Nutrition in the LAC Region," examined priorities and opportunities for improving nutrition programming in the region.

- Infant and child feeding is a priority issue in the Africa region as well, and A.I.D. has posted a regional nutrition advisor in West Africa to monitor and advise public and private organizations on infant feeding.

- The Integrated Child Development Services Project (ICDS) in India is an Indian Government program that provides a comprehensive package of services for children and pregnant and nursing women in order to reduce malnutrition and mortality. A.I.D. assistance, in which a PVO played a vital role, included the provision of food aid, technical assistance and training in nutrition/health education and health management information systems, and research and development activities. The program has produced substantial improvements in the survival, health and nutritional status of children and women.

- Food Assistance. Title II food aid continues to meet expanding food insecurity crises around the world, especially in

Africa. A.I.D. has also fully integrated the unique resource of Title III food aid into development programs, assuring its use to leverage policy reforms that address the underlying causes of food insecurity, as well as utilizing the money generated from food sales for specific development projects. In addition, we are undertaking some innovative activities under the new Title III mandate linking food aid to nutrition. An example is a recently-signed agreement to use funds from Title III sales along with seed capital funds from our nutrition account to establish a National Lactation Management Training Center in Bolivia. The center will train health and nutrition workers in order to improve practices that promote breastfeeding and to create a cadre of qualified people who will develop curricula for medical, nursing and nutrition schools.

#### The Future

Nutrition has been but one element of A.I.D.'s efforts to improve the lives of infants and children around the world. Since 1985, A.I.D. has committed \$1.5 billion to the child survival program. It is an investment whose returns have already been substantial. It has improved the health prospects among the developing world's children and strengthened the capacities of developing countries to provide health services.

At the 1990 World Summit for Children, the U.S. joined seventy other nations in committing to continuing the effort to assist less



developed countries in reducing child deaths, improving child health and sustaining these improvements. Analysis of A.I.D.'s experience in its child survival programs suggest the following eight conclusions.

1. Focus on a limited number of relatively low-cost preventive interventions is a key facet of program success.
2. A limited number of additional interventions addressing other major causes of child mortality will be required to achieve greatest reductions in infant and child mortality.
3. Child survival programs must move toward integration of their interventions to reap the benefits of developing sustainable health systems.
4. Important gains in both reduction of child mortality and in sustainability can be made by improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the systems that deliver child health services.
5. Communications and marketing are essential to provide families with needed information, stimulate behavior change, and create sustained demand for child health services.
6. Child survival programs must look beyond the public sector

to recruit additional resources for delivering and sustaining child health services.

7. Building national capabilities is essential to improve and sustain child survival activities.

8. Institutionalizing child survival will require development and implementation of policies that support child health and child health services.

At the 1992 International Conference on Nutrition the U.S. joined 159 countries in reaffirming the Child Survival nutrition goals, as well as other nutrition activities which significantly affect the wellbeing of children. Countries agreed at the ICN to prepare or improve their national plans for nutrition. Many countries are engaged in this process, including the U.S. We in A.I.D. intend to be active participants in the U.S. review of its National Plan. We will be looking at ways to shape our PL 480 responsibilities, which include nutrition goals to take into account appropriate developing country nutrition/child survival strategies which emerge in the post-ICN period.

A.I.D. has committed itself to an international partnership to develop new technologies and strategies to expand and strengthen child survival programs. The development of new and improved vaccines through the Children's Vaccine Initiative, the application

of modern communications media to inform and educate, the continued testing of new approaches to improve the quality of care -- these are all areas in which A.I.D. is playing a leading role. We realize, as Brian Atwood stated last month, that we must lead with our ideas where we cannot lead with our resources.

We have also come to realize that the flow of benefits in child survival programs is not one-way. The United States benefits directly and indirectly from the investments in the health systems of the developing world, both in terms of the availability of new technologies and the transfer of knowledge and skills back to the U.S. Transferring the capacity to prevent and control diseases -- which are notoriously unimpressed by political boundaries -- has a clear and direct impact on our ability to protect the health and well-being of the American public.

But there is another more profound sense in which the health and well-being of the United States is intertwined with that of the developing world. Imagine a world in which one-third of the people are perpetually sick, in which they lack the energy to participate in their own development, in which malnutrition and endemic disease rob millions of their vitality and faculties. It is a world of misery and hopelessness, a world destined for conflict, instability and acts of desperation. It is a world in which investments in any other aspect of social and economic development cannot have their full impact. It is a world that A.I.D.'s entire development

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assistance program is focused on eliminating. It is a world that we must not continue to tolerate.



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### MICRONUTRIENT DEFICIENCIES

Rarely has there been an opportunity to make an enormous difference globally to the health and survival of children, their mental and physical development, to labor productivity and national development, and protection against environmental hazards. Reducing vitamin and mineral deficiencies provides such an opportunity. New information is showing that for a few cents per person it is possible to make significant gains in the near term. It is hard to find a more relevant and urgent child nutrition issue - relevant for emerging demographic trends and the remaining causes of infant and child mortality, for economic and financial constraints within which development aid and national development resources must be apportioned, and for the current limitations in primary health care and primary education.

The term **micronutrients** is used for vitamins and minerals because they are needed in very small quantities for maintaining health and well-being of humans, animals and plants. However, if enough of these substances are not provided the effects can be devastating. Only in the last decade have the implications of micronutrient deficiencies been truly understood. It is this realization of the comprehensiveness of the devastation caused and magnitude of people affected - rather than any new technological breakthroughs in dealing with them - that has given new urgency to launching a major global attack on the problem. The technologies and solutions are proven, highly cost-effective, and have been known for some time. They include food fortification, changing eating habits to diversify sources of foods consumed, increasing availability through production of foods rich in micronutrients, and supplements.

### **MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM**

The extent of micronutrient malnutrition - mainly a deficiency of iron, iodine and vitamin A - is greater than previously thought, largely because less visible and less easily detectable forms of the deficiencies that are also more widespread, have now been shown to affect critical functions related to mental development, health and survival, and labor productivity. Surveys indicate that more than 2 billion individuals are affected. Some individuals suffer from a single deficiency, however multiple deficiencies are more common. The age groups most affected are infants and children under the age of six years and pregnant women, although significant numbers of school-age children and adults in the work force are affected as well. In addition to developing countries shown in the map (Figure 1), these deficiencies are thought to be widespread in areas of the newly independent states in eastern Europe and Asia. Northern and western Europe and the United States have experienced a decline in the prevalence of these deficiencies in the past few decades, largely resulting from strategies being recommended for developing countries today.

## EFFECTS OF THE DEFICIENCIES

Each vitamin and mineral plays a unique role in vital body functions. For example, iron is essential for the oxygen-carrying capacity of blood cells, its deficiency depriving brain and muscle tissue of nourishment and the ability to function normally. Vitamin A acts through different channels to protect the immune system and the absence of sufficient vitamin A has the same type of crippling effect on the immune system as a virus, resulting in the inability to recover from common infections. Vitamin A is also a powerful anti-oxidant and can neutralize cancer-producing environmental chemicals. Iodine is essential for the production of hormones needed for brain development and physical growth, and deficient populations exhibit signs of mental impairment and dwarfism.

Economically, micronutrient deficiencies result in a number of increased costs for individuals, families, communities and nations. Due to reduced labor productivity in work output and wages, lower educational attainments, reduced enrollment and attendance in school, increased morbidity and mortality especially among children, and higher health care costs, it is the health, education, and human resource-intensive sectors that are most affected.

### Labor Productivity

**Reducing iron deficiency improves worker productivity.** Recent estimates for Bangladesh suggest that lowering iron deficiency anemia by two-thirds by 2000 (the National Action Plan goal) could make a potential contribution to the GDP of \$3.2 billion cumulatively (1993-2000) in increased productivity of agricultural labor (USAID, 1993). See Figure 2. Earlier, Indonesian researchers had demonstrated increased productivity in anemic rubber plantation workers. In a more recent study in Indonesia, iron-deficient anemic women increased their productivity while picking tea leaves following iron treatment.

**Improving iodine status can significantly improve the income earning capacity and work competency of individuals.** For example, in China, researchers found, that the average income per person in one Chinese village soared in the three years following a salt iodization program. Income per person rose almost 10-fold from 1981 to 1984. Evidence suggests that in addition to other social changes the iodization program was a decisive factor. For the first time, for example, men from the village were sufficiently fit to enlist in the army. A similar relationship between income and iodine levels was found in Ecuador where persons with moderate iodine deficiencies were paid consistently less for agricultural work than individuals with normal iodine levels.

**Preventing vitamin A deficiency blindness can increase earnings significantly.** Economic analyses show that the gains from a reduced incidence of blindness alone are considerable. If one assumes that a nation loses \$200 in productivity per year per blind

person between 15 and 65 years old and interest rates are between five and 10 percent, then the productivity gain from preventing blindness in an individual is between \$520 and \$1,840. When the current estimates of children going blind - one-half to one million every year - are multiplied, the loss in productivity is staggering.

### Education Sector

**Preventing iron-deficiency anemia can improve aptitudes, capacity to focus attention and school attendance.** Researchers from Indonesia, Thailand and India consistently showed lower cognitive achievement scores in anemic school-children that improved significantly though not completely when treated with iron supplements. In very young children the damage may be permanent. In Costa Rica, school children who were anemic as infants failed to catch up with their non-anemic colleagues in learning abilities, even after their anemia had been successfully treated. See Figure 3.

**Improving iodine status can raise the learning capacity of school children and increase attendance.** Children who suffer from milder forms of the deficiency may also become mentally and neurologically handicapped, according to new studies. Children in areas of endemic iodine deficiency tend to start school later and drop out earlier. The effects may occur much earlier, during fetal development, and may be permanent. In Papua New Guinea, for example, researchers found iodine levels in women during pregnancy related to the offspring's performance 12 years later on a battery of tests. See Figure 4.

**Reducing vitamin A deficiency protects vision and reduces absenteeism from higher morbidity in children.**

### Health Sector

**Vitamin A is now recognized as one of the most cost-effective infant and child mortality reducing measures in developing countries.** Globally an estimated 23 percent reduction in infant and young child deaths are preventable in disadvantaged populations through vitamin A according to recent estimates. In five of seven community-based trials in Africa and Asia, mortality in children, between the ages of 1 to 5 years old, was reduced by 20 to 54 percent when given vitamin A in fortified food, in doses simulating adequate dietary intake, or in supplements.

**Reducing iron deficiency can lower the risk of maternal mortality.** Evidence has directly linked 20 percent of all maternal deaths in West Africa and India with iron deficiency anemia.

**Preventing iron, iodine, and vitamin A deficiencies can lower hospitalization costs because of fewer health complications and lower morbidity.** Vitamin A supplementation of children hospitalized for measles systematically reduced complications, hospitalization time and deaths by half in three carefully controlled tests.

Preventing blindness from vitamin A deficiency and mental impairment from iron and iodine deficiency will lower rehabilitation costs.

#### PROGRAM AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH MICRONUTRIENT DEFICIENCIES

Unlike other health and nutrition problems, where long after the discovery of the devastating effects of some new scourge or virus, the remedy may be decades away, for micronutrient deficiency, several proven options are already available. Each one can be more or less appropriate depending upon local conditions. Some vitamins and minerals (such as the precursor of vitamin A and iron) abound in nature, are found in low cost foods and need to be included in the diets of those at risk of deficiencies. Others such as iodine and selenium may be missing from the soil, water and food in certain areas, and therefore need to be added to food or water supplies through fortification. Where fortified or naturally rich food sources cannot be found and to treat individuals who are deficient, supplements are an excellent alternative.

In the Western world, iodized salt has largely taken care of iodine deficiency, and was started in the 1920's in the United States; not so in most developing countries. A major portion of the Western world's margarine production is fortified with vitamin A, not so in developing countries. Legal acceptance of cereal enrichment in the United States in 1941 virtually guaranteed the disappearance of B vitamin deficiencies and reduced iron deficiency. This remains to be done in the developing world. Iron supplements for infants and pregnant women are routinely taken throughout the more developed countries but rarely done in developing countries. None of these is an expensive or technically complicated intervention. In fact analyses of pilot programs has shown their cost-effectiveness in developing country settings, as shown in Figure 5 and Table 1. Some examples are given below:

- Increases in productivity were found with a remarkable degree of consistency in eight studies of work output related to hemoglobin levels (an indicator of iron status). In one test conducted among a group of Indonesian rubber plantation workers, half of whom were anemic, researchers found that iron supplements given to the anemic workers plus a small incentive payment resulted in approximately 20 percent higher work output than anemic tappers with a calculated benefit/cost ratio that "is potentially as high as 260:1" according to World Bank analyses.
- Examining a series of iron fortification tests, researchers found that the value of benefits from fortification varied from 7 times the costs in field trials in Indonesia to 42 in Kenya and 70 in Mexico. In each case, analysis using the most conservative criteria found that the benefits of intervention exceeded their costs, frequently substantially.
- In a comprehensive study in the Philippines mass dosage with vitamin A capsules every six months yielded benefits of 2.4 to 3.4 times the costs; the



- fortification of MSG with vitamin A produced benefits of 6 to 21 times the cost.
- Largely due to the potential magnitude of vitamin A impacts on infant and child mortality, the number of productive years gained per dollar invested for vitamin A supplementation ranked favorably with other known mortality reduction technologies in a recent World Bank assessment (McGuire, 1990).
  - Cost-benefit studies for iodine intervention among children in South America showed that the benefits far exceeded the costs. Other studies, including one in the United States, suggest a high payoff for iodine intervention.

Our studies on the factors affecting cost-effectiveness of horticulture and diet diversification, fortification and supplements, underway in Latin America and the Caribbean, suggest that programs packages need to be carefully tailored to local conditions and the specifics of micronutrients. Examples of factors that should be considered include: the choice of food vehicle and form of fortificant to optimize stability and absorbability under local conditions, proposed duration and level of resources available can make one type of intervention a more efficient choice, the status of local supply systems for supplements, especially in the private sector, and identification of micronutrient-rich foods in a community that mothers can be taught to feed to their children.

Today, the field of policy and program development is at the stage where the experiences of developed countries and results of research and analyses in developing countries need to be applied on a large scale and rapidly expanded to achieve high coverage. There is guarded optimism that it can be done. Representatives and heads of state of over 150 countries, the European Economic Community and international agencies (who met at the World Summit for Children in 1990, at a policy conference on micronutrients in 1991, and recently at the International Conference on Nutrition in December 1992) have pledged to support the achievement of the virtual elimination of iodine and vitamin A deficiencies and a reduction in iron deficiency by one-third by the year 2000. The issue now is designing country strategies and implementing them.

A number of technical areas need attention such as in fine-tuning assessments and simplified diagnostic procedures, and adaptation of food technology and other solutions to local sites. Others include: adapting or fine-tuning assessment and diagnostic methods that can be used with little formal training, careful consideration of micronutrients in emergency relief programs that rely on bilateral and multilateral donated food, may need supplements for distribution, and promotion of gardening activities at refugee camps (deficiencies of vitamins A and B plus scurvy are on the rise, and vitamin C very difficult to provide through fortification). However, if the mobilization of international expertise and willingness of developed countries to provide assistance continues at present levels, the technical issues can be effectively dealt with. Success of country programs, then, will be largely determined by the political will and sustained commitment by public and private entities in the countries themselves to get the job done. Donors can make a significant contribution by endorsing national policies

supportive of micronutrient issues and giving priority to nutrition in their aid portfolios at the country level, and include nutrition considerations in trade dialogue in key countries.

What is the role of various country entities? Considering that the most sustainable means of correcting micronutrient deficiencies is through food, and that the economic value to individuals and families of maintaining adequate micronutrient status far surpasses the costs of acquiring vitamin and mineral-rich foods, in the long run, eliminating micronutrient deficiencies will require people making the appropriate dietary and budgetary choices for themselves. The role of government in developed countries has been to set food and pharmaceutical standards and provide public information on the problem and remedies. For immediate results, distribution of supplements and food fortification offer the best hope. In this area, public and private sector partnership is critical. The food and pharmaceutical industry has played a pivotal role in national fortification programs in a number of countries in Europe; Asia; and North, Central, and South America. Industry has absorbed the costs of: modifying food processing routines, market research on consumer acceptance and ability to pay, public information campaigns on the value of fortified foods, quality control, and development of more stable forms of fortificants. Non-profit organizations such as CARE, Helen Keller, International Eye Foundation, Project HOPE and others have led the way in developing innovative and low cost intervention programs; have provided models for the delivery of health and nutrition services; and helped raise awareness of child nutrition concerns overseas. Public health and nutrition advocates from academic and public interest institutions and from consumer groups have been meaningful partners of government.

## CONCLUSION

The economic value of addressing micronutrient deficiencies, especially in enhancing the returns from investments in health and child survival, primary school education, and agricultural labor productivity alone, greatly exceeds their cost. It would be wasteful and short-sighted for development aid to continue in these sectors while micronutrient deficiencies erode away the benefits, especially since the solutions are low-cost and the payoff is rapid. While experts disagree on the precise cost/benefit ratios of existing micronutrient intervention programs, there is consensus that the available solutions are cost effective. Investing in nutrition can produce results quickly and because nutritional effects are known to pass from generation to generation, the effect over time is considerable. Considering the widespread nature of these deficiencies and the wide array of low-cost solutions, a new imperative exists to support micronutrient programs. The benefits derive not only from the reduced burden of illness and death but also from tangible economic dividends to individuals, families, communities and nations. of the improved mental and physical capacity.

(Attachments follow:)


FIGURE 1

## PREVALENCE OF MICRONUTRIENT DEFICIENCIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES




FIGURE 2

## INCREASED PRODUCTIVITY FROM ANEMIA REDUCTION




Sources: Able and Burkhalter, USAID/PROFILES, 1993.

FIGURE 3



Source: Adapted from Lazoff et al., New England J. Med., 1991.

FIGURE 4




Source: Adapted from Sanghvi, USAID/VTAL 1991.



FIGURE 5

## PRODUCTIVITY GAINED PER PROGRAM \$



Source: Levin et al., World Bank 1991.

TABLE 1

## COSTS OF MICRONUTRIENT INTERVENTIONS

<i>Micronutrient</i>	<i>Country/Year</i>	<i>Cost per Person (US \$)</i>
<b>IODINE</b>		
Oil injection	Peru 1978	.49
Oil injection	Zaire 1977	.14
Oil injection	Indonesia 1986	.21
Water fortification	Italy 1986	.04
Salt	India 1987	.04
<b>VITAMIN A</b>		
Sugar fortification	Guatemala 1976	.14
Capsule	Haiti 1978	.46-.68
Capsule	Indonesia/Philippines	.42
<b>IRON</b>		
Salt fortification	India 1980	.10
Sugar fortification	Guatemala 1980	.10
Sugar fortification	1980	.84
Tablets	1980	2.65-4.44

Source: Levin et al., World Bank, 1991.

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## Executive Summary

The emphasis of US foreign aid is to promote sustainable development with a focus on economic growth, population and health, the environment, and democratization. Improving maternal and infant nutrition should be essential tenants of this strategy. Women's economic roles are critical to sustainable development, yet their potential is greatly limited due to high rates of malnutrition that contribute to high morbidity and mortality.

Poor infant and child feeding, resulting in malnutrition, is a major cause of mortality. Many of the efforts to reduce deaths among children in developing countries are less effectual because health interventions are implemented without addressing poor child feeding, the underlying cause of child death. Population growth rates continue unchecked because families, unsure that their children will survive, limit their use of contraception.

Children are often the impetus to community action. Programs that help to improve children's lives by ensuring adequate food consumption and access to health care are effective means of promoting democratic action at a community level. When democracy builds from the bottom up, then its ability to push political processes at the top are enhanced.

Thus, improved maternal and child nutrition must be essential components of the US foreign aid strategy. Food aid should be used more effectively to help improve diets of young children and their mothers and should be integrated with population and health activities, environmental programs, and efforts to enhance democratization.



## Introduction

The World Summit for Children goals for the year 2000 call for reducing by half maternal mortality rates and moderate and severe child malnutrition. Each year 500,000 women in developing countries die during childbirth (similar to the number of all women who gave birth in California last year). There are 185 million malnourished children under the age of five in developing countries, or more than 10 times the number of young children living in the United States. Aside from the obvious humanitarian reasons for supporting the goals of the World Summit for Children, there are important policy reasons for adopting them as part of the U.S. foreign aid strategy.

## Maternal health and nutrition

Maternal mortality rates in developing countries are high, caused by lack of reproductive health services for women, poor maternal nutritional status (including high rates of anemia), and low priority given to women's health. A woman's health status affects her ability to care for her children, seek health services for her family, and work productively.

When women are malnourished, their infants are likely to be born at low birth weight, and thus start their lives in a malnourished state, one which is difficult to reverse. In developing countries, 19% of infants are born at low birth weight (UNICEF, 1993). The *major* way to





prevent low birth weight is by improving maternal nutritional status. In order to achieve sustainable results, actions to improve the nutritional status of women must occur not only during pregnancy and lactation, but also during childhood and adolescence. Adolescence is a particularly important time to improve women's nutrition because the growth spurt that occurs at this time will affect adult height and weight.

Anemia and iodine deficiency disorders among women also have major economic and health consequences for developing countries. Maternal micronutrient deficiencies can influence the developing fetus' mental development. High levels of anemia limit work output and increase illness.

Many households depend solely on female labor and income. Worldwide, one family out of three is headed by a woman. Even in households where male income is available, women devote proportionately more of their income to basic needs including food, clothing, education and health care. Thus, improving maternal nutritional status will yield both health and economic benefits.

#### **Young Child Morbidity and Mortality in relation to malnutrition**

The three major causes of child mortality in developing countries are acute respiratory infections (3.6 million deaths), diarrhea (3 million deaths), and other peri-natal and neonatal deaths associated with low birth weight, prematurity and birth trauma (2.5 million deaths)



(UNICEF, 1993). Together, they represent 70% of the 12.9 million deaths among children under age five years.

The recently released World Development Report (World Bank, 1993) emphasizes the major role of child nutrition on the global burden of disease. Mild and moderate malnutrition indirectly contribute to mortality and morbidity through their impact on acute respiratory infections, diarrhea, tuberculosis, measles, pertussis and malaria.

### *Diarrhea*

A major cause of deaths due to diarrhea is malnutrition since malnutrition increases a child's risk of being severely ill and of dying from diarrhea. About half of all diarrhea deaths are caused by persistent (severe) diarrhea, which is more likely to occur when children are malnourished. For example, a study in India found that the case fatality rate (the likelihood of dying from diarrhea) was 24 times greater for severely malnourished children than for adequately nourished children (Bhandari et al, 1992).

Breastfeeding plays a significant role in reducing diarrheal morbidity and mortality. A case-control study in Brazil illustrated that the risk of mortality from diarrhea was 25 times higher in non-breastfed infants aged 0-2 months compared to exclusively breastfed infants (Victora et al, 1987). The role of exclusive breastfeeding in preventing diarrheal morbidity has been



documented in an urban slum area of Lima, Peru, and in urban and rural Philippines, where non-breastfed infants were much more likely to get diarrhea than those receiving only breastmilk in the first 6 months of life (Brown et al, 1989, Popkin et al, 1990).

The importance of the child's diet in preventing deaths from diarrhea is highlighted in a recent Health Sector Priorities Review conducted by the World Bank. The Review suggests that the optimal preventive strategy for reducing the incidence of diarrhea includes, in order of priority, measles vaccination, breastfeeding promotion, promotion of improved weaning and hygiene practices, and improved water and sanitation facilities (Martines et al, 1991).

#### *Acute Respiratory Infections*

For children under five in industrialized countries, the annual incidence of pneumonia is 3-4% compared to 10-20% in most developing countries. In populations with high rates of malnutrition and low birth weight, the incidence can be as high as 80% (Stansfield and Sheppard, 1991). The reasons for such high rates of life-threatening pneumonia are malnutrition and lack of health services. Poor nutritional status is associated with increased risk and severity of pneumonia. Malnourished infants are 10-20 times as likely to contract pneumonia as children of normal weight, and they are much more likely to die from it. As with diarrhea, breastfed infants are at a greatly reduced risk of getting pneumonia or dying from it.



### *Perinatal and neonatal deaths*

As discussed earlier, maternal health and nutrition is the major determinant of an infant's health at birth, through effects on low birth weight and prematurity. UNICEF estimates that 25% of perinatal and neonatal deaths could be prevented through better prenatal and delivery care and improved maternal nutritional status.

To summarize, the top three killers of infants and young children can be addressed through preventive measures that improve maternal nutrition and health and prevent malnutrition through improved child feeding. During the 1980s, emphasis was placed on interventions to reduce illness through child survival interventions. It's now time to include child feeding and maternal nutrition as part of the child survival strategy.

### **Infant feeding and improved child nutrition**

Levels of malnutrition among preschool children range from 10% in Latin America to 60% in South Asia (ACC-SCN, 1992). Global efforts to reduce malnutrition among young children must focus on optimal feeding of young children which includes promotion of breastfeeding, enhancement of complementary food intake, and improvement of feeding practices.





Breastmilk provides the necessary energy and nutrients during the first six months of life and continues to play an important role in providing calories, protein and nutrients for older infants and toddlers. We see little malnutrition during the first 6 months of life among infants who are exclusively breastfed. Malnutrition in developing countries starts between 6-12 months of age when breastmilk alone is no longer sufficient to support adequate growth. There is a dramatic increase in malnutrition between six months and two years of age. Generally by 2 to 3 years of age, nutritional status no longer deteriorates, but children are unable to compensate for the early poor feeding and continue to be underweight and stunted. They remain chronically malnourished, with the associated problems of higher risks of infection, reduced learning capacity, and lower school attainment (McGuire and Austin, 1987).

Why are so many children malnourished? Some may think that it is just a problem of lack of food, but in fact, there often are sufficient quantities of food available in communities where children are malnourished. More often, inappropriate weaning diets and feeding practices are responsible. In developing countries a typical adult diet, consisting primarily of cereal and legumes, contains too much bulk for young children who cannot consume sufficient quantities to meet their energy requirements. For example, a 20 pound child would need to consume over a pound of rice to meet his or her energy needs. Often gruels made with large amounts of water are given to young children, and these do not provide



sufficient calories. A study in Tanzania found that children would need to consume 4 quarts of the traditional gruel to meet their energy needs.

Many foods available for young children in developing countries lack vitamins and minerals needed for growth. While foods in this country are fortified to provide children with many sources of micronutrients, such foods are generally not available in developing countries. In addition, due to demands on women's time to grow, process, cook and serve food for their families, they do not have the time to actively encourage young children to eat. All of these factors result in poor "First Feedings" in developing countries, and the resulting high levels of malnutrition.

#### Foreign Aid Strategy

By concentrating efforts on these problems, we can show successes similar to those obtained by previous efforts by USAID in reducing deaths from diarrhea and immunizable diseases. Our foreign aid and agriculture programs can be used to improve child feeding while at the same time meet goals for sustainable development.

For example, in the environment, USAID is promoting the cultivation of trees for use as a renewable source of fuel. One of the objectives of women's income generating programs is to improve child feeding. A program in Ghana with this goal supported the processing



of agricultural products. This project also included the cultivation of *Leucenia* trees for use as a renewable source of fuel for the processing activities, thus combining several developmental goals.

Community kitchens in Peru illustrate how Food For Peace donations can be used to improve maternal and child nutrition. Donated commodities are used in community kitchens to cook special foods for children to ensure adequate diets. These community kitchens provide a learning ground for how democratic principles operate. The food serves two purposes: improving child feeding and at the same time helping communities learn how to work together. Such actions promote community cooperation in contrast to some food distribution programs that result in dissension among community members.

Programs to improve child feeding can also result in gains for population and health. The contraceptive effect of exclusive breastfeeding plays a major role in reducing fertility among women not practicing contraception, and it protects maternal and infant health through increased child spacing. Contraceptive use is less among women who have experienced a preceding child death. For countries where contraceptive use is low, a child death can lead to increased fertility because the cessation of breastfeeding results in shorter periods of infertility and birth intervals.



In conclusion, programs to improve maternal and child nutrition can reduce morbidity and mortality and at the same time work towards meeting the goals of the World Summit for Children and USAID's goals of sustainable economic growth, enhanced environmental conditions, improvements in population and health, and democratization. Achieving these goals requires increasing AID's emphasis on child feeding, micronutrient intake, and maternal nutrition.

### Recommendations

- Nutrition programming at USAID needs to be strengthened considerably in child survival and other health activities, in the Food For Peace program, and within agricultural programs to ensure food security (including micronutrient adequacy of the food supply).
- Food aid should be targeted to meet nutritional objectives, with those most at risk to malnutrition being the central focus aimed at:
  - ▼ Improving girls' and women's nutrition,
  - ▼ Enabling mothers to exclusively breastfeed for 6 months and to continue breastfeeding for up to 2 years,
  - ▼ Improving energy, protein and micronutrient content of diets of children 6-24 months





## Conclusion

The Congress has put mothers and children at the center of its domestic agenda (as illustrated by its support for increased funding of WIC, the Supplemental program for Women, Infants and Children). It can do even more in development activities to improve maternal and child nutrition by making sure that the goals of UNICEF's World Summit for Children become a reality.



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(Attachments follow:)

## BIOGRAPHY OF SANDRA L. HUFFMAN, Sc.D.

*President of NURTURE/Center to Prevent Childhood Malnutrition*

Dr. Sandra L. Huffman, the president of NURTURE, is an Adjunct Associate Professor at Johns Hopkins University, School of Hygiene and Public Health in the Department of International Health. She founded NURTURE in 1986 while at Johns Hopkins University in an effort to merge academic research with community-level experiences and policy change. Dr. Huffman lived and worked overseas in Bangladesh and Colombia for several years. She conducted research on maternal and infant nutrition at the International Center of Diarrheal Diseases in Bangladesh and worked on childhood nutrition intervention programs in Colombia and Peru.

Dr. Huffman has produced many reports and articles on infant feeding and child nutrition and is considered an expert in the area. In addition, she has testified numerous times at Congressional Hearings on hunger in the United States and in developing countries. She has served as a consultant to UNICEF, World Health Organization (WHO), and World Bank. In addition, she served on the National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Nutrition Programs.



NURTURE  
CENTER TO PREVENT  
CHILDHOOD MALNUTRITION

# First Foods

**First Foods.** *Breastmilk and complementary foods consumed during the first two years of life.*

The risk of dying from hunger is much greater for children than adults. Each year there are about 49 million deaths throughout the world. Nearly one-third of these deaths occur among children under 5 years of age who die from infection and malnutrition.

Lack of exclusive breastfeeding is a significant cause of infection in early infancy and can result in malnutrition. Breastmilk, the universal First Food, meets all of a child's nutritional needs from birth to about six months of age.

Children are particularly vulnerable to malnutrition during the weaning process, defined as the transition from breastmilk as the sole source of nourishment to the usual family diet.

By six months of age, most babies need other foods in addition to breastmilk. The foods offered to infants are often contaminated and

woefully inadequate in calories, protein, and micronutrients. The result: growth faltering and malnutrition.

*(continued)*

*If global efforts to reduce malnutrition and mortality are to succeed, they must focus on breastfeeding promotion, enhanced weaning diets, and improved feeding practices.*

## PROBLEMS DURING WEANING


- Sub-optimal breastfeeding practices
- Poor quality of weaning diets  
(too few calories, protein, and/or micronutrients)
- Detrimental feeding practices
  - Early or delayed introduction of complementary foods
  - Infrequent feedings
  - Unsupervised feedings
  - Contaminated foods and feeding utensils



## Poor weaning diets

While adequate food may be available for adults in poor communities, too often their children are underfed or offered foods with too much bulk or too much water.

Poorly nourished children in many developing countries eat similar *amounts* of food as well nourished children. However, there is a vast difference in food *quality*, as illustrated by the energy (caloric) intake in the figure at the right.



**Too much bulk.  
Too little variety.**

In many cultures, the weaning diet consists of a starchy staple. In order to meet daily energy requirements, a toddler weighing 10 kilograms would have to eat 1 kilogram of cooked rice or some other starchy staple. Given their small stomach sizes, young children cannot consume such large quantities of food.

**Too much water.**

Many thin porridges and soups served as First Foods fail to provide sufficient calories. A study in Tanzania found that a child would have to consume 4-5 liters of the traditional liquid gruel to meet the child's daily energy needs!

**Too little protein.  
Too few micronutrients.**

Weaning diets are often deficient in protein and micronutrients such as vitamin A, iron, and zinc. Absence of micronutrients can diminish a child's appetite and immunity to infection and can result in blindness, stunted growth, mental and physical handicaps, and death.

### Enhancing weaning diets

- ♦ *Inform parents* of the amounts and types of foods appropriate for children
- ♦ *Motivate caregivers* to use indigenous ingredients (such as oil and green leafy vegetables) and local processing techniques (roasting, fermentation, and malting) to make traditional weaning foods safer and more nutritious
- ♦ *Support community-based projects* to improve the availability of adequate First Foods

## Poor feeding practices

Malnutrition is more than a food issue; it is also a feeding issue. Various behaviors, traditional beliefs about food, and feeding practices affect childhood nutrition.

**Timing: too early or too late introduction of complementary foods.**

Both early and delayed introduction of semi-solid foods can result in malnutrition. Breastmilk is the complete, perfect food for infants during the first six months, yet breastmilk is frequently replaced in early infancy with contaminated and nutritionally inferior substitutes. If the introduction of complementary foods is delayed beyond six months, breastmilk may not satisfy a child's nutritional requirements.

### Infrequent feedings.

Given their small stomach sizes, young children need to be fed frequently during the day to ensure adequate food consumption. Labor, time, and resource constraints (lack of fuel, refrigeration, and low-cost processed foods) are often obstacles to frequent feedings.


### Unsupervised feedings.

Numerous studies report a positive correlation between nutritional status and active feeding by the caregiver. Children are more likely to thrive if the caregiver interacts with the child during feeding, sees how much food is consumed, and encourages the child to eat.



## Improving feeding practices

- ♦ *Develop social marketing campaigns* to educate parents about good feeding practices
- ♦ *Remove obstacles to frequent feeding* by supporting community-based production of weaning food, nutritious snacks for young children, fuel efficient stoves, refrigeration units, and small feeding bowls



Many children cannot compensate for early poor feeding. The two girls in the photo above are the same age, but the girl on the right is stunted and underweight for her age.

## Diarrhea in weaning-age children




A major cause of diarrheal diseases and associated malnutrition in infants and toddlers is contamination of feeding bottles, breastmilk substitutes, and weaning foods. Weaning food contamination is usually the result of insufficient cooking or inadequate storage and reheating of food.

### Ensuring food safety

- ♦ *Promote exclusive breastfeeding during the first six months and continued breastfeeding during the weaning process*
- ♦ *Educate caregivers in safe food preparation, food handling, and personal hygiene*
- ♦ *Improve water supplies and sanitation facilities*

## FIRST FOODS



Birth to about 6 months	6 months - 24 months
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Only breastmilk</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Breastmilk</li> <li>• Appropriate weaning diet</li> <li>• Improved feeding practices</li> </ul>

Photo credits: page 3 Ray Wilin, TALC; page 4 CALMA

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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES

Public Health Service

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Centers for Disease Control  
and Prevention (CDC)  
Atlanta GA 30333

STATEMENT OF  
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DIRECTOR OF FIELD SERVICES  
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE  
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION  
U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE  
  
BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AGRICULTURE AND HUNGER  
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 20, 1993



Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee, I am Dr. Stanley Foster, Director of Field Services in the International Health Program Office of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

I would like to thank you for providing me this opportunity to testify on the important topic of immunization, nutrition, and child survival. Within the global context, immunization refers to six diseases included in the Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI). The diseases are measles, whooping cough, tetanus, poliomyelitis, diphtheria, and tuberculosis.

I would especially like to commend the committee for its vision in linking immunization and nutrition together. As will be discussed later in this statement, the two are interrelated. Measles and, to a lesser extent, whooping cough are major causes of growth retardation and undernutrition.

Malnutrition, on the other hand, increases the severity of measles and the probability of death by as much as 10-fold. In emergency situations such as that in Somalia and southern Sudan, a third to a half of the children infected with measles die. Among potential health interventions for developing world children, immunization is among the most important and most cost effective.

For those of you new to the issue of hunger, disease, and child survival, it is important to see immunization in terms of individual children, families, and communities. You all belong to the Congress, a family of approximately 500. Had the 500 of you been born in an African village or on a Nepali mountainside, by the age of five, 15-25 of you would have died of measles and its complications, 5 would have died of whooping cough, and 5 would have died of tetanus; three of you would be paralyzed with poliomyelitis.

Extrapolating these numbers to the 100 million children born in developing countries each year, without immunization 3 million would die of measles, 1 million of pertussis, and 1 million of tetanus

(see Appendix 1). An additional million children would be disabled with poliomyelitis, blindness, and malnutrition. Low cost effective technologies exist to prevent most of this disease burden.

#### EXPANDED PROGRAMME ON IMMUNIZATION (EPI)

The Expanded Programme on Immunization, EPI, is a global initiative of United Nation agencies (WHO and UNICEF), its member countries, bilateral technical assistance agencies including the United States Agency for International Development (A.I.D), and voluntary agencies such as Rotary International. It has as its goal the immunization of infants (in the first year of life) and pregnant women to prevent six major causes of childhood morbidity and mortality.


The EPI was launched in 1974. The goal was to provide vaccination to 80% of the world's infants by 12 months of age. In 1980, only 10% of the world's children were fully immunized. I would ask you to envision yourself on the health appropriations committee of an African country in 1980. What would your reaction have been to a request by the Ministry of Health that, despite the problems of economics, transport, logistics, roads, and the political demands for curative services, you allocate scarce resources to increase immunization coverage from 10% to 80%? "Absurd", I believe, would have been the natural response.

The actual scenario, as it played out, has been considerably different. With vision and leadership at each level (community, district, nation, region, and world), leaders have placed increased importance on immunization. This ranges from where the women's organization in Indonesia organize the immunization sessions in their communities to personal visits of Mr. James Grant (Executive Director of UNICEF) to Heads of State to convince them that child survival is a political issue worthy of their

attention and effort. This involvement in making services available to all the population has been popular with the public and has provided significant positive political feedback.

### Vaccine Coverage

Vaccination coverage, the percent of infants vaccinated with the 4 EPI vaccines in the first year of life, increased from less than 20% in 1982 to nearly 80% in 1990. These increases in coverage represent a humanitarian miracle in which political will and global cooperation made a difference, Figure 1.



**Figure 1**

This progress represents the collaborative effort of many partners,

- \* The conceptualization of a vision and a strategy for global immunization by the World Health Organization (WHO) and its member countries.
- \* The development of a global consensus coordinated by WHO and UNICEF that child survival is important and that immunization is an essential prerequisite for child survival.

- \* The development by WHO of a cold chain (keeping vaccines cold from site of production to site of vaccine administration) strategy and equipment which now ensures that potent vaccine can be delivered from the manufacturer in an industrialized country to the arms of a child in a remote village on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro in Kenya.
- \* The expansion by UNICEF of a standardized bulk procurement system for the purchase (at lowest possible cost) and distribution of vaccines, cold chain equipment, and transport.
- \* Global support (technical and financial) of Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs), governments, WHO, and UNICEF for child survival and immunization.
- \* The interruption of civil war in two countries (El Salvador and Lebanon) to allow for childhood vaccination.
- \* The advocacy and support of the late Mickey Leland and the Select Committee for Hunger and Congress for Child Survival, Immunization, and the Development Fund for Africa.
- \* United States Agency for International Development implementation of bilateral, regional, and global child survival activities.

What is not apparent from the increases in coverage is the technical knowledge, dedication, and commitment of the hundreds of thousands of health workers in developing countries. To illustrate this point, I will share one experience from the A.I.D.-funded Africa Child Survival Initiative-CCCD, a regional project collaboration with 13 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. CDC and A.I.D. in partnership with African colleagues in Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea, identified that vaccination effectiveness was being limited because of deficiencies in the vaccination system such as problems in



vaccine storage and sterilization. Through the regional CCCD project, this information was shared with the Director of Preventive Services in the Central African Republic. He called in his regional teams and instructed them to assess (by direct observation) the quality of immunization in half their health facilities by using a standard check list. When confronted with the results (warm vaccines, non-sterile syringes with their risk of virus disease transmission, poor communication with mothers), he challenged his staff to develop methods of training and supervision to correct the observed deficiencies. He also promised them a follow-up assessment the following year. As can be seen in Figure 2 comparing the baseline and follow-up observations, the quality of vaccine delivery in the Central African Republic improved. A.I.D. technical assistance through strengthening African capacity was effective in improving the safety and efficacy of immunization.




Figure 2

### Effectiveness and Impact of Immunization

Delivery of a vaccine to a child does not ensure effective immunization and disease protection.

Disease incidence needs to be monitored to ensure that the immunizations are having the desired effect in preventing disease. For me, one of the most rewarding achievements of the CCCD project has been the development of African capacity to monitor the occurrence of disease. When the CCCD program was launched, most systems of disease reporting were archival pencil and paper operations; data were seldom understood or used. In Togo, analysis was delayed 3-5 years. With A.I.D. support and CDC technical assistance, surveillance systems have been analyzed and upgraded, microcomputers provided, staff trained in data collection and analysis, and decision makers trained in use of data for decision making. Availability of timely data has enabled countries to monitor and modify implementation.

These surveillance systems are being used to measure the effectiveness of immunization programs in reducing disease incidence. As can be seen in Figure 3, data from 4 African countries document significant decreases in measles incidence, a disease which kills an estimated 3-5% of all African children unprotected by immunization. Data from one of these countries, Burundi, show similar levels of decline in the incidence of pertussis (whooping cough) and poliomyelitis, Figure 4.




Figure 3




Figure 4

Using reports of vaccine coverage and vaccine efficacy, it is estimated that globally 3 million deaths were prevented by immunization in 1991 (Appendix 1). This is a testimony to what is possible with a global vision of a key humanitarian issue, political leadership at national and international levels, collaborative support toward a common goal, and a target-oriented and problem-oriented operational program. For those of you interested, copies of a document prepared on Lessons Learned from the CCCD project have been made available to the Committee.

#### Effectiveness of Immunization on Child Survival

In 1981, studies in Zaire raised a question as to the impact of immunization on child health and survival. Their data suggested that lives saved through immunization were lost to other common causes of childhood mortality such as malaria, diarrhea, pneumonia, and malnutrition. If this were in fact true, there would be less justification for allocating resources to immunization. Studies in four

countries (Bangladesh, Haiti, Guinea Bissau, and Senegal) have now clearly shown that children getting measles vaccine have a 15-25% increase in survival, frequently in excess of that predicted on the basis on measles mortality. Perhaps the most interesting of these studies was one reported from Guinea Bissau in which survival was compared among a group of children effectively immunized with a group of children that inadvertently received non-potent vaccine. By the age of 3 mortality among those effectively vaccinated was 3.2%, significantly less than the 13.2% in those not immunized.

These results speak directly to the subject of this hearing, the interrelationships of immunization, nutrition, and child survival. Research, much of it sponsored by A.I.D. and Helen Keller International, has clarified many of these relationships. The following facts are now clear.

- \* All children unprotected by immunization will eventually get measles.
- \* While measles in the industrialized world is usually a mild disease, 3-5% of children in the developing world will die if infected.
- \* Among severely malnourished children such as refugees, 30-50% of those infected with measles will die of the disease and its complications.
- \* Measles depletes vitamin A stores and is one of the major precipitants of acute vitamin A deficiency, which can result in blindness. As much as half of the childhood blindness in Africa has been attributed to measles.
- \* Treatment of measles with vitamin A can reduce morbidity and mortality.
- \* Two complications of measles, diarrhea and pneumonia, are major causes of under-5 mortality.
- \* Measles is a major cause of childhood growth retardation and malnutrition. It is a frequent cause of "kwashiorkor", a fatal type of severe malnutrition.



- Measles is frequently the event that moves a biologically coping child into the vulnerable frail child.
- Frailty limits the ability of a child to attend school, learn, and be economically productive.

In a World Bank study of Health Priorities for the Developing World to be published in November 1993, immunizations, especially those for measles, polio and neonatal tetanus, were identified as among those most cost effective. Expressed in terms of cost per disability-adjusted-life years (DALY) gained, tetanus at \$10, measles at \$10, and polio at \$25 were highly cost effective. In comparison, coronary bypass surgery costs over \$5000 per DALY. As the EPI delivery system is utilized for delivering micronutrient supplementation, the effectiveness and efficiency of the health delivery system will increase.

Perhaps one of the most exciting aspects of immunization is progress toward poliomyelitis eradication. While many persons may not remember the 1950s and the pre-vaccine era when 20,000 cases of poliomyelitis occurred annually in the United States, the western hemisphere has not had a case of poliomyelitis for the last 22 months. This exciting breakthrough reflects the vision and leadership of the Pan American Health Organization (WHO's regional office for the Americas) and the effective collaboration of countries and donor partners. Rotarians around the world have raised \$220 million for global polio eradication. A.I.D. and the Inter-American Development Bank have also provided financial support. Current eradication priority is being focused on eastern Asia including China and the Pacific basin. Global poliomyelitis eradication is being targeted for the year 2000. Polio eradication, when achieved, will save the United States an estimated \$200 million per year in vaccine and delivery costs.

## WORLD SUMMIT FOR CHILDREN

In 1990, representatives from 151 countries including the President of the United States and 69 other heads of State met at the United Nations in New York to focus global attention on children, their health and survival. Five of the 30 goals agreed to at that meeting involved issues related to this hearing:

- \* Between 1990 and 2000, reduction of severe and moderate malnutrition among under-5 children by half
- \* Virtual elimination of iodine deficiency disorders
- \* Virtual elimination of vitamin A deficiency and its consequences, including blindness
- \* Reduction by one third of 1990 levels of iron deficiency among women of childbearing age
- \* Maintenance of a high level of immunization coverage (at least 90% of children under 1 by the year 2000)
- \* Reduction by 95% in measles deaths and reduction by 90% of measles cases ... by the year 1995
- \* Elimination of neonatal tetanus by 1995
- \* Eradication of poliomyelitis by 2000

Individual countries including the United States have developed national plans of actions to achieve the goals set at the Summit. In some countries, e.g., Mexico, progress is being monitored at the national level bi-annually.

## CHALLENGES AND OBSTACLES

Progress in immunization the 1980s was achieved through the extraordinary collaboration of national and international interests. In the poorer developing countries, an estimated two-thirds of costs were provided from national budgets; primarily funding of personnel and infrastructure. One third of the costs, approximately \$5 per capita, were provided through bilateral and multilateral assistance. This assistance was especially critical for those countries with limited foreign exchange to purchase vaccines and equipment from abroad.

Over the last two years, external support to immunization has decreased. This has been due in part to the global recession and cutbacks in funds for technical assistance and also a shift in technical assistance away from child survival to other priorities. Certain of the poorer countries, are no longer assured adequate support (vaccines and cold chain equipment) to ensure continuation of vaccination coverage at current levels. Coverage levels, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa where the burden of diseases preventable by immunization is greatest, are beginning to fall. Figure 5 provides coverage data from the 17 countries reporting 1992 data to WHO.



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


Figure 5

At a  
time that  
the  
Agency  
for

Internati

onal Development is undergoing administrative review, it is important to affirm the important role of A.I.D. in the advocacy, leadership, and support for child survival. Progress was made in the 1980s. The challenges for the 1990s will, however, be considerably different. Mechanisms need to be identified which draw effectively on the technical strengths of US government and non-government institutions and coordinate efforts among international agencies. The most cost effective means must be found to support and strengthen the capacity of countries to plan, implement, and evaluate their immunization and other child survival programs.

A conclusion of the World Bank's 1993 World Development Report merits consideration (p8):

"Intensified government support is required to extend the Expanded Programme of Immunization (EPI), which currently protects about 80 percent of the children in the developing world against six major diseases at a cost of \$1.4 billion a year. Expanding EPI coverage to 95 percent of all children would have significant impact on children in poor households, who make up a disproportionately

large share of those not reached by the EPI. Other vaccines, particularly Hepatitis B and yellow fever, could be added to the six currently included in the EPI, as could vitamin A and iodine supplements. In most developing countries such an "EPI Plus" cluster of interventions in the first year of life would have the highest cost-effectiveness of any health measures available in the world today."

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions you or your colleagues may have.



## Appendix 1 - EPI Preventable Diseases

Cases and Deaths in Absence of Immunization, Prevented 1991, Not Prevented 1991

(\*WHO Data updated by Foster, IHPO, CDC May 1993)

Disease	Without Immunization		Prevented 1991		Not-Prevented 1991	
	Cases	Deaths	Cases	Deaths	Cases	Deaths
Neonatal Tetanus		1,200,000*		662,000*		567,000*
Disseminated Childhood Tuberculosis	1,000,000	175,000	450,000	80,000	550,000	95,000
Pertussis	100,000,000*	1,000,000*	65,000,000*	650,000*	43,000,000*	383,000*
Diphtheria						
Non-Neonatal Tetanus <5	100,000	50,000	80,000	40,000	20,000	10,000
Poliomyelitis	659,000*		532,000*		127,000*	
Measles	132,000,000*	2,740,000*	87,000,000*	1,600,000*	45,000,000*	1,100,000*
TOTAL				3,032,000		2,155,000



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